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ANCIENT GREECE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF

ARNOLD H. L. HEEREN,

BY GEORGE BANCROFT.

ALSO

THREE HISTORICAL TREATISES,

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

I.—POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION.
II.—THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRACTICAL INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL THEORIES.
III.—THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE CONTINENTAL INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

NEW AND IMPROVED EDITION.

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THE TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION.

The volume of which a translation is here offered to the public, forms in the original a portion of an extensive work, entitled, "Reflections on the Politics, Intercourse, and Commerce of the chief Nations of Antiquity." Mr. Heeren has accomplished his design only with respect to the nations of Asia and Africa. On those of Europe he has published nothing further than the present series of essays, which relate solely to subjects connected with the political institutions of the Greeks, and may be regarded as an independent collection of historical sketches.

It is on that larger work that the literary reputation of Mr. Heeren primarily depends. With respect to the Asiatic and African nations, he has discussed his subject in its full extent, and furnishes a more distinct account of their ancient condition than has perhaps been given by any other writer. Early in life he was led to consider the history of the world as influenced by colonial establishments and commerce; and the results of his investigations, in a department of science to which he is enthusiastically attached, and to which he has uninterruptedly devoted the most precious years of a long life, are communicated in the elaborate production which we have named.

In that portion which relates to Asia, after considering the character of the continent itself, he first treats of the Persians, giving a geographical and statistical account of their ancient empire, their form of government, the rights and authority of their kings, the administration of their provinces, and their military resources.

The Phœnicians next pass in review; and a sketch is given of their internal condition and government, their colonies and foreign possessions, their commerce, their manufactures and inland trade.

The country and nation of the Babylonians, and their commerce, form the next subjects of consideration.

The Scythians are then delineated, and a geographical survey of their several tribes is naturally followed by an inquiry into the commerce and intercourse of the nations which inhabited the middle of Asia.

In treating of India, it was necessary to consider with careful criticism, the knowledge which still remains to us of that distant country, and to collect such fragments of information as can be found respecting its earliest history, political constitution, and commerce. The Indians are the most remote Asiatic nation which had an influence on the higher culture of the ancient world, and with them the division which treats of Asia is terminated.

To the lover of studies connected with antiquity, the history of the African nations possesses the deepest interest. Beside the physical peculiarities of this singular part of the globe, the Carthaginians present the most remarkable example of the wealth and power which a state may acquire by commerce alone; and at the same time, it shows most forcibly the changes to which such a state is exposed, when the uncertainty of its resources is increased by a want of the higher virtues, of valour, faith, and religion. In Egypt, on the other hand, the vast antiquity of its political institutions, the veil of uncertainty which hangs over its early condition, connected with the

magnificence of its monuments, that have, as it were, been discovered within the recollection of our contemporaries, all serve to render that country a most interesting subject of speculation and critical study.

The volume on Africa first introduces the Carthaginians, who had the melancholy fate of becoming famous only by their ruin. Mr. Heeren discusses the condition of their African territory, their foreign provinces and colonies, their form of government, their revenue, their commerce by land and by sea, their military force, and lastly the decline and fall of their state.

Before entering upon the consideration of the Egyptians, Mr. Heeren ascends the Nile, and presents us with a geographical sketch of the Ethiopian nations, an account of the state of Meroë, and of the commerce of Meroë and Ethiopia.

The Egyptians are then considered. A general view of their country and its inhabitants, its political condition and its commerce,—these are the topics, under which he treats of that most ancient people. The whole is concluded by an analysis of the monuments which yet remain of Egyptian Thebes.

These are the subjects which are discussed in the "Reflections of Heeren," a work which deservedly holds a high rank among the best historical productions of our age. Mr. Heeren's style is uniformly clear, and there are few of his countrymen whose works so readily admit of being translated. We may add, there are few so uniformly distinguished for sound sense and a rational and liberal method of studying the monuments of antiquity. He is entirely free from any undue fondness for philosophical speculations, but recommends himself by his perspicuity, moderation, and flowing style.

The business of translating is but a humble one; and yet it may be the surest method of increasing the number of good books which are in the hands of our countrymen. None can be offered more directly interesting to them, than those which relate to political institutions. Holding as we do our destinies and our national character and prosperity in our own hands, it becomes us to contemplate the revolutions of governments; to study human nature, as exhibited in its grandest features in the changes of nations; to consider not only the politics of the present age, but gaining some firm ground, such as history points out, to observe with careful attention the wrecks of other institutions and other times. The present volume may perhaps do something to call public attention to the merits and true character of the ancient Greeks. The admirers of Grecian eloquence will find in one of the chapters, an outline of the political career of Demosthenes. His reputation is there vindicated from the calumnies that have so long been heaped upon one of the noblest, most persevering, most disinterested advocates of the cause of suffering liberty.

The Translator hopes the work will prove acceptable to scholars and those who have leisure for the study of history; and that it will be received by them as an earnest of his desire to do something, however little it may be, for the advancement of learning in our common country.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

This translation, of which two or three editions have been published in England, has recently been adopted as a text-book in Harvard College. Hence it became necessary to reprint it; and the opportunity has been seized to revise it, and to adopt the few changes and additions, which were made by Mr. Heeren in the latest edition of his works.

Boston, February 12, 1842.

GENERAL PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

To the student of the history of man, there is hardly a phenomenon more important in itself, or more difficult of explanation, than the superiority of Europe over the other parts of our earth. Whatever justice may be rendered to other lands and nations, it cannot be denied that the noblest and best of every thing, which humanity has produced, sprung up, or at least ripened, on European soil. In the multitude, variety, and beauty of their natural productions, Asia and Africa far surpass Europe; but in every thing which is the work of man, the nations of Europe stand far above those of the other continents. It was among them, that, by making marriage the union of but one with one, domestic society obtained that form, without which the higher culture of so many parts of our nature could never have been attained; and if slavery and bondage were established among them, they alone, recognising their injustice, abolished them. It was chiefly and almost exclusively among them, that such constitutions were framed, as are suited to nations who have become conscious of their rights. If Asia, during all the changes in its extensive empires, does but show the continued reproduction of despotism, it was on European soil that the germ of political freedom unfolded itself, and under the most various forms, in so many places, bore the noblest fruits; which again were transplanted to other parts of the world. The simplest inventions of the mechanic arts may perhaps belong in part to the East; but how have they all been perfected by Europeans! What progress from the loom of the Hindoo to the power-looms driven by steam; from the sun-dial to the chronometer, which guides the mariner over the ocean; from the bark canoe of the Mohawk to the British man-of-war! And if we direct our attention to those nobler arts, which, as it were, raise human nature above itself, what a distance between the Jupiter of Phidias and an Indian idol; between the Transfiguration of Raphael and the works of a Chinese painter! The East had its annalists, but never produced a Tacitus, or a Gibbon; it had its poets, but never advanced to criticism; it had its sages, who not unfrequently produced a powerful effect on their nations by means of their doctrines; but a Plato or a Kant never ripened on the banks of the Ganges and the Hoangho.

Nor can we less admire that political superiority, which the nations of this small region, just emerging from savage life, immediately established over the extensive countries of the large continents. The East has seen powerful conquerors; but it was only in Europe that generals appeared, who invented a science of war really worthy of the name. Hardly had a kingdom in Macedonia of limited extent out-grown its childhood, before Macedonians ruled on the Indus as on the Nile. The imperial city was the heiress of the imperial nation; Asia and Africa adored the Cæsars. Even in the centuries of the middle age, when the intellectual superiority of the Europeans seemed to have sunk, the nations of the East attempted to subjugate them in vain. The Mongolians advanced into Silesia; nothing but the wastes of Russia long remained in their power: the Arabs desired to overrun the West; the sword of Charles Martel compelled them to rest contented with a part of Spain; and the chivalrous Frank, under the banner of the cross, soon bade them defiance in their own home. And how did the fame of Europeans beam over the earth, when, through Columbus and Vasco de Gama, the morning of its fairer day began to dawn! The new world at once became their prey, that it might receive their culture, and become their rival; more than a third part of Asia submitted to the Russian sceptre; merchants on the Thames and the Zuyder See seized on the government of India; and if the Turks have thus far been successful in preserving the country which they have robbed from Europe, will it remain to them for ever? will it remain to them long? The career of conquest may have been marked with severity and blood; the Europeans became not the tyrants only, but also the instructers of the world. The civilization of mankind seems to be more and more closely connected with their progress; and if, in these times of universal revolution, any consoling prospect for the future is opened, is it not the triumph of European culture beyond the limits of Europe?

From whence proceeds this superiority, this universal sovereignty of so small a region as Europe? An important truth presents itself at once. Not undisciplined strength, not the mere physical force of the mass,—it was intelligence which produced it; and if the military science of Europeans founded their sovereignty, it was their superior political science which maintained it. But the question which was proposed remains still unanswered; for we desire to know the causes of this intellectual superiority; and why it was in Europe that the faculties of human nature were so much more beautifully unfolded?

To such a question no perfectly satisfactory answer can be given. The phenomenon is in itself much too rich, much too vast for that. It will be readily conceded, that it could only be the consequence of many co-operating causes; of these several can be enumerated, and thus afford some partial solution. But to enumerate

them all separately, and in their united influences, could only be done by a mind, to which it should be granted, from a higher point of view than any to which a mortal can attain, to contemplate the whole web of the history of our race, and follow the course and the interweaving of the various threads.

Here attention is drawn to one important circumstance, of which the cautious inquirer almost fears to estimate the value. Whilst we see the surface of the other continents covered with nations of different, and almost always of dark colour, (and, in so far as this determines the race, of different races,) the inhabitants of Europe belong only to one race. It has not, and it never had, any other native inhabitants than white nations.[1] Is the white man distinguished by greater natural talents? Has he by means of them precedence over his coloured brethren? This is a question which physiology cannot answer at all, and which history must answer with timidity. Who will absolutely deny that the differences of organization, which attend on the difference in colour, can have an influence on the more rapid or more difficult unfolding of the mind? But, on the other hand, who can demonstrate this influence, without first raising that secret veil, which conceals from us the reciprocal connexion between body and mind? And yet we must esteem it probable; and how much does this probability increase in strength, if we make inquiries of history? The great superiority which the white nations in all ages and parts of the world have possessed, is a matter of fact, which cannot be done away with by denials. It may be said, this was the consequence of external circumstances, which favoured them more. But has this always been so? And why has it been so? And, further, why did those darker nations, which rose above the savage state, attain only to a degree of culture of their own; a degree which was passed neither by the Egyptian nor by the Mongolian, neither by the Chinese nor the Hindoo? And among the coloured races, why did the black remain behind the brown and the yellow? If these observations cannot but make us inclined to attribute differences of capacity to the several branches of our race, they do not on that account prove an absolute want of capacity in our darker fellow-men, nor must they be urged as containing the whole explanation of European superiority. This, only, is intended; experience thus far seems to prove, that a greater facility in developing the powers of mind belongs to the nations of a clear colour; but we will welcome the age which shall contradict this experience, and exhibit cultivated nations of negroes.

But however high or low this natural precedency of the Europeans may be estimated, no one can fail to observe, that the physical qualities of this continent offer peculiar advantages, which may serve not a little to explain the above-mentioned phenomenon.

[1] The Gipsies are foreigners; and it may seem doubtful whether the Laplanders are to be reckoned to the white or yellow race.

Europe belongs almost entirely to the northern temperate zone. Its most important lands lie between the fortieth and sixtieth degree of north latitude. Further to the north nature gradually dies away. Thus our continent has in no part the luxuriant fruitfulness of tropic regions; but also no such ungrateful climate, as to make the care for the mere preservation of life exhaust the whole strength of its inhabitants. Europe, except where local causes put obstacles in the way, is throughout susceptible of agriculture. To this it invites, or rather compels; for it is as little adapted to the life of hunters as of herdsmen. Although its inhabitants have at various periods changed their places of abode, they were never nomadic tribes. They emigrated to conquer; to make other establishments where booty or better lands attracted them. No European nation ever lived in tents; the well-wooded plains offered in abundance the materials for constructing those huts which the inclement skies required. Its soil and climate were peculiarly fitted to accustom men to that regular industry, which is the source of all prosperity. If Europe could boast of but few distinguished products, perhaps of no one which was exclusively its own, the transplantation of the choicest from distant regions made it necessary to cherish and to rear them. Thus art joined with nature, and this union is the mother of the gradual improvement of our race. Without exertion man can never enlarge the circle of his ideas; but at the same time his mere preservation must not claim the exercise of all his faculties. A fruitfulness, sufficient to reward the pains of culture, is spread almost equally over Europe; there are no vast tracts of perfect barrenness; no deserts like those of Arabia and Africa; and the steppes, which themselves are well watered, begin towards the east. Mountains of a moderate elevation usually interrupt the plains; in every direction there is an agreeable interchange of hill and valley; and if nature does not exhibit the luxurious pomp of the torrid zone, her awakening in spring has charms which are wanting to the splendid uniformity of tropic climes.

It is true, that a similar climate is shared by a large portion of middle Asia; and it may be asked, why, then, opposite results should be exhibited, where the shepherd nations of Tartary and Mongolia, so long as they roamed in their own countries, seem to have been compelled to remain for ever stationary? But by the character of its soil, by the interchange of mountains and valleys, by the number of its navigable rivers, and above all, by its coasts on the Mediterranean, Europe distinguishes itself from those regions so remarkably, that this similar temperature of the air, (which is moreover not perfectly equal under equal degrees of latitude, since Asia is colder,) can afford no foundation for a comparison.

But can we derive from this physical difference, those moral advantages, which were produced by the better regulation of domestic society? With this begins in some measure the history of the

first culture of our continent; tradition has not forgotten to tell, how the founder of the oldest colony among the savage inhabitants of Attica was also the founder of regular marriages; and who has not learned of Tacitus the holy usage of our German ancestors? Is it merely the character of the climate which causes both sexes to ripen more gradually, and at the same time more nearly simultaneously, and a cooler blood to flow in the veins of man; or is a more delicate sentiment impressed upon the European, a higher moral nobility, which determines the relation of the two sexes? Be this as it may, who does not perceive the decisive importance of the fact? Does not the wall of division which separates the inhabitants of the East from those of the West, repose chiefly on this basis? And can it be doubted, that this better domestic institution was essential to the progress of our political institutions? For we say confidently, no nation, where polygamy was established, has ever obtained a free and well-ordered constitution.

Whether these causes alone, or whether others beside them, (for who will deny that there may have been others?) procured for the Europeans their superiority, thus much is certain, that all Europe may now boast of this superiority. If the nations of the South preceded those of the North,—if these were still wandering in their forests when those had already obtained their ripeness,—they finally made up for their dilatoriness. Their time also came; the time when they could look down on their southern brethren with a just consciousness of their own worth. This leads us to the important differences, which are peculiar to the North and the South of this continent.

A chain of mountains, which, though many arms extend to the north and south, runs in its chief direction from west to east, the chain of the Alps, connected in the west with the Pyrenees by the mountains of Sevennes, extending to the Carpathian and the Balkan towards the east as far as the shores of the Black Sea, divides this continent into two very unequal parts, the Southern and the Northern. It separates the three peninsulas which run to the south, those of the Pyrenees, Italy, and Greece, together with the southern coast of France and Germany, from the great continent of Europe, which stretches to the north beyond the polar circle. This last, which is by far the larger half, contains almost all the chief streams of this continent; the Ebro, the Rhone, and the Po, of all that flow into the Mediterranean, are alone important for navigation. No other chain of mountains of our earth has had such an influence on the history of our race, as the chain of the Alps. During a long succession of ages, it parted, as it were, two worlds from each other; the fairest buds of civilization had already opened under the Grecian and Hesperian skies, whilst scattered tribes of barbarians were yet wandering in the forests of the North. How different would have been the whole history of Europe, had the wall of the Alps, instead of being near the Mediterranean,

been removed to the shores of the North Sea? This boundary, it is true, seems of less moment in our time; when the enterprising spirit of the European has built for itself a road across the Alps, just as it has found a path over the ocean; but it was of decisive importance for the age of which we are speaking, for antiquity. The North and South were then physically, morally, and politically divided; that chain long remained the protecting bulwark of the one against the other; and if Cæsar, finally breaking over these boundaries, removed in some measure the political landmarks, the distinction still continues apparent between the Roman part of Europe, and that which never yielded to the Romans.

It is therefore only the southern part of our hemisphere, which can employ us in our present inquiries. Its limited extent, which seemed to afford no room for powerful nations, was amply compensated by its climate and situation. What traveller from the North ever descended the southern side of the Alps without being excited by the view of the novel scenery that surrounded him? The more beautiful blue of the Italian and Grecian sky, the milder air, the more graceful forms of the mountains, the pomp of the rocky shores and the islands, the dark tints of the forests glittering with golden fruits—do these exist merely in the songs of the poets? Although the tropic climes are still distant, a feeling of their existence is awakened even here. The aloe grows wild in Lower Italy; the sugar-cane thrives in Sicily; from the top of Ætna the eye can discern the rocks of Malta, where the fruit of the palm-tree ripens, and in the azure distance, even the coasts of neighbouring Africa.[1] Here nature never partakes of the uniformity, which so long repressed the spirit of the natives in the forests and plains of the North. In all these countries there is a constant interchange of moderately elevated mountains with pleasant valleys and level lands, over which Pomona has scattered her choicest blessings. The limited extent of the countries allows no large navigable rivers; but what an indemnification for this is found in its extensive and richly indented coasts! The Mediterranean Sea belongs to the South of Europe; and it was by means of that sea, that the nations of the West were formed. Let an extensive heath occupy its place, and we should yet be wandering Tartars and Mongolians, like the nomades of middle Asia.

Of the nations of the South, only three can engage our attention; the Greeks, Macedonians, and Romans, the masters of Italy and then of the world. We have named them in the order in which history presents them as prominent, although distinguished in different ways. We shall follow the same order in treating of them.

[1] Bartel's Reise durch Sicilien. B. II. p. 338—340.

GREECE.

CHAPTER I.

GEOGRAPHICAL VIEW OF GREECE.

WERE any one, who is entirely unacquainted with the history of the Greeks, to examine the map with attentive eye, he could hardly remain in doubt that their country, in point of situation, is favoured by nature beyond any other in Europe. It is the most southern of that continent. The promontory of Tænarium, in which it terminates, lies under almost the same degree of latitude with the celebrated rock of Calpe; and its northern boundary falls somewhat to the south of Madrid. In this manner it extends from that promontory to Olympus and the Cambunian mountains, which divide it from Macedonia, about two hundred and twenty-five miles from south to north.[1] Its eastern point is the promontory of Sunium in Attica; from thence its greatest breadth, to the promontory of Leucas in the west, is about one hundred and sixty miles. The greatness of the nation and the abundance of its achievements easily lead to the error of believing the country an extensive one. But even if we add all the islands, its square contents are a third less than those of Portugal. But what advantages of situation does it not possess over the Iberian peninsula. If this, according to the ideas of the ancients, was the western extremity of the world, as the distant Serica was the eastern, Greece was as it were in the centre of the most cultivated countries of three continents. A short passage by sea divided it from Italy; and the voyage to Egypt, Asia Minor, and Phœnicia, though somewhat longer, seemed hardly more dangerous.

[1] From $36\frac{1}{2}$ to 40 degrees north latitude.

Nature herself, in this land of such moderate extent, established the geographical divisions, separating the peninsula of the Peloponnesus from the main land; and dividing the latter into nearly equal parts, northern and southern, by the chain of Œta, which traverses it obliquely. In every direction hills interchange with valleys and fruitful plains; and though in its narrow compass no large rivers are found, (the Peneus and Achelous are the only considerable ones,) its extensive coasts, abundantly provided with bays, landing-places, and natural harbours, afford more than an equivalent.

The peninsula of Pelops, so called in honour of Pelops, who, according to the tradition, introduced, not war, but the gifts of peace from Asia Minor, is about equal in extent to Sicily, and forms the southernmost district.[1] It consists of a central high ridge of hills, which sends out several branches, and some as far as the sea; but between these branches there are fruitful plains well watered by an abundance of streams, which pour from the mountains in every direction. This high inland district, no where touching the sea, is the far-famed Arcadia of poetical tradition. Its highest ridge, Mount Cyllene, rises, according to Strabo, from fifteen to twenty stadia above the sea.[2] Nature has destined this country for pastoral life. "The pastures and meadows in summer are always green and unscorched; for the shade and moisture preserve them. The country has an appearance similar to that of Switzerland, and the Arcadians in some measure resemble the inhabitants of the Alps. They possessed a love of freedom and yet a love of money; for wherever there was money, you might see Arcadian hirelings. But it is chiefly the western part of Arcadia (where Pan invented the shepherd's flute) which deserves the name of a pastoral country. Innumerable brooks, one more delightful than the other, sometimes rushing impetuously and sometimes gently murmuring, pour themselves down the mountains. Vegetation is rich and magnificent; every where freshness and coolness are found. One flock of sheep succeeds another, till the rugged Taygetus is approached; where numerous herds of

[1] See the map of the Peloponnesus by Professor C. O. Müller, on which the mountains as well as the different districts are given with critical exactness.

[2] Strabo, l. viii. p. 595, ed. Casaub. 1707. The indefinite nature of the account shows how uncertain it is.

goats interchange with them."[1] The inhabitants of Arcadia, devoted to the pastoral life, preferred therefore for a long time to dwell in the open country rather than in cities; and when some of these, particularly Tegea and Mantinea, became considerable, the contests between them destroyed the peace and liberties of the people. The shepherd life among the Greeks, although much ornamented by the poets, betrays its origin in this; that it arose among a people, who did not wander like nomades, but had fixed abodes.

Round Arcadia lay seven districts, almost all of which were well watered by streams, that descended from its highlands. In the south lay the land of heroes, Laconia, rough and mountainous, but thickly settled; so that it is said, at one time, to have contained nearly a hundred towns or villages.[2] It was watered by the Eurotas, the clearest and purest of all the Grecian rivers,[3] which, rising in Arcadia, was increased by several smaller streams. Sparta was built upon its banks, the mistress of the country, without walls, without gates; defended only by its citizens. It was one of the larger cities of Greece; but, notwithstanding the market-place, the theatre, and the various temples which Pausanias enumerates,[4] it was not one of the more splendid. The monuments of fallen heroes[5] constituted the principal ornament of the banks of the Eurotas, which were then, and still are, covered with laurel.[6] But all these monuments have perished; there is a doubt even as to the spot where ancient Sparta was situated. It was formerly thought to be the modern Misitra; this opinion has been given up; a more recent traveller believes, that about three miles to the south-east of Misitra, he has discovered, in the ruins of Mogula, the traces of the ancient theatre and some temples.[7] At the

[1] Bartholdy. Bruchstücke zur nähern Kenntniss Griechenlands, s. 239—241.

[2] Manso has enumerated sixty-seven: Sparta, i. 2. p. 15. And yet Laconia was not much more extensive than the territory of Nuremberg, when a free city.

[3] Bartholdy. Bruchstücke, &c. p. 228.

[4] Pausan. iii. p. 240, ed. Kuhn.

[5] See the long list of them in Pausanias, p. 240, 243, &c.

[6] Pouqueville. Voyage i. p. 189.

[7] See Chateaubriand. Itinéraire de Paris à Jerusalem, i. p. 25. This traveller was but *one* hour in going from Misitra to Mogula, by way of Palaiochoros, on horseback and in a gallop. Those discoveries belong to M. Chateaubriand; he remarks, however, that others before him had supposed Palaiochoros to be the site of ancient Sparta. The great insecurity of travelling in

distance of four miles lay Amyclæ, celebrated for the oracle of Apollo, of whose sanctuary not a trace is now visible; and a road of twenty miles led from Sparta to Gythium, its harbour in that period of its history, when, mistaking its true policy, it built a fleet. On the west and north, Laconia was surrounded by the lofty Taygetus, which separated it from the fruitful plains of Messenia. This country was soon overpowered by Sparta,[1] which, having thus doubled its territory, easily became the largest of all the Grecian cities. But after a long and quiet possession, Messenia was finally avenged; when Epaminondas, its restorer, crushed the power of humbled Sparta.

A neck of land, called Argolis, from its capital city Argos, extends in a south-easterly direction from Arcadia forty-eight miles into the sea, where it terminates in the promontory of Scillæum. Many and great recollections recall this country to memory from the heroic age; and the remains of the most ancient style of architecture, the Cyclopic walls, which are still standing on the sites of the west towns, make that age present even now. Here lay Tiryns, whence Hercules departed to enter on his labours; here was Mycenæ, the country of Agamemnon, the most powerful and most unhappy of kings; here was Nemea, celebrated for its games instituted in honour of Neptune. But the glory of its earliest times does not seem to have animated Argos. No Themistocles, no Agesilaus was ever counted among its citizens; and, though it possessed a territory of no inconsiderable extent, holding in subjection the larger western moiety of the district, while Epidaurus and Træzene remained independent;—still it never assumed a rank among the first of the Grecian states, but was rather the sport of foreign policy.

In the west of the Peloponnesus lay Elis, the holy land. Its length from south to north, if the small southern district

the Peloponnesus increases the difficulty of the investigation; yet by the work of Sir William Gell, in his *Itinerary of the Morea*, being a description of the Routes of that peninsula, London, 1817, with a map, the topography of the peninsula has received sufficient illustrations. The distances given in the text rest on his authority. He makes the distance from Misitra or Mistra to Sparta to be 52 minutes. The city lay on hills, and appears to have been about a mile long.—Gell, p. 222.

[1] In the second Messenian war, which ended 668 years before Christ.

of Triphylia be reckoned, amounted to forty-eight miles; its breadth in the broadest part was not more than half as much. Several rivers, which had their rise in the Arcadian mountains, watered its fruitful plains. Among them the Alpheus was the largest and the most famous; for the Olympic games were celebrated on its banks. Its fountains were not far distant from those of the Eurotas; and as the latter, taking a southerly direction, flowed through the land of war, the former, in a westerly one, passed through the land of peace. For here, in the country sacred to Jove, where the nation of the Hellenes, assembling in festive pomp, saluted each other as one people, no bloody feuds were suffered to profane the soil. Armies were indeed permitted to pass through the consecrated land; but they were first deprived of their arms, which they did not again receive till they left it.[1] This general rule was afterwards limited in its application to the time of the Olympian games; but even during the following wars, the treasures of art in the sanctuaries of Elis remained uninjured; and under their protection it long enjoyed a beneficent peace.

The country of Elis embraced three divisions. The woody Triphylia was in the south, and contained that Pylus, which, according to the judgment of Strabo, could lay a better claim than either of the other two towns of the same name, to have been the country ruled by Nestor.[2] The northern division was Elis, a plain enclosed by the rough mountains Pholoë and Scollis, both spurs from the Arcadian Erymanthus, and watered by the Selleis and the Elian Peneus, on whose banks lay the city that gave a name to the whole region, over which it also exercised supreme authority; for the district of the Elians, embracing both Pisatis and Triphylia, extended to the borders of Messenia.[3] The middle

[1] Strabo, viii. p. 247. Phidon of Argos was the first who violated this sanctity by an invasion, to appropriate to himself the holding of the Olympic games (about 900 years before Christ); yet this occupation must have been transient, for when Elis was built, (about 447 years before Christ,) that city, even then relying on this sanctity, was surrounded by no walls.—Strabo, l. c. It was not till after the Peloponnesian war, that this and so many other religious ideas appear to have died away.

[2] Strabo, viii. p. 242. The two other towns were situated, one in northern Elis, the other in Messenia.

[3] Strabo, viii. p. 247, relates the manner in which it came to be extended thus far by the assistance of the Spartans in the Messenian war.

territory, Pisatis, so called from the city Pisa, was the most important of all, for it contained Olympia. Two roads from Elis led thither, one nearer the sea through the plain, another through the mountains; the distance was from twenty-eight to thirty-two miles.[1] The name Olympia designated the country near the city Pisa,[2] (which even in Strabo's time was no longer in existence,) where every five years those games were celebrated, which the Elians established after the subjugation of the Pisans, and at which they presided. If this privilege gave to them, as it were, all their importance in the eyes of the Greeks; if their country thus became the common centre; if it was the first in Greece with respect to works of art and perhaps to wealth; if their safety, their prosperity, their fame, and in some measure their existence as an independent state, were connected with the temple of Jupiter Olympius and its festivals;—need we be astonished, if no sacrifice seemed to them too great, by which the glory of Olympia was to be increased? Here on the banks of the Alpheus stood the sacred grove, called Altis, of olive and plane trees, surrounded by an enclosure; a sanctuary of the arts, such as the world has never since beheld. For what are all our cabinets and museums, compared with this one spot? Its centre was occupied by the national temple of the Hellenes, the temple of Olympian Jove,[3] in which was the colossal statue of that god, the masterpiece of Phidias. No other work of art in antiquity was so generally acknowledged to have been the first, even whilst all other inventions of Grecian genius were still uninjured; and need we hesitate to regard it as the first of all the works of art, of which we have any knowledge? Besides this temple, the grove contained that of Juno Lucina, the theatre and the prytaneum; in front of it, or perhaps within its precincts,[4] was the stadium

[1] According to Strabo, l. c. 300 stadia.

[2] Barthélemy is not strictly accurate, when he calls (iv. p. 207) Pisa and Olympia one city. Pisa was but six stadia (not quite a mile) from the temple; Schol. Pind. ad Ol. x. 55. I have never met with any mention of a city Olympia.

[3] The temple of Jupiter Olympius, built by the Elians in the age of Pericles, had nearly the same dimensions as the Parthenon at Athens; 230 feet in length, 95 in breadth, and 68 in height. The colossal statue of Jupiter, represented as seated, nearly touched the roof of the temple, as Strabo relates; and is said to have been sixty feet high. Compare: Völkel über den grossen Tempel und die Statue des Jupiters in Olympia, 1794.

[4] According to Strabo, in the Altis: Barthélemy says, in front of it. We

together with the race-ground, or hippodromus. The whole forest was filled with monuments and statues, erected in honour of gods, heroes, and conquerors. Pausanias mentions more than two hundred and thirty statues; of Jupiter alone he describes twenty-three,[1] and these were, for the most part, works of the first artists; for how could inferiority gain admittance, where even mediocrity became despicable? Pliny estimates the whole number of these statues in his time, at three thousand.[2] To this must be added the treasuries (θησαυροι), which the piety or the vanity of so many cities, enumerated by Pausanias,[3] had established by their votive presents. It was with a just pride, that the Grecian departed from Olympia. He could say to himself with truth, that he had seen the noblest objects on earth, and that these were not the works of foreigners, nor the pillage of foreign lands, but at once the creation and the property of his own nation.

The territory of Elis was indebted for its repose to the protection of the gods; Achaia, the country which bounded it on the north, to the wisdom of men. Having once been inhabited by Ionians, this maritime country had borne the name of Ionia; which was afterwards applied exclusively to the neighbouring sea on the west side of Greece. But in the confusion produced by the general emigration of the Dorians, it exchanged its ancient inhabitants for Achæans.[4] Achaia, watered by a multitude of mountain streams, which descended from the high ridges of Arcadia, belonged, with respect to its extent, fruitfulness, and population, to the middling countries of Greece. The character of its inhabitants was analogous. They never aspired after aggrandizement, or influence abroad. They were not made illustrious

are still much in the dark respecting the situation of ancient Olympia. What Chandler says is unimportant. The only modern traveller, who has made *accurate* investigations, is M. Fauvel. But I am acquainted with his communication to the National Institute, *Précis de ses voyages dans le continent de la Grèce, etc.*, only from the short notice contained in Millin, *Magazin Encyclop.* 1802, T. II. He found, it is there said, not only the remains of the temple of Jupiter, but also of the hippodromus.

[1] Pausanias, v. p. 434, etc. has enumerated and described that number. Among them there was a colossus of bronze, 27 feet high.

[2] Pliny, Hist. Nat. xxxiv. 17. There were as many at Athens, Delphi, and Rhodes.

[3] Paus. vi. p. 497, etc.

[4] As early as 1100 before Christ.

by great generals or great poets. But they possessed good laws. Twelve cities,[1] each with a small territory, independent of each other in the management of their internal affairs, formed a confederacy, which, under the name of the Achæan league, could trace its origin to remote antiquity. A perfect equality was its fundamental principle; no precedence of rank or power was to be usurped by any single city. What an example for the other parts of Greece, if they had been able or willing to understand it! In this manner the Achæans continued for a long time in the enjoyment of happy tranquillity, having no share in the wars of their neighbours. Their country was in no one's way, and attracted no one; even during the Peloponnesian war, they remained neutral.[2] The Macedonian supremacy finally dissolved the confederacy, and favoured individual tyrants, to use them as its instruments. But the times were to come, when Nemesis should rule. The Achæan league was renewed, and enlarged, and it became most dangerous to the Macedonian rulers.

The small territory of the city Sicyon (which afterwards belonged to the Achæan league) divided Achaia from that of Corinth. In point of extent, this state was one of the smallest in Greece; but the importance of a commercial state does not depend on the extent of its territory. Venice was never more flourishing or more powerful, than at a time when it did not possess a square mile on the continent. Wealthy Corinth, more than four miles in extent, lay at the foot of a steep and elevated hill, on which its citadel was built. There was hardly a stronger fortress in all Greece, and perhaps no spot afforded a more splendid prospect than Acrocorinthus.[3] Beneath it might be seen the busy city and

[1] Dyme and Patræ were the most important; Helice was swallowed up by the sea.

[2] Thucyd. ii. 9.

[3] See Strabo, p. 261. Of modern travellers, Spon and Wheler ascended it in 1676. Chateaubriand, i. 36, says, that the prospect at the foot of the citadel is enchanting. If it is so now, what must it formerly have been? Clarke (Travels, vol. ii. § 5, p. 745, etc.) describes the few remaining ruins, and the whole country round Corinth; especially the isthmus. He too, and his companions, were refused admittance to the citadel, yet they obtained leave to climb the cliff on which it stands; and which might be made as strong as Gibraltar. They gained the summit just at sunset: "a more splendid prospect cannot be found in Europe." It extended even to the Acropolis at Athens. Travels, ii. p. 749.

its territory, with its temples, its theatres, and its aqueducts.[1] Its two harbours, Lechæum on the western bay, Cenchreæ on the eastern, filled with ships, and the two bays themselves, with the isthmus between them, were all in sight. The peaks of Helicon, and of Parnassus itself, were seen at a distance; and a strong eye could distinguish on the eastern side the Acropolis of Athens. What images and emotions are excited by this prospect!

Beyond the isthmus of the Peloponnesus, which the Grecians, acquainted for a long time with no other, were accustomed to call simply the Isthmus, lay the tract of Hellas. Its southern half, stretching as far as the chain of Œta, was divided into eight, or, if Locris, of which there were two parts, be twice counted, into nine districts; of these, the extent was but small, as their number indicates. Next to the isthmus, on which may still be seen the ruins of a stadium and a theatre,[2] and that temple of Neptune, in the grove of fir trees, where all Greece assembled to celebrate the Isthmian games, the small but fruitful territory of Megara[3] began; and through this, along the high rocky shore, where the robber Sciron is said to have exercised his profession, the road conducted to the favourite land of the gods, to Attica.[4]

A neck of land or peninsula, opposite to that of Argolis, extends in a south-easterly direction about fifty-six miles into the Ægean Sea, and forms this country. Where it is connected with the main land, its greatest breadth may be twenty-four miles; but it tapers more and more to a point, till it ends in the high cape of Sunium, on the summit of which the temple of Minerva announced to the traveller, as he arrived from sea, the land which was protected by the goddess of courage and wisdom. It was not endowed with luxuriant fruitfulness; it never produced so much corn as would supply its own inhabitants; and for this, neither the honey of Hymettus, nor the marble of the Pentelic mountains, nor even the silver mines of Laurium, could have

[1] Corinth is famous, even with the poets, for being well supplied with water; compare Euripides in Strabo, l. c. Pausanias enumerates, l. ii. 117, its many temples and aqueducts.

[2] Clarke's Travels, ii. p. 752. Even the sacred grove of firs still exists, from which, according to Pausanias, the crowns of the victors were taken.

[3] Like that of Corinth, not more than eight miles in length and breadth.

[4] On Attica, see the critical map of Professor O. Müller.

afforded a compensation. But the culture of the olive, mechanic industry, and the advantageous use made of the situation of the country for the purposes of commerce, gave to the frugal people all that they needed, and something more; for the activity of commerce was shackled by no restrictive laws. Almost the whole country is mountainous; the mountains are indeed of a moderate height, and covered with aromatic plants, but they are stony and without forests. Their outlines are, however, wonderfully beautiful; the waters of the Ilissus, the Cephissus, and of other rivers, or to speak more accurately, of other brooks, which stream from them, are clear as crystal, and delicious to the taste; and the almost constant clearness of the atmosphere, which lends very peculiar tints to the buildings, no less than to the mountains,[1] opens a prospect which distance can hardly bound. "For, without doubt," (says a modern traveller,[2]) "this is the most salubrious, the purest, and the mildest climate of Greece; as Euripides[3] has said, 'Our air is soft and mild; the frost of winter is never severe, nor the beams of Phœbus oppressive; so that for us there are no attractions in the choicest delights which are offered by the fields of Asia, or the wealth of Hellas.'"

But where the mountains open, and leave room for plains of a moderate extent, the soil is still covered by forests of olive trees, of which the eye can perceive no termination. "More beautiful are no where to be seen. Those of Palermo or on the Riviera of Genoa are hardly to be compared with these, which seem as it were immortal, and century after century send forth new branches and new shoots with renovated vigour."[4] Formerly they overshadowed the sacred road, and the gardens of the academy; and if the goddess herself, like her scholars, has deserted the soil, she has at least left behind her for posterity, the first of the presents, which she made to her darling nation.

The traveller from Corinth and Megara, passing the isthmus to Attica, reached the sacred city of Eleusis at the

[1] See the remarks of Chateaubriand on this subject. *Itinéraire à Jerusalem*, i. p. 191.

[2] Bartholdy, Bruchstücke, etc. p. 214.

[3] Euripides in Erechtheo, fr. i. v. 15, etc.

[4] Bartholdy, Bruchstücke, etc. p. 220. This account is confirmed by Clarke, ii. p. 783, who was told that the olive trees were 40,000 in number.

distance of about eight miles from Megara. When the inhabitants of that place submitted to Athens, they reserved for themselves nothing but their sanctuaries ;[1] and hence the mysterious festivals of Ceres continued to be celebrated in their temple. From this place, the sacred road, of almost unvarying breadth, led to the city which Pallas protected.

Athens lay in a plain, which on the south-west extended for about four miles towards the sea and the harbours, but on the other side was enclosed by mountains. The plain itself was interrupted by several rocky hills. The largest and highest of these supported the Citadel or Acropolis, which took its name from its founder Cecrops; round this, the city was spread out, especially in the direction of the sea. The summit of the hill contained a level space, about eight hundred feet long, and half as broad; which seemed, as it were, prepared by nature to support those masterpieces of architecture, which announced at a great distance the splendour of Athens. The only road which led to it, conducted to the Propylæa,[2] with its two wings, the temple of Victory, and another temple, ornamented with the pictures of Polygnotus. That superb edifice, the most splendid monument which was erected under the administration of Pericles, the work of Mnesicles, was decorated by the admirable sculptures of Phidias.[3] They formed the proud entrance to the level summit of the hill, on which were the temples of the guardian deities of Athens. On the left was the temple of Pallas, the protectress of cities, with the column which fell from heaven, and the sacred olive tree; and that of Neptune.[4] But on the right, the Parthenon, the pride of Athens, rose above every thing else, possessing the colossal statue of Minerva by Phidias, next to the Olympian Jupiter,

[1] Pausan. i. p. 92.

[2] Compare the sketches and drawings in Stuart's *Antiquities of Athens.*

[3] A part of these master-pieces has perished. By robbing the Acropolis, Lord Elgin has gained a name, which no other will wish to share with him. The sea has swallowed up his plunder. The devastation made by this modern Herostratus, is described not by Chateaubriand only, Itinér. i. p. 202, but also, and with just indignation, by his own countryman, Clarke, Travels, ii. p. 483, an eye-witness.

[4] The two, forming one whole, were only divided by a partition. Consult on the details of the building: Minervæ Poliadis Sacræ et aedes in arce Athenarum; illustrata ab C. Odofredo Müller. Gottingæ, 1820. And the plan of the city by the same author, who, in his essay, followed a still extant Attic inscription; and in his plan of Athens differs widely from Barthélemy.

the noblest of his works. At the foot of the hill on the one side was the Odeon, and the theatre of Bacchus, where the tragic contests were celebrated on the festivals of the god, and those immortal master-pieces were represented, which, having remained to us, double our regret for those that are lost; on the other side was the Prytaneum, where the chief magistrates and most meritorious citizens were honoured by a table, provided at the public expense. A moderate valley, Cœle, was interposed between the Acropolis and the hill on which the Areopagus held its sessions; and between this and the hill of the Pnyx, where the collected people was accustomed to decide on the affairs of the republic. Here may still be seen the tribune, from which Pericles and Demosthenes spoke; (it is imperishable, since it was hewn in the rock;) not long ago it was cleared from rubbish, together with the four steps which led to it.[1]

If any desire a more copious enumeration of the temples, the halls, and the works of art, which decorated the city of Pallas, they may find it in Pausanias. Even in his time, how much, if not the larger part, yet the best, had been removed; how much had been injured and destroyed in the wars; and yet when we read what was still there, we naturally ask with respect to Athens, (as with respect to so many other Grecian cities,) where could all this have found room? The whole country round Athens, particularly the long road to the Piræeus, was ornamented with monuments of all kinds, especially with the tombs of great poets, warriors, and statesmen, who did not often remain after death without expressions of public gratitude, which were given so much the less frequently during their lives. A double wall, called the Northern and Southern, enclosed the road, which was nearly four miles long, on both sides, and embraced the two harbours of Piræeus and Phalereus. This wall, designed and executed by Themistocles, was one of the most important works of the Athenians. It was forty Grecian ells in height, built entirely of freestone, and so broad, that two baggage-waggons could pass each other. The Piræeus, to which it led, formed (as did Phaleræ) a city by itself, with its own public squares, temples, market-places, and its en-

[1] Chateaubriand, Itinéraire, vol. i. p. 184; and Clarke, Travels, ii. 2, p. 450.

livening commercial crowd; and it seemed perhaps even more animated than Athens.[1] Its harbour, well provided with docks and magazines, was spacious enough to hold in its three divisions four hundred triremes; whilst the Phalereus and Munychius could each accommodate only about fifty.[2] All three were formed naturally by the bays of the coast; but the Piræeus excelled the others not only in extent, but also in security.

The plain of Athens was surrounded on three sides by mountains, which formed its limits within no very great distance of the city. The prospect from the Acropolis and the Parthenon commanded on the east the two peaks of Hymettus; on the north, Pentelicus with its quarries of marble; to the north-west, the Cithæron was seen at a great distance, rising above the smaller mountains; and Laurium, rich in silver mines, lay to the south-east almost at the end of the peninsula; but towards the south-west, the eye could freely range over the harbours and the Saronic bay, with the islands of Salamis and Ægina, as far as the lofty citadel of Corinth.[3] Many of the chief places of the cantons (δημοι) into which Attica was divided, (and of these there were more than one hundred and seventy,) might also be seen; and the situation was distinct even of the towns, which the mountains covered. No one of these was important as a city, and yet there were few which had not something worthy of observation, statues, altars, and temples; for to whatever part of his country the Athenian strayed, he needed to behold something which might remind him that he was in Attica. There were many, of which the name alone awakened proud recollections; and no one was farther than a day's journey from Athens. It required but about five hours to reach the long but narrow plain[4] of Marathon, on the opposite coast of Attica. It was twenty-four miles to Sunium, which

[1] The Piræeus was sometimes reckoned as a part of Athens; and this explains how it was possible to say, that the city was two hundred stadia, or twenty miles, in circumference. Dio Chrysost. Or. vi.

[2] The rich compilations of Meursius on the Piræeus, no less than on Athens, the Acropolis, the Ceramicus, etc. (Gronov. Thes. Ant. Gr. vol. ii. iii.) contain almost all the passages of the ancients respecting them.

[3] Chateaubriand, Itinéraire, etc. i. p. 206.

[4] Chandler's Travels, p. 163. Clarke, Plates ii. 2. Pl. 4. 5., gives not only a description, but a map and view of the country.

lay at the southern extremity of the peninsula, and about twenty to the borders of Bœotia.

This country, so frequently enveloped in mists, lay to the north-west of Attica, and exhibited, in almost every respect, a different character. Bœotia was shut in by the chain of Helicon, Cithæron, Parnassus, and, towards the sea, Ptoüs; these enclosed a large plain, constituting the chief part of the country. Numerous rivers, of which the Cephissus was the most important,[1] descending from the heights, had probably stagnated for a long time, and had formed lakes, of which Copäis is the largest. This lake must have subterraneous outlets; for while the canals, through which its waters were anciently distributed, have fallen into decay, it has so far decreased in modern times, that it is now almost dried to a swamp.[2] But these same rivers appear to have formed the soil of Bœotia, which is among the most fruitful in Greece. Bœotia was also perhaps the most thickly settled part of Greece; for no other could show an equal number of important cities. The names of almost all of them are frequently mentioned in history; for it was the will of destiny, that the fate of Greece should often be decided in Bœotia. Its freedom was won at Platææ, and lost at Chæronea; the Spartans conquered at Tanagra, and at Leuctra their power was crushed for ever. Thebes with its seven gates, (more distinguished for its extent than its buildings,) esteemed itself the head of the Bœotian cities, although it was not acknowledged as such by all. This usurpation by Thebes of a supremacy over Bœotia, was of decisive importance in several periods of Grecian history.

Bœotia was divided by Mount Cithæron from Attica, and by Parnassus from Phocis. This district, of moderate size and irregular shape, extended to the south along the bay of Corinth; and was bounded on the north by the chain of Œta. Here are the passes which lead from Bœotia to Attica. Of these the most important is near the city Elatea,

[1] Distinct from the Cephissus in Attica.

[2] Bartholdy, Bruchstücke, etc. p. 230. On the ancient subterraneous outlets of this lake, which form some of the most curious remains of the earliest hydraulic works, and on the geography and earliest history of Bœotia, a clearer light is spread in C. O. Müller's histories of the Hellenic Tribes and Cities, published in 1820, with a map.

and on that account was early occupied by Philip on his second invasion of Greece. The desolate mountain of Parnassus, once associated with the fame of Phocis, presents to the traveller of our times nothing but recollections. Delphi lay on the south side of it, overshadowed by its double peak; and not far above the city was the temple, the oracle of Apollo. Here the masterpieces of art were displayed in countless abundance under the protection of the god; together with the costly and consecrated offerings of nations, cities,[1] and kings. Here, in the Amphictyonic council, still more costly treasures, the first maxims of the laws of nations, were matured by the Greeks. Hither on the festival days, when the great games of the Pythian deity recurred, (games surpassed only by those of Olympia,) pilgrims and spectators poured in throngs; here at the Castalian fountain the songs of the poets resounded in solemn rivalship; and, more exciting than all, the acclamations of the multitude.

Of all this not a vestige remains. Not even ruins have been spared to us by time. Only one monument of doubtful character seems to designate the spot, where Œdipus slew his father Laius; and whilst every vestige of greatness and glory has vanished, nothing but the memory of a crime is perpetuated.[2]

Phocis and Mount Parnassus separate the two parts of Locris. The eastern part, inhabited by the two tribes which took their names from the city Opus and Mount Cnemis,[3] lies along the Euripus, or the long strait, which divides the island Eubœa from Bœotia; and would have almost nothing to show, that is worthy of commemoration, were it not that the inseparable names of Thermopylæ and Leonidas produce an emotion in every noble mind. "Here the long heroic file of three hundred Spartans takes precedence of others, as it moves through the gate of eternity."[4] "At Thermopylæ," says Herodotus,[5] "a steep and inacessible

[1] Many of them had, as at Olympia, storehouses of their own. Pliny, xxxiv. 17, estimates the number of statues at Delphi, as at Olympia and Athens, to have been even in his time 3000.

[2] Bartholdy, Bruchstücke, p. 251. Compare the view in Clarke, Plates ii. 2. Pl. 10, 11.

[3] Locri, Opuntii, and Epicnemidii.

[4] This grave is still shown. See the view of it and of the country, in Clarke, pl. 13.

[5] Herod. vii. 176.

mountain rises on the west side in the direction of Œta; but on the east side of the road are the sea and marshes. In the pass there are warm fountains, near which stands an altar to Hercules. On going from Trachin to Hellas, the road is but half a plethrum (fifty feet) wide, yet the narrowest place is not there; but just in front and back of Thermopylæ, where there is room for but one carriage." Thus Thermopylæ was considered as the only road, by which an army could pass from Thessaly into Hellas, for nothing more than a footpath ran across the mountains; and Thermopylæ, not only during the wars with Persia, but also in the age of Philip, was considered the gate of Greece.

The western part of Locris, on the bay of Corinth, inhabited by the Ozolæ, was greater in extent, but possessed fewer remarkable objects. Yet its harbour Naupactus has preserved its importance, while so many of the most celebrated cities have become insignificant. It is now called Lepanto, and is perhaps the only town of which the modern name is more harmonious than the ancient.

The western parts of Hellas, rough Ætolia and woody Acarnania, are indeed among the largest districts, but are so inferior to the rest in fame, that the historian can do little more than name them. Nature was here neither less sublime nor less munificent; both were situated on the largest of the Grecian rivers, the Achelous, which flowed between them; both were inhabited by descendants of the Hellenes; both were once celebrated for heroes; and yet the Ætolians and the Acarnanians remained barbarians, after the Athenians had become the instructors of the world.—How difficult it is to comprehend the history of the culture of nations!

The chain of Œta, which farther west receives the name of Othrys, and at last of Pindus, and taking a northerly direction, is connected with the mountains of Macedonia, divides the central part of Greece from the northern. Thessaly, the largest of all the Grecian provinces, (though its extent cannot be given with accuracy, for its boundary on the north was never defined,) forms the eastern, and Epirus the western part of this district. There is hardly any other in Greece, for which nature seems to have done so much as for Thessaly. The mountains which have been mentioned, surrounded it on three sides; while the peaks

of Ossa and of Olympus rose above them on the east along the coasts of the Ægean Sea. Thessaly can with justice be called the land of the Peneus; which, descending from Pindus, flowed through it from west to east. A multitude of tributary streams poured from the north and the south into this river. The traditions of the ancients related,[1] that it had stagnated for centuries, till an earthquake divided Olympus and Ossa,[2] and opened for it a passage to the Ægean Sea through the delicious vale of Tempe.[3] Thus the plain of Thessaly arose from the floods, possessed of a soil which they had long been fertilizing. No other district had so extensive an internal navigation; which, with a little assistance from art, might have been carried to all its parts. Its fruitful soil was fitted alike for pasturing and the cultivation of corn; its coasts, especially the bay of Pagasa,[4] afforded the best harbours for shipping; nature seemed hardly to have left a wish ungratified. It was in Thessaly, that the tribe of the Hellenes, according to the tradition, first applied themselves to agriculture; and thence its several branches spread over the more southern lands. Almost all the names of its towns, as Pelasgiotis and Thessaliotis, recall some association connected with the primitive history and heroic age of the nation. The Doric tribe found in Estiæotis its oldest dwelling-places; and who has ever heard the name of Phthiotis, without remembering the hero of the Iliad, the great Pelides? Thessaly was always well inhabited and rich in cities. In the interior the most celebrated were Larissa, situated in the midst of the noble plain, and Pheræ; Iolcos, whence the Argonauts embarked, and Magnesia, were on the sea-coast. But it was perhaps the very fertility of the soil, which ruined the Thessalians. They rioted in sensual enjoyments; they were celebrated for banquets, and not for works of genius; and although

[1] Herod. viii. 6. Strab. ix. p. 296.

[2] To commemorate the event, a festival was instituted in Thessaly, called the Peloria, which festival seems to have been continued in a Christian one. Bartholdy, p. 137.

[3] "Tempe forms, as it were, a triple valley, which is broad at the entrance and at the end, but very narrow in the middle." These are the words of Bartholdy, who, of all modern travellers, has given us the most accurate account of Tempe, from his own observation. Bruchstücke, etc., p. 112, etc.

[4] Pagasa itself, (afterwards called Demetrias,) Iolcos, and Magnesia.

Olympus, the mountain of the gods, was on the boundary of their land, nothing god-like was ever unfolded within its precincts. Is it strange that in the midst of such gross sensuality, the love of self overpowered the love of country; that neither heroes nor poets were created among them by the inspirations of patriotism? Anarchy and tyranny commonly followed each other in regular succession; and thus Thessaly, always ripe for foreign subjugation, cowered of itself beneath the yoke of the Persians, and afterwards under that of Philip.

On the opposite side of the Peneus, the pure race and language of the Hellenes were not to be found. Other nations, probably of Illyrian descent, dwelt there; the Perrhæbians, the Athamanes, and others; who, as Strabo relates, sometimes claimed to belong to the Thessalians, and sometimes to the Macedonians.[1] The case was not different in Epirus, which lay to the west. The house of the Æacidæ, a Grecian family, the descendants of Achilles, were indeed the rulers over the Molossians; and the oracle of the Jupiter of the Hellenes was heard in the sacred grove of Dodona; but still the larger portion of the inhabitants seems hardly to have been of the Grecian race.

The main land of Hellas was surrounded by a coronet of islands, which were gradually occupied by the Hellenes, and came to be considered as parts of their country. They rose above the sea with beautiful verdure, and were surmounted by rocky hills. We can hardly doubt, that we see in them the remains of an earlier world; when the waters which covered the middle parts of Asia, and the deserts of northern Africa, retired, leaving behind them the Euxine and the Mediterranean Sea, as two vast reservoirs. Each of those islands commonly bore the name of the chief town, of which it formed the territory; with the exception of the three large islands, Eubœa, Crete, and Cyprus, each of which contained several cities. Almost every one of them contained its own remarkable objects, and its own claims to fame. Fruitful Corcyra[2] boasted then, as it does now, of its harbour and its ships. Ithaca, small as it is,

[1] Strabo, vii. p. 494. Others esteem them of Pelasgic origin. Compare C. O. Müller's Dorians, i. p. 25. [2] Now Corfu.

shares the immortality of Ulysses and Homer. Cythera, in the south, was the residence of the Paphian goddess. Ægina, unimportant as it seems, long disputed with Athens the sovereignty of the sea. What Greek could hear Salamis named, without feeling a superiority over the barbarians? Eubœa was celebrated for its fruitfulness; Thasos, for its gold mines; Samothrace, for its mysteries; and in the labyrinth of the Cyclades and Sporades, now called the Archipelago, what island had not afforded the poets the subject of a hymn?[1] Delos and Naxus had their gods; Paros, its marble; Melos, its misfortunes.[2] If so many of them are now desolate; if the alluring Cythera has become a naked rock; if Samos is poisoned by its swamps; if nature herself seems here to have grown old; shall we conclude that these things were so in ancient times? The Etesian winds blow certainly with more piercing roughness, now that the tops of the mountains are naked; the brooks stagnate in the desolate plains; but the change of seasons still produces varying visions; and the traveller, who at one time finds the Archipelago melancholy and waste, a few months later may contemplate a smiling prospect. "In spring, these islands are covered with green turf, with anemones and flowers of all colours. But in the month of August, when the northerly winds prevail, every thing is burnt and dried up, and the parched fields produce no more herbage till autumn."[3]

This view of Greece, though it cannot claim to be considered a regular description, leads us to several remarks, which may perhaps throw some light on the history of the nation.

First: Greece was naturally so divided and cut in pieces in a geographical point of view, that it could not have been easy for any one district to gain the supremacy over the rest. Thessaly could not well control the lands which lay to the south of Œta; and still less could Hellas sway the Peloponnesus, or the Peloponnesus, Hellas. Nature herself had erected breastworks for those, who desired and who knew how to

[1] Need we mention the hymns of Callimachus?
[2] See Thucydides, v. 116.
[3] Bartholdy, Bruchstücke, etc., p. 194. The whole description of the Archipelago, by this traveller, should be consulted.

be free. It was easy to defend Thermopylæ, or the Isthmus. We do not here take into consideration the superior power of a foreign conqueror; but even that could have effected little, so long as the nation refused to forge its own chains.

Again: If Greece was excelled by many countries in fertility, it would yet be difficult, and, at least in Europe, impossible, to find a land of such limited extent, where nature had done so much to prepare the way for the various branches of industry. Greece was not merely an agricultural, or a commercial country, or a land fitted for pasturing; it was all, at once; but different parts of it had different degrees of aptitude for the one or the other. The fruitful Messenia was fit for the growth of corn; Arcadia, for the nurture of cattle. Attica was proud of its oil, and the honey of Hymettus; Thessaly, of its horses. Of mines, there were not many; still they were not unknown in Laurium and Thasos. The maritime towns were suited for trade and commerce; and the coasts, indented with bays, and the islands, invited to navigation. This variety of pursuits in active life may have been the cause of an extensive intellectual culture, which was directed to many objects, and perhaps laid the foundation for the further improvement of the nation.

Lastly: No other country in Europe was so favourably situated for holding commerce with the oldest cultivated nations of the western world. On the way to Asia Minor and Phœnicia, one island almost touched upon another. It was easy to cross into Italy; and the coasts of Egypt were not far distant. Even in the times of fable, a path was discovered from the shores of Thessaly to those of Colchis; and how much earlier, and with how much greater facility, to those countries, where no rocks, like the Symplegades, opposed the passage of the daring Argo?

CHAPTER II.

EARLIEST CONDITION OF THE NATION; AND ITS BRANCHES.

The nation of the Hellenes, as they called themselves after an ancient leader, (for they received the name of Greeks from foreigners,) preserved many a tradition respecting their earliest state, representing them to have been nearly on a level with the savage tribes which now wander in the forests of North America.[1] From these traditions, it would seem, that there was once a time when they had no agriculture, but lived on the spontaneous produce of the woods; and when even fire could not be appropriated to the service of man, till it had first been stolen from heaven. Yet, in the mean while, they gradually spread over the country, which they afterwards possessed; and all foreign tribes were either driven from the soil, or were mingled with them. Much is told of the emigration of individual tribes, from the southern districts to the northern, and from these back again into the southern; but the peculiar habits of nomades, as seen in the nations of middle Asia, belonged to the Greeks as little as to the Germanic race. The moderate extent and the hilly character of their country, which afforded pasture only for less numerous herds, did not admit of that kind of life.

As far as we can judge from the very indefinite accounts of this early period, it seems, especially in the fourteenth and thirteenth centuries before the Christian era, that the race of the Hellenes was already so far extended over Hellas, as to be every where predominant. For it appears as such even then, before the Trojan war. The nation of the Pelasgi, which, no less than that of the Hellenes, belonged to the first inhabitants of the country, and which must be considered as having had a different origin, since their language was different,[2] may at an early period have been the

[1] Æschyl. Prom. vinct. v. 442, etc.

[2] Herod. i. 57. The relation of the Pelasgi to the Hellenes is of difficult solution. But the judgment of Herodotus in the passage now cited, rests on the comparison of the language of Pelasgi, of whom some were found even in his times, in the city Cruston, and Placiæ, and Scylace, the two last on the

most powerful, but was constantly reduced within narrower limits, and either emigrated to Italy and other countries; or, where it preserved its residence, as in Arcadia and Attica, was gradually mingled with the Hellenes, of whom the power was constantly increasing, until every vestige of it, as a separate race, was entirely lost. Whilst the Hellenes were thus spreading through Greece, the several chief tribes of them became more and more distinctly marked; and this division was so lasting and so full of consequences, that the internal history of the nation for the most part depended on it. Of the four most important branches, the Ionians, Dorians, Æolians, and Achæans, the two first (for the Æolians were chiefly mingled with the Dorians)[1] and the Achæans were so eminent, that they deserve to be regarded as the chief component parts of the nation. It is important, in order to become acquainted with the people, to know in what parts of Greece these several tribes had their places of residence. But these places did not remain unchanged; the event which had the greatest influence on them for the succeeding time, happened shortly after the termination of the Trojan war. Till then the tribe of the Achæans had been so powerful, that Homer, who, as Thucydides has already observed,[2] had no general name for the whole nation, commonly distinguishes that tribe from the others; which he sometimes designates collectively by the name of Panhellenes.[3] It possessed at that time almost all the Peloponnesus, with the exception of the very district which afterwards was occupied by it and bore its name, but which was then still called Ionia; and as the territories of Agamemnon

Hellespont. This was so different from the language of the Hellenes, as in his opinion to prove a nation of a different stock. True, this is at variance with his previous remarks, that the Dorians are of Hellenic, the Ionians of Pelasgic origin. But the Ionians whom he had in view, are the Athenians, who had become Hellenes, by the immigrations and intermarriage of Ionians with the native Pelasgi. Compare viii. 44. If difference of language proves difference of origin, we must discriminate between the Pelasgi and Hellenes. For to affirm that the Pelasgi of the cities above named, had exchanged their own language for another, would be a wholly gratuitous supposition.

[1] Euripides, enumerating in Ion, v. 1581, etc., the tribes of the Hellenes, makes no mention of the Æolians.

[2] Thucyd. i. 3.

[3] Πανέλληνες καὶ Ἀχαιοί, as Iliad ii. 530. The Hellenes of Homer are particularly the inhabitants of Thessaly; but the expression *Panhellenes* proves that even then, or soon after, when the catalogue of the ships was written, the name had begun to receive a general application.

and Menelaus, the most powerful of the Grecian princes, both lay in that peninsula, the first rank was clearly due to the Achæans. But soon after this war, it was the lot of that tribe to be in part subjugated and reduced to the severest bondage,[1] and in part to be expelled from the lands where it had resided, and confined to a small district, which from that time was called Achaia. This was a consequence of the immigration of the Dorians, under the direction of the descendants of Hercules; of which immigration the chief object was the conquest of the Peloponnesus; but it also occasioned a change in the places occupied by most of the other tribes of the Hellenes. From this time almost the whole of the Peloponnesus was occupied by the Dorians, and the kindred tribes of the Ætolians, who possessed Elis; the district of Achaia alone became the property of the Achæans, who, being in quest of refuge, drove from it the Ionians. But besides this, a large part of the rest of Hellas was occupied by tribes, which, though not expressly called Dorians, betrayed by their dialects their Doric origin; Bœotians, Locrians, Thessalians, and even the Macedonian Hellenes belonged to this class; and although the inhabitants of the western maritime tracts and islands were at first called Æolians, their dialects were so similar, that they soon ceased to be distinguished from the Dorians. This powerful tribe was also extended towards the east and west by means of its colonies. Several of the islands of the Archipelago were occupied by them; and they flourished on the coast of Asia Minor, and still more in Lower Italy and Sicily, and their colonies bloomed even in Africa in Cyrene. The Ionic branch, as far as we know, kept possession of no part of the main land of Greece, excepting Attica.[2] But Attica alone outweighed in glory and power all the rest of Greece. Most of the large island of Eubœa also belonged to the Ionians; many of the small islands of the Archipelago were

[1] The Helots of the Spartans were, for the most part, descendants of the conquered Achæans. Theopomp. ap. Athen. vi. p. 265.

[2] The other Ionians and even the Athenians laid aside the name; and none formally preserved it except those of Asia Minor. Herod. i. 143. Hence the extent of this tribe cannot be accurately given; and indeed no attempt should be made to trace every little Grecian tribe to its origin, and form a tree of descent for them all. This the Greeks themselves were never able to do; but the chief tribes remained distinct.

entirely occupied by them; and while their colonies in Asia Minor were decidedly superior, their colonies on the coasts of Italy and Sicily were but little inferior to those of other Grecian tribes.

From the earliest times, these two tribes were distinguished from each other by striking characteristics, which were not removed by the cultivation which was becoming universal. On the Doric tribe, the character of severity is imprinted, which is observable in the full tones of its dialect, in its songs, its dances, the simplicity of its style of living, and in its constitutions. It was most strongly attached to ancient usage.[1] From this its regulations for private and public life took their origin, which were fixed by the prescriptive rules of its lawgivers. It respected the superiority of family and age. The governments of the Doric cities were originally more or less the government of rich and noble families; and this is one cause of the greater solidity of their political institutions. Good counsel was drawn from the experience of age; wherever an old man appeared, the young rose from their seats. Religion among the Dorians was less a matter of luxury; but it was more an object of which they felt the need. What important transaction did they ever begin, without first consulting the oracle?—All this is true from the earliest times. When once the reverence for ancient usage was overcome, the Dorians knew no bounds; and Tarentum exceeded all cities in luxury, just as Syracuse did in internal feuds. After this tribe had once emigrated to the Peloponnesus, not only the greater part of that peninsula, but also of the neighbouring main land of Hellas was occupied by it.

The Ionians were on the contrary more distinguished for vivacity and a proneness to excitement. Ancient usage restrained them much less than it did the Dorians. They were easily induced to change, if pleasure could be gained by the change. They were bent on enjoyment, and seem to have been equally susceptible of refined gratifications of the mind and those of the senses. They lived amidst holidays; and nothing was pleasant to them without song

[1] The character of the Doric tribe, as well as its history, has been amply illustrated by C. O. Müller, in his History of Grecian Tribes and Cities, vol. ii.

and dance. Their soft dialect brings to mind the languages of the South Sea; but in both cases the remark is found to be true, that a soft language is by no means a proof of deficiency in warlike spirit. In the constitutions of their states, hereditary privileges were either rejected at once, or borne with only for a short time. The supreme authority rested with the people, and although it was limited by many institutions, the people still decided the character of the government. Any thing could be expected of these states, rather than domestic tranquillity. Nothing was so great that they did not believe they could attain it; and for that very reason they often attained greatness.

These differences in the natural character of the most important tribes, needed to be mentioned at the beginning. There are few subjects in history which have been so little illustrated, especially with reference to their consequences, as the characters of nations and their branches. And yet it is these peculiarities, which, in a certain degree, form the guiding thread in the web of the history of nations. From whatever they may proceed, whether from original descent, or the earliest institutions, or from both, experience teaches that they are almost indelible. The difference between the Doric and Ionic tribes, runs through the whole of Grecian history. This produced the deep-rooted hatred between Sparta and Athens, though that hatred may have been nourished by other causes; and who needs to be told, that the history of all Greece is connected with the history of those leading states.

The difference of tribes and their dispositions was also one of the chief causes of the subsequent political partitions of the soil. There probably was never a land of similar extent, in which so large a number of states subsisted together. They lived, both the large and the small ones, (if indeed we may call these large, which were only proportionally so,) each after its own customs; and hence Greece was saved from the torpor of large empires, and was able to preserve so much life and activity within itself.

Of the earliest history of the nation, we can expect only fragments. We leave it to the historian to collect them and to judge of their value.[1] But we must direct attention

[1] On this subject I refer to the work of Professor C. O. Müller:

to those general circumstances, which had a decisive influence on the earliest progress of national culture, if we would form correct opinions with respect to it. Before we can describe the heroic age, we must explain the influence of religion, of early poetry, and of foreign emigrations, and show how they served to introduce that age.

CHAPTER III.

ORIGINAL SOURCES OF THE CULTURE OF THE GREEKS.

RELIGION.

It is not easy to decide, whether the culture of a nation proceeds originally from their sacred or their civil institutions. The character of the domestic relations, the proper application of the means provided for the easier and more regular support of life, agriculture, and husbandry, constitute the first foundation of national culture; but even these can make but little progress without the assistance of religion. Without the fear of the gods, marriage loses its sanctity, and property its security. The earthly and the divine are so mingled in our natures, that nothing but a continued harmony between them both, can elevate us above the mere animal creation. But it has been wisely ordained by the Author of our being, that the feelings of religion can be unfolded, and thus the character of our existence ennobled, even before a high degree of knowledge has been attained. It would be difficult, and perhaps impossible, to find a nation, which can show no vestiges of religion; and there never yet has been, nor can there be a nation, in which the reverence for a superior being was but the fruit of refined philosophy.

The foundation of all religion is the belief in higher existences, (however differently these may be represented to the mind,) which have an influence on our destinies. The

Geschichte Hellenischer Stämme und Städte, B. i. Orchomenos und die Minyer; B. ii. iii. die Durier. Müller's Orchomenos and the Dorians.

natural consequences of this belief are certain rites of worship; invocations, sacrifices, and offerings. All this is so connected with the feelings of man, that it springs from within him, and exists independent of all research or knowledge. And this is the religion of the people. But so soon as the intelligent spirit of man was somewhat awakened, a higher principle was separated (though in very different ways) from this simple faith; and that remained in the possession of a small circle of priests, of the initiated, of the enlightened. If the religion of the people reposed only on belief and indistinct conceptions, certain doctrines, on the contrary, belonged to those higher circles, although they were often represented by images, and exhibited to the senses by outward ceremonies. These two kinds of religion commonly remained distinct from each other; and the difference was the most clearly marked in such nations as had a caste of priests. But still there were some points, in which they both were united. Even a caste of priests, with whatever secrecy they guarded their doctrines, could influence the people only by means of external forms. But the less the order of priests is separated by a nice line of division from the mass of the people, the more faint becomes the distinction between the religion of the people and the doctrine of the priests. How far the two differed from each other, and remained different, must ever be an object of learned inquiry; to have confounded them, has been one of the chief sources of error with regard to the religion of the ancients.

Among the Greeks there never was a distinct caste of priests, nor even, as we shall hereafter observe, a separate order of priesthood. And yet, beside the popular religion, they had a religion of the initiated; and their mysteries were almost as ancient as the faith of the people. Each of these must be considered by itself, before we can draw any general conclusion respecting the influence of religion on their character.

The popular religion of the Greeks rested on a belief in certain superhuman beings, and in the influence exercised by them over the destinies of mortals; on the fear of offending them, resulting from this belief; and on the custom of worshipping them. Yet according to the account of

the earliest and most credible witnesses, these divinities were not of Grecian origin; and the learned investigations of modern writers on the origin of them individually, establish the fact beyond a doubt.[1] "The Hellenes," says Herodotus,[2] "have received their gods of the Pelasgi; but the Pelasgi, who at first honoured their gods without giving them particular names, took the names of their divinities from the Egyptians." This account of the historian has difficulties, which cannot be entirely cleared away. If it be granted, that certain divinities and the manner in which they were worshipped came from Egypt, we may still ask, how could the names have been of Egyptian origin, since the names of the Egyptian gods are almost all known to us, and are very different from those of the Greeks. We learn of Herodotus himself, that it was common for the Egyptian priests, even in his age, to institute comparisons between their gods and those of the Greeks, and to transfer the names of the latter to their own divinities. And this enables us, at least, to explain how the historian, who was accustomed to hear a Jupiter, a Bacchus, a Diana, mentioned in Egypt, could have thought the matter very probable. But the question is still by no means answered. For if the Egyptian priests, in the time of Herodotus, applied the Grecian names to their gods, how can we explain the alleged fact, that the Greeks first borrowed those names from them? There are, however, two circumstances, which we may infer from the words of Herodotus himself, and which throw some light on the subject. The historian has not concealed the source of his information. These assertions were made to him at Dodona; he heard, then, a tradition of the priests of that place. But the oracle of Dodona traced its origin to Egypt; can we wonder, then, that its priests should derive the gods of the Greeks from the same source? Again: it is clear from Herodotus, that the Hellenes did not receive them directly from the Egyptians, but through the Pelasgi; that is, they received them at second hand. We shall hereafter remark, that they came chiefly by way of Crete and Samothrace. Could such cir-

[1] Compare, above all, Creuzer. Symbolik, b. ii. s. 376, etc., and Böttiger, Kunstmythologie, Abschn. i. über Zeus; Abschn. ii. über Juno.

[2] Herod. ii. 50, 52.

cuitous routes have left them unchanged? And is it not probable, that the Pelasgi essentially altered them in their own way, before delivering them to the Hellenes? Questions of this kind cannot now be answered with certainty; but, however many of the Egyptian gods may have been introduced into Greece, it is certain that not all were of that origin. The father of history has not forgotten to remark,[1] that Neptune, Juno, Bacchus, and others were not of Egyptian origin, and this has been fully substantiated by the acute investigations of the modern inquirers whom we have just cited.

But to whatever country the gods of the Hellenes may have originally belonged, they certainly did not remain, in Greece, what they had been before. We need but throw a glance on the Grecian religion to convince ourselves, that the gods of the Greeks became entirely their property, if they were not so originally; that is, the representations which they made of them, were entirely different from the conceptions of those nations, of whom they may have borrowed them. Wherever Jupiter, Juno, Neptune, and Phœbus Apollo, may have first been worshipped, no country but Hellas adored the Olympian ruler of the world, the queen of heaven, the power which encompassed the world, the far-darting god of light. And it was the same with the rest. What the Grecian touched, became gold, though before it had been but a baser metal.

But if the popular religion of the Greeks was formed by changing the character of foreign gods, in what did the change consist? What were the characteristics of the Grecian assembly of divinities? This question is important, not for the history of the Grecian religion alone, but for the general history of religion itself. For the problem is nothing less, than to fix on the essential difference between the religion of the ancient eastern and western world.

This characteristic difference may yet be easily discovered, and may be reduced, we think, to a single head.

All inquiries relative to the divinities of the East, even though the explanations of individual ones may be various, lead to the general result, that objects and powers of nature

[1] Herod. ii. 50.

lay at their foundation. These may have been, first, corporeal objects, the sun, the moon, the stars, the earth, the river which watered the country; or they may have been powers of nature, a creating, a preserving, a destroying power; or, which was more usual, both these may have been combined; and visible objects became objects of adoration, in so far as they were the expressions of a creating or destroying power. When the gods of the Egyptians, the Indians, the Persians, the Phrygians, the Phœnicians, and others, are analyzed, even in cases where the interpretation remains imperfect, it cannot be doubted, that some idea of this kind lay at the bottom, and was the predominant one. They had but one signification, as far as this idea was connected with it; and the sacred traditions and mythological tales respecting them, seem to us without meaning, because we have so often lost the key to their interpretation. "The Egyptians," Herodotus relates,[1] "had a sacred tradition, that Hercules once appeared before Ammon, and desired to see his face. Ammon refused, and Hercules continued his entreaties; upon this, Ammon slew a ram, veiled himself in its skin, put on its head, and in this plight showed himself to Hercules. From that time the Thebans ceased to sacrifice rams; only once a year, on the festival of Ammon, they kill a single one, hang its skin round the picture of the god, and show at the same time the picture of Hercules." Who understands this story and this festival from the mere relation? But when we learn that the ram, opening the Egyptian year, is the symbol of the approaching spring, that Hercules is the sun of that season in its full power, the story, as well as the festival, is explained as descriptive of the spring, and as a figurative representation of the season that is beginning. In this, as in similar cases, the object or power of nature was exhibited under a human form; for the tendency to copy that form, is too deeply fixed in our natures; or rather it results immediately from the limitations of the same. But in all such cases in the East, where the human form was attributed to the gods, it was but a secondary affair, the indispensable means of presenting them to the senses. It was never any thing more. And this is the

[1] Herod. ii. 42.

reason, why no hesitation was made among those nations to depart from this human form, and to disfigure it whenever it seemed possible to give, by that means, a greater degree of distinctness to the symbolic representation; or if any other object could thus be more successfully accomplished. This is the source of all those singular shapes, under which the gods of the East appear. The Indian makes no scruple of giving his gods twenty arms; the Phrygian represents his Diana with as many breasts; the Egyptian gave them the heads of beasts. Different as these disfigurations are, they all have their origin in this; the human form was but a subordinate object; the chief aim was the distinct representation of the symbol, under a form suited to their modes of comprehension.

As the Grecians received most if not all of their gods from abroad, they of course received them as symbols of those natural objects and powers; and the farther we look back in the Grecian theogony, the more clearly do their gods appear as such beings. He who reads with tolerable attention the earlier systems as contained in Hesiod, cannot mistake this for a moment; and it cannot be denied, that there are traces of this origin in the gods of Homer. That his Jupiter designates the ether, his Juno the atmosphere, his Phœbus Apollo the sun, is obvious in many of his narrations. But it is equally obvious, that the prevailing representation with him is not the ancient symbolical one, that rather his Jupiter is already the ruler of gods and men, his Juno the queen of Olympus.

This then is the essential peculiarity of the popular religion of the Greeks; they gradually dismissed those symbolical representations, and not only dismissed them, but adopted something more human and more sublime in their stead. The gods of the Greeks were *moral persons.*

When we call them moral persons, we do not mean to say, that a higher degree of moral purity was attributed to them than humanity can attain; (the reverse is well enough known;) but rather, that the whole moral nature of man, with its defects and its excellencies, was considered as belonging to them, only with the additional notions of superior physical force, a more delicately organized system, and a more exalted, if not always a more beautiful form. But

these views became the prevailing ones, the views of the people; and thus an indestructible wall of division was placed between Grecian and foreign gods. The former were moral beings; this was their leading character, or rather all their character; they would have been mere names, if this had been taken from them; but with the barbarians their gods remained only personifications of certain objects and powers of nature; and hence neither a moral nature nor character belonged to them, although the human shape and certain actions and powers were attributed to them.

Having thus illustrated the essential difference between the Grecian and foreign gods, and shown in what the transformation of the foreign gods, adopted by the Grecians, consisted, the question arises, how and by what means did that transformation take place?

By means of poetry and the arts. Poetry was the creating power; the arts confirmed the representations which she had called into being, by conferring on them visible forms. And here we come to the decisive point, from which we must proceed in continuing our inquiry.

"Whence each of the gods is descended, whether they have always existed," says the father of history,[1] "and how they were formed, all this the Grecians have but recently known. Hesiod and Homer, whom I do not esteem more than four hundred years older than I am, are the poets who invented for the Grecians their theogony; gave the gods their epithets; fixed their rank and occupations; and described their forms. The poets who are said to have lived before these men, lived, as I believe, after them."

This remarkable account deserves more careful attention. The historian expressly remarks, that this is his own presumption, not the assertion of others. He may certainly have been mistaken; but he would hardly express himself so explicitly, unless he had believed himself warranted to do so. We must receive his opinion therefore as the result of such an investigation as could in his age be carried on; and can we do more than he?

He names Homer and Hesiod; and naturally understands by them the authors of the poems which already bore their

[1] Herod. ii. 53.

names; the two great epic poems of Homer, and at least the Theogony of Hesiod. The case does not become changed, even if those productions are, agreeably to a modern opinion, the works of several authors. It would only be necessary to say, it was the ancient epic poets of the schools of Homer and of Hesiod, who formed the divine world of the Greeks; and perhaps this manner of expression is at all events the more correct. For it would be difficult to doubt that the successors of those poets contributed their share.

According to the assurances of Herodotus, these poets were the first to designate the forms of the gods; that is, they attributed to them, not merely the human figure, but the human figure in a definite shape. They distinguished, moreover, their kindred, their descent, their occupations; they also defined the personal relations of each individual; and therefore gave them the epithets which were borrowed from all this. But if we collect these observations into one, they signify nothing less, than that the poets were the authors of the popular religion, in so far as this was grounded on definite representations of the several divinities.

This is not intended to imply, that Homer made it his object to be the creator of a national religion. He did but make a poetic use of the previous popular belief. But that poetic spirit, which left nothing indistinctly delineated in the heroes whose deeds he celebrated, bringing before our eyes the persons and their characters, effects the same with the gods. He invented his divine personages as little as he did his heroes; but he gave their character to the one and the other. The circle of his gods is limited to a small number. They are inhabitants of Olympus, and if they do not all belong to the same family, they yet belong to the same place; and they usually live together, at least, when that is required by the purposes of the poet. Under such circumstances, an inferior poet might have felt the necessity of giving them individuality. And how much more a Homer? But that he executed this in so perfect a manner, is to be ascribed to the superiority of his genius.

Thus the popular notions entertained of the gods were first established by Homer, and established never to be changed. His songs continued to live in the mouth of the

nation; and how would it have been possible to efface images, which were painted with such strokes and colours? Hesiod is, indeed, named with him; but what are his catalogues of names compared with the living pictures of Mæonides?

In this manner, by means of the epic poets, that is, almost exclusively by means of Homer, the gods of the Greeks were raised to the rank of moral beings, possessed of definite characters. As such they gained life in the conceptions of the people; and however much may have been invented respecting them in the poetry of a later age, no one was permitted to represent them under a figure, or with attributes inconsistent with the popular belief. We soon perceive the various consequences, which this must have had on the culture and improvement of the nation.

The more a nation conceives its gods to be like men, the nearer does it approach them, and the more intimately does it live with them. According to the earliest views of the Greeks, the gods often wandered among them, shared in their business, requited them with good or ill, in conformity to their reception, and especially to the number of presents and sacrifices with which they were honoured. Those views decided the character of religious worship, which received from them, not merely its forms, but also its life and meaning. How could this worship have received any other than a cheerful, friendly character? The gods were gratified with the same pleasures as mortals; their delights were the same; the gifts which were offered them were the same which please men; there was a common, a correspondent enjoyment. With such conceptions, how could their holidays have been otherwise than joyous ones? And as their joy was expressed by dance and song, both of these necessarily became constituent parts of their religious festivals.

It is another question: What influence must such a religion have had on the morals of the nation? The gods were by no means represented as pure moral beings, but as beings possessed of all human passions and weaknesses. But at the same time the Greeks never entertained the idea, that their divinities were to be held up as models of virtue; and hence the injury done to morality by such a religion, however warmly the philosophers afterwards spoke against it, could hardly have been so great as we, with our pre-

possessions, should have at first imagined. If it was not declared a duty to become like the gods, no excuse for the imitation could be drawn from the faults and crimes attributed to them. Besides, these stories were esteemed, even by the vulgar, only as poetic inventions, and there was little concern about their truth, or their want of truth. There existed, independent of those tales, the fear of the gods as higher beings, who on the whole desired excellence, and abhorred and sometimes punished crime. This punishment was inflicted in this world; for the poets and the people of Greece for a long time adopted a belief in no punishment beyond the grave, except of those who had been guilty of direct blasphemy against the gods.[1] The system of morals was on the whole deduced from that fear of the gods, but that fear especially produced the observance of certain duties, which were of great practical importance, as, for example, the inviolable character of suppliants, (supplices,) who stood under the particular protection of the gods; the sanctity of oaths, and the like; of which the violation was also considered as a direct crime against the gods. Thus the popular religion of the Greeks was no doubt a support of morality; though never in the same degree as with us. That its importance was felt as a means of bridling the licentiousness of the people, is sufficiently clear from the care which the state took during its better days to preserve the popular religion, and from the punishments inflicted on those who corrupted it or denied its gods. When we may name the popular religion of the Greeks in one sense a religion of the poets, we by no means indulge merely in a play of fancy. But if the influence of the popular religion on the moral character of the nation should be differently estimated, there is less room to doubt as to its influence on taste; for that was formed entirely by the popular religion, and continued indissolubly united with it.

By the transformation of the Grecian divinities into moral agents, an infinite field was opened for poetic invention. By becoming human, the gods became peculiarly beings for the poets. The muse of the moderns has attempted to re-

[1] The reader may here compare an essay of Heeren on the notions entertained by the Greeks of rewards and punishments after death. Heeren; Historische Werke, Th. iii. s. 214.

present the Supreme Being in action; she could do so only by giving him as far as possible the attributes of men; with what success this has been attended, is known. It was in vain to endeavour to deceive us with respect to the chasm which lay between our more sublime ideas of the Divinity, and the image under which he was represented. But the case was altogether different in ancient Greece. The poet was not only allowed, but compelled to introduce the gods in a manner consistent with popular belief, if he would not fail of producing the desired effect. The great characteristics of human nature were expressed in them; they were exhibited as so many definite archetypes. The poet might relate of them whatever he pleased, but he was never permitted to alter the original characters; whether he celebrated their own actions, or introduced them as participating in the exploits of mortals. Although themselves immortal, they always preserved the human character, and excited a corresponding interest; with their weaknesses and faults, they stood nearer to man, than if they had been represented as possessing the perfection of moral excellence.

Thus the popular religion of the Greeks was thoroughly poetical. There is no need of a long argument to show, that it also decided the character of Grecian art, by affording an inexhaustible supply of subjects.

On this point a single remark only needs here be made. Among the nations of the East, the plastic art not only never created forms of ideal beauty, but was rather exercised in producing hideous ones. The monstrous figures of their gods, which we have already mentioned, are proofs of it. The Grecian artist was secure against any thing similar to this, now that their gods had become not merely physical, but human, moral beings. He never could have thought of representing a Jupiter or a Juno with ten arms; he would have destroyed his own work, by offending the popular religious notions. Hence he was forced to remain true to the pure human figure, and was thus brought very near the step, which was to raise him still higher, and give ideal beauty to his images. That step he would probably have taken without assistance; but the previous labours of the poets made it more natural and more easy. Phidias found in Homer the idea of his Olympian Jupiter, and the

most sublime image in human shape, which time has spared us, the Apollo of the Vatican, may be traced to the same origin.

Beside the popular religion, Greece possessed also a religion of the initiated, preserved in the mysteries. Whatever we may think of these institutions, and whatever idea we may form of them, no one can doubt that they were religious ones. They must then have necessarily stood in a certain relation to the religion of the people; but we shall not be able to explain, with any degree of probability, the nature of that relation, until we trace them to their origin.

We must preface this inquiry with a general remark. All the mysteries of the Greeks, as far as we are acquainted with them, were introduced from abroad; and we can still point out the origin of most of them. Ceres had long wandered over the earth, before she was received at Eleusis, and erected there her sanctuary.[1] Her secret service in the Thesmophoria, according to the account of Herodotus,[2] was first introduced by Danaus, who brought it from Egypt to the Peloponnesus. Whether the sacred rites of Orpheus and Bacchus originally belonged to the Thracians or the Egyptians, they certainly came from abroad. Those of the Curetes and the Dactyli had their home in Crete.

It has often been said, that these institutions in Greece suffered, in the progress of time, many and great alterations, that they commonly degenerated, or to speak more correctly, that the Grecians accommodated them to themselves. It was not possible for them to preserve among the Greeks the same character which they had among other nations. And here we are induced to ask: What were they originally? How were they introduced and preserved in Greece? And what relation did they bear to the popular religion?

The answer to these questions is contained in the remarks which we have already made on the transformation and appropriation of foreign gods by the Hellenes. Most of those gods, if not all of them, were received as symbolical, physical beings; the poets made of them moral agents; and as such they appear in the religion of the people.

[1] Isocrat. Paneg. op. p. 46. ed. Steph., and many other places in Meursii Eleusin. cap. i.

[2] Herod. iv. 172.

The symbolical meaning would have been lost, if no means had been provided to insure its preservation. The mysteries, it seems, afforded such means. Their great end therefore was, to preserve the knowledge of the peculiar attributes of those divinities, which had been incorporated into the popular religion under new forms; what powers and objects of nature they represented; how these, and how the universe came into being; in a word, cosmogonies, like those contained in the Orphic instructions. But this knowledge, though it was preserved by oral instruction, was perpetuated no less by symbolic representations and usages; which, at least in part, consisted of those sacred traditions or fables, of which we have already made mention. "In the sanctuary of Sais," says Herodotus, "representations are given by night of the adventures of the goddess; and these are called by the Egyptians mysteries; of which, however, I will relate no more. It was from thence that these mysteries were introduced into Greece."[1] If we find in this the chief design of the mysteries, we would by no means assert, that this was the only one. For who does not perceive how much more could be connected with it? With the progress of time a greater variety of representations may have arisen in the mysteries; their original meaning might perhaps be gradually and entirely lost; and another be introduced in its stead.[2]

[1] Herod. l. c.

[2] The investigation respecting the mysteries is a most extensive one, and yet very little has thus far been ascertained, as may be seen from the highly valuable work of St. Croix, especially in the German translation: Versuch über die alten Mysterien, translated by Lenz, 1790. I refer to this book for the necessary proofs. There has also appeared an excellent work by V. Ouwaroff: Essai sur les mystères d'Eleusis: Troisième Ed. à Paris, 1816. The learned author, p. 65, says: "Nous avons essayè de prouver, que les mystères réligieux de la Grèce, loin d'être de vaines cérémonies, enfermoient effectivement quelques restes de traditions antiques, et formoient la veritable doctrine ésotérique du polythéisme." With this we agree; at the same time we limit the esoteric doctrine originally to the meaning which the divinities of the Greeks, transformed as they were into poetic beings, still possessed as representing powers of nature; yet without excluding the inferences made above in the text. It does not belong to the political historian to pursue this investigation any farther; he must leave it to the student of the history of religions. Yet two remarks may here be permitted. First: Homer and Hesiod say nothing of mysteries; which may very possibly have been older than those poets, but are thus proved to have had in their time less importance than they afterwards gained. And this is immediately explained, so soon as the proper object of the mysteries is discovered, by making the difference between the popular religion, as modified by the poets, and the more

Those passages may therefore be very easily explained, which import that the mysteries, as has been particularly asserted of those of Eleusis, illustrated the superiority of civilized over savage life; the invention and value of agriculture, to which the worship of physical deities had immediate reference; and gave instructions respecting a future life and its nature. For what was this more than an interpretation of the sacred traditions, which were told of the goddess as the instructress in agriculture, of the forced descent of her daughter to the lower world, etc.? And we need not be more astonished, if in some of their sacred rites we perceive an excitement carried to a degree of enthusiastic madness, which belonged peculiarly to the East, but which the Hellenes were very willing to receive. For we must not neglect to bear in mind that they shared the spirit of the East; and did they not live on the very boundary line between the East and the West? As those institutions were propagated farther to the West, they lost their original character. We know what the Bacchanalian rites became at Rome; and had they been introduced north of the Alps, what form would they have there assumed? But to those countries it was possible to transplant the vine, not the service of the god to whom the vine was sacred. The orgies of Bacchus suited the cold soil and inclement forests of the north, as little as the character of its inhabitants.

The secret doctrines which were taught in the mysteries, may have finally degenerated into mere forms and an unmeaning ritual. And yet the mysteries exercised a great influence on the spirit of the nation, not of the initiated only, but also of the great mass of the people; and perhaps they influenced the latter still more than the former. They preserved the reverence for sacred things; and this gave them their political importance. They produced that effect better than any modern secret societies. The mysteries had their secrets, but not every thing connected with

ancient physical religion of the East. Secondly: Diodor. I. p. 393. The mysteries introduced from Crete, are said to have constituted the public worship of the Cretans. It was in Greece, then, that they first came to be mysteries. This, too, can hardly be more naturally explained, than by the departure of the popular religion, as established by the poets, from the other more ancient one.

them was secret. They had, like those of Eleusis, their public festivals, processions, and pilgrimages; in which none but the initiated took a part, but of which no one was prohibited from being a spectator. Whilst the multitude was permitted to gaze at them, it learned to believe, that there was something sublimer than any thing with which it was acquainted, revealed only to the initiated; and while the worth of that sublimer knowledge did not consist in secrecy alone, it did not lose any of its value by being concealed.

Thus the popular religion and the secret doctrines, although always distinguished from each other, united in serving to curb the people. The condition, and the influence of religion on a nation, are always closely connected with the situation of those persons, who are particularly appointed for the service of the gods, the priests. The regulations of the Greeks concerning them, deserve the more attention, since many unimportant subjects of Grecian antiquity have been treated with an almost disproportionate expense of industry and erudition; but with respect to the priesthood of the nation, we are as yet left without any investigation, corresponding to the importance of the subject.[1] The very abundance of matter renders it the more difficult, for very little can be expressed in general terms; and many changes were brought about by time.

During the heroic age, we learn of Homer, that there were priests, who seem to have devoted themselves exclusively to that vocation. We readily call to mind a Calchas, a Chryses, and others. But even in that age, such priests appear but individually; no longer in colleges or societies, as the colonies of priests may have been, when in earlier times they migrated into Greece; and it does not appear that their influence over the rest of the people was very great and important. The sacred rites in honour of the gods were not performed by them alone; they were not even needed at the public solemnities. The leaders and commanders themselves offer their sacrifices,[2] perform the prayers, and observe the signs which indicated the result of

[1] The Prolegomena to a Scientific Mythology, by C. O. Müller, p. 249, etc., contain the outlines for the inquiry, and agree with the remarks made above.

[2] Instead of all other passages, see the description of the sacrifices which Nestor makes to Pallas. Od. iii. 430, etc.

an undertaking. In a word, kings and leaders were at the same time priests.

Traces of these very ancient regulations were preserved for a long time among the Greeks. The second Archon at Athens, who presided at the public ceremonies of worship, was called the king, because he had to prepare the sacred rites, which were formerly regulated by the kings. He had his assistants; and it was necessary for his spouse to be of irreproachable character, as she also had secret religious services to perform. He was, however, like the other Archons, annually appointed, and the election was made by lot.[1] The priests and priestesses of the several divinities were for the most part chosen. But the priestesses could be married, and the priests seem by no means to have been excluded by their station from participating in the offices and occupations of citizens. There were some sacerdotal offices, which were hereditary in certain families. But the number of them seem to have been inconsiderable. In Athens, the Eumolpidæ possessed the privilege, that the hierophant, or first director of the Eleusinian rites, as well as the other three,[2] should be taken from their family. But the place of hierophant could not be obtained except by a person of advanced years; and those other offices were probably not occupied during life, but frequently assigned anew.[3] How far the same was true in other cases, is but seldom related. At Delphi, the first of the oracles of the Hellenes, the Pythian priestess was chosen from among the women of the city;[4] and was obliged to have no intercourse with men. It is hardly probable from the extreme exertions connected with the delivery of oracles, that the same person could long fill the place. Here, as elsewhere, people were appointed for the service without the temple, some of whom, like Ion in Euripides, belonged to the god or the temple, and were even educated within its limits. But the service within the temple was performed by the most considerable citizens of Delphi, who were

[1] See the important passage in Demosthenes, in Neaer. Op. ii. p. 1370, ed. Reisk.

[2] The Daduchus, or torch-bearer; the Hieroceryx, or sacred herald; and the Epibomius, who served at the altar.

[3] St. Croix has collected examples in his Essay on the Ancient Mysteries.

[4] Euripid. Ion, v. 1320.

chosen by lot.[1] The sanctuary of Dodona, where the responses of the oracle were made, as at Delphi and in other temples, by priestesses, seems to have belonged to the family of the Selli, of which Homer had heard;[2] but we have no particular accounts respecting the situation of that family.

The regulations respecting priests, proposed by Plato in his books on laws,[3] show most clearly, that the ideas of the Greeks required, that the offices of priests should not long be filled by the same persons. "Let the election of the priests," says he, "be committed to the god, by referring the appointment to lot; those on whom the lot falls, must submit to an examination. But each priesthood shall be filled for one year only, and no longer, by the same person; he who fills it, may not be less than sixty years old. The same rule shall apply to the priestesses."

We infer from all this, that, though the regulations respecting the priesthood were not the same in all parts of Greece, that office was commonly filled for a limited time only, was regarded as a place of honour, to which, as to the other mysteries, appointments were made by lot, with an examination, and was subjected to the same rotation with the rest. They to whom it was intrusted, were taken from the class of active citizens, to which they again returned; and even whilst they were priests, they were by no means withdrawn from the regular business of civil life.[4] The priesthood did not gain even that degree of firmness which it had at Rome; where the priests, though they were not separated from secular pursuits, formed separate colleges, like those of the Pontifices and Augurs; and the members of whom were chosen for life. Since the priesthood then, among the Hellenes in general, and in the several states, never formed a distinct order, it could not possess the spirit of a party, and it was quite impossible for any thing like priestcraft to prevail. Religion and public acts of worship were so far considered holy and inviolable, that they were

[1] See the important passage in Euripid. Ion, 414: "I," says Ion, speaking to the foreigner on the service of the temple, "I have charge only of the outer part; the interior belongs to them who sit near the tripod, the first of the Delphians whom the lot selected."

[2] Il. xv. 235. [3] Plato, de Leg. l. vi. Op. viii. p. 266. Bip.

[4] Not even from the duties of war. The Daduchus Callias fought at the battle of Marathon in his costume as a priest. Plutarch in Aristid. Op. ii. p. 491, ed. Reiske.

protected by the state; and that a degree of intolerance was produced, which led even to injustice and cruelty. But we do not find that the priests were peculiarly active in such cases. It was the people which believed itself injured; or a political party; or individual demagogues, who had some particular object in view.[1]

As the priests of the Greeks formed no distinct class in society, it is evident, that they could have no such secret system of instructions, as was possessed by those of Egypt. No such system can therefore be contrasted with the popular religion; instead of it there were the mysteries; but the initiated were not all of them priests, nor was it necessary for every priest to be initiated into the mysteries. Any could be admitted to them, whose condition in life, and behaviour, were found to deserve the distinction.

These regulations led to important consequences. There was in the nation no separate class, which claimed an exclusive right to certain branches of scientific and intellectual culture; and preserved that exclusive right by means of written characters, intelligible only to themselves. That which should be the common property, and is the noblest common property of humanity, was such among the Greeks. And this made it possible to unfold with freedom the spirit of philosophy. The oldest philosophy of the Greeks, as it appeared at first in the Ionic school, may have originally stood in close union with religion, and may indeed have proceeded from it; for who does not perceive the near connexion between speculations on the elements of things, and those ancient representations of the gods as powers or objects of nature. But religion could not long hold philosophy in chains. It could not prevent the spirit of free inquiry from awakening and gaining strength; and hence it was possible for all those sciences, which are promoted by that spirit, to assume among the Greeks a decided and peculiar character. In the intellectual culture of the East, all scientific knowledge is connected with religion; but as these were kept

[1] Consult above every thing else, the oration of Andocides on the Profanation of the Mysteries, delivered on occasion of the well-known accusation of Alcibiades and his friends. Did we not know that a political party was active in that affair, it would hardly seem intelligible to us. It gives a remarkable proof of the ease with which the passions of the Athenians might be aroused, when any attack was made on the things they deemed sacred.

separate by the Greeks, science gained among them that independent character, which distinguishes the West, and which was communicated to the nations of whom the Greeks were the instructors.

As the priests never formed a distinct order, and still less a caste, in Greece, the religion never became a religion of state to such a degree as in other countries. It was sometimes subservient to public policy, but never became a slave to it. The dry, prosaic religion of the Romans could be used or abused to such purposes; but that of the Greeks was much too poetical. The former seems to have existed only for the sake of the state; and the latter, even when it was useful to the state, appears to have rendered none but voluntary services. The Patricians confined the popular religion of Rome within the strict limits of a system; but in Greece, religion preserved its freedom of character.

COLONISTS FROM ABROAD.

The race of the Hellenes was always the prevalent one in Greece; but it was by no means unmixed. The superior advantages of the country invited foreign emigrations, and its situation facilitated them. Many nations of Thracian, Carian, and Illyrian origin, descended at different times from the North by land.[1] These colonists, at least such as remained in the country, may by degrees have been amalgamated with the Hellenes; but, being themselves barbarians, they could not have contributed much towards softening the manners of the nation; although the poets of Thrace, an Orpheus and his school of bards, and Linus and others, were not without influence on them. The case was far different with those who came by sea. Greece, as we observed in a former chapter,[2] was surrounded at no great distance by the most cultivated nations of the western world, which nations were more or less devoted to commerce and the founding of colonies. This is well known to have been the character of the Phœnicians, and it is equally certain that it was so of the inhabitants of Asia Minor; and traces of Egyptian colonies are found no less in Europe than in Asia.

[1] Their names are for the most part mentioned by Strabo, l. vii. p. 494.
[2] Compare the close of chapter first.

If no accounts had been preserved of colonies of those nations, emigrating to Greece, they would of themselves have seemed highly probable. But we are so far from being without accounts of this kind, that they have been much more accurately preserved, than the remoteness of time and the condition of the nation would have authorized us to expect. The memory of them could not become extinct, for their consequences were too lasting; and if events which for so long a time were preserved by nothing but tradition, are differently related and sometimes highly coloured, the critical student of history can hardly make any valid objections against their general truth, if the narratives are interpreted as the mythical language of extreme antiquity requires. The first of the foreign colonies, which are mentioned as having arrived by sea, is that which, under the direction of Cecrops, came from Sais in Lower Egypt to Attica;[1] fifty years later, Danaus led his colony from Chemmis in Upper Egypt, to Argos in the Peloponnesus. These emigrations took place at the period in which, according to the most probable chronological reckoning, the great revolutions in Egypt were effected by the expulsion of the Arabian nomades; and the kingdom was restored to its liberty and independence; a period, in which emigrations were at least not improbable. The colony which, as Herodotus relates, was brought by Cadmus, together with the alphabet, from Phœnicia to Greece,[2] needs no further proof, when we learn how extensive were the colonies of that nation; we are only astonished, that we hear of but one such in Greece; since the common course of things would rather lead us to expect a continued immigration, such as took

[1] This is supposed to have taken place about 1550 years before Christ. The immigration by Cecrops from Egypt, is questioned by the investigations of C. O. Müller, in the History of the Hellenic Tribes and Cities, i. p. 106, etc., inasmuch as Theopompus is the earliest writer who mentions it. But Theopompus must have had before him an earlier authority. That a belief in a relationship with the Egyptians is as old as the age of Solon, appears to me certain, from the narration of Plato in Timæus (Op. ix. p. 293, etc., ed. Bip.). Further inquiries respecting the influence of Egypt on Greece, on which opinions are now so divided, will probably lead to the conclusion, that the truth is in the middle. Want of land, excessive population, and revolutions, which are the chief causes of emigration, existed no where in the old world in more force than in Egypt, and particularly at the time assigned for the emigration of Cecrops, during the dominion and after the expulsion of the Hycsos from Lower Egypt.

[2] Herod. v. 58.

place in the islands, which became almost entirely Phœnician. Even this doubt vanishes, when we regard Cadmus, not as a person, but as the symbol of the Phœnician colonies in Greece; although the early and distinct notices of Cadmus in Herodotus, render it difficult to give up the usual representation. Nor should we forget the establishment made by Pelops of Lydia in the peninsula which bears his name.[1] That also was occasioned by the events of war. Tantalus, the father of Pelops, having been driven from Lydia by Ilus, king of Troy, sought and found in Argos a place of refuge for himself and his treasures.

Yet very different answers have been given to the question, What influence had the emigration of those foreign colonists on the culture of the Greeks? And more have denied than have conceded, that such an influence was exerted. Where cultivated nations make establishments in the vicinity of barbarians, it would be wrong to infer directly the civilization of the latter, unless it be confirmed by distinct evidence. The aborigines of America have been for more than two centuries the immediate neighbours of civilized Europeans, and yet how little have they adopted from them! And if doubts were entertained in the case of the Greeks, it was chiefly because their whole national culture was so remarkably different from that of those Eastern nations, that the former could hardly seem much indebted to the latter.

Yet the testimony of the Greeks themselves proves such an influence too clearly to be doubted. Cecrops is expressly mentioned, as having first established domestic union among the inhabitants of Attica, by the introduction of regular marriages; and as having built the citadel which afterwards bore his name. The same is true of the citadel which Cadmus built in Thebes; and if we interpret the account of Herodotus respecting the introduction of the alphabet by him, to mean only, that the Hellenes were indebted for it to the Phœnicians, (which on the whole can hardly be doubted,) the case would not be changed. And if Pelops not only emigrated to Argos with his treasures, but gave his name to the peninsula, the facts admit of no other interpretation than that his emigration was productive of the most important consequences.

[1] Strabo, p. 222.

But further. These foreigners not only became princes themselves, but made the royal power hereditary in their families. The earliest kings of Attica, Pandion, Ægeus, Theseus, were all descended from the house of Cecrops, although only by the female side. Perseus and his heroic family sprung in like manner from the family of Danaus. When we name Cadmus, we remember at the same time his descendants, the favourites of the tragic muse, Laius, Œdipus, Eteocles, and Polynices, the rulers of Thebes. But the posterity of Pelops, the house of Atrides, excelled all the rest in fame as in misfortunes. In this manner the traditional history of the nation is principally dependent on these families from abroad; they were not only the oldest rulers, but the memory of them continued to live in the mouth of the people from age to age; till the tragic poets conferred on them immortality. It is impossible that such a continued dominion of those families should have had no influence on the nation. To assert it would be to assert what is inconsistent with the natural course of things.

If these immigrations seem to have been occasioned by political causes, others had their origin in religion. In modern times the savage nature of barbarians has been tamed by missions; but although antiquity knew and could know none such, the early part of our present inquiries proves, that political and mercantile ends were none the less connected with sanctuaries and oracles. Greece received its colonies of priests; by which we mean the establishments of sanctuaries by foreigners, who brought with them their own peculiar forms of worship. The Homeric hymn to Apollo affords a remarkable proof, that such institutions were entirely in the spirit of the ancient Grecian world. When the Pythian god was establishing his oracle at Delphi, he beheld on the sea a merchant-ship from Crete; this he directs to Crissa, and appoints the foreigners the servants of his newly-established sanctuary, near which they settled and abode.[1] When this story, which we would not affirm to be historically true, is stripped of the language of poetry, it can only mean, that a Cretan colony founded the temple and oracle of Delphi. And the account given by Herodotus of the Egyptian origin of the oracle of Dodona, ceases to surprise us,[2]

[1] Homer. Hymn. in Apoll. 390, etc. [2] Herod. ii. 54.

although that oracle owes its establishment to another cause, the Phœnician slave-trade, by means of which two consecrated women were carried, the one to Ammonium in Libya, the other to Dodona. If we knew more certainly who the Selli were, who are thought to have been a branch of the Pelasgi, and are said by Homer[1] to have been the servants of the god, and in possession of the oracle, we should probably be able to say more than we now can respecting its history. That it was of Egyptian origin, is acknowledged not only by the sacred traditions of Dodona, but also by those of Egypt. It was impossible for these settlements to assume in Greece the aspect which they took in Africa. The character of the country and the spirit of the people were alike opposed to it; for though the popular religion in Greece was not wholly unconnected with politics, the state had never, as in Egypt, been founded entirely upon religion. But those settlements became the central point of societies of nations; they subsisted as oracles; of which the Greek stood in need both in public and private life.

Similar sacred institutions arose very early on several of the islands round Greece, and were transplanted from them to the continent. Those of Crete and Samothrace were the most important. The first of these islands occupies, in many points of view, a very important place in the most ancient history of Grecian culture; but the culture, which sprung up in Crete, seems rather to have produced early blossoms than later fruits. All that we know of the glory of Crete, belongs to the age of Homer and the preceding times.[2] The period in which they cleared the sea of robbers; exercised supremacy over the islands, and a part of the country on the shore, even of Attica; and received their laws from Minos, the familiar friend of Jove, belongs to so remote an age, that it affords less room for certainty than for conjecture. But Crete still appears in Homer so flourishing, that hardly a country on the continent could be compared with it.[3] The situation of this large island can alone serve to explain how it came to precede Hellas in culture. It

[1] Il. xvi. 234.

[2] See the rich compilation of Meursius; Crete, Cyprus, Rhodes, 1675.

[3] Crete awes the circling waves, a fruitful soil,
And ninety cities crown the sea-born isle.
Od. xix. 172, etc.; in Pope, 196, etc.

lay at almost equal distances from Egypt, Phœnicia, and Greece. If it was, as we are told, the country of brass and iron, and if these metals were first manufactured there,[1] the obscurity which covered the oldest tradition is at once removed. Late investigations have, however, led to more discriminating views; for they have shown, that by confounding the Ida of Phrygia or Asia Minor, with the Ida of Crete, many things have been applied to the latter, which should have been restricted to the former.[2] The prevailing minerals in Crete do not contain brass and iron;[3] and Crete has, therefore, been improperly regarded as the country of these metals. But they are found in the Ida of Phrygian Lydia; and that there was also the home of the fabulous personages, the Dactyli and Curetes, to whom tradition attributes the first acquisition and working of iron, is apparent even from the account in Strabo.[4] Yet they and their worship were transplanted to Crete; and with them the working of iron, which, though not originating in Crete, could easily have been introduced from Asia Minor and Cyprus. Nor can any one, who is familiar with the origin of the ancient religions of nature, be surprised to find this earliest metallurgy connecting itself with a worship, which generated sacred usages and mysteries.[5] As far as we can judge, the immigration of the Dactyli and Curetes into Crete belongs to the age before Minos;[6] and if manufactures of iron and brass were established there, the immigration into the island from various quarters, by the Pelasgi, Hellenes, and Phœnicians, are easily explained.[7]

[1] The most important passage in Diodor. v. p. 381.

[2] Hoeck's Kreta, I. Band.

[3] Hoeck, I. 42, and the appendix by Hausmann on the character of the geological formations of Crete, p. 443.

[4] Strabo, p. 725, and Hoeck, 284.

[5] Diod. I. p. 381. So too the workmen in the mines of Germany abound in superstitions.

[6] Hoeck, I. 359, first appendix.

[7] They are enumerated chronologically by Diodorus, I. p. 382. Hoeck, I. 52, proves that no evidence exists of immigrations from Egypt

CHAPTER IV.

THE HEROIC AGE—THE TROJAN WAR.

ALTHOUGH the history of the progress of the Greek nation during the early period of its culture, is imperfect and fragmentary, the progress itself is certain. In the age which we best designate in the spirit of the nation by the name of the Heroic Age, and which extends from about the thirteenth to the eleventh century before the Christian era, we find them advanced to a far higher degree of civilization, than that of which by their own accounts they were possessed before. The poet who delineates them in that stage is never untrue to the poetic character; and yet Homer was regarded even by the ancients as of historical authority; and, to a certain point, deserved to be so regarded. Truth was his object in his accounts and descriptions, as far as it can be the object of a poet, and even in a greater degree than was necessary, when he distinguishes the earlier and later times or ages. He is the best source of information respecting the heroic age; and since that source is so copious, there is no need of drawing from any other.

When we compare the Greeks of Homer with those of later ages, we immediately perceive a remarkable difference, to which we must at once direct our attention. His Greeks, to whatever tribe they belong, are all equal in point of culture. With him, the Thessalian differs in nothing from the inhabitant of the Peloponnesus, nor the Etolian from the Bœotian and Athenian; the sole points of difference which he marks, are merely personal; or, at most, result from the greater or smaller extent of the several territories. Hence we infer, that the causes which afterwards gave the inhabitants of the eastern part of Hellas so great an advantage over those of the west, had not then begun to operate. There must rather have been some causes of general influence, to produce that early progress; and therefore we have less reason to fear that we were mistaken in assigning the first place among them to religion.

Yet religion had no influence in exciting and developing

that heroic spirit, which is the characteristic of the age. In those later centuries of the middle age which embrace the Christian heroic age, a devotional spirit formed a prominent feature in the character of a knight; but nothing like this is to be found among the Greeks. The Grecian heroes always preserve a belief in the gods; are intimately and directly united with them; are sometimes persecuted and sometimes protected by them; but they do not fight for their religion, like the Christian knights. Such an idea could never occur to them; for their representations of their gods did not admit of it. And here we remark one great point of difference between the Grecian and Christian heroic character. A second, to which we shall return directly, results from the different condition of the other sex. But another prominent trait is common to both; the propensity to extraordinary and bold undertakings, not only at home, but in foreign lands, in countries beyond the sea, and of which tradition had, for the most part, spread none but indistinct accounts. This propensity was first awakened by the early immigrations of the Hellenes. But the exploits of the oldest heroes among the Greeks, Meleager, Tydeus, and others, before Hercules and Jason, were performed at home; and even those which are said to have been performed by Hercules out of Greece, are probably a later fiction, invented at the time when his name was first added to the number of the Argonauts, and the Grecian Hercules was confounded with the Phœnician. Adventures in foreign regions begin with Jason and the Argonautic expedition; and those adventures were destined soon to end in a general union of the nation for the purpose of carrying on a war beyond the sea.

As far as we can judge amidst the uncertainty of the chronology of that period, this adventurous spirit appears to have been awakened in the century immediately preceding the Trojan war. According to all possible chronological combinations, we must refer to this period the expedition of the Argonauts and the undertaking of Theseus against Crete; which events happened soon after the dominion of the sea had been gained for that island by Minos. The general condition of Greece in that period explains, in some measure, why the limits of that country began to grow too narrow, and a new theatre for the display of enterprise

to be sought for. The whole of Greece previous to the Trojan war, appears to have enjoyed perfect tranquillity within its own boundaries. The limits of the small districts into which Greece was divided, seem already to have been definitively established. We hear of no contention respecting them on the part of the princes; and Homer was able to enumerate the several possessions with precision. The war of the seven against Thebes had its origin in family discord; and the claims of the exiled Heraclidæ were not made valid till a more recent age. It was on the whole an age of internal peace, notwithstanding some interruptions. In such an age there was little opportunity for heroic exploits at home; and what was more natural than that the warlike spirit, which was once roused, should go in quest of them abroad?

But such was the situation of the country, that this could take place only by sea. There was in the North nothing which could invite the spirit of enterprise; and the country in that direction was possessed by warlike nations. On the other hand, the reports which came to the Greeks respecting the land beyond the sea, were numerous; even though they may have been brought by none but the Phœnicians. The countries and nations which were the chief objects of the voyages of that commercial people, the Cimmerians in the North, the Lotophagi, and the gardens of the Hesperides on the coast of Libya; Sicily with its wonders, the Cyclops, and Scylla and Charybdis; and even Spain, with the mighty Geryon and the pillars of Hercules, are dimly seen in the earliest Grecian mythology. These traditions did much towards awakening the spirit of adventure, and thus occasioned the Argonautic expedition.

These early voyages, by which so much activity was awakened, and so much energy called into action, were the chief means by which the circle of ideas in the nation was enlarged. This is obvious from those ancient mythological tales, which were thus introduced, and which were the fruit of the increased intercourse with foreign countries. The geography of Homer, limited as it is, not only extends far beyond the bounds of his native land; but shows a manifest desire of discovering the farthest limits of the earth. The ocean stream which flowed round it, is mentioned; the regions

are named, in which the sun has the gates of its rising and setting; even the entrance to the lower world is known. The obscurity in which all this was veiled, served but to excite the adventurous spirit, when once aroused, to new undertakings.

The internal political condition of Greece in the heroic age was in one respect similar to that of a later period; and in another essentially different. It was similar in the division into small territories; but it was altogether different in the constitutions of the states.

The division into territories, a result of the variety of the tribes, was in those times as great, or perhaps greater than in more recent ones. The district of Thessaly alone contained, in Homer's time, no less than ten small states, each of which had its prince or leader. In the central part of Greece, the Bœotians had five principalities;[1] the Minyes, whose capital was Orchomenus, the Locrians,[2] the Athenians, the Phocians, had each their own ruler. In the Peloponnesus, there existed, independent of each other, the kingdoms of Argos, of Mycenæ, of Sparta, of Pylus, that of the Elians, divided under four heads, and Arcadia. Many of the islands also had their own princes. On the west side, the government of Ulysses embraced, beside Ithaca, the islands Zacynthus and Cephallene, and Epirus which lies over against it. The flourishing island of Crete was swayed by Idomeneus; Salamis, by Ajax; Eubœa, inhabited by the Abantes, Rhodes, and Cos had their own rulers; Ægina, and probably others of the small islands, belonged to the neighbouring princes.

This political division was therefore from the earliest times a peculiarity of Greece; and it never ceased to be so. And here it is natural to ask, how it could have continued so long? How happened it, that amidst the early civil wars, and especially the later superiority of the Doric tribe, the supremacy of an individual state was never established? One principal cause of this is to be found in the natural geographical divisions of the country, which we have described in a former chapter; another, no less important, seems to lie

[1] Il. ii., catalog. nav. 1, etc., where also the passages may be found, which serve as proofs of the following statements.

[2] The Opuntii and Epicnemidii. Homer makes no mention of the Ozolæ.

in the internal division of the several tribes. Even where those of the same tribe made their settlements, they were immediately split into separate townships. According to these, the troops of soldiers are distinguished in Homer. Proofs of it are found in all parts of his poems, especially in the catalogue of the ships. If these townships stood under one common head, they were still united only by a feeble bond. The germ of division was deeply fixed, even in those earlier times; and as it unfolded, it was destined to mature the whole subsequent political condition of Greece.

Yet though the divisions of the country were then as numerous, the forms of government in those early times were entirely different from the later ones. We meet with no governments but those of princes or kings; there were then no republics; and yet republicanism was eventually to decide the political character of Greece. These monarchical constitutions, if that name may be applied to them, were rather the outlines of constitutions than regular, finished forms of government. They were a consequence of the most ancient condition of the nation, when either ruling families sprung up in the several tribes, or the leaders of foreign colonies had known how to secure to themselves and their posterity the government over the natives. The families of Peleus, Cadmus, Pelops, and others, have already been mentioned. It was a great recommendation of the later rulers, to be able to trace their lineage to one of the ancient heroes or gods; and Alexander himself sought the confirmation of his own descent from the temple of Ammon. But though much depended on descent, we learn from observing those ancient families, that it was not only necessary that the founder of the family should be a hero, but, if its elevation was to be preserved, that many heroes like him should arise among his posterity. For this the houses of Pelops and Cadmus were the most illustrious. But only certain branches of the family of Hercules, the first of Grecian heroes, were remembered by the nation, while others passed into oblivion. The Greeks paid respect to birth, yet they never attributed every thing to it; and if in those republican times, the noble families were preserved distinct from the rest, their superiority depended seldom on birth alone; and no line was drawn between them and the rest of the people, such as divided the

Patricians from the Plebeians in the early period of Roman history. The correct feeling of the Greeks is observable in this, as in so many other things. The respect for their illustrious families was continued in the recollection of their actions; but the descendants were not long permitted to live on the fame of their forefathers.

The constitutions of the heroic age were the result of circumstances, and wants which were felt. Esteem for the ruling families secured to them the government; but their power was not strictly hereditary. Princes were not much more than the first amongst their peers; even the latter were sometimes denominated princes.[1] The son had commonly the precedence over others in the succession; but his claim was measured by his personal qualifications for the station.[2] It was his first duty to lead in war; and he could not do this, unless he was himself distinguished for courage and strength. His privileges in peace were not great. He called together the popular assembly, which was chiefly, if not exclusively, composed of the older and more distinguished citizens.[3] Here the king had his own seat; the ensign of his dignity was a sceptre or staff. He had the right of addressing the assembly, which was done standing. In all important events he was bound to consult the people. In addition to this he sometimes acted as judge;[4] but not always; for the administration of justice was often committed to an assembly of the elders.[5] Nothing was known of particular taxes paid to the king. His superiority consisted in a piece of land, and a larger part of the booty. Excepting this, he derived his support from his own possessions and the produce of his fields and herds. The preservation of his dignity required an almost unbounded hospitality. His house was the place of assembly for persons of the upper class, who almost always sat at table with him; to turn away strangers, who asked for shelter, or only

[1] As, in Od. viii. 41, the *σκηπτοῦχοι βασιλῆες* of Ithaca.

[2] Observe the description of the situation of Telemachus in this respect. Odyss. i. 392, etc.

[3] Compare the description of the assembly of Phæacians. Odyss. viii.

[4] Aristot. Polit. iii. 14. *Στρατηγὸς γὰρ ἦν καὶ δικαστῆς ὁ βασιλευς, καὶ τῶν πρὸς θεοῦς κύριος.*

[5] See e. g. the representation on the shield of Achilles. Il. xviii. 504.

seemed to stand in need of it, would have been an unexampled outrage.[1]

Greece, even in those times, was a thickly peopled and well cultivated country. What a crowd of cities is enumerated by the poet! And we must not imagine these to have been open towns with scattered habitations. The epithets applied to them frequently prove the reverse. They are in part surrounded with walls; have gates and regular streets.[2] Yet the houses stand by themselves; having in front a court, and in the rear a garden.[3] Such at least were the houses of the most respectable. Others appear to stand directly on the street without any court in front. In the middle of the city there is a public square or market-place; the common place of assembly for the citizens, whether on solemn occasions, or for deliberation, or courts of justice, or any other purpose. It is surrounded with seats of stone, on which the distinguished men are wont on such occasions to take their places.[4] No trace is to be found of any pavement in the streets.

The different branches of agriculture were already well advanced. Property in lands was universal; of which the boundaries were fixed by measurement, and often designated by stones.[5] The poet describes to us the various labours of farming, ploughing, whether with oxen or mules, sowing, reaping, binding the sheaves, and treading out the corn by oxen on the threshing floor. Nor does he omit to mention the culture of the grape, the tilling of gardens, and the various duties of the herdsman.[6] It may be doubted whether the soil was much better cultivated in the most flourishing period of Grecian history.

The houses of the heroes were large and spacious, and at the same time suited to the climate. The court was surrounded by a gallery, about which the bedchambers were

[1] How warmly Menelaus reproaches Eteoneus for proposing to send the strangers some where else. Od. iv. 31.

[2] E. g. Athens with broad streets (εὐρυάγυια). Od. vii. 8. Gortys with firm walls (τειχιόεσσα); and others.

[3] Thus the palace of Menelaus, Od. ii.; and of Alcinous, Od. vii. Others on the street. Il. xviii. 496.

[4] The city of the Phæacians, Od. vii., gives proof of all this.

[5] Il. xii. 421, xxi. 405.

[6] I need only call to mind the representations on the shield of Achilles. Il. xviii. 540, etc.

built. There was a direct entrance from the court to the hall, which was the common place of resort.[1] Movable seats (θρόνοι) stood along the sides of the walls. Every thing glistened with brass. On one side was a place of deposit, where the arms were kept. In the back-ground was the hearth, and the seat for the lady of the mansion, when she made her appearance below. Several steps conducted from thence to a higher gallery, near which were the chambers of the women, where they were employed in household labours, especially in weaving. Several outhouses for the purpose of grinding and baking were connected with the house; others for the common habitations of the male and female slaves; and also stables for the horses.[2] The stalls for cattle were commonly in the fields.

Astonishment is excited by the abundance of metals, both of the precious and baser ones, with which the mansions were adorned, and of which the household utensils were made.[3] The walls glittered with them; the seats were made of them. Water for washing was presented in golden ewers on silver salvers; the benches, arms, utensils were ornamented with them. Even if we suppose that much, called golden, was only gilded, we still have reason to ask, whence this wealth in precious metals? Homer gives us a hint respecting the silver, when he speaks of it as belonging to Alybe, in the land of the Halizones.[4] Most of the gold probably came from Lydia, where this metal in later times was so abundant, that the Greeks were for the most part supplied with all they used from that country. As there was no coined money,[5] and as the metals were in consequence used in commerce as means of exchange, the manufacturing of them seems to have been one of the chief branches of mechanic industry. Proofs of this are found in the preparation of arms and utensils. We need but call to mind the shield of Achilles, the torch-bearing statues in the house of Alcinous,[6]

[1] The above-mentioned mansions of Menelaus and Alcinous best illustrate this style of architecture; although the description of the mansion of Ulysses is in some parts more minute.

[2] Thus with Menelaus, Od. iv. 40.

[3] Above all in the mansion of Menelaus.

[4] Il. ii. Catalog. v. 364. Without doubt in the Caucasian chain of mountains; even if the Halizones and the Chalybes were not the same.

[5] This was probably one of the chief reasons why so much of it was manufactured.

[6] Od. vii. 100.

the enamelled figures on the clasp of Ulysses' mantle,[1] etc. But it is difficult to say, how far these manufactures were made by the Greeks, or gained by exchange from abroad. As the poet commonly describes them to be the works of Vulcan, it is at least clear, that manufactures of this kind were somewhat rare, and in part foreign.[2] Gold was afterwards wrought in Asia Minor, especially in Lydia; all labour in brass and iron seems, as we remarked above, to have been first brought to perfection among the Hellenes in Crete.

These labours in metal appear to have limited the early progress of the plastic arts. We find no traces of painting, and none of marble statues. But those efforts in metal imply practice in drawing; for we hear not only of figures, but also of expression in their positions and motions.[3]

The art of weaving, the chief occupation of the women, was even then carried to a high degree of perfection. The stuffs were of wool and linen; it is hard to decide how far cotton was in those times manufactured in Greece.[4] Yet garments of foreign manufacture, those of Egypt and Sidon, were esteemed the most beautiful.[5] The dress was decent but free. The female sex were by no means accustomed to conceal the countenance, but were clad in long robes; both sexes wore a tight under garment, over which the broad upper garment was thrown.[6]

The internal regulations of families were simple, but not without those peculiarities, which are a natural consequence of the introduction of slavery. Polygamy was not directly authorized; but the sanctity of marriage was not considered as violated by the intercourse of the husband with female slaves. The noble characters of Andromache and of Penelope exhibit, each in its own way, models of elevated con-

[1] Od. xix. 225, etc.

[2] As e. g. the silver goblet received by Menelaus from the king of Sidon. Od. iv. 615.

[3] Besides the description of the shield of Achilles, note especially Od. xix. 228, etc.

[4] Compare, above all, the description of Achilles' clothing. Od. xix. 225, etc. The mantle, (χλαινα,) rough to the touch, was without doubt of wool; but the under garment (χιτων) can hardly pass for either woollen or linen.

Fine as a filmy web beneath it shone
A vest, that dazzled like a cloudless sun.

[5] As e. g. Il. vi. 290.

[6] The passages are collected in Feithii Ant. Homer. iii. cap. 7.

jugal affection. It is more difficult for us, with our feelings, to understand the seduced and returning Helen; and yet if we compare Helen, the beloved of Paris in the Iliad,[1] with Helen, the spouse of Menelaus in the Odyssey,[2] we find truth and much internal harmony in the character which could err, but not become wholly untrue to nobleness of feeling. It is a woman, who, having become in youth the victim of sensuality, (and never without emotions of regret,) returned afterwards to reason; before she was compelled to do so by age. Even after her return from Troy, she was still exceedingly beautiful;[3] (and who can think of counting her years?) And yet even then the two sexes stood to each other in the same relation, which continued in later times. The wife is housewife, and nothing more. Even the sublime Andromache, after that parting, which will draw tears as long as there are eyes which can weep and hearts which can feel, is sent back to the apartments of the women, to superintend the labours of the maid-servants.[4] Still we observe in her conjugal love of an elevated character. In other instances love has reference, both with mortals and with immortals, to sensual enjoyment; although in the noble and uncorrupted virgin characters, as in the amiable Nausicaa, it was united with that bashfulness, which accompanies maiden youth. But we meet with no trace of those elevated feelings, that romantic love, as it is very improperly termed, which results from a higher regard for the female sex. That love and that regard are traits peculiar to the Germanic nations, a result of the spirit of gallantry which was a leading feature in the character of chivalry, but which we vainly look for in Greece. Yet here the Greek stands between the East and the West. Although he was never wont to revere woman as a being of a higher order, he did not, like the Asiatic, imprison her by troops in a haram.

The progress which had been made in social life, is visible in nothing, except the relative situation of the sexes, more distinctly, than in the tone of conversation among men. A solemn dignity belonged to it even in common intercourse; the style of salutation and address is connected with certain forms; the epithets with which the heroes honoured each

[1] In the third book.
[2] Odyss. iv. and xv.
[3] Odyss. iv. 121.
[4] Il. vi. 490.

other, were so adopted into the language of intercourse, that they are not unfrequently applied, even where the language of reproach is used. Let it not be said, that this is merely the language of epic poetry. The poet never could have employed it, if its original, and a taste for it, had not already existed. If the tone of intercourse is a measure of the social and, in a certain degree, of the moral improvement of a nation, the Greeks of the heroic age were already vastly elevated beyond their earlier savage state.

To complete the picture of those times, it is necessary to speak of war and the art of war. The heroic age of the Greeks, considered from this point of view, exhibits a mixture of savageness and magnanimity, and the first outlines of the laws of nations. The enemy who has been slain, is not secure against outrage, and yet the corpse is not always abused.[1] The conquered party offers a ransom; and it depends on the victor to accept or refuse it. The arms, both of attack and defence, are of iron or brass. No hero appeared, like Hercules of old, with a club and lion's skin for spear and shield. The art of war, as far as it relates to the position and erecting of fortified camps, seems to have been first invented in the siege of Troy.[2] In other respects, every thing depended on the more or less perfect equipments, together with personal courage and strength. As the great multitude was, for the most part, without defensive armour, and as only a few were completely accoutred, one of these last outweighed a host of the rest. But only the leaders were thus armed; and they, standing on their chariots of war, (for cavalry was still unknown,) fought with each other in the space between the armies. If they were victorious, they spread panic before them; and it became easy for them to break through the ranks. But we will pursue no farther the description of scenes, which every one prefers to read in the poet himself.

As the crusades were the fruit of the revolution in the social condition of the West, the Trojan war resulted from the same causes in Greece. It was necessary that a fondness for adventures in foreign lands should be awakened;

[1] An example, Il. vi. 417.

[2] See on this subject, on which we believe we may be brief, the Excursus of Heyne to the vi. vii. and viii. books of the Iliad.

expeditions by sea, like that of the Argonauts, be attended with success; and a union of the heroes, as in that and the march against Thebes, be first established; before such an undertaking could become practicable. But now it resulted so naturally from the whole condition of things, that, though its object might have been a different one, it must have taken place even without a Helen.

The expedition against Troy, like the crusades, was a voluntary undertaking on the part of those who joined in it; and this circumstance had an influence on all the internal regulations. The leaders of the several bands were voluntary followers of the Atridæ, and could therefore depart from the army at their own pleasure. Agamemnon was but the first among the first. It is more difficult to ascertain the relation between the leaders and their people; and he who should undertake to describe every thing minutely, would be most sure of making mistakes. There were certainly control and obedience. The troops follow their leaders, and leave the battle with them. But much even of this seems to have been voluntary; and the spirit of the age allowed no such severe discipline as exists in modern armies. None but a Thersites could have received the treatment of Thersites.

This undertaking, begun and successfully terminated by united exertions, kindled the national spirit of the Hellenes. On the fields of Asia, the tribes had for the first time been assembled, for the first time had saluted each other as brethren. They had fought and had conquered in company. Yet something of a higher character was still wanting to preserve the flame, which was just blazing up. The assistance of the muse was needed, to commemorate in words those events of which the echo will never die away. By preserving the memory of them for ever, the most beautiful fruits which they bore were saved from perishing.

CHAPTER V.

THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE HEROIC AGE. MIGRATIONS. ORIGIN OF REPUBLICAN FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, AND THEIR CHARACTER.

LIKE the age of chivalry in western Europe, the heroic age of the Greeks began and ended without our being able to define either period by an exact date. Such a phenomenon is the fruit of causes which are rooted deeply and of continuing influence, and it neither suddenly ripens nor suddenly decays. The heroic age was not immediately terminated by the Trojan war; yet it was during that period in its greatest glory.[1] It was closely united with the political constitution of the times; the princes of the tribes were the first of the heroes. When the constitution of the tribes was changed, the ancient heroic world could not continue. No new undertaking was begun, which was so splendidly executed and closed. Although, therefore, heroic characters may still have arisen, as in the times of Achilles and Agamemnon, no similar career of honour was opened to them; they were not celebrated in song like the Atridæ and their companions; and though they may have gained the praise of their contemporaries, they did not live, like the latter, in the memory of succeeding generations.

In the age succeeding the Trojan war, several events took place, which prepared and introduced an entire revolution in the domestic and still more in the public life of the Greeks. The result of these revolutions was the origin and general prevalence of republican forms of government among them; and this decided the whole future character of their public life as a nation.

It is still possible for us to show the general causes of this great change; but when we remember that these events took place before Greece had produced an historian, and when tradition was the only authority, we give up all expectation of gaining perfect and unbroken historical accounts; and

[1] Hesiod limits his fourth age, the age of heroes, to the times immediately before and after the Trojan war. Op. et Dies, 156, etc.

acknowledge that we can hardly know more of them than Thucydides.

"The emigration of the tribes," says this historian,[1] "was by no means at an end with the Trojan war. The continuance of the war produced many changes; in many cities disturbances were excited, which occasioned the banished parties to found new cities. The Bœotians, driven from Arne in Thessaly, took possession of their country in the sixtieth year after the fall of Troy; in the eightieth, the Dorians, led on by the Heraclidæ, conquered the Peloponnesus." And we have already observed, what great revolutions were produced by this last event. A new tribe, till then the weaker, was extended and became the more powerful. But still greater changes were to come; the race of the Hellenes were destined to extend on the east and west, far beyond the limits of their ancient country. "When Greece," continues Thucydides, "after a long interval, at length became composed, and assumed a firmer appearance, it sent out colonies; Athens, to Ionia in Asia Minor, and to a great part of the islands of the Archipelago; the Peloponnesians, chiefly to Italy and Sicily; all which settlements were not made till after the Trojan times."

The views of the nation could not but be enlarged by the Trojan war. It had become acquainted with the coasts of Asia, those lands so highly favoured by nature; and the recollection of them never died away. When the new internal storms followed, and almost all the tribes of the Hellenes were driven from their places of abode, it is not remarkable that the coasts of Asia should have attracted the emigrating parties. Since the downfal of Troy, no new dominion had been established there; no nation of the country was strong enough to prohibit the settlement of the foreigners. Thus, in the course of not more than a century,[2] the western coast of Asia Minor was occupied by a chain of Grecian cities, extending from the Hellespont to the boundary of Cilicia. Æolians, conducted by the descendants of the fallen house of the Atridæ, established their residence in the vicinity of the ruins of Troy, on the coast of Mysia, in the most fruitful region known to those times,[3] and on the opposite island

[1] Thucyd. i. 12. [2] In a period subsequent to the year 1130 before Christ.
[3] Herod. i. 149.

of Lesbos; on the continent they built twelve cities, and on Lesbos Mitylene, which now gives a name to the whole island. Smyrna, the only one which has preserved a part of its splendour, and Cyme, exceeded all the rest on the main land. Æolis was bounded on the south by Ionia, a region so called from the twelve Ionian cities, which were built by the Ionians, who had been expelled from their ancient country. They also occupied the neighbouring islands Chios and Samos. If Æolis could boast of superior fertility, the Ionian sky was celebrated with the Greeks as the mildest and most delightful.[1] Of these cities, Miletus, Ephesus, and Phocæa became flourishing commercial towns; the mothers of many daughters, extending from the shores of the Black Sea and Lake Mæotis, to the coasts of Gaul and Iberia. Neither were the Dorians content with their conquest of the Peloponnesus; troops of them thronged to Asia; Cos, and the wealthy Rhodes, as well as the cities Halicarnassus and Cnidus, were peopled by them. In this manner, as the series of cities planted by the Grecians ascended the Macedonian and Thracian coast to Byzantium, the Ægean Sea was encircled with Grecian colonies, and its islands were covered with them. But the mother country seems soon to have been filled again; and as the east offered no more room, the emigrants wandered to the west. At a somewhat later period, but with hardly less success, the coasts of Lower Italy, which soon took the name of Magna Græcia, and those of Sicily, were occupied by Dorians, Achæans, and Ionians.[2] On the gulf of Tarentum, not only the city of that name, but Croton and Sybaris soon rose to a degree of population and wealth, bordering on the fabulous; whilst the chain of towns extended by way of Rhegium and Pæstum as far as Cumæ and Naples. These colonial towns were still more frequent on the coasts of Sicily, from Messana and the unrivalled Syracuse to the proud Agrigentum. And in the now desolate Barca, on the coast of Libya, Cyrene flourished with the towns of which it was the metropolis, and proved that Greeks remained true to their origin even in Africa.

We reserve for another chapter the consideration of the

[1] Herod. i. 142.

[2] Especially between the years 800 and 700 before the Christian era. Yet single colonies were earlier established.

flourishing condition and various consequences of their colonies. But whilst the world of the Greeks and their circle of vision were thus enlarged, it was not possible for their political condition to remain unchanged. Freedom ripens in colonies. Beyond the sea, ancient usage cannot be preserved, cannot altogether be renewed, as at home. The former bonds of attachment to the soil and ancient customs, were broken by emigration; the spirit felt itself to be more free in the new country; new strength was required for the necessary exertions; and those exertions were animated by success. Where every man lives by the labour of his hands, equality arises, even if it did not exist before. Each day is fraught with new experience; the necessity of common defence is more felt in lands where the new settlers find ancient inhabitants desirous of being free from them. Need we wonder, then, if the authority of the founders, even where it had originally subsisted, soon gave way to liberty?

Similar phenomena are observable in the mother country. The annihilation of so many of the ruling houses in the Trojan war and its immediate consequences would have produced them even without internal storms. How then could the ancient order of things be restored, after so great revolutions and such changes in the residence of nearly all the tribes? The heroic age disappeared; and with it the supremacy of the princes; and when heroes came forward, like Aristomenes, they resemble adventurers rather than the sublime figures of Homer. On the other hand, the intercourse and trade with the colonies were continued on all sides; for, according to the Grecian custom, the mother country and her colonies were never strangers to each other; and the former soon had a lesson to learn of the latter.

A new order of things was the necessary consequence. The ancient ruling families died away of themselves, or lost their power. But this did not take place in all or most of the Grecian cities at one time, but very gradually; and he who should speak of a general political revolution in the modern phrase, would excite altogether erroneous conceptions. As far as we can judge from the imperfect accounts which remain of the history of the individual states, more than a century elapsed before the change was complete. We cannot fix the period of it in all of them; it happened

in most of them between the years 900 and 700 before Christ; in others, in the two centuries immediately after the Doric emigration. In several, as in Athens, it was brought about by degrees. In that city, when the royal dignity was abolished at the death of Codrus,[1] archons, differing little from kings, were appointed from his family for life; these were followed by archons chosen for ten years;[2] and these last continued for seventy years, till the yearly election of a college of archons set the seal to democracy.

The fruit of these changes was the establishment of free constitutions for the cities; which constitutions could prosper only with the increasing prosperity of the towns. Thucydides has described to us in an admirable manner how this happened. "In those times," says he,[3] "no important war, which could give a great ascendency to individual states, was carried on; the wars which chanced to arise, were only with the nearest neighbours." Though tranquillity may thus have sometimes been interrupted, the increase of the cities could not be retarded. "But since colonies were established beyond the sea, several of the cities began to apply themselves to navigation and commerce; and the intercourse kept up with them afforded mutual advantages.[4] The cities," continues Thucydides, "became more powerful and more wealthy; but then usurpers arose in most of them, who sought only to confirm their own power, and enrich their own families; but performed no great exploits; until they were overthrown, not long before the Persian wars, by the Spartans (who, amidst all those storms, were never subjected to tyrants) and the Athenians." [5]

The essential character of the new political form assumed by Greece, consisted therefore in the circumstance, that the free states which were formed, were nothing but cities with their districts, and their constitutions were consequently only forms of city government. This point of view must never be lost sight of. The districts into which Greece was divided, did not form, as such, so many states; but the same

[1] In the year 1068 before Christ. [2] In the year 752 before Christ.
[3] Thucyd. i. 15. [4] Thucyd. i. 13.
[5] For the counterpart to the narration of Thucydides, we need only call to mind the history of the Italian cities, towards the end of the middle age.

often contained many states, if it possessed several independent cities; though a whole district sometimes formed the territory of but one city, as Attica of Athens, Laconia of Sparta, etc., and in such a case formed of course but one state. But it might easily happen, that the cities of one district, especially if their inhabitants were of kindred tribes, formed alliances for mutual safety; as the twelve Achæan cities had done. But these alliances had reference only to foreign relations; and thus they formed a confederation of cities, but not one state; for each individual city had its own internal constitution, and managed its own concerns. It might also happen, that some one of the cities, on becoming powerful, should claim the sovereignty over the rest; as Thebes over the Bœotian cities. But however far such a superior rank might lead; it was intended by the Greeks, not only that each state should preserve its internal liberty; but that its submission should be voluntary; although the claims of a supreme city occasionally led to compulsory measures. When Thebes usurped the first rank in Bœotia, Platææ would never acknowledge its sovereignty. The consequences of it are known from history.

The whole political life of the nation was thus connected with cities and their constitutions; and no one can judge of Grecian history with accuracy, unless he comprehends the spirit of them. The strength of such cities seems to be very limited; but the history of the world abounds in examples, which show how far beyond expectation they can rise. They are animated by public spirit, resulting from civil prosperity; and the force of that spirit can be expressed in no statistical tables.

CHAPTER VI.

HOMER. THE EPIC POETS.

The heroic age was past, before the poets, who celebrated it, arose. It produced some contemporary with itself; but their fame was eclipsed by those who came after

them, and were it not for Homer, the names of Demodocus and Phemius had never become immortal.

With the Greeks, epic poetry had an importance, which it possessed among no other people; it was the source of their national education in poetry and the arts. It became so by means of the Homeric poems. But boundless as was the genius of the Ionian bard, a concurrence of favourable circumstances was still needed, to prepare for his appearance, and to make it possible.

Epic poetry was of itself a fruit of the heroic age; just as the poetry of chivalry was the result of the age of chivalry. The picture drawn for us by Homer of the heroic times, leaves no room to doubt of it. The feasts of the heroes, like the banquets of the knights, were ornamented with song. But the more copious the stream is to which it swelled, the more does it deserve to be traced, as far as possible, to its origin.

Even before the heroic age, we hear of several poets, of Orpheus, Linus, and a few others. But if their hymns were merely invocations and eulogies of the gods, as we must infer from the accounts which are handed down to us respecting them,[1] no similarity seems to have existed between them and the subsequent heroic poetry; although a transition not only became possible, but actually took place, when the actions of the gods were made the subjects of hymns.[2] The heroic poetry, according to all that we know of it, preserved the character of narration; whether those narrations contained accounts of the gods or of heroes;[3] "the actions of gods and heroes, who were celebrated in song." In the songs of Demodocus and Phemius, the subject is taken from the one and from the other; he celebrates the loves of Mars and Venus,[4] no less than the adventures which took place before Troy. The latter class of subjects cannot be more ancient than the heroic age, even though we should esteem the former as much older. But that age produced the class of bards, who were employed in celebrating the actions of

[1] Our present Orphic hymns have this character. The more ancient ones, if there were such, were nothing else. See Pausanias ix. p. 770; and the very ancient hymn, preserved by Stobæus. Stob. Eclog. i. p. 40, in Heeren's edition.

[2] The proof of this is found in the hymns attributed to Homer.

[3] Odyss. i. 338.

[4] Odyss. viii. 266, etc.

the heroes. They formed a separate class in society; but they stood on an equal footing with the heroes, and are considered as belonging to them.[1] The gift of song came to them from the gods; it is the Muse, or Jove himself, who inspires them and teaches them what they should sing.[2] As this representation continually recurs, it is probable that their poetic effusions were often extemporaneous. At least this seems in many cases hardly to admit of a doubt. Ulysses proposes to Demodocus the subject of his song;[3] and the bard, like the modern improvisatori, commences his strains under the influence of the sudden inspiration. We would by no means be understood to assert, that there were none but extemporaneous productions. Certain songs very naturally became favourites, and were kept alive in the mouths of the poets; whilst an infinite number, which were but the offspring of the moment, died away at their birth. But an abundance of songs was needed; a variety was required, and the charm of novelty even then enforced its claims.[4]

> For novel lays attract our ravished ears;
> But old the mind with inattention hears.

The voice was always accompanied by some instrument. The bard was provided with a harp, on which he played a prelude,[5] to elevate and inspire his mind, and with which he accompanied the song when begun. His voice probably preserved a medium between singing and recitation; the words, and not the melody, were regarded by the listeners; hence it was necessary for him to remain intelligible to all. In countries where nothing similar is found, it is difficult to represent such scenes to the mind; but whoever has had an opportunity of listening to the improvisatori of Italy, can easily form an idea of Demodocus and Phemius.

However imperfect our ideas of the earliest heroic songs may remain after all which the poet has told us, the following positions may be inferred from it. First: The singers were at the same time poets; they sang their own works; there is no trace of their having sung those of others. Farther: their songs were poured forth from the inspiration

[1] Od. viii. 483. Demodocus himself is here called a Hero.
[2] Od. viii. 73, i. 348.
[3] Od. viii. 492, etc., a leading passage.
[4] Od. i. 352.
[5] *ἀναβάλλεσθαι*, Od. viii. 266, etc.

of the moment; or only reposed in their memory. In the former case, they were, in the full sense of the word, improvisatori; and, in the latter, they must necessarily have remained in some measure improvisatori, for they lived in an age, which, even if it possessed the alphabet, seems never to have thought of committing poems to writing. The epic poetry of the Greeks did not continue to be mere extemporaneous effusions; but it seems to us very probable, that such was its origin. Lastly: Although the song was sometimes accompanied by a dance illustrative of its subject, imitative gestures are never attributed to the bard himself. There are dancers for that. Epic poetry and the ballet can thus be united; but the union was not essential, and probably took place only in the histories concerning the gods.[1] This union was very natural. Under the southern skies of Europe, no proper melody is required for the imitative dance; it is only necessary that the time should be distinctly marked. When the bard did this with his lyre, the dancers, as well as himself, had all that they required.

This heroic poetry, which was so closely interwoven with social life, that it could be spared at no cheering banquet, was common, no doubt, throughout all Hellas. We hear its strains in the island of the Phæacians, no less than in the dwellings of Ulysses and Menelaus. The poet does not bring before us strict contests in song; but we may learn, that the spirit of emulation was strong, and that some believed themselves already perfect in their art, from the story of the Thracian Thamyris, who wished to contend with the muses, and was punished for his daring by the loss of the light of his eyes, and the art of song.[2]

Epic poetry emigrated with the colonies to the shores of Asia. When we remember, that those settlements were made during the heroic age, and that in part the sons and posterity of the princes, in whose halls at Argos and Mycenæ its echoes had formerly been heard, were the leaders of those expeditions,[3] this will hardly seem doubtful, and still less improbable.

But that epic poetry should have first displayed its full

[1] As in the story of the amour of Mars and Venus. Od. viii.
[2] Il. Cat. Nav. 102.
[3] As Orestes and his descendants.

glory in those regions, and should have raised itself to the sublimity and extent which it obtained; was more than could have been expected.

And yet it was so. Homer appeared. The history of the poet and his works is lost in doubtful obscurity; as is the history of many of the first minds who have done honour to humanity, because they arose amidst darkness. The majestic stream of his song, blessing and fertilizing, flows, like the Nile, through many lands and nations; like the sources of the Nile, its fountains will remain concealed.

It cannot be the object of these essays, to enter anew into these investigations, which probably have already been carried as far as the present state of criticism and learning will admit.[1] The modern inquirers can hardly be reproached with credulity, for nothing, which could be doubted, not even the existence of Homer himself, has been left unquestioned. When once the rotten fabric of ancient belief was examined, no one of the pillars, on which it rested, could escape inspection. The general result was, that the whole building rested far more on the foundation of tradition, than of credible history; but how far this foundation is secure, is a question, respecting which, the voices will hardly be able to unite.

It seems of chief importance to expect no more than the nature of things makes possible. If the period of tradition in history is the region of twilight, we should not expect in it perfect light. The creations of genius remain always half miracles, because they are, for the most part, created far from the reach of observation. If we were in possession of all the historic testimonies, we never could wholly explain the origin of the Iliad and the Odyssey; for their origin, in all essential points, must have remained the secret of the poet. But we can, to a certain extent, explain how, under the circumstances of those times, an epic poet could arise; how he could elevate his mind; and how he could become of such importance to his nation and to posterity. This is all to which our inquiry should be directed.

The age of Homer, according to all probability, was that in which the Ionian colonies flourished in the vigour of

[1] It is hardly necessary to refer to the Excursus of Heyne on the last book of the Iliad; and the Prolegomena of Wolf.

youth.[1] Their subsequent condition shows that this must have been so; although history has not preserved for us any particular account on the subject. It is easy to conceive, that in a country highly favoured by nature; external circumstances could afford the poet many facilities, by means of the forms of social life, of which song was the companion. But the circumstances of the times afforded many greater advantages to poetic genius.

The glimmerings of tradition were not yet departed. The expedition against Troy, and the efforts of the earlier poets, had rather contributed so to mature the traditions, that they offered the noblest subjects for national poems. Before that time, the heroes of the several tribes had been of importance to none but their tribe; but those who were distinguished in the common undertaking against Troy, became heroes of the nation. Their actions and their sufferings awakened a general interest. Add to this, that these actions and adventures had already been celebrated by many of the early bards; and that they had even then imparted to the whole of history the poetic character, which distinguished it. Time is always needed to mature tradition for the epic poet. The songs of a Phemius and a Demodocus, though the subjects of them were taken from that war, were but the first essays, which died away, as the ancient songs have done, which commemorated the exploits of the crusaders. It was not till three hundred years after the loss of the Holy Land, that the poet appeared who was to celebrate the glory of Godfrey in a manner worthy of the hero; more time had perhaps passed after Achilles and Hector fell in battle, before the Grecian poet secured to them their immortality.

The language no less than the subject had been improved in this age. Although neither all its words nor its phrases were limited in their use by strict grammatical rules, it was by no means awkward or rough. It had for centuries been improved by the poets, and had now become a poetic language. It almost seemed more easy to make use of it in verse than in prose; and the forms of the hexameter, of which alone

[1] The age of Homer is usually set about a century after the foundation of those colonies, about the year 950 before Christ. If it be true, that Lycurgus, whose laws were given about the year 880, introduced his poems into Sparta, he cannot be much younger. We must leave to others the prosecution of these inquiries.

the epic poet made use, are extremely simple.[1] The language voluntarily submitted to the poet; and there never was a tongue, in which inspiration could have poured itself forth with more readiness and ease.

Under such circumstances it is intelligible, that when a sublime poetic genius arose among a people so fond of poetry and song as the Ionians always were, the age was favourable to him; although the elevated creations of his mind must continue to appear wonderful. There are two things, which in modern times appear most remarkable and difficult of explanation; how a poet could have first conceived the idea of so extensive a whole, as the Iliad and the Odyssey; and how works of such extent could have been finished and preserved, without the aid of writing.

With regard to the first point, criticism has endeavoured to show, and has succeeded in showing, that these poems, especially the Iliad, have by no means that perfect unity which they were formerly believed to possess; that rather many whole pieces have been interpolated or annexed to them; and there hardly exists at present an inquiring scholar, who can persuade himself, that we possess them both in the same state in which they came from the hands of the poet. But notwithstanding the more or less frequent interpolations, each has but one primary action; which, although it is interrupted by frequent episodes, could hardly have been introduced by any but the original author; and which does not permit us to consider either of these poems as a mere collection of scattered rhapsodies. It is certainly a gigantic step, to raise epic poetry to the unity of the chief action; but the idea springs from the very nature of a narration; and therefore it did not stand in need of a theory, which was foreign to the age; genius was able of itself to take this step.[2] Herodotus did something similar in the department of history.

[1] How much easier it must have been to make extemporaneous verses in that measure, than in the *ottava rima* of the Italians. And yet the Italian wears its shackles with the greatest ease.

[2] A more plausible objection is this: that even if it be conceded, that it was possible to invent and execute such large poems, they would have answered no end, as they were too long to admit of being recited at once. But a reply may be made to this. The Iliad and Odyssey could not be recited at a banquet. But there were public festivals and assemblies which lasted many days, and Herodotus read aloud the nine books of his history, in a succession of

We find it still more difficult to comprehend how works of this extent could have been planned and executed without the aid of letters, and preserved, probably for a long time, till they were finally saved from perishing by being committed to writing. We will not here repeat at large, what has already been said by others; that a class of singers, devoted exclusively to this business, could easily preserve in memory much more; that the poems were recited in parts, and therefore needed to be remembered only in parts; and that even in a later age, when the Homeric poems had already been intrusted to writing, the rhapsodists still knew them so perfectly, (as we must infer from the Ion of Plato,) that they could readily recite any passage which was desired. But let us be permitted to call to mind a fact, which has come to light since the modern inquiries respecting Homer, and which proves, that poems of even greater extent than the Iliad and the Odyssey can live in the memory and mouths of a nation. The Dschangariade of the Calmucks is said to surpass the poems of Homer in length, as much as it stands beneath them in merit;[1] and yet it exists only in the memory of a people, which is not unacquainted with writing. But the songs of a nation are probably the last things which are committed to writing, for the very reason that they are remembered.

But whatever opinions may be entertained on the origin of these poems, and whether we ascribe them to one author or to several, it will hardly be doubted that they all belong, on the whole, to one age, which we call, in a larger sense,

days, at Olympia. The Iliad and Odyssey, which when free from interpolations were perhaps much shorter than they now are, may have been recited in the course of several days. And if we may be permitted to indulge in conjecture, why may they not have been designed for such occasions? That the Greeks were accustomed to intellectual enjoyments, interrupted and afterwards continued, appears from the *Tetralogies* of the Dramatists in a later age. This is characteristic of a nation, which even in its pleasures desired something more than pastime, and always aimed at grandeur and beauty.

[1] See on this subject B. Bergmann, Nomadische, Streifereyen unter den Kalmycken, B. 2, S. 213, etc. This Calmuck Homer flourished in the last century. He is said to have sung three hundred and sixty cantos; but this number may be exaggerated. Of the singers, called Dschangartschi, it is not easy to find one, who knows more than twenty by heart. In the fourth part of his work, Mr. Bergmann has given us a translation of one of them, which is about equal in length to a rhapsody of Homer. It thus appears to be no uncommon thing for the Calmuck singers to retain in memory a poem quite as long as the Iliad or Odyssey.

the age of Homer. The important fact is, that we possess them. Whatever hypothesis we may adopt on their origin and formation, their influence on the Grecian nation and on posterity remains the same. And these are the topics which claim our regard.

It was Homer who formed the character of the Greek nation. No poet has ever, as a poet, exercised a similar influence over his countrymen. Prophets, lawgivers, and sages have formed the character of other nations; it was reserved to a poet to form that of the Greeks. This is a trait in their character, which could not be wholly erased even in the period of their degeneracy. When lawgivers and sages appeared in Greece, the work of the poet had already been accomplished; and they paid homage to his superior genius. He held up before his nation the mirror, in which they were to behold the world of gods and heroes no less than of feeble mortals, and to behold them reflected with purity and truth. His poems are founded on the first feelings of human nature; on the love of children, wife, and country; on that passion which outweighs all others, the love of glory. His songs were poured forth from a breast, which sympathized with all the feelings of man; and therefore they enter, and will continue to enter, every breast, which cherishes the same sympathies. If it is granted to his immortal spirit, from another heaven than any of which he dreamed on earth, to look down on his race, to see the nations from the fields of Asia to the forests of Hercynia, performing pilgrimages to the fountain, which his magic wand caused to flow; if it is permitted him to overlook the whole harvest of grand, of elevated, of glorious productions, which have been called into being by means of his songs; wherever his immortal spirit may reside, nothing more can be required to complete his happiness.

Wherever writing is known, where it is used for the purpose of preserving poems, and thus a poetic literature is formed, the muse loses her youthful freshness. Works of the greatest merit may still be produced; but poetry exerts its full influence only so long as it is considered inseparable from recitation. The Homeric poems were therefore so far from having produced a less considerable effect, because they for a long time were not written down, that the source

of their power lay in this very circumstance. They entered the memory and the soul of the nation. If we were better acquainted with the forms of social life, which were prevalent in the cities of Ionia, and with which poetry necessarily stood in the closest union, we should be able to judge more definitely of its effects. The nature of things seems to show, that there, as in the mother country, they must have been sung at festivals and assemblies, whether public or private. This custom was so deeply fixed in the nation, that it continued long after these poems were committed to writing, and were thus accessible to a reader, and in fact, that it was declamation which continued to give them their full effect. We need but call to mind the remark, which Ion, the rhapsodist, makes to Socrates;[1] "I see the hearers now weep and now rise in passion, and appear as if deprived of sensation." If the rhapsodists, in an age when all that was divine in their art had passed away, and when they sung only for money, could produce such effects, how great must have been their influence in the period of their greatest glory!

Since the time of Homer, and chiefly through him, great changes in the relations of the class of bards necessarily took place; and the traces of such changes are still distinct. Originally they sang only their own compositions, but now it became the custom to sing those of others, which they had committed to memory. In that part of Asia which was inhabited by Greeks, and especially at Chios, where Homer is said to have lived,[2] a particular school of bards was formed which, even among the ancients, were known by the name of the Homeridæ. Whether these consisted originally of the family relations of the poet, is a question of no interest; it became the name of those rhapsodists, who sang the poems of Homer, or those attributed to him. They are therefore distinguished from the earlier rhapsodists by this, that they sang not their own works, but those of an-

[1] Plat. Op. iv. p. 190.

[2] According to the well-known passage in the hymn to Apollo, cited by Thucydides, iii. 104. "A blind man; he dwells on the rocky Chios; and his songs are the first among men." Even if this hymn be not by Homer, (the age of Thucydides esteemed it certainly his,) it must have been composed in an age which approached that of Homer. That Homer was an inhabitant of Chios, is an account, for the truth of which we have no guaranty but tradition. But that tradition is a very ancient one, and the account contains nothing which is in itself improbable, or which should induce us to doubt its accuracy.

other; and this appears to have been the first change, which was effected, though without design, by Homer. But we may find, in the gradual progress of the cities, and the modes of living in them, a chief cause of a change in the rhapsodists, which could not be very advantageous for them. In these cities, there may have been houses of the opulent, and public halls,[1] in which they could recite; but they found no longer the dwellings of heroes and kings. Little confidence as we may place in the life of Homer attributed to Herodotus, and several other writings; it is still remarkable, that all unite in describing the fortunes of the poet during his lifetime, as by no means splendid. But his songs continued to live, and, probably in the very first century after the poet, were carried by Lycurgus into the Peloponnesus; and from the same school, other epic poets also started up, whose works have been overwhelmed by the stream of time.[2] A happy accident has preserved for us the general contents of a few of them;[3] but, though these accounts are meagre, we may still infer from them, that even among the ancients, they were chiefly of interest to the professed student of literature, and that they never gained any claim to be called national poems. But the works of these, and so many others, of whom we know only the names, show how gener-

[1] The λέσχαι. We are almost involuntarily reminded of similar appearances, which marked the decline of the poetry of chivalry, in the age of those whom we commonly call our master singers. The inquiry might be made, whether the relations of city life had an equal influence on the school or fraternity of rhapsodists, who separated themselves still more observably from the rest of society?

[2] The Cyclic poets, as they are called, who treated subjects of mythological tradition, or the cyclus of traditions respecting the Trojan expedition. See on this subject, Excurs. i. ad Æneid. L. ii. ed. Heynii.

[3] In the selections of Proclus, in Bibl. d. alten Litt. und Kunst. St. i. Inedita, p. I, etc. These are, 1. The Cyprian poem, probably by Stasinus of Cyprus. It contained, in eleven books, the earlier events of the Trojan war before the action of the Iliad. 2. The Æthiopis of Arctinus the Melesian; containing, in five books, the expedition and death of Memnon. 3. The small Iliad of Lesches of Mitylene; embracing, in four books, the contention of Ajax and Ulysses, till the preparation of the Trojan horse. 4. The destruction of Troy (Ἰλίου πέρσις) of Arctinus, in two books. 5. The return of the heroes (νοστοι) of Augias, in five books. 6. The Telegoniad, or fates of Ulysses after his return, by Eugammon, in two books. The contents of these poems, as here given, show, that no one of them can be compared, in point of plan, with the epopees of Homer. But these poems must also for a long time have been preserved by song alone; for their authors, although somewhat younger than Homer, still lived in times, when, according to all that we know, letters were but litte used, or perhaps entirely unknown.

ally epic poetry was extended among the nation. After the epic language had once been perfected by Homer, it remained peculiar to this kind of poetry; and when we read the works of much later poets, of Quintus, or of Nonnus, we might believe ourselves employed on authors many centuries older than they, had we not other evidence beside their language to fix the period in which they lived. That the dialect of Homer remained the principal one for this class of poetry, had an important influence on Grecian literature. Amidst all the changes and improvements in language, it prevented the ancient from becoming antiquated, and secured it a place among the later modes of expression. This was a gain for the language and for the nation. With the dialect of Homer, his spirit continued in some measure to live among the epic poets. Language cannot of itself make a poet; but yet how much depends on language! If in those later poets we occasionally hear echoes of Homer, is it not sometimes his spirit which addresses us?

But his influence on the spirit of his countrymen was much more important than his influence on their language. He had delineated the world of heroes in colours which can never fade. He had made it present to posterity; and thus the artist and the tragic poet found a sphere opened for the employment of their powers of representation. And the scenes from which they drew their subjects, could not have remained foreign to their countrymen. We do but touch on this subject, in order to say something on the point which lies particularly within the circle of our inquiries; the influence which Homer and the epic poets exercised on the political character of their countrymen.

When we compare the scanty fragments which are still extant, respecting the circulation and preservation of the poems of Homer, it is remarkable that in Hellas itself, the lawgivers and rulers were the most active in making them known and in saving them from perishing. Lycurgus, we are told, was the first who introduced them into the Peloponnesus by means of the rhapsodists; Solon esteemed the subject so important, that in his code of laws, he formed distinct regulations, in conformity to which it seems probable that the several rhapsodies were recited, not as before without method, but in their natural order, by several rhapsodists,

who relieved each other. All this prepared for the undertaking of Pisistratus; who, according to the accounts of the ancients, not only arranged the poems of Homer, but gained a claim to the eternal gratitude of posterity, by committing them to writing.[1]

This care in those illustrious men did not result from a mere admiration of poetry. That it was connected with political views, if such confirmation were needed, appears from the circumstance, that Solon took notice of it in his laws. Were we to form a judgment on this subject from the narrow views of our own times, it would seem strange, that they who founded or confirmed the government of a number, even a democracy, should have laboured to extend the productions of a bard, who was opposed to their principles, and declares his political creed without disguise;[2] "no good comes of the government of the many; let one be ruler, and one be king;" and in whose works, as we have already remarked, republicanism finds no support. But their views were not so limited. Their object was not to confirm, by means of the poet, their own institutions and their own laws. They desired to animate their nation with a love for excellence and sublimity. Poetry and song, indissolubly united, seemed to them the fittest means of gaining that end. These had the greatest influence on the intellectual culture of the people. And if that culture lay within the sphere of the Grecian lawgivers, (and it always did, though in different degrees,) of what importance in their eyes must that poet have been, whose poems, above all others, were recited by the class of rhapsodists, that lent a glory to the national festivals and assemblies? Solon, himself one of the first of moral poets, could not but perceive, how much experience and knowledge of the world are contained in those books, with which youth is begun, and to which age returns. No fear was entertained, lest the narrations respecting the gods should be injurious to morals; although that fear afterwards induced Plato to banish them from his republic; the philosopher, who but for Homer never could have become Plato. For, as we have already remarked, the gods were not held up as models for imitation. But whilst the people

[1] The passages in proof of this are collected and duly weighed in the Prolegomena of Wolf, p. 139, etc. [2] Il. ii. 204.

was enriching itself with that infinite treasure of practical wisdom, it continued at the same time to live in a world of heroes, and to preserve living sensibility to the great and the noble. Of this it is impossible to estimate the consequences, the gain of the nation as a nation, by the encouragement of its warlike spirit, by the preservation of its love of liberty and independence. In one respect, those lawgivers were unquestionably in the right; a nation, of which the culture rested on the Iliad and Odyssey, could not easily be reduced to a nation of slaves.

CHAPTER VII.

MEANS OF PRESERVING THE NATIONAL CHARACTER.

THE Greeks, though divided at home, and extended widely in foreign countries, always considered themselves as forming but one nation. The character of the Hellenes was no where obliterated; the citizen of Massilia and Byzantium retained it no less than the Spartan and Athenian. The name barbarian, although it was applied to all who were not Greeks, conveyed a secondary idea, which was closely interwoven with the Grecian character; that they esteemed themselves more cultivated than the rest of the world. It was not that gross kind of national pride, which despises all foreigners because they are foreigners; even where it was in itself unjust, its origin was a just one.

But this higher culture could never have remained a bond of national union, the different tribes of the Hellenes possessed it in such different degrees. External marks were therefore needed. These were afforded by two things; by language, and certain institutions sanctioned by religion.

Various and different as were the dialects of the Hellenes,[1] —and these differences existed not only among the various tribes, but even among the several neighbouring cities,— they yet acknowledged in their language, that they formed but one nation, were but branches of the same family.

[1] See what Herodotus says of the dialects of the Grecian cities in Asia, i. 142.

Those who were not Greeks, were described even by Homer,[1] as "men of other tongues;" and yet Homer had no general name for the nation. But though the bond of a common language may be a natural and an indissoluble one, something more is required to make it serve as the bond of national union. The language must be not merely the instrument of communicating thoughts; for it is that to every savage; something must exist in it, which may be regarded as the common property of the nation, because it is precious and dear to them; the works of poets, and next to them, of prose writers, which are admired, listened to, and read by all. It is such productions which make a language peculiarly valuable to a nation. The national spirit and manner of thinking and feeling, are expressed in them; the nation beholds in them its own portrait; and sees the continuance of its spirit among future generations secured. They form not only its common property, in which, according to the fullest meaning of the phrase, each tribe has its undisputed share; they form its most sublime, its noblest, its least perishable property.[2] In what a light, therefore, do Homer and those who trod in his footsteps appear, when they are considered from this point of view. Their poems, listened to and admired by all who used the Greek language, reminded the inhabitants of Hellas, of Ionia, and of Sicily, in the liveliest manner, that they were brothers. When we consider the long series of ages, during which the poems of Homer and the Homeridæ were the only common possession of the Hellenes, it may even be made a question, whether without them they would have remained a nation.[3] National poetry was therefore the bond, which held them together; but this bond was strengthened by another, by that of religion.

Unlike the religions of the East, the religion of the Hellenes was supported by no sacred books, was connected with no peculiar doctrines; it could not therefore serve, like the former, to unite a nation by means of a common religious creed; but it was fitted for gaining that end, in so

[1] Βαρβαρόφωνοι. Il. ii. 867.

[2] See Heeren's Essay on the means of preserving the nationality of a conquered people. Historische Werke, B. ii. l. 1, etc.

[3] And how would the Greeks constitute a nation but for their poetry and literature?

far as the external rites of religion afforded opportunities. But as the nation had no caste of priests, nor even a united order of priesthood, it naturally followed, that though individual temples could in a certain degree become national temples, this must depend, for the most part, on accidental circumstances; and where every thing was voluntary, nothing could be settled by established forms like those which prevailed in other countries. The temples at Olympia, Delos, and Delphi, may justly be denominated national temples, although not in the same sense in which we call those of the Jews and the Egyptians national; but their effects were perhaps only more considerable and more secure, because every thing connected with them was voluntary. The fruits of civilization came forth, and were matured, under the protection of these sanctuaries also; though not in the same manner as in Egypt and Ethiopia;[1] and when we hear of national festivals,[2] oracles, and Amphictyonic assemblies, other ideas are connected with them, than were awakened by the temples in the countries just named. But let it not be forgotten, that all these fruits, of which we must make mention separately, ripened on one and the same branch; that they, therefore, closely united, could ripen only together; that by this very means they gained a higher value in the eyes of the nation; and that this value must be estimated by their influence, rather than by what they were in themselves.

We shall hardly be mistaken, if we consider those sanctuaries the most ancient, which were celebrated for their oracles. Those of Dodona and Delphi were declared to be so by the voice of the nation; and both of them, especially that of Delphi, were so far superior to the rest, that they are in some measure to be esteemed as the only national oracles.[3]

[1] Heeren. Ideen. etc. Th. ii. 487, etc.

[2] The Greek word for them, is *πανηγύρεις*.

[3] The number of Grecian oracles, constantly increasing, became, as is well known, exceedingly numerous. With the exception of that of Dodona, which was of Egyptio-Pelasgic origin, the oracles of the Greeks were almost exclusively connected with the worship of Apollo. We know of more than fifty of his oracles (see Bulenger de oraculis et vatibus, in Thes. Ant. Gr. vol. vii.); of the few others, the more celebrated owed their origin to the same god, as those of Mopsus and Trophonius, to whom he had imparted the gift of prophesying. How much of the rites of religion among the Hellenes depended on the religion of Apollo. New light is shed on this subject by C. O. Müller, in his volume on the Dorians, i. 199.

Olympia, it is true, had originally an oracle also;[1] but from unknown causes, it became hushed, probably just after the distinguished success of the oracles of Apollo. We leave to others all further investigation of these institutions; the question which claims our attention, is, how far they contributed to preserve the spirit and the union of the nation. They did not effect this by being regarded as intended only for the Hellenes. Foreigners also were permitted to consult the oracles; and to recompense the answers which they received by consecrated presents. But this took place only in individual cases; and was done probably by none but rulers and kings, from the time when Alyattes first made application at Delphi.[2] In other cases, the difference of language was alone sufficient to keep foreigners away, as the Pythian priestess spoke always in Greek. These institutions belonged, if not exclusively, yet principally to the Hellenes; of whom both individuals and cities could always have access to them. They formed the connecting link between politics and the popular religion. Their great political influence, especially in the states of the Doric race, is too well known from history to make it necessary for us to adduce proofs of it. That influence doubtless became less after the Persian wars. Whether this diminution of influence was injurious or advantageous cannot easily be decided. When the reciprocal hatred of the Athenians and Spartans excited them to the fury of civil war, how much suffering would have been spared to Greece, if the voice of the gods had been able to avert the storm. But the affairs of the Delphic temple were still considered as the concern of the Grecian nation; and even after infidelity had usurped the place of the ancient superstition, the violation of the sanctuary gave the politicians a pretence, sufficient to kindle a civil war, which was destined to cost Greece its liberties.

Among the numerous festivals which the several Grecian cities were accustomed to celebrate, there were some, which, from causes that are no longer well known, or were perhaps quite accidental, soon became really national. At these, foreigners could be spectators; but the Hellenes alone were permitted to contend for the prizes. The right to do so belonged to the inhabitant of the farthest colony, as well as of

[1] Strabo, viii. p. 542. [2] Herod. i. 9.

the mother country, and was esteemed inalienable and invaluable. Even princes were proud of the privilege, for which the Persian king himself would have sued in vain, of sending their chariots to the races of Olympia. Every one has learned from the hymns of Pindar, that, beside the Olympic contests, the Pythian games at Delphi, the Nemean at Argos, and the Isthmian at Corinth, belong to the same class. As to the origin of these games, Homer does not make mention of them, which he would hardly have neglected to do, if they had existed or been famous in his day. Yet the foundation of them was laid in so remote a period of antiquity, that it is attributed to gods and heroes. Uncertain as are these traditions, it is remarkable, that a different origin is attributed to each one of them. Those of Olympia were instituted by Hercules, on his victorious return, and were designed as contests in bodily strength; those of Delphi were in their origin nothing but musical exercises; although others were afterwards added to them. Those of Nemea were originally funeral games; respecting the occasion of instituting those of the Isthmus, there are different accounts.[1]

But whatever may have been the origin of the games, they became national ones. This did not certainly take place at once; and we should err, if we should apply the accounts given us of the Olympic games in the flourishing periods of Greece, to the earlier ages. On the contrary, from the accurate registers which were kept by the judges, we learn most distinctly, with respect to these games, that they gained their importance and character by degrees.[2] They have not forgotten to mention, when the different kinds of contests (for at first there were none but in racing) were permitted and adopted. But still these games gained importance, although it was only by degrees; and the time came, when they merited to be celebrated by a Pindar.

In this manner, therefore, these festivals, and the games connected with them, received a national character. They were peculiar to the Grecians; and on that account also

[1] All the passages on the origin and the arrangements of the games, may be found collected in Schmidtii Prolegomenis ad Pindarum; Potter's Archaeologia; and Corsini Dissertationes agonisticæ; and others.

[2] See Pausanias in Eliacis, l. v. 9.

were of great utility. "Those are justly praised," Isocrates[1] very happily observes, "who instituted these famous assemblies, and thus made it customary for us to come together as allies, having set aside our hostilities; to increase our friendship by recalling our relationship in our common vows and sacrifices; to renew our ancient family friendships, and to form new ones. They have provided, that neither the unpolished nor the well educated should leave the games without profit; but that in this assembly of the Hellenes in one place, some may display their wealth, and others observe the contests, and none be present without a purpose, but each have something of which to boast; the one part, while they see those engaged in the contests making exertions on their account; the other, when they consider that all this concourse of people has assembled to be spectators of their contests."

The accounts which we read of the splendour of these games, especially of the Olympic, where the nation of the Hellenes appeared in its glory, give a high idea of them. And yet it was public opinion, far more than the reality, which gave to the crown of victory its value. The glory of being conqueror in them, was the highest with which the Grecian was acquainted; it conferred honour, not only on him who won the palm, but on his family and on his native city. He was not honoured in Olympia alone; his victory was the victory of his native place; here he was solemnly received; new festivals were instituted on his account; he had afterwards a right of living at the public charge in the prytanea. A victory at Olympia, says Cicero with truth,[2] rendered the victor illustrious, no less than his consulate the Roman consul. The tournaments of the middle age were something similar; or might have become something similar, if the relations of society had not prevented. But as a distinct line of division was drawn between the classes, they became interesting to but one class. Birth decided who could take a part in them, and who were excluded. There was nothing of that among the Hellenes. The lowest of the people could join at Olympia in the contest for the branch of the sacred olive tree, as well as Alcibiades, or even the ruler of Syracuse with all the splendour of his equipage.

[1] Isocrates. Panegyr. Op. p. 49, Steph. [2] Cicero. Quæst. Tusc. ii. 17.

The influence on the political relations of the Grecian states, was perhaps not so great as Isocrates represents. A solemnity of a few days could hardly be sufficient to cool the passions and still the mutual enmities of the several tribes. History mentions no peace, which was ever negotiated, and still less which was ever concluded at Olympia. But so much the greater was the influence exercised over the culture of the nation; and if the culture of a nation decides its character, our plan requires of us to pause and consider it.

In all their institutions, when they are considered in the light in which the Greeks regarded them, we shall commonly find proofs of the noble dispositions of the Hellenes. And these are to be observed in the games, where every thing which was in itself beautiful and glorious; bodily strength and skill in boxing; wrestling, and running; the splendour of opulence, as displayed in the equipages for the chariot races; excellence in poetry, and soon also in other intellectual productions, were here rewarded, each with its prize. But the degree of importance assigned to the productions of mind was not every where the same. Musical contests,[1] in which the Greeks united poetry, song, and music, were common in those larger games, as well as in those hardly less splendid ones, which were instituted in the several cities. But there was a difference in their relative importance. At Olympia, though they were not entirely excluded, they were yet less essential;[2] they formed from the beginning the primary object in the Pythian games. They held the same rank in several festivals of the smaller cities, in the Panathenæa at Athens, in Delos,[3] at Epidaurus,

[1] The Greeks made a distinction between *ἀγόνες γυμνικοὶ* and *μουσικοί*. The former relate to the exercises of the body; the latter, to the works of genius; that is, to poetry, and whatever was connected with it. At these festivals it never entered the mind of the Greeks to institute prizes for competitors in the arts of design; at least not in the plastic art. (Pliny, however, mentions a competition of painters, xxxv. 35.) The cause of this may in part be, that those arts were not so soon brought to perfection as the former ones; but the cause was rather that the Greeks conceived it proper to institute competition only in those arts, of which the results were temporary; and not in those, of which the productions are exhibited in public, and are lasting; for in them, as in sculpture for example, there is a constant exhibition, and therefore a constant emulation.

[2] See the instructive Versuch von den musicalischen Wettstreiten der Alten, which is to be found in der neuen Bibl. der Schönen Wissenschaften, B. vii.

[3] The musical contests in Delos, with which gymnastic exercises soon came

Ephesus, and other places. But even where no actual competition took place, every one who felt possessed of sufficient talents, was permitted to come forward with the productions of art. The rhapsodist and the performer on the flute, the lyric poet, the historian, and the orator, had each his place. The hymns of Pindar were chanted in honour of the victors, not in emulation of others; and Herodotus had no rival when he read the books of his history at Olympia. The Hellenes made room for every thing which was glorious and beautiful, and it was especially at Olympia and Delphi, that the observer of the character of the Greeks could justly break forth in exclamations of admiring astonishment.

The Amphictyonic assemblies, as they were called by the Grecians, appear to have exercised a still greater influence on political union.[1] Under that name the assemblies are signified, that were held in some common temple by several tribes which occupied the territory round it, or by neighbouring cities, in order to consult on the affairs connected with the sanctuary, and on others of a more general nature. It was therefore characteristic of these assemblies, first, that a temple or sanctuary formed their central point; further, that several tribes or cities participated in them; thirdly, that assemblies of the people, festivals, and, of course, games were connected with them; and fourthly, that besides these popular assemblies and festivals, deputies under various names, (Theori, Pylagoræ,) were sent by the several states which participated in them, to deliberate on subjects of common interest. We shall be able to see these institutions in their true light, after taking a view of the origin of temples in Greece.

As soon as the manners of cities were distinctly formed with the Greeks, and the individual cities in the mother country, no less than in the colonies, had for the most part

to be connected, were the most ancient Ionic national games; as Thucydides, iii. 104, has already proved from the Homeric hymn to Apollo. They were originally connected with the service of that god, and were communicated with it by the Ionians to the Dorians. Hence they were not regarded at Olympia, Nemea, and on the Isthmus, as forming an essential part of the solemnity.

[1] The Greek word is sometimes spelt *ἀμφικτίονες*, those who dwell round about, sometimes *ἀμφικτυονες*, from the hero Amphictyon, called by tradition the founder of the same.

become rich by means of commerce and industry in the arts, temples were built by single towns. Beside this, as we shall show more fully in another place, the luxury of the public was connected almost exclusively with these temples, and they were to serve as the measure of the splendour and wealth of the respective cities. The building of temples, therefore, became, especially after the Persian wars, and even a century before them, a matter, in which the honour of the cities was concerned, and their public spirit was exhibited. In this manner that multitude of temples arose, which still present, in their numerous ruins, master-pieces of architecture. But it was not and could not have been so in the earliest times. The building of a temple was then commonly a joint undertaking; partly because these temples, however they may have been inferior to the later ones,[1] were still too costly to be erected by the separate communities; and partly and chiefly because such common sanctuaries were needed for celebrating the common festivals of each tribe.

Such a sanctuary formed in some measure a point of union. It was an object of common care; it became necessary to watch over the temple itself, its estates, and its possessions; and as this could not be done by the several communities at large, what was more natural, than to depute envoys for the purpose? But in a nation where every thing was freely developed, and so little was fixed by established forms, it could not but happen, that other affairs of general interest should occasionally be discussed; either at the popular festivals, or in the assemblies of the delegates; and that is the most probable, as the allies considered themselves, for the most part, as branches of the same nation. They became therefore the points of political union; the idea of a formal alliance was not yet connected with them, but might be expected from their maturity.

We find traces of such Amphictyonic assemblies in Greece itself, and in the colonies.[2] Their origin, especially in the

[1] See what Pausanias, x. p. 810, says of the temples, which were successively built at Delphi.

[2] A catalogue of them, which might perhaps be enlarged, has been given by St. Croix, *Des anciens Gouvernements federatifs*, p. 115, etc. We follow him, as it will afford, at the same time, proofs of what has been said above. There was such an Amphictyonia in Bœotia, at Orchestus, in a temple of Neptune; in

mother country, is very ancient; and we may in most cases assert, and with justice, that it belongs to the period, when the republican forms of government were not yet introduced, and the constitutions of the tribes were in vigour. For we find that those who shared in them, were much more frequently influenced to assemble by tribes than by cities. And this affords an obvious reason, why they lost their influence as the nation advanced in culture, except where peculiar causes operated to preserve them. In the flourishing period of Greece, most of them had become mere antiquities, which were only occasionally mentioned; or, if they continued in the popular festivals which were connected with them, (and popular festivals are always longest preserved,) they were but bodies without soul. This result was a necessary one, since, on the downfal of the constitutions of the tribes, the whole political life of the nation was connected with the cities, the spirit of the tribes had become annihilated by the spirit of the cities, and each of the cities had erected its own temples.

Yet of these Amphictyonic councils, one rose to a higher degree of importance, and always preserved a certain measure of dignity; so that it was called, by way of eminence, the Amphictyonic council. This was the one held at Delphi and Thermopylæ.[1] When we bear in mind the ideas which have just been illustrated, we shall hardly be led to expect, that the nation, in its whole extent, would ever have been united by any common bond; and still less that this bond should have been more closely drawn with the progress of time, and finally have united all the Grecian states in one political

Attica, in a temple, of which the name is not mentioned; at Corinth, on the isthmus, in the temple of Neptune; in the island Caluria, near Argolis, also in a temple of Neptune; another in Argolis, in the celebrated temple of Juno (Ἡραῖον); in Elis, in a temple of Neptune; also on the Grecian islands; in Eubœa, in the temple of Diana Amaurusia; in Delos, in the temple of Apollo, the Panegyris, of which we have already made mention, and which served for all the neighbouring islands; in Asia, the Panionium at Mycale, afterwards at Ephesus, for the Ionians; the temple of Apollo Triopius for the Dorians; for the Æolians, the temple of Apollo Grynæus. Even the neighbouring Asiatic tribes, the Carians and the Lycians, had similar institutions, either peculiar, or adopted of the Greeks. The proofs of these accounts may be found collected in the above mentioned author.

[1] According to Strabo, ix. p. 289, it does not appear that the assembly was held alternately at Delphi and Thermopylæ; but the deputies first came together at Thermopylæ to sacrifice to Ceres; and then proceeded to Delphi, where business was transacted.

body. But this Amphictyonic assembly contributed much to the preserving of national feeling and national unity, and as such deserves to be considered by us with more attention.

Strabo concedes,[1] that even in his time it was impossible to ascertain the origin of the Amphictyonic assembly; this however was certain, that it belonged to remote antiquity. We must here remark, that Homer does not make any mention of it; and yet Homer speaks of the wealthy Delphi;[2] and although his silence affords no proof that it did not exist, we may at least infer, that the council was not then so important as at a later day. The causes which made this Amphictyonia so much superior to all the rest, are not expressly given; but should we err, if we were to look for them in the ever-increasing dignity and influence of the Delphic oracle? When we call to mind the great importance attached to the liberty of consulting this oracle, scarcely a doubt on the subject can remain. The states which were members of this Amphictyonia, had no exclusive right to that privilege; but had the care of the temple, and therefore of the oracle, in their hands.[3] No ancient writer has preserved for us so accurate an account of the regulations of that institution, that all important questions respecting them can be answered; and those who speak of them do not agree with each other. But from a comparison of their statements, we may infer, that though this Amphictyonia did not by any means embrace the whole of the Hellenes, yet the most considerable states of the mother country and of Asia Minor took part in it. According to Æschines,[4] there were twelve of them (although he enumerates but eleven); Thessalians, Bœotians, (not the Thebans only, he expressly remarks,) Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians,

[1] Strabo, l. c. The special inquiries on this subject may be found discussed in the prize Essay of Tittman, on the Amphictyonic League. Berlin, 1812.

[2] Il. ix. 404, 405. Homer calls it Pytho.

[3] Individual states obtained the right of being the first to consult the oracle, *προμαντεία*, and this right was valued very highly.

[4] Æschines de Falsâ Legatione, iii. p. 285, ed. Reisk. This is the most important passage. St. Croix, p. 27, has compared the discrepant accounts of Pausanias, x. p. 815, and Harpocration, v. *Αμφικτύονες*. The authority of Æschines respecting his own times, seems to me of more weight than all the others, and therefore I follow him alone. No man had better means of information than he. But many changes in the regulations were subsequently made by the Macedonians and the Romans.

Magnesians, Phthiotians, Maleans,[1] Phocians, Œtæans, Locrians; the twelfth state was probably the Dolopians.[2] Every city belonging to these tribes, had the right of sending deputies; the smallest had an equal right with the largest; and the votes of all were equal; of the Ionians, says Æschines, the deputies from Eretria in Eubœa and from Priene in Asia Minor,[3] were equal to those from Athens; of the Dorians, those from Dorium in Laconia, and from Cytinium on Parnassus, had as much weight as those from Lacedæmon. But the votes were not counted by cities, but by tribes; each tribe had two votes, and the majority decided.[4]

And how large was the sphere of action, in which this assembly was accustomed to exert its influence? Its first duty was to take charge of the temple; its property; its presents, the offerings of piety; its sanctity. From this it naturally follows, that the assembly possessed judiciary powers. Persons who had committed sacrilege on the temple, were summoned before its tribunal, where judgment was passed and the acts of penance and punishment decreed.[5] But to these, political objects were added at a very early period; such as the preservation of peace among the confederates, and the accommodating of contentions, which had arisen. We have, it is true, no proof, that those who participated in the assembly considered themselves as nearly allied to each other; but it is as little doubtful, that under the protection of this sanctuary, certain ideas arose and were diffused, which might be considered as forming, in some

[1] The four last were all in Thessaly. The reason of their being thus distinguished from the rest of the Thessalians is probably to be found in the privilege, which they had preserved, of a separate vote. Herodotus, vii. 132, divides them in the same manner.

[2] Heeren, p. 39.

[3] It is therefore certain, that the individual colonies in Asia Minor participated in the assembly. We might suggest the question, whether all the Asiatic colonies, and whether colonies in other regions, did the same.

[4] For all further knowledge which we have of the regulations of the Amphictyonic council, we are indebted to Strabo, ix. p. 289. According to him each city sent a deputy. These assembled twice a year, at the equinoxes. We are ignorant of the length of the sessions of the assembly, whether any definite time was fixed for them, or not; and of many other things respecting them.

[5] As for instance, against the Phocians at the beginning of the last sacred war; and afterwards against the Locrians. Demosthenes has preserved for us two of these decrees, (δόγματα,) Op. i. p. 278. Reisk. From them we learn the forms in which they were written.

measure, the foundation of a system of national law, although it was never brought to maturity. Of this we have indisputable proof in the ancient oaths, which were taken by all the members of the assembly, and which have been preserved by Æschines.[1] "I read," says the orator, "in the assembly the oaths, to which the heaviest imprecations were attached; and by which our ancestors[2] were obliged to promise never to destroy any one of the Amphictyonic cities,[3] nor to cut off their streams,[4] whether in war or in peace; should any city dare, notwithstanding, to do so, to take up arms against it and lay it waste; and if any one should sin against the god, or form any scheme against the sanctuary, to oppose him with hand and foot, and word and deed." This form of oath, it cannot be doubted, was very ancient, and expresses with sufficient clearness the original objects of the confederation. But it shows equally distinctly, that the attainment of these ends depended much more on the circumstances and condition of the age, than on the members of the council themselves.

To him who measures the value of this assembly only by the influence which it had in preventing wars among the tribes that took part in it, its utility may seem very doubtful; as history has preserved no proofs of such influence. But even if it had existed in the earliest ages, it must have ceased of itself, when individual states of Greece became so powerful, as to assume a supremacy over the rest. Sparta and Athens referred the decision of their quarrels to Delphi, as little as Prussia and Austria to Ratisbon. But it would be wrong to impute the blame of this to the members of the council. They had no strong arm, except when the god extended his to protect them; or some other power took arms in their behalf. But it is a high degree of merit to preserve principles in the memory of the nations, even when it is impossible to prevent their violation. And when we observe that several ideas relating to the law of nations, were indelibly imprinted on the character of the Greeks; if in the midst of all their civil wars, they never laid waste any Grecian city, even when it was subdued; ought we not

[1] Æschines, l. c. p. 284.
[2] Οἱ ἀρχαῖοι.
[3] Ἀνάστατον ποιῆσαι, to render uninhabitable, by removing its inhabitants.
[4] By means of which they would have become uninhabitable.

attribute this in some measure to the Amphictyonic assembly? They had it not in their power to preserve peace; but they contributed to prevent the Grecians from forgetting, even in war, that they still were Grecians.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PERSIAN WARS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES.

Since the Trojan war, no opportunity had been presented to the Greek nation, of acting as one people in any equal and common undertaking. The institutions which we have just described, preserved, in a certain degree, the national spirit; but they were by no means sufficient to produce political union; any tendency to which was counteracted by the whole condition and internal relations of the nation. Even the colonies were unfavourable to it; not only by their distance, but still more by the independence which they enjoyed. In our days, how soon do colonies which become independent, grow estranged from the mother countries, after having long stood in the closest connexion with her.

In the century which preceded the Persian war,[1] the Grecian states, excepting the Asiatic cities, which languished under the Persian yoke, had in many respects made advances in culture. Freedom had been triumphantly established in almost every part[2] of the mother country. The tyrants who had usurped power in the cities, had been overthrown in part by the Spartans, in part by the citizens themselves; and popular governments had been introduced in their stead. Above all, Athens had shaken off the Pisistratidæ; and it came off victorious from the contest which it had been obliged to sustain for its liberty. It enjoyed the full consciousness of its youthful energies; "Athens," Herodotus says,[3] "which before was great, when freed from its usurpers

[1] Between the years 600 and 500 before the Christian era.

[2] Thessaly was an exception, where the government of the Aleuadæ still continued, although it was tottering; for which reason they, like the Pisistratidæ, invited the Persians into Greece. Herod. vii. 6.

[3] Herod. v. 66.

became still greater." At the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ, Sparta had, for the first time, undertaken to exert an influence beyond the Peloponnesus; Corinth also had, for eighty-four years,[1] been in possession of freedom; and a similar advantage had been gained by several of the less powerful cities, by Sicyon[2] and Epidaurus. The islands, no less than the continent, were in a flourishing condition; their independence stood at that time in no danger from the Persians or the Athenians. Samos never saw an age like that of Polycrates, who trembled at his own prosperity;[3] the small island of Naxus could muster eight thousand heavy-armed men;[4] the inconsiderable Siphnus, very much enriched by its gold mines, deemed it expedient to consult the Pythian oracle on the duration of its fortunes.[5] The cities of Magna Græcia, Tarentum, Croton, and Sybaris,[6] had attained the period of their splendour; in Sicily, Syracuse, although disturbed by internal dissensions, was yet so powerful that Gelon, its ruler, claimed in the Persian wars the chief command of all the Grecian forces; Marseilles arose on the shores of Gaul; Cyrene was established on the coast of Libya.

But some grand object of common interest still was wanting; and as the Spartans were already jealous of Athens, it was the more to be feared, that the consciousness of increasing strength would lead to nothing but the mutual ruin of the cities in civil wars. The Persian wars supplied the object which was needed. Although they by no means resulted in the establishment of that general union of the whole nation of the Hellenes, of which a great man had formed the idea without believing in the possibility of realizing it; the whole condition of Greece in succeeding ages, its foreign and for the most part its domestic relations, were all a consequence of them; and we do not say too much, when we assert, that the political character of Greece was formed by them.

There never was any general union of the Greeks against the Persians; but the idea of such a confederation had been

[1] The year 584 before Christ.
[2] From about the year 600 B. C. Epidaurus at the same time.
[3] Herod. iii. 72. [4] Herod. v. 30. [5] Pausan. Phoc. p. 628.
[6] Herod. vi. 127. Yet Sybaris was destroyed just before the Persian wars, by the Crotoniatæ, in the year 510 before Christ.

called up; and was, if not entirely, yet in a great measure, carried into effect. What is more arduous, than in times of great difficulty, when every one fears for himself, and is chiefly concerned for self-preservation, to preserve among a multitude of small states, that public spirit and union, in which all strength consists. The Athenians were left almost alone to repel the first invasion of Darius Hystaspes; but the glory won at Marathon was not sufficient to awaken general enthusiasm, when greater danger threatened from the invasion of Xerxes. All the Thessalians, the Locrians, and Bœotians, except the cities of Thespiæ and Plateæ, sent earth and water to the Persian king at the first call to submit; although these tokens of subjection were attended by the curses of the rest of the Greeks, and the vow that a tithe of their estates should be devoted to the deity of Delphi.[1] Yet of the rest of the Greeks, who did not favour Persia, some were willing to assist only on condition of being appointed to conduct and command the whole;[2] others, if their country could be the first to be protected;[3] others sent a squadron, which was ordered to wait till it was certain which side would gain the victory;[4] and others pretended they were held back by the declarations of an oracle.[5] So true is the remark of Herodotus, that, however ill it might be taken by others, he was constrained to declare, that Greece was indebted for its freedom to Athens.[6] Athens, with Themistocles for its leader, gave life to the courage of the other states; induced them to lay aside their quarrels; yielded, where it was duty to yield;[7] and always relied on

[1] Herod. vii. 132.

[2] Gelon of Syracuse; Herod. vii. 158. On this condition, he promised to produce an army of 28,000 men, well equipped; a fleet of 200 triremes, and as much grain as was desired. "Of truth," answered the Lacedæmonian ambassador, "Agamemnon, the descendant of Pelops, would remonstrate loudly, were he to hear that the chief command had been taken from the Spartans, by Gelon the Syracusan." And when Gelon declared, that he would be content with the command by sea, the Athenian envoy quickly replied, "King of Syracuse, Hellas has sent us to you, not because it needs a general, but because it needs an army."

[3] The Thessalians, who had however already surrendered. Herod. vii. 172.

[4] The Corcyræans; Herod. vii. 168.

[5] The Cretans; Herod. vii. 169.

[6] Herod. vii. 139. A noble testimony in favour of Athens, and at the same time, of the free spirit and impartiality of Herodotus. "I must here," says this lover of truth, "express to all Greece, an opinion, which to most men is odious; but yet that, which to me seems the truth, I will not conceal."

[7] As at Artemisium; Herod. viii. 3.

its own strength, while it seemed to expect safety from all. Hope was not disappointed in the result; the battle of Salamis gave a new impulse to the spirit of the Greeks; and when in the following year[1] the battle of Plateæ gave a decision to the contest, the greater part of Hellas was assembled in the field of battle.[2]

We would give no description of those glorious days, but only of the consequences which they had for Greece. In the actions of men, greatness is seldom or never quite unmixed with meanness; and he who investigates the actions of those times with care, will find many and various proofs of it. And yet in the whole compass of history, we can find no series of events, which deserve to be compared with the grand spectacle then exhibited; and with all the exaggerations of the orators and poets, the feeling of pride with which the Greek reflected on his achievements was a just one. A small country had withstood the attack of half a continent; it had not only saved the most costly possessions, which were endangered, its freedom, its independence; it felt itself strong enough to continue the contest, and did not lay aside its arms, till it was permitted to prescribe the conditions of peace.

The price of that peace, was the emancipation of the Greek colonies in Asia from Persian supremacy. Twenty years before the invasion of Xerxes, when those cities had attempted to throw off the Persian yoke, the Athenians had boldly ventured to send a squadron with troops to reinforce them; and that expedition occasioned the burning of Sardis, which was the capital of the Persian dominions in Asia Minor. "These ships," says Herodotus,[3] "were the origin of the wars between the Hellenes and the barbarians." This interference was deeply resented by the Persians; and their resentment would have been reasonable, if they had possessed the right of reducing free cities to a state of dependence. Herodotus has given a copious narration of the ill success of the revolt, and of the manner in which Miletus suffered for it. Even in the subsequent expeditions of the Persians against Europe, the ruling idea was the desire of taking revenge on Athens; and when Xerxes reduced that city to ashes, he may have found in it no small degree of satisfac-

[1] In the year 479 B. C. [2] Herod. ix. 28. [3] Herod. v. 97.

tion.[1] But when the victory remained in the hands of the Greeks, they continued with spirit a war, which for them was no longer a dangerous one; and if the emancipation of their countrymen became from that time nothing more than an ostensible reason,[2] it was still a proof of the reviving national spirit. When the war after fifty-one years was terminated by the first peace with the Persians,[3] it was done under the conditions, that the Grecian cities in Asia should be free; that the troops of the Persians should keep two days' march distant from them; and that their squadron should leave the Ægean sea.[4] In a similar manner, after a long and similar contest, emancipated Holland, in a more recent age, prescribed the conditions of peace to the ruler of both the Indies, and blockaded the mouths of his rivers, while it preserved the ocean open to itself.

Thus the people of Hellas, by means of this war, appeared among the nations in the splendour of victory. They were now permitted to look around in tranquil security; for who would venture to attack them. The Eastern world obeyed the humbled Persian; in the North, the kingdom of Macedonia had not yet begun its career of conquest; and Italy, still divided into small states, did not as yet contain a victorious republic. The period was therefore come, in which Greece could unfold all its youthful vigour; poetry and the fine arts put forth their blossoms; the philosophic mind contemplates itself in tranquillity; and in public spirit, the several cities vie with each other in generous competition. A nation does not need peace and tranquillity to become great; but it needs the consciousness that it is possessed of strength, to gain peace and tranquillity.

The Persian wars gave a character, not only to the relations of Greece with foreign countries, but also to its internal condition; and were of hardly less importance to the nation by means of the latter, than of the former. During

[1] Herod. viii. 54.

[2] The Asiatic Greeks, however, during the expedition of Xerxes, in which they were compelled to take a part with their ships, had entreated the Spartans and Athenians to free them. Herod. viii. 132.

[3] In the year 449 B. C., reckoning from the participation of the Persians in the insurrection of the Asiatic Greeks, under Aristagoras, in the year 500 B. C.

[4] Plutarch in Cimon. Op. iii. p. 202, quotes the decree of the people, containing the conditions. The formal treaty has in later days been questioned. Dahlman's Historical Inquiries, I. Yet war certainly ceased.

that contest, the idea of a supremacy, or ἡγεμονία, as the Greeks termed it, intrusted to one state over the rest, or usurped by that state, became current throughout Greece.

Even before the Persian war, the idea had been faintly expressed; Sparta had always, as the strongest of the Dorian tribes, asserted a sort of supremacy over the Peloponnesus; and had in some measure deserved it, by banishing the tyrants from the cities of that peninsula.[1]

In the common opposition, made by so many of the Grecian cities, to the attack of Xerxes, the want of a general leader was felt; but according to the Grecian rules, this command could not so well be committed to one man, as to one state. We have already observed, that several laid claims to it; those of Syracuse were at once rejected; and Athens was at once prudent and generous enough to yield. At that time, therefore, the honour was nominally conferred on Sparta; it was actually possessed by the state, of which the talents merited it; and Sparta had no Themistocles. But Athens soon gained it nominally also; when the haughtiness of Pausanias exasperated the confederates; and Sparta was deprived by his fall of the only man, who in those days could have reflected any lustre upon the state.[2]

In this manner, Athens was placed at the head of a large part of Greece, confederated against Persia; and from this moment its supremacy begins to have a practical importance for Greece. The circumstances under which this chief command was conferred on Athens, showed that nothing

[1] Thucyd. i. 18, 76.

[2] Of this we have accurate accounts in Thucydides, i. 95. The Spartans, Athenians, and many of the confederates, had undertaken a naval expedition against Cyprus and Byzantium, 470 years before Christ. Offended with Pausanias, (who about this time was recalled by Sparta herself,) the allies, especially the Ionians, entreated the Athenians, as being of a kindred tribe, to assume the supreme command. Those who were of the Peloponnesus, took no part in this act. The Athenians were very willing to comply with the request; and the confederates never received another Spartan general. From this account, the following points are to be inferred: 1. The Athenians obtained the same chief command, which had been exercised by the Spartans. 2. The states which conferred that command on Athens, must have been islands and maritime towns, as the whole expedition was a naval one. 3. Although not all who shared in it were Ionians, yet the relationship of tribes had a great influence on the choice. 4. The command conferred on the Athenians, embraced therefore by no means all the Grecian cities, nor even all which had been united against Persia; as the Peloponnesians expressly withdrew from it, and the other states of the interior took no part in the matter.

more was intended to be given, than the conduct of the war that was still to be continued with united efforts against the Persians. No government of the allied states, no interference in their internal affairs, was intended. But how much was included in the conduct of a war against a very powerful enemy from the very nature of the office; and how much more for them who knew how to profit by it! As long as the war against the Persian king was continued, could it be much less than the guidance of all external affairs? For in a period like that, what other relations could have employed the practical politics of the Greeks. Or if any others existed, were they not at least intimately connected with that war? And as for the grand questions respecting the duration of the war and the conditions of peace, did they not depend on those who stood at the head of the undertaking?

The first use which Athens made of this superior command, was the establishment of a general treasury, as well as a common fleet, for the carrying on of the war; while it was fixed, which of the allies should contribute money and ships, and in what proportion. The Athenians, says Thucydides,[1] now first established the office of treasurers[2] of Greece; who were to collect the tribute, as the sums which were raised were denominated (and names are not matters of indifference in politics); the amount of which was then fixed at four hundred and sixty talents.[3] Yet to avoid every thing which could seem odious, the treasury was not directly fixed at Athens, but at Delos, in the temple of Apollo; where the assemblies also were held. But the most important circumstance was, that the most just of the Grecians, Aristides, was appointed treasurer; and the office of assigning to each state its proportion of the general contribution, was intrusted to him.[4] No one in those days made any complaint; and Aristides died as poor as he had lived.

Two remarks are here so naturally suggested, that they hardly need any proof; the first is, that Athens, by means of this regulation, laid the foundation of its greatness; the second is, that hardly any government, and how much less a popular government, could long withstand the temptation to abuse this power. But a third remark must be made in

[1] Thucyd. i. 96.
[2] Ἑλληνοταμίαι.
[3] Full £72,700.
[4] Plutarch. Aristid. Op. ii. p. 535.

connexion with the preceding observation; Athens gained the importance which she had for the world, by means of her supremacy over the other states. It was that which made her conspicuous in the history of mankind. The importance which she gained was immediately of a political nature; but every thing of a vast and noble character, for which Athens was distinguished, was inseparably connected with her political greatness. We will disguise no one of the abuses, of which the consequences were finally most fatal to Athens herself; but we cannot limit our view to the narrow range adopted by those, who make the abuses the criterion of their judgment.

The allies, by committing the conduct of the war to Athens, expressly acknowledged that city to be the first in Greece, and this was silently acknowledged by the other states; for Sparta, which alone was able to rival it in strength, voluntarily withdrew into the background.[1] Athens had the consciousness of deserving this rank; for the freedom of Greece had had its origin there. But it was desirous of preserving its high station, not by force alone, but by showing itself to be the first in every thing, which according to the views of the Greeks could render a city illustrious. Its temples were now to be the most splendid; its works of art the noblest; its festivals and its theatres the most beautiful and the most costly. But for the supremacy of Athens, Pericles never could have found there a sphere of action worthy of himself; no Phidias, no Polygnotus, no Sophocles could have flourished. For the public spirit of the Athenian proceeded from the consciousness, that he was the first among the Grecians; and nothing but that public spirit could have encouraged and rewarded the genius, which was capable of producing works like theirs. Perhaps their very greatness prepared the fall of Athens; but if they were doomed to suffer for it, the gratitude due to them from mankind, is not on that account diminished.

The supremacy of Athens was, as the nature of the whole confederation makes apparent, immediately connected with its naval superiority; for the allied states were all islands or maritime cities. Thus the expressions of supreme command (*ἡγεμονία*) and dominion of the sea,[2] that is, the dominion of

[1] Thucyd. i. 95. [2] *Θαλασσοκρατία.*

the Ægean and Ionian seas, (for the ambition of the Athenians extended no further,) came to signify the same thing. This dominion of the sea was therefore, in its origin, not only not blamable, but absolutely essential to the attainment of the object proposed. The security of the Greeks against the attacks of the Persians depended on it; and so too did the continuance of the confederacy. We cannot acquit Athens of the charge of having afterwards abused her naval superiority; but he who considers the nature of such alliances and the difficulty of holding them together, will concede, that in practice it would be almost impossible to avoid the appearance of abusing such a supremacy; since the same things which to one party seem an abuse, in the eyes of the other are only the necessary means to secure the end.

When the sea was made secure, and no attack was further to be feared from the Persians,—how could it be otherwise, than that the continuance of the war, and consequently the contributions made for that purpose, should be to many of them unnecessarily oppressive? And how could it be avoided, that some should feel themselves injured, or be actually injured in the contributions exacted of them. The consequences of all this were, on the one side a refusal to pay the contributions, and on the other, severity in collecting them;[1] and as they continued to be refused, this was considered as a revolt, and wars followed with several of the allies; at first with the island Naxos;[2] then with Thasus,[3] with Samos,[4] and others.[5] But those who had been overcome, were no longer treated as allies, but as subjects; and thus the relation of Athens to the several states was different; for a distinction was made between the voluntary confederates and

[1] "The Athenians," says Thucydides, i. 99, "exacted the contributions with severity; and were the more oppressive to the allies, as these were unaccustomed to oppression." But if the Athenians had not insisted on the payment of them with severity, how soon would the whole confederacy have fallen into ruin.

[2] Thucyd. i. 98. [3] Thucyd. i. 100, 101. [4] Thucyd. i. 116.

[5] The difference of the allies, and also the view taken by the Athenians of their supremacy, and of the oppression with which they were charged, are no where more clearly developed, than in the speech of the Athenian ambassador in Camarina. Thucyd. vi. 83, etc. "The Chians," says he, "and Methymnæans (in Lesbos) need only furnish ships. From most of the others, we exact the tribute with severity. Others, though inhabitants of islands, and easy to be taken, are yet entirely voluntary allies, on account of the situation of their islands round the Peloponnesus."

the subjects.[1] The latter were obliged to pay in money an equivalent for the ships, which they were bound to furnish; for Athens found it more advantageous to have its ships built in this manner, by itself. But the matter did not rest here. The sum of the yearly tribute, fixed under Pericles at four hundred and sixty talents, was raised by Alcibiades[2] to six hundred. When, during the Peloponnesian war, Athens suffered from the want of money, the tribute was changed into duties of five per centum on the value of all imported articles, collected by the Athenians in the harbours of the allies.[3] But the most oppressive of all was perhaps the judiciary power, which Athens usurped over the allies; not merely in the differences, which arose between the states, but also in private suits.[4] Individuals were obliged to go to Athens to transact their business, and in consequence, to the great advantage of the Athenian householders, inn-keepers, and the like, a multitude of foreigners were constantly in that city, in order to bring their affairs to an issue.

It is therefore obvious, that the nature of the Athenian supremacy was changed. It had been at first a voluntary association, and now it had become, for far the larger number of the states that shared in it, a forced one. That several of the confederates were continually striving to break free from the alliance, has been shown by the examples cited above; but it is easy to perceive, how difficult, or rather how impossible it was, to effect a general union between them against Athens. If they had been desirous of attempting it, how great were the means possessed by Athens, of anticipating them. Yet there was one moment, when, but for their almost inconceivable want of forethought, an attempt might have justly been expected from them; and that period was the close of the war with Persia.[5] The Greeks framed their articles in the treaty of peace; and had nothing further to

[1] The *αὐτόνομοι* and the *ὑπήκοοι*, both of whom were still bound to pay the taxes (*ὑποτελεῖς*). Manso, in his acute illustration of the *Hegemonia*, Sparta B. iii. Beylage 12, 13, distinguishes three classes; those who contributed ships, but no money; those who contributed nothing but money; and those who were at once subject and tributary. The nature of things seems to require, that it should have been so; yet Thucydides, vi. 69, makes no difference between the two last.

[2] Plutarch. Op. ii. p. 535. [3] Thucyd. vii. 28.

[4] See, upon this subject, Xenoph. de Rep. Athen. Op. 694. ed. Leunclav.

[5] In the year 449 before Christ; be it that peace was formally concluded or not.

fear from the Persians. The whole object of the confederacy was therefore at an end. And yet we do not hear that any voices were then raised against Athens. On the other side, it may with propriety be asked, if justice did not require of the Athenians, voluntarily to restore to the allies their liberty. But this question will hardly be put by a practical statesman. To free the allies from their subordination would have been to deprive Athens of its splendour; to dry up a chief source of the revenues of the republic; perhaps to pave the way to its ruin. What Athenian statesman would have dared to make such a proposition? Had he made it, could he have carried it through? Would he not rather have insured his own downfal? There are examples where single rulers, weary of power, have freely resigned it; but a people never yet voluntarily gave up authority over subject nations.

Perhaps these remarks may contribute to rectify the judgments of Isocrates,[1] in his celebrated accusation of the dominion of the sea;[2] which he considered as the source of all the misery of Athens and of Greece. The views which he entertained were certainly just; but the evils proceeded from the abuses; and it were just as easy to show, that his celebrated Athens, but for that dominion, never would have afforded him a subject for his panegyrics.

But how those evils could result from that abuse; how they prepared the downfal of Athens, when Sparta appeared as the deliverer of Greece; how the rule of these deliverers, much worse than that of the first oppressors, inflicted on Greece wounds, which were not only deep, but incurable; in general, the causes which produced the ruin of that country, remain for investigation in one of the later chapters, to which we must make our way through some previous researches.

[1] We shall be obliged to recur frequently to Isocrates. It is impossible to read the venerable and aged orator, who was filled with the purest patriotism which a Grecian could feel, without respecting and loving him. But he was a political writer, without being a practical statesman; and, like St. Pierre and other excellent men of the same class, he believed much to be possible which was not so. The historian must consult him with caution. This panegyrist of antiquity often regarded it in too advantageous a light, and is, besides, little concerned about the accuracy of his historical delineations.

[2] Isocrat. Op. p. 172. ed. Steph.

CHAPTER IX.

CONSTITUTIONS OF THE GRECIAN STATES.

In the present chapter, we do not undertake to give an outline of the several Grecian states; but rather to delineate the general characteristics of the Grecian forms of government. Such a general investigation seems the more essential, as, in the obvious impossibility of analyzing each one of them, it will throw light on those, which may hereafter be selected for particular description.

With respect to a nation, in which every thing that could be done in public, was public; where every thing great and glorious was especially the result of this public life; where even private life was identified with that of the public; where the individual did but live with and for the state, this investigation must have a much higher degree of interest, than if it related to any other, in which the line of division is distinctly drawn between public and private life. He who will judge of the Grecians, must be acquainted with the constitutions of their states; and he must not only consider the inanimate forms, as they are taught us by the learned compilers and writers on what are called Grecian antiquities; but regard them as they were regarded by the Greeks themselves.

If the remark, which we made above,[1] that the Grecian states, with few exceptions, were cities with their districts, and their constitutions, therefore, the constitutions of cities; if this remark needed to be further confirmed, it could be done by referring to the fact, that the Greeks designate the ideas of state and of city, by the same word.[2] We must therefore always bear in mind the idea of city constitutions, and never forget that those of which we are treating, not only had nothing in common with those of the large em-

[1] An attempt to collect and arrange the separate accounts has been made by F. W. Tittman. His work on the Grecian Constitutions proves his industry, and the paucity of the accounts that have come down to us.

[2] Πόλις, *civitas*. Respecting the meaning of πόλις, and the difference between πόλις and ἔθνος, *state* and *nation*, consult Aristot. Polit. Op. ii. p. 235, ed. Casaub.

pires of modern times, but not even with those of the smaller principalities. If for the sake of giving a distinct representation, we were to compare them with any thing in modern history, we could best compare them, as the character of the Italian cities of the middle age is hardly more familiar than that of the Grecian, with the imperial towns in Germany, especially in the days of their prosperity, previous to the thirty years' war, before they were limited in the freedom of their movements by the vicinity of more powerful monarchical states; were it not that the influence of the difference of religion created a dissimilarity.

And yet this comparison may throw some light on the great variety, which is observed in those states, in spite of the apparent uniformity which existed among the Grecian states, (as all were necessarily similar in some respects,) and which equally existed in those German cities. And the comparison will be still more justified, if we add, that the extent of territory was as different among the Grecian cities, and yet on the whole was nearly the same. There were few, which possessed a larger territory, than formerly belonged to Ulm or Nuremberg; but in Greece, as in Germany, the prosperity of the city did not depend on the extent of its territory. Corinth hardly possessed a larger district than that of Augsburg; and yet both rose to an eminent degree of opulence and culture.

But great as this variety in the constitutions may have been, (and we shall illustrate this subject more fully hereafter,) they all coincided in one grand point. They all were free constitutions; that is, they allowed of no rulers, whom the people as a body, or certain classes of the people, could not call to account;[1] he, who usurped such authority, was, in the language of the Greeks, a tyrant. In this the idea is contained, that the state shall govern itself; and not be governed by an individual; and of course a very different view of the state was taken from the modern European notion. The view of the Greeks was entirely opposed to that of those modern politicians, who conceive of the state as a mere machine; and of those also, who would make of it nothing but an institution of police. The Greeks regarded

[1] Aristot. Polit. Op. ii. p. 251, 282. The magistrates must be responsible for their administration, *ὑπεύθυνοι*, as the Greeks expressed it.

the state, no less than each individual, as a moral person. Moral powers have influence in it, and decide its plans of operation. Hence it becomes the great object of him who would manage a state, to secure to reason the superiority over passion and desire; and the attainment of virtue and morality, is in this sense an object of the state, just as it should be of the individual.

If with these previous reflections we proceed to investigate the laws of the Greeks, they will present themselves to our view in their true light. The constitutions of their cities, like those of the moderns, were framed by necessity, and developed by circumstances. But as abuses are much sooner felt in small states and towns, than in large ones, the necessity of reforms was early felt in many of them; and this necessity occasioned lawgivers to make their appearance, much before the spirit of speculation had been occupied on the subject of politics. The objects therefore of those lawgivers were altogether practical; and, without the knowledge of any philosophical system, they endeavoured to accomplish them by means of reflection and experience. A commonwealth could never have been conceived of by them, except as governing itself; and on this foundation they rested their codes. It never occurred to them, to look for the means of that self-government, to nothing but the forms of government; and although those forms were not left unnoticed in their codes, yet they were noticed only to a certain degree. No Grecian lawgiver ever thought of abolishing entirely the ancient usage, and becoming, according to the phrase now in vogue, the framers of a new constitution. In giving laws, they only reformed. Lycurgus, Solon, and the rest, so far from abolishing what usage had established, endeavoured to preserve every thing which could be preserved; and only added, in part, several new institutions, and in part made for the existing ones better regulations. If we possessed therefore the whole of the laws of Solon, we should by no means find them to contain a perfect constitution. But to compensate for that, they embraced, not only the rights of individuals, but also morals, in a much higher degree, than the latter can be embraced in the view of any modern lawgiver. The organization of

private life, and hence the education of youth,[1] on which the prevalence and continuance of good morals depend, formed one of their leading objects. They were deeply convinced, that that moral person, the state, would otherwise be incapable of governing itself. To this it must be added, that in these small commonwealths, in these towns with their territories, many regulations could be made and executed, which could not be put into operation in a powerful and widely extended nation. Whether these regulations were always good, and always well adapted to their purpose, is quite another question; it is our duty at present to show, from what point of view those lawgivers were accustomed to regard the art of regulating the state, and the means of preserving and directing it.[2]

Whenever a commonwealth or city governs itself, it is a fundamental idea, that the supreme power resides with its members, with the citizens. But it may rest with the citizens collectively, or only with certain classes, or perhaps only with certain families. Thus there naturally arose among the Greeks that difference, which they designated by the names of Aristocracies and Democracies; and to one of these two classes, they referred all their constitutions. But it is not easy to draw a distinct line between the two. When we are speaking of the meaning which they bore in practical politics, we must beware of taking them in that signification, which was afterwards given them by the speculative politicians, by Aristotle[3] and others. In their practical politics, the Greeks no doubt connected certain ideas with those denominations; but the ideas were not very distinctly defined; and the surest way of erring would be, to desire to define them more accurately than was done by the Greeks themselves. The fundamental idea of the democratic constitution was, that all citizens, as such, should enjoy equal

[1] Aristot. Polit. Op. ii. p. 301, 336.

[2] This taken together, forms what the Greeks called *political science*—*πολιτική ἐπιστήμη*.

[3] If here, in investigating the practical meaning of those words, we can make no use of the theoretical definitions of Aristotle in his Politics, we would not by any means give up the right of citing him as of authority in the history of the Greek constitutions, in so far as he himself speaks of them. And whose testimony on these subjects deserves more weight than that of the man, who, in a work which has unfortunately been lost, described and analyzed all the known forms of government of his time, two hundred and fifty-five in number.

rights in the administration of the state; and yet a perfect equality existed in very few of the cities. This equality was commonly limited to a participation in the popular assemblies and the courts.[1] A government did not cease to be a democracy, though the poorer class were entirely excluded from all magistracies, and their votes of less weight in the popular assemblies. On the other hand, an aristocracy always pre-supposed exclusive privileges of individual classes or families. But these were very different and various. There were hereditary aristocracies, where, as in Sparta, the highest dignities continued in a few families. But this was seldom the case. It was commonly the richer and more distinguished class, which obtained the sole administration of the state; and it was either wealth, or birth, or both together, that decided.[2] But wealth consisted not so much in money, as in land; and it was estimated by real estate. This wealth was chiefly exhibited, in ancient times, in the sums expended on horses. Those whose means were sufficient, constituted the cavalry of the citizens; and these formed the richer part of the soldiery, which consisted only of citizens or militia. It is therefore easy to understand, how it was possible that the circumstance, whether the district of a city possessed much pasture land, could have had so much influence, in practical politics, on the formation of the constitution.[3] It was therefore these nobles, the Eupatridæ and Optimates, who, though they did not wholly exclude the people from a share in the legislation, endeavoured to secure to themselves the magistracies, and the seats in the courts of justice; and wherever this was the case, there was what the Greeks termed an aristocracy.[4]

In cities, where wealth is for the most part measured by possessions in lands, it is almost unavoidable that not only a class of great proprietors should rise up; but that this inequality should constantly increase; and landed estates

[1] Aristot. Polit. iii. 1.

[2] Aristot. Polit. iv. 5.

[3] Aristotle cites examples of it in Eretria, Chalcis, and other cities. Polit. iv. 3.

[4] Oligarchy was distinguished from this. But though both words were in use, no other line can be drawn between them, than the greater or smaller number of Optimates, who had the government in their hands. That this remark is a true one appears from the definitions, to which Aristotle, Polit. iii. 7, is obliged to have recourse, in order to distinguish them.

come finally into the hands of a few families.[1] In an age when there were much fewer mechanic professions, and when those few were carried on chiefly by slaves, the consequences of this inequality were much more oppressive; and it was therefore one of the chief objects of the lawgivers, either to prevent this evil, or, where it already existed, to remedy it; as otherwise a revolution of the state would sooner or later have inevitably followed. In this manner we may understand why a new and equal division of the land among the citizens was made;[2] why the acquisition of lands by purchase or gift was forbidden, and only permitted in the way of inheritance and of marriage;[3] why a limit was fixed to the amount of land, which a single citizen could possess.[4] But with all these and other similar precautions, it was not possible to hinder entirely the evil, against which they were intended to guard; and hence were prepared the causes of those numerous and violent commotions, to which all the Grecian states were more or less exposed.

In the constitutions of cities, however they may be formed, the right of citizenship is the first and most important. He who does not possess it, may perhaps live in the city under certain conditions, and enjoy the protection of its laws;[5] but he is not, properly speaking, a member of the state; and can enjoy neither the same rights, nor the same respect, as the citizen. The regulations, therefore, respecting sharing in the right of citizenship, were necessarily strict; but they were very different in the several Grecian cities. In some, the full privileges of citizenship were secured, if both the parents had been citizens;[6] in others, it was necessary to trace such a descent through two or three generations;[7] whilst in others, no respect was had, except to the descent from the mother.[8] There were some cities which very rarely and with difficulty could be induced to confer

[1] This was the case in Thurii, Aristot. Polit. v. 7.
[2] As in Sparta, by the laws of Lycurgus.
[3] As in Sparta, and also among the Locrians, Aristot. Polit. ii. 7.
[4] Aristot. l. c.
[5] These μέτοικοι, *inquilini*, were formed in almost all the Grecian cities. It was common for them to pay for protection, and to bear other civil burdens.
[6] As, for example, at Athens.
[7] As in Larissa, Aristot. Polit. iii. 2. So too in Massilia.
[8] Aristot. Polit. iii. 5.

the right of citizenship; whilst in others foreigners were admitted to it with readiness. In these cases, accidental circumstances not unfrequently decided; and the same city was sometimes compelled to exchange its early and severe principles, for milder ones, if the number of the ancient citizens came to be too small.[1] In colonies, the milder principles were of necessity followed; since there might arrive from the mother country a whole company of new emigrants, whom it would either be impossible or inexpedient to reject. And hence we may explain what is so frequently observable in the colonies, that the wards of the citizens were divided according to their arrival from the different mother countries; one of the most fruitful sources of internal commotions, and even of the most violent political revolutions.[2]

In free cities, the constitution and the administration are always connected in an equally eminent degree with the division of the citizens. But here again we find a vast difference among the Greeks. We first notice those states, which made a distinction in the privileges of the inhabitants of the chief town, and of the villages and country. There were some Grecian states, where the inhabitants of the city enjoyed great privileges; and the rest of their countrymen stood in a subordinate relation to them;[3] whilst in others there was no distinction of rights between the one and the other.[4] The other divisions of the citizens were settled partly by birth, according to the ward to which a man happened to belong;[5] partly from his place of residence, according to the district in which he resided;[6] and partly from property or the census, according to the class in which he was reckoned. Though not in all, yet in many states, the ward, and the place of residence, were attached to the name of each individual; which was absolutely necessary in a nation that had no family names, or where they at least were not generally introduced. There is no need of men-

[1] Thus at Athens, Clisthenes received a large number of foreigners into the class of citizens. Aristot. iii. 2.

[2] Examples of it at Sybaris, Thurium, Byzantium, and other places are cited, Aristotle, Polit. v. 3.

[3] Hence in Laconia, the difference between Spartans and Lacedæmonians (περίοικοι). So also in Crete and in Argos.

[4] As at Athens.

[5] According to the φύλαι (or wards).

[6] According to the δήμοι (or cantons).

tioning how important was the difference in fortune; as the proportion of the public burden to be borne by each one was decided according to his wealth; and the kind of service to be required in war, whether in the cavalry or the infantry, and whether in heavy or light armour, was regulated by the same criterion; as will ever be the case in countries, where there is no other armed force than the militia formed of the citizens.

On these divisions of the citizens, the organization of their assemblies (ἐκκλησίαι) was founded. These assemblies, which were a natural result of city governments, were, according to the views of the Greeks, so essential an institution, that they probably existed in every Grecian city, though not always under the same regulations. Yet the manner in which they were held in every city except Athens and Sparta, is almost wholly unknown to us. The nature of the case required, that the manner in which they were to be held, should every where be established by rule. It was the custom to give to but one magistrate the right of convoking and opening them.[1] But we do not know in what manner the votes were taken in the several cities, whether merely by polls, or by the wards and other divisions of the people. And in this, too, there was a great difference, whether all citizens had the right of voting, or whether a certain census was first requisite.[2] In most of the cities, regular assemblies on fixed days, and extraordinary meetings also, appear to have been held.[3] To attend was regarded as the duty of every citizen; and as the better part were apt to remain away, especially in stormy times, absence was often made a punishable offence.[4] It may easily be supposed, that the decisions were expressed in an established form, written down and preserved, and sometimes engraved on tables. But although the forms were fixed, the subjects which might come before the assembly were by no means so clearly defined. The principle which was acted upon was, that sub-

[1] In the heroic age, it was the privilege of the kings to convoke the assembly. See above, in the fourth chapter.

[2] That a great variety prevailed in this respect, is clear from Aristot. Polit. iv. 13.

This was the case in Athens and Sparta.

[4] This is the case, says Aristotle, Polit. iv. 13, in the oligarchic, or aristocratical cities; while on the contrary, in the democratic, the poor were well paid for appearing in the assemblies.

jects which were important for the community, were to be brought before it. But how uncertain is the very idea of what is or is not important. How much, too, depends on the form which the constitution has taken at a certain period; whether the power of the senate, or of certain magistrates preponderates. We find even in the history of Rome, that questions of the utmost interest to the people, questions of war and peace, were sometimes submitted to the people, and sometimes not. No less considerable difference prevailed in the Grecian cities. Yet writers are accustomed to comprehend the subjects belonging to the common assemblies in three grand classes.[1] The first embraces legislation; for what the Greeks called a law, (νόμος,) was always a decree passed or confirmed by the commons; although it is difficult, we should rather say impossible, to define with accuracy the extent of this legislation. The second embraces the choice of magistrates. This right, although not all magistrates were appointed by election, was regarded, and justly regarded, as one of the most important privileges. For the power of the commons is preserved by nothing more effectually, than by making it necessary for those who would obtain a place, to apply for it to them. The third class was formed by the popular courts of justice, which, as we shall hereafter take occasion to show, were of the highest importance as a support of the democracy.

The consequences which the discussion and the decision of the most important concerns in the assemblies of the whole commons must inevitably have had, are so naturally suggested, that they hardly need to be illustrated at large. How could it have escaped those lawgivers, that to intrust this unlimited power to the commons, was not much less than to pave the way for the rule of the populace, if we include under that name the mass of indigent citizens?

The most natural means of guarding against this evil, would without doubt have been the choice of persons, possessed of plenary powers, to represent the citizens. But it is obvious, that the system of representation has the least opportunity of coming to perfection in city governments. It is the fruit of the enlarged extent of states; where it is

[1] The chief passage on this subject is in Aristot. Polit. iv. 14.

impossible for all to meet in the assemblies. But in cities with a narrow territory, what could lead to such a form; since neither distance nor numbers made it difficult for the citizens to appear personally in the assemblies. It is true, that the alliances of several cities, as of the Bœotian or the Achæan, led to the idea of sending deputies to the assemblies; but in those meetings, the internal affairs of the confederates were never discussed; they were reserved for the consideration of each city; and the deliberations of the whole body related only to general affairs with respect to foreign relations. But a true system of representation can never be formed in that manner; the true sphere of action of a legislative body, is to be found in the internal affairs of the nation.

It was therefore necessary to think of other means of meeting the danger apprehended from the rule of the populace; and those means were various. Aristotle expressly remarks,[1] that there were cities, in which no general assemblies of the citizens were held; and only such citizens appeared, as had been expressly convoked or invited. These obviously formed a class of aristocratic governments. But even in the democracies, means[2] were taken, partly to have the important business transacted in smaller divisions, before the commons came to vote upon it; partly to limit the subjects which were to be brought before them; partly to reserve the revision, if not of all, yet of some of the decrees, to another peculiar board; and partly, and most frequently, to name another deliberate assembly, whose duty it was to consider every thing which was to come before the commons, and so far to prepare the business, that nothing remained for the commons, but to accept or reject the measures proposed.

This assembly was called by the Greeks, a council (βουλή). We are acquainted with its internal regulations only at Athens; but there is no reason to doubt that in several Grecian states, a similar assembly existed under the same name.[3] If

[1] Aristot. Polit. iii. 1. A similar regulation existed in several German imperial towns; as, for example, in Bremen, where the most distinguished citizens were invited by the senate to attend the convention of citizens; and of course no uninvited person made his appearance. It is to be regretted, that Aristotle has cited no Grecian city as an example.

[2] See in proof what follows, Aristot. Polit. iv. 14, Op. ii. p. 286.

[3] As at Argos and Mantinea, Thucyd. v. 47. So too in Chios, Thucyd. viii. 14.

we may draw inferences respecting its nature in other states from what it was at Athens, it consisted of a numerous committee of the citizens annually chosen; its members, taken after a fixed rule from each of the corporations, were chosen by lot; but they could not become actual members without a previous examination. For in no case was it of so much importance as here, to effect the exclusion of all but honest men; who, being themselves interested in the preservation of the state and its constitution, might decide on the business presented to them, with prudence and moderation. In Athens, at least, the greatest pains were taken with the internal organization of this body; so that it seems to us, as will appear from the investigations respecting this state, to have been almost too artificial. Regulations, similar in kind, though not exactly the same, were probably established in the other cities, where similar wants and circumstances prevailed. It is easy to perceive, that the preservation of the internal liberties of such a body against the encroachments of parties and too powerful individuals, made such regulations essential. It was probably to promote this end, that the appointments to the council were made only for the year.[1] It prevented the committee from becoming a faction, and thus assuming the whole administration of the state. But beside this, another great advantage was gained; for in this manner, by far the larger number of distinguished and upright citizens, became acquainted with the affairs and the government of the state.

In other cities, instead of this annual council, there was a senate (γερουσία), which had no periodical change of its members, but formed a permanent board. Its very name expresses that it was composed of the elders; and what was more natural, than to look for good counsel to the experience of maturity? The rule respecting age may have been very different in the several cities, and perhaps in many no rule on the subject existed. But in others, it was enforced with rigorous accuracy. The immediate object was to have in it a board of counsel; but its sphere of action was by no means so limited. In Sparta, the assembly of elders had its place by the side of the kings. The senate of Corinth is

[1] This explains why Aristotle, Polit. iv. 15, calls the βουλή an institution favourable to the form of government.

mentioned under the same name;[1] that of Massilia[2] under a different one, but its members held their places for life; and in how many other cities may there have been a council of elders, of which history makes no mention, just as it is silent respecting the internal regulations in those just enumerated.[3] Even in cities which usually had no such senate, an extraordinary one was sometimes appointed in extraordinary cases, where good advice was needed. This took place in Athens after the great overthrow in Sicily.[4]

Besides an assembly of citizens, or town meeting, and a senate, a Grecian city had its magistrates. Even the ancient politicians were perplexed to express with accuracy the idea of magistrates.[5] For not all to whom public business was committed by the citizens, could be called magistrates; for otherwise the ambassadors and priests would have belonged to that class. In modern constitutions, it is not seldom difficult to decide, who ought to be reckoned in the number of magistrates, as will be apparent from calling to mind the inferior officers. But no important misunderstanding can arise, if we are careful to affix to the word the double idea of possessing a part of the executive power; and of gaining, in consequence of the importance of the business intrusted to them, a higher degree of consideration than belonged to the common citizen.

In the republican constitutions of the Greeks a second idea was attached to that of a magistracy; it was necessary to call every magistrate to account respecting the affairs of his office.[6] He who went beyond this rule, ceased to be a magistrate and became a tyrant. The magistrate was there-

[1] Plutarch. Op. ii. p. 177. [2] Strabo, iii. p. 124.

[3] There was perhaps no one Grecian city, in which such a council did not exist, for the nature of things made it almost indispensable. They were most commonly called *βουλὴ* and *γερουσία*, and these words may often have been confounded. For although the *βουλὴ* in Athens was a body chosen from the citizens but for a year, and the *γερουσία* of Sparta was a permanent council, we cannot safely infer, that the terms, when used, always implied such a difference. In Crete, e. g. the council of elders was called *βουλὴ*, according to Aristot. Polit. ii. 10, though in its organization it resembled the *γερουσία* of Sparta.

[4] Thucyd. viii. i.

[5] See, on this subject, Aristot. Polit. iv. 15. The practical politicians, no less than the theorists, were perplexed in defining the word. An important passage may be found in Æschin. in Ctesiphont. iii. p. 397, etc., Reisk.

[6] They were of necessity *ὑπεύθυνοι*. Aristot. Polit. ii. 12.

fore compelled to recognise the sovereignty of the people. This certainly implied, that an account was to be given to the commons; but as in such constitutions not every thing was systematically established, there were some states, in which separate boards, as that of the Ephori in Sparta, usurped the right of calling the magistrates to account.[1]

In the inquiry respecting magistrates, says Aristotle,[2] several questions are to be considered: How many magistrates there are, and how great is their authority? How long they continue in office, and whether they ought to continue long? Further,—Who ought to be appointed? and by whom? and how? These are questions, which of themselves show, that republican states are had in view; and which lead us to anticipate that great variety, which prevailed on these points in the Grecian constitutions. We desire to treat first of the last questions.

According to the whole spirit of the Grecian constitutions, it cannot be doubted, that their leading principle was, that all magistrates must be appointed by the people. The right of choosing the magistrates was always regarded, and justly regarded, as an important part of the freedom of a citizen.[3] But although this principle was predominant, it still had its exceptions. There were states, in which the first offices were hereditary in certain families.[4] But as we have already taken occasion to observe, this was a rare case; and where one magistracy was hereditary, all the rest were elective; at Sparta, though the royal dignity was hereditary, the Ephori were chosen. But beside the appointment by election, the custom very commonly prevailed of appointing by lot. And our astonishment is very justly excited by this method, which not unfrequently commits to chance the appointment to the first and most weighty employments in the state. But even in several of the German imperial towns, the lot had an important share in the appointment to offices. It is uninfluenced by favour, birth, and wealth. And therefore the nomination of magistrates by lot, was

[1] There were magistrates appointed on purpose, called *εὐθυνολογίσται*. Aristot. Polit. vi. 8.

[2] Aristot. Polit. iv. 15.

[3] Aristot. Polit. ii. 12. *Μηδὲ γὰρ τούτου, τοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν, κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος, δοῦλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος.*

[4] As the kings in Sparta.

considered by the Grecian politicians, as the surest characteristic of a democracy.[1] But where the appointment was left to be decided by that method, the decision was not always made solely by it. He on whom the lot fell, could still be subjected to a severe examination, and very frequently was so. And where some places were filled in this way, it was by no means pursued in the appointment to all.

But in the election, also, the greatest differences prevailed; since sometimes all classes, and sometimes only particular ones, took part in them.[2] To admit all citizens to vote, is one of the chief characteristics of a democracy; and we know this was done not only in Athens, but in many other cities. But when the aristocratic and democratic party had once become distinct, endeavours were almost inevitably made to exclude the mass of the people from any share in the elections. For the aristocrat found nothing more humiliating, than to approach the common citizen as a suppliant, before he could arrive at places of honour. Where the first step succeeded, the second soon followed; and the magistrates themselves supplied any vacant places in their board. This, says Aristotle,[3] is the peculiar mark of oligarchy, and leads almost always to revolutions in the states.

And who was eligible to office? This question is still more important than that respecting the electors; and an equally great difference prevailed on this point in the various states. The maxim, that men, to whom the control of the public affairs should be committed, must not only possess sufficient capacity, but must also be interested in the support of existing forms, is so obvious, that the principle of excluding the lower orders of the people from participating in the magistracies, could hardly seem otherwise than judicious and necessary.[4] But when it was adopted, it could seldom be preserved. When a state became flourishing and powerful, the people felt itself to be of more importance;[5] and it was not always flattery of the populace, which in such times induced its leaders to abolish those restrictive laws, but a conviction of the impossibility of

[1] Aristot. Polit. iv. 15.

[2] Aristotle, l. c., classifies these varieties.

[3] Aristot. l. c.

[4] That not only Solon, but other lawgivers, had adopted this regulation, is remarked by Aristotle, Polit. iii. 11.

[5] See, on this subject also, Aristot. l. c.

maintaining them. In an individual case, such an unlimited freedom of choice can become very injurious; but it is, on the whole, much less so than it appears to be; and the restrictions are apt to become pernicious. If it be birth which forms the limiting principle, if a man must belong to certain families in order to gain an office, it would be made directly impossible for men of talents to obtain them; and this has often produced the most violent revolutions. If fortune be made the qualification,[1] this is in itself no criterion of desert. If it be age, want of energy is too often connected with riper experience.

In most of the Grecian cities, there certainly existed a reason, why regard should be had to wealth; because that consisted almost always in real estate. But where the poor were excluded by no restrictive laws, they were obliged of their own accord to retire from most of the magistracies. These offices were not lucrative; on the contrary, considerable expenses were often connected with them.[2] There were no fixed salaries, as in our states; and the prospect which in Rome in a later period was so inviting to the magistrates, the administration of a province, did not exist in Greece. It was therefore impossible for the poorer class to press forward with eagerness to these offices; in many cities there even existed a necessity of imposing a punishment, if the person elected would not accept the office committed to him.[3] It was far more the honour and the glory, than the gain, which gave a value to the magistracies. But the honour of being the first, or one of the first, among his fellow citizens, is for many a more powerful excitement, than that which can be derived from emolument.

In small republics, no other fear needs be entertained respecting the offices of magistrates, than lest certain families should gain the exclusive possession of them. This is what the Greeks meant by an oligarchy,[4] when the number of such families remained small. These were with justice regarded as a corruption of the constitutions. There may

[1] Many places in Aristotle show, that this was the case in a large number of cities; and under the most various regulations; e. g. iv. 11.

[2] As for banquets, public buildings, festivals, etc. Aristot. Polit. vi. 8.

[3] Aristot. Polit. iv. 9.

[4] Not only Aristot. iv. 6, but many passages in Thucydides; as, e. g., viii. 82.

have been exceptions, and we find in history examples, both within and without Greece, where such states have been administered with moderation and wisdom. But more frequently experience has shown the contrary result. The precautions taken against this evil by the Grecians, were the same with those adopted in many of the German imperial towns; persons connected by blood, as father and son, or several brothers, could not at the same time be magistrates.[1] Connexions by marriage are no where said to have excluded from office; on the contrary, it would be easier to find examples of brothers-in-law filling magistracies at the same time.[2]

Most of the magistrates were chosen annually; many for but half a year.[3] This frequent renewal had its advantages, and also its evils. It is the strongest pillar of the rule of the people; which is by nothing so much confirmed, as by the frequent exercise of the right of election. This was the point of view taken by the politicians of Greece, when they considered the authority of the people to reside in the elections.[4] That these frequent elections did not tend to preserve internal tranquillity, is easy to be perceived. But on the other side, the philosopher of Stagira has not failed to remark, that the permanent possession of magistracies might have led to discontent.[5]

An enumeration of the different magistracies usual among the Greeks, is not required by our purpose; neither would it be possible, as our acquaintance with the several constitutions of the cities is incredibly limited.[6] The little that we know of the regulations in the individual states, especially in Athens, proves that the number of such offices was very considerable; and the same appears from the classification, which Aristotle has attempted to make of them.[7] Their duties are commonly indicated by their names; but these again were entirely different in the various cities, even in cases where the duties were the same. The Cosmi were in Crete what the Ephori were in Sparta. Most of the cities

[1] It was so in Massilia and in Cnidus. Aristot. Polit. v. 6.
[2] As Agesilaus and Pisander in Sparta.
[3] Aristot. Polit. iv. 15. [4] Thucyd. viii. 89. [5] Aristot. Polit. ii. 5.
[6] See Tittman on the Grecian Constitutions.
[7] See the instructive passage, Polit. iv. 15.

must have had a magistrate like the Archons in Athens; and yet it would not be easy to find the name in any other. The numerous encroachments made by the lawgivers on domestic life, contributed much to multiply the offices of magistrates and extend their sphere of action. The Grecians had formed no idea of a police, as a general branch of the administration of the state; but they were acquainted with several of its branches; and although they had no general board of police, the circumstances just mentioned led them to establish several particular branches; and even some, which are not usual in our times. The superintendence of women, the superintendence of children, was in many cities intrusted to particular magistrates;[1] and as the Areopagus of Athens had in general the care of morals, there were undoubtedly similar tribunals in other Grecian cities.

Thus then it appears, that amidst an almost infinite variety of forms, assemblies of the citizens, senates, and magistracies, are the institutions which belonged to every Grecian commonwealth. The preservation of freedom and equality among the commons[2] formed their chief object. It was not considered unjust to take from any one, of whom it was only feared that he might become dangerous to this freedom, the power of doing injury, by a temporary banishment from the city; and this took place at Athens and Argos[3] by ostracism, and by petalism in Syracuse. Nothing can be more jealous than the love of liberty; and unfortunately for mankind, experience shows but too clearly that it has reason to be so.

Nevertheless, neither these nor other precautions were able to save the Grecian cities from the usurpations of tyrants, as they were termed. Few cities, in the mother country, and in the colonies, escaped this fate. The Grecians connected with this word the idea of an illegitimate, but not necessarily of a cruel government. It was illegitimate, because it was not conferred by the commons; but usurped without, or even against their will. A demagogue, however great his power may have been, was never, as such, denominated a tyrant; but he received the name, if he set himself above the people; that is, if he refused to lay before

[1] The *γυναικονόμοι* and the *παιδονόμοι*. Aristot. l. c.
[2] The *αὐτονομία* and *ἰσονομία*. [3] Aristot. Polit. v. 3.

the people the account which was due to them.[1] The usual support of such an authority, is an armed power, composed of foreigners and hirelings; which was therefore always regarded as the sure mark of a tyrant.[2] Such a government by no means necessarily implied, that the existing regulations and laws would be entirely set aside. They could continue; even a usurper needs an administration; only he raises himself above the laws. The natural aim of these tyrants usually was, to make their power hereditary in their families. But though this happened in many cities, the supreme power was seldom retained for a long time by the same family. It continued longest, says Aristotle,[3] in the house of Orthagoras in Sicyon, for as it was very moderate and even popular, it lasted a century; and for the same causes it was preserved about as long in the house of Cypselus in Corinth. But if it could not be maintained by such means, how could it have been kept up by mere violence and terror? Where the love of freedom is once so deeply fixed, as it was in the character of the Grecians, the attempts to oppress it only give a new impulse to its defenders.

And by what criterion shall the historian, who investigates the history of humanity, form his judgment of the worth of these constitutions? By that, which a modern school, placing the object of the state in the security of person and of property, desires to see adopted? We may observe in Greece exertions made to gain that security; but it is equally clear, that it was, and, with such constitutions, could have been, but imperfectly attained. In the midst of the frequent storms, to which those states were exposed, that tranquillity could not long be preserved, in which men limit their active powers to the improvement of their domestic condition. It does not belong to us to institute inquiries into the correctness of those principles; but experience does not admit of its being denied, that in these, to all appearances, so imperfect constitutions, every thing, which forms the glory of man, flourished in its highest perfection. It was those very storms, which called forth master spirits, by opening to them a sphere of action. There was no place here for indolence and inactivity of mind; where each individual felt most

[1] By desiring to become *ἀνυπεύθυνος*. Aristot. Polit. iv. 10. See above, p. xxx.
[2] Aristot. Polit. iii. 14. [3] Aristot, Polit. v. 12.

sensibly, that he existed only through the state and with the state; where every revolution of the state in some measure inevitably affected him; and the security of person and property was necessarily much less firmly established, than in well-regulated monarchies. We leave to every one to form his own judgment, and select his own criterion; but we will draw from the whole one general inference, that the forms under which the character of the human race can be unfolded, have not been so limited by the hand of the Eternal, as the wisdom of the schools would lead us to believe.

But whatever may be thought of the value of these constitutions, the reflection is forced upon us, that they surpassed all others in internal variety; and therefore in no other nation could so great an abundance of political ideas have been awakened, and preserved in practical circulation. Of the hundreds of Grecian cities, perhaps there were no two, of which the constitutions were perfectly alike; and none, of which the internal relations had not changed their form. How much had been tried in each one of them, and how often had the experiments been repeated! And did not each of these experiments enrich the science of politics with new results? Where then could there have been so much political animation, so large an amount of practical knowledge, as among the Greeks? If uniformity is, in the political world, as in the regions of taste and letters, the parent of narrowness, and if variety, on the contrary, promotes cultivation, no nation ever moved in better paths than the Greeks. Although some cities became pre-eminent, no single city engrossed every thing; the splendour of Athens could as little eclipse Corinth and Sparta, as Miletus and Syracuse. Each city had a life of its own, its own manner of existence and action; and it was because each one had a consciousness of its own value, that each came to possess an independent worth.

CHAPTER X.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GREEKS.

THE increasing wants of modern states have not only employed practical statesmen, but have led to the formation of many theories, of which the truth and utility are still subjects of discussion. Among the ancients, the finances of the nation were not regarded from so high a point of view, and therefore could not have been, in the same degree, an object of speculation. Whether the world has lost by this, or not, is a question which we prefer to leave unanswered. If the ancients knew less of the importance of the division of labour, they were also less acquainted with the doctrine of the modern schools, which transforms nations into productive herds. The Greeks were aware, that men must have productive arts, if they would live; but that it is the end of life to be employed in them, never entered their minds.

But the modern should not look with absolute contempt on the state of political science among the ancients. The chief question now agitated between theorists and practical statesmen, whether the mere gain in money decides on the wealth of a nation, and should form the object of its industry, was correctly understood and answered by the illustrious Stagirite. "Many," says he,[1] "suppose wealth to consist in the abundance of coined money, because it is the object of usury and commerce. Money is of itself without value, and gains its utility only by the law; when it ceases to be current, it loses its value,[2] and cannot be employed in the acquisition of necessaries; and therefore he who is rich in money, may yet be destitute of a necessary support. But it is ridiculous to say, that wealth consists in any thing, of which a man may be possessed, and yet die of hunger; as the fable relates of Midas, at whose touch every thing became gold."[3]

[1] Aristot. Polit. i. 9.

[2] "Οτι τε μεταθεμένων τῶν χρωμένων οὐδενὸς ἄξιον καὶ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί. I refer χρωμένων to cities or states. "If the cities which hitherto made use of it, change it."

[3] Aristotle found in the traditions of Greece, a more suitable example, than that which the French government usually cited respecting the man, who had abundance of gold on a desert island.

In a nation, in which private existence was subordinate to that of the public, the industry employed in the increase of wealth, could not gain the exclusive importance which it has with the moderns. With the ancients, the citizen was first anxious for the state, and only next for himself. As long as there is any higher object than the acquisition of money, the love of self cannot manifest itself so fully, as where every more elevated pursuit is wanting. While religion in modern Europe primarily engaged the attention of states, as of individuals, the science of finances could not be fully developed, although pecuniary embarrassment was often very sensibly felt. Men learned to tread under foot the most glorious productions of mind, to trample upon the monuments of moral and intellectual greatness, before they received those theories which assign to the great instructors of mankind in philosophy and in religion, a place in the unproductive class. In the states of Greece, each individual was obliged of himself to say, that his own welfare was connected with the welfare of the state; that his private welfare would be ruined by a revolution in the existing order of things, by the rule of the populace, or by subjection to a foreign power; that all his industry was of advantage to him only while the state should continue to subsist. Although the patriotism, thus produced, proceeded frequently from selfishness, it had as a consequence, that the exertions of the individual were directed to something besides his private advantage, and that his private welfare was less regarded than that of the public. The times arrived, in which this too was changed; but they were the precursors of the ruin of liberty.

There was still another reason, which contributed to make the Greeks regard the arts of industry in general, and some of them in particular, in a very different light from that in which they are now considered. And this was slavery, which was generally prevalent, either under the form of domestic servitude, or, in some states, of villanage.

To be convinced of this, we need only look at the variety of employments, which were carried on by slaves and villains. Such were all those household duties, which with us are committed to footmen; and besides them, several other charges, as the superintendence, and, in part, the early edu-

cation and instruction of children. Vanity, still more than necessity, increased the number of those who were held in bondage, after it became the custom to be served by a numerous retinue of beautiful slaves. In the same manner all labours were performed, which are now done by journeymen and lacqueys. Some of the rich Grecians made a business of keeping slaves to let for such services. All kinds of labour in the mines were performed by slaves; who, as well as the mines, were the property of individual citizens.[1] The sailors on board of the galleys consisted, at least in part, of slaves. Most if not all trades were carried on by slaves; who were universally employed in the manufacturing establishments. In these, not only the labourers, but also the overseers were slaves; for the owners did not even trouble themselves with the care of superintending; but they farmed the whole to persons, who were perhaps often the overseers also, and from whom they received a certain rent, according to the number of slaves, which they were obliged to keep undiminished.[2] In those states where there were slaves attached to the soil, as in Laconia, Messenia, Crete, and Thessaly, agriculture was conducted exclusively by them. In the others, the masters may have bestowed more attention on the subject; but as the Strepsiades of the comedian shows, they did little more than superintend; and the work was left to the slaves.

If we put all this together, we shall see how limited were the branches of industry which remained for the free. But the most unavoidable, and at the same time the most important consequence of it was, that all those employments which were committed to slaves, were regarded as mean and degrading;[3] and this view of them was not only confirmed by prevailing prejudices, but expressly sanctioned by the laws. To this class belonged especially the mechanics, and even the retailers. For although all mechanic employments were by no means conducted by slaves, a shade was thrown on them all. "In well-regulated states," says Aristotle,[4] "the lower order of mechanics are not even admitted to the rights of citizens;" and now we cease to

[1] Xenoph. de Redit. speaks of this at large. [2] See Petit. de Leg. Att. ii. 6.

[3] Βάναυσοι, *artes illiberales*. We have no word which exactly expresses this idea, because we have not the thing itself.

[4] Aristot. Polit. iii. 5. Ἡ δε βελτίστη πόλις οὐ ποιήσει βάναυσον πολίτην.

wonder at the proposition of another statesman,[1] who would commit all mechanic labours to public slaves. This was not merely a theory; it was once actually put in practice at Epidamnus.[2] In the cities which were democratically governed, the condition of the mechanics was somewhat more favourable. They could become citizens and magistrates, as at Athens during the period of the democracy.[3] The inferior branches of trade were not looked upon with much more favour. In Thebes, there was a law, that no one, who within ten years had been engaged in retail dealings, could be elected to a magistracy.[4]

As the Grecian cities were very different in character, the ideas which prevailed on this subject could not be the same. In those states where agriculture was the chief employment, the other means of gaining a livelihood may have been despised. In maritime and commercial towns, of which the number was very considerable, the business of commerce must have been esteemed. But those who were employed in manufacturing and selling goods, were never able to gain that degree of respectability which they enjoy among modern nations.[5] Even in Athens, says Xenophon,[6] much would be gained by treating more respectfully and more hospitably the foreign merchants, brought by their business to that city. The income derived from landed estate, was most esteemed by the Greeks. "The best nation," says Aristotle,[7] "is a nation of farmers."

From the little esteem in which the other means of gaining a livelihood were held, it followed that a wealthy middling class could not be formed in the Grecian states; and this is censured by those who have criticised their constitutions, as the chief cause of their unsettled condition. But this censure rests, for the most part, on an erroneous representation. It was degrading for a Grecian to carry on any of those kinds of employment with his own hands; but it by no means lessened his consideration to have them conducted on his account. Workshops and manufactures, as well as mines and lands, could be possessed by the first men in the country.

[1] Phaneas of Chalcedon. Aristot. Polit. ii. 7.
[2] Aristot. Polit. l. c. [3] Aristot. Polit. iii. 4. [4] Aristot. l. c.
[5] Compare on this subject, first of all, Aristot. Polit. i. 11, where he analyzes and treats of the several branches of industry.
[6] Xen. de Redit. Op. p. 922, Leunclav. [7] Aristot. Polit. vi. 4.

The father of Demosthenes, a rich and respectable man, left at his death a manufactory of swords; which was kept up by his son;[1] and examples could be easily multiplied, from the orators and the comedian. When this circumstance is kept in view, the blame attached to the Grecian constitutions is in a great measure, though not entirely removed. The impediments which public opinion put in the way of industry, did not so much injure those concerned in any large enterprise, as those engaged in the smaller occupations. The latter did really feel the evil, and we are not disposed to represent it as inconsiderable.

But we must return once more to the remark which explains the true cause of this regulation; that in the Grecian states, public life was placed above private life. "All agree," says Aristotle,[2] "that in every well-regulated state, sufficient leisure must be preserved from the wants of life for the public business; but a difference of opinion exists as to the manner in which this can be done. It is effected by means of slaves; who are not, however, treated in all places alike." Here we have the point of view, from which the politician should consider slavery in Greece. It served to raise the class of citizens to a sort of nobility, especially where they consisted almost entirely of landed proprietors. It is true, that this class lived by the labours of the other; and every thing, which in modern times has been said respecting and against slavery, may therefore so far be applied to the Grecians. But their fame does not rest on the circumstance of their obtaining that leisure at the expense of the lower order; but in the application which the noblest of them made of that leisure. No one will deny, that without their slaves, the character of the culture of the upper class in Greece could in no respects have become what it did; and if the fruits which were borne possess a value for every cultivated mind, we may at least be permitted to doubt, whether they were too dearly purchased by the introduction of slavery.[3]

[1] Demosth. adv. Aphob. Op. ii. p. 816. [2] Aristotle ii. 9.

[3] This may be the more safely asserted, because it is hardly possible to say any thing in general on the condition of slaves in Greece; so different was it at different times; in different countries; and even in the same country. On this subject I would refer to the following instructive work; Geschichte und Zustand der Sclaverey und Leibeigenschaft in Griechenland, von J. F. Reitemeyer. Berlin, 1789. History and Condition of Slavery and Villanage in Greece, by J. F. Reitemeyer.

The free exertions of industry were in some measure limited by the regulations of which we have spoken; but in a very different manner from any usual in our times. They were the result of public opinion; and if they were confirmed by the laws, this was done in conformity to that opinion. In other respects, the interference of government in the matter was inconsiderable. No efforts were made to preserve the mass of specie undiminished, or to increase it; nothing was known of the balance of trade; and consequently, all the violent measures resulting from it were never devised by the Greeks. They had duties, as well as the moderns; but those duties were exacted only for the sake of increasing the public revenue, not to direct the efforts of domestic industry, by the prohibition of certain wares. There was no prohibition of the exportation of raw materials by way of protection;[1] no encouragement of manufactures at the expense of the agriculturists. In this respect, therefore, there existed freedom of occupations, commerce, and trade. And such was the general custom. As every thing was decided by circumstances, and not by theories, there may have been single exceptions; and perhaps single examples,[2] where the state for a season usurped a monopoly. But how far was this from the mercantile and restrictive system of the moderns!

The reciprocal influence between national economy and that of the state, is so great and so natural, that it was necessary to premise a few observations respecting the former. Before we treat of the latter, it will be useful to say a few words on a subject, which is equally important to both; the money of the Greeks.

National economy can exist without money, but finances cannot. It would be important to fix the time, when coined money first became current in Greece, and when money was first coined in the country itself. But it is difficult to give an exact answer to either of these questions, especially to the first. Homer never speaks of money; and his silence

[1] The exportation of articles of food, especially of corn, may have been prohibited at Athens and elsewhere, when a scarcity was apprehended. Such prohibitions were natural, and could not well fail of being made. The remark in the text refers to prohibitions to favour domestic industry; as of the export of unmanufactured wool. This explanation is in answer to the remarks of Professor Boeckh in his work on the Public Economy of the Athenians, i. 56. [2] Aristot. de Re Famil. l. ii.

is in this case valid as evidence; for in more than one passage where he speaks of a barter,[1] he must necessarily have mentioned it, if he had been acquainted with it. On the other hand, we may confidently affirm on the authority of Demosthenes, that in the age of Solon,[2] coined silver money was not only known in the cities of Greece, but had been in circulation for a length of time;[3] for the punishment of death had already been set upon the crime of counterfeiting it; Solon mentioned it as in general use throughout the Grecian cities; and many of them had already supplied its place with the baser metals. The Grecian coins, which are still extant, can afford us no accurate dates, as the time of their coinage is not marked upon them; but several of them are certainly as ancient as the age of Solon; and perhaps are even older. The coins of Sybaris, for example, must be at least of the sixth century before the Christian era; as that city was totally destroyed in the year 510 B.C. The most ancient coins of Rhegium, Croton, and Syracuse, seem from the letters in the superscriptions to be of far higher antiquity.[4] If the account that Lycurgus prohibited in Sparta the use of money of the precious metals, is well supported,[5] we should be able to trace the history of Grecian coins to a still more remote age; and this opinion is corroborated at least by the narration of the Parian chronicle,[6] that Phidon

[1] As for example, Il. vi. 472. Od. i. 430.

[2] About 600 years before the Christian era.

[3] "I will relate to you," says the orator, while opposing a bill brought in by Timocrates, "what Solon once said against a man who proposed a bad law. The cities, said he to the judges, have a law, that he who counterfeits money, shall be put to death. He thought this law was made for the protection of private persons, and their private intercourse; but the laws he esteemed the coin of the state. They, therefore, who corrupt the laws, must be much more heavily punished, than they who adulterate the coinage or introduce false money. Yea, many cities exist and flourish, although they debase their silver money with brass and lead; but those which have bad laws, will certainly be ruined." Demosth. in Timocrat. Op. i. p. 763, 764. Compare with this what Herod. iii. 56, remarks of the counterfeit money, with which Polycrates is said to have cheated the Spartans.

[4] Ekhel. Doctrina Nummorum Veterum, i. p. 170—177, 242.

[5] Plutarch. in Lycurg. Op. i. p. 177. His code is computed to have been given about 880 years B. C.

[6] Marmor Parium. Ep. xxxi. cf. Strabo viii. p. 563. This was about 15 years before the legislation of Lycurgus. It might, therefore, not without probability be supposed, that Lycurgus wished and was able to prohibit money of the precious metals, because it at that time was just beginning to circulate in Greece.

of Argos in the year 631 (i. e. 895 years B. C.) first began to coin silver in the island of Ægina.

But although we cannot at present trace the history of coined money in Greece any further,[1] we may from the preceding observations infer one general conclusion; the founding of colonies and the intercourse kept up with them, caused coined money to be introduced and extensively used in Greece. Before their foundation, the Greeks knew nothing of coined money. When money was first coined in Ægina, the colonies of Asia Minor and of Magna Græcia[2] were already established and flourishing; and we are expressly informed, that money was coined in that island, in order to carry on commerce beyond the sea.[3] It cannot be proved with certainty, that money was coined in the Asiatic colonies sooner than in the mother country. But when we call to mind the well-known relation of Herodotus,[4] that the Lydians were the inventors of money coined of gold and silver, (a thing in itself not improbable, as it is known that Lydia abounded in gold,[5]) and that the most flourishing Grecian colonies were situated on the Lydian coasts, we cannot but find it highly probable, that the Greeks received the art of coining, like so many other inventions, from Asia; and here too the remark is valid, that in their hands every thing received a new form and a new beauty. For no nation has ever yet had coins, of which the stamp equalled in beauty those of the Grecian, and especially of the Sicilian cities.

The right of minting gold was regarded in Greece as the privilege of the state, which superintended it. Hence arose that variety and multitude of city coins, which are easily distinguished by their peculiar stamps. Coins were also struck by several of the tribes, the Thessalians, the Bœotians, and others, as they formed by their alliances one political body.

Though the Grecian coins were of both precious and base

[1] Compare Wachteri Archæologia Nummaria, Lips. 1740; and the introductory inquiries in Ekhel. D. N. V.

[2] As e. g. Cumæ.

[3] Strabo viii. p. 577. He refers to Ephorus.

[4] Herod. i. 94.

[5] Nor is there any other nation which disputes this honour with the Lydians. For the Egyptians, e. g., are named without any reason. See Wachter, l. c. cap. iv.

metals, they were originally struck of precious metal only, and probably at first of nothing but silver. So few of the gold coins have been preserved, that we cannot certainly say, whether they are altogether as ancient; but those of base metal are certainly of a later period. That, even before the time of Solon, silver money had in many cities a large proportion of alloy, appears from the passage which we cited from Demosthenes.[1] In Hellas itself, we know of no silver mines except those of Laurium, which were very ancient;[2] but the gold mines of Thrace and the neighbouring island Thasos were quite as ancient, for they were wrought by the Phœnicians. Yet the Greeks received most of their gold from Lydia. And still there was not specie enough in circulation, especially in the commercial towns; and although the Greeks knew nothing of paper money, several cities made use of the same resource, which had been introduced at Carthage,[3] the use of nominal coins, which possessed a current value, not corresponding to their intrinsic one.[4] Such was the iron money (if my view is a just one) which was adopted in Byzantium, Clazomene,[5] and perhaps in some other cities.[6] It is certain, therefore, that the Greeks had money which was current only in the state, and out of it was of no value; as we learn also from a passage in Plato.[7] It is much to be regretted, that we do not know by what means its value was kept from falling.

The inquiry into the economy of a nation, intricate as it may be, can be reduced to the following points: What were the wants of the state? What means were adopted to

[1] Yet the ancient gold coins which we still possess, have almost no alloy, and the silver ones very little.

[2] So old, that it was impossible to fix their age. Xenoph. de Redit. Op. p. 924.

[3] Heeren's Ideen ii. S. 164.

[4] Pollux ix. 78.

[5] Aristot. Œcon. ii. Op. ii. p. 383. A decisive passage.

[6] Most of the cities, says Xenophon, Op. p. 922, have money, which is not current except in their own territory; hence merchants are obliged to barter their own wares for other wares. Athens makes a solitary exception; its silver drachmas had universal currency. It was therefore quite common for cities to have two kinds of money, coins of nominal value, current only in the city which struck them; and metallic money, of which the value depended on its intrinsic worth, and which circulated in other places. Hence Plato, de Legg. v. p. 742, permits this in his state.

[7] Plato l. c. The current silver money consisted in drachmas, and pieces of money were struck of as much as four drachmas. Ekhel. i. p. lxxxv. thinks it probable, that the other cities, in their silver coin, followed the Attic standard.

supply them? How were those means brought together? How administered? The inquiry respecting the economy of the Grecian states will be conducted with reference to these questions.

The small republics of that people appear at the first view, according to the modern criterion, to have hardly had any wants, which could make a financial system necessary; and in fact there were some states, as Sparta during a long period, without any finances. The magistrates were rewarded with honour, not with a salary. The soldiers were citizens, and not hirelings; and many of those public institutions, which are now supported by the governments for the most various purposes, and in part at very great expense, were then entirely unknown, because they were not felt to be necessary.

And yet we find that the burdens which the citizens of those republics had to support, continued gradually to increase; especially at the epochs of the Persian wars, and the Peloponnesian, and in the later period of Grecian liberty, they became very oppressive. States can create wants, no less than individuals. Even in Greece, experience shows that necessities are multiplied with the increase of power and splendour. But when we call them oppressive, we must not forget, that the heaviness of the contributions paid to the state, is not to be estimated by their absolute amount; nor yet by the proportion alone, which that amount bears to the income. In our present investigations, it is more important to bear in mind, what our modern economists have entirely overlooked, that in republican states (or at least more especially in them) there exists, beside the criterion of money, a moral criterion, by which a judgment on the greater or less degree of oppression is to be formed. Where the citizen exists only with and for the state; where the preservation of the commonwealth is every thing to the individual; many a tax is easily paid, which under other circumstances would have been highly oppressive. But in the theories of our modern political artists, there is no chapter, which treats of the important influence of patriotism and public spirit on the financial system; probably because the statistical tables have no rubric for them as sources of produce.

The wants of states are partly established by their nature; but still more by opinion. That is a real want, which is believed to be such. The explanation of the management of the affairs of any nation would necessarily be very imperfect, if we should pay no regard to the ideas which it entertained respecting its necessities. On this point the Greeks had very different notions from ours. Many things seemed essential to them, which do not appear so to us; many things are needed by us, of which they did not feel the necessity.

The first object with the Greek was the honour and splendour of his city. In that world of small republics, each wished to make itself remarkable; each to be distinguished for something. Now there were two things which, in the eyes of the Greeks, rendered a city illustrious; its public monuments and its festivals. These objects were therefore politically necessary, in a different sense from that in which they can be called so in modern states. Among these the first place belongs to the temples. No Grecian city was without gods, of whom it honoured some as its guardian deities. How could these gods be left without dwelling-places? The art of sculpture was very naturally exerted in connexion with that of architecture; for the statues of the gods did not merely adorn the temples, but were indispensably necessary as objects of adoration. The same may be said of the festivals. Life without holidays would have ceased to be life to a Greek. But these holidays were not passed exclusively in prayers, or at banquets. Processions, music, and public shows, were an essential part of them. These were not merely the diversions of the people during the festival, they constituted the festival itself.

All this was intimately connected with religion. The Greeks had almost no public festivals except religious ones. They were celebrated in honour of some god, some hero; above all, in honour of the patron deities of the place.[1] By this means, many things which we are accustomed to regard as objects of amusement, received a much more elevated character. They became duties enjoined by religion; which could not be neglected without injury to the honour

[1] Meursii Græcia Feriata, in Gronov. Thes. Ant. Græc. vol. vii., is one of the richest compilations on the subject of the Grecian festivals.

and reputation, and even to the welfare of the city. The gods would have been incensed; and the accidental evils, which might have fallen on the city, would infallibly have been regarded as punishments inflicted by the gods. We need not therefore be astonished, when we hear that a city could be very seriously embarrassed for want of sufficient means to celebrate its festivals with due solemnity.[1]

Thus an almost immeasurable field was opened for public expenses of a kind hardly known to modern states. Even in cases where the governments believe it necessary to expend something on public festivals, little is done except in the capital; and this expenditure has never, to our knowledge, made an article in a budget. It would have made the very first in Grecian cities, at least in times of peace. And he who can vividly present those states to his mind, will easily perceive how many things must have combined to increase these expenditures. They were prompted not by a mere regard for the honour of the state; jealousy and envy of the other cities were of influence also. And still more is to be attributed to the emulation and the vanity of those, who were appointed to the charge of the expenditures. One desired to surpass another. This was the most reputable manner of displaying wealth. And although, as far as we know, public shows were not, in the Grecian cities, so indispensably the means of gaining the favour of the people as at Rome, (probably because what in Rome was originally voluntary, had ever been considered in Greece as one of the duties and burdens of a citizen, which did not merit even thanks,) political ends may have often been of influence with individuals.

The Grecian temples had, for the most part, possessions of their own, with which they met the expenses incurred in the service of the god. Their possessions consisted partly in votive presents, which, especially where the divinities of health and prophecy were adored, had been offered by the hopes or the gratitude of the suppliants for aid and counsel. We know from several examples, especially from that of the Delphic temple, that treasures were there accumulated, of more value probably than those of Loretto, or any other

[1] Consult what Aristotle relates of Antissæus, Op. ii. p. 390.

shrine in Europe.[1] ut as they were sacred to the gods, and did not come into circulation, they were, for the most part, but unproductive treasures, possessing no other value than what they received from the artist. We could desire more accurate information respecting the administration of the treasures of the temples; for it seems hardly credible, that the great stores of gold and silver, which were not wrought, should have been left entirely unemployed. But besides these treasures, the temples drew a large part of their revenue from lands;[2] which were not unfrequently consecrated to their service. When a new colonial city was built, it was usual to devote at once a part of its territory to the gods.[3] But although these resources were sufficient for the support of the temple, the priests, the various persons employed in the service of the temple, and perhaps the daily sacrifices, yet the incense and other expenses, the celebration of the festivals with all the costs connected with it, still continued a burden to be borne by the public.

Beside the expenses which were required by religion and the honour of the city, there were others which the administration made necessary. The magistrates, in the proper sense of the word, were without salaries; but the state needed many inferior servants for the taxes, the police, etc.; and these must certainly have been paid.[4] Add to this, that several of the duties of citizens were of such a nature that

[1] The consequences with which the profanation of the Delphic treasures in the Sacred war, was fraught for Greece, may be learned from Athen. vi. 231, etc.

[2] Not only single fields, but whole districts were consecrated to the gods. Beside the fields of Cirrha, it was desired to consecrate the whole of Phocis to Apollo of Delphi. Diod. xvi. p. 245. Brasidas devoted to Pallas the territory of Lecythus, which he had conquered. Thucyd. iv. cap. 116. It is a mistake to believe that the consecrated land must have remained uncultivated. That of Cirrha remained so, because a curse rested on it. Pausan. p. 894. In other cases it was used sometimes for pasture land, especially for the sacred herds; Thucyd. v. 53; sometimes it was tilled; Thucyd. iii. 68; but for the most part let for a rent. Whoever did not pay the rent, *μοσθώσεις τῶν τεμένων*, was considered destitute of honour. Demosth. in Macart. Op. ii. p. 1069. In another passage, the orator complains of the number of enemies he had made by collecting these rents when he was Demarch. Or. in Eubulid. Op. ii. p. 1318. Two contracts for similar rents have been preserved. Mazochi Tabb. Heracleens, p. 145, etc., and 257, etc.

[3] Plato de Legg. iv. p. 717.

[4] But though the magistrates were not paid, there were certain offices (especially such as were connected with the care of any funds) which could be made very productive to those who held them. An example of this kind is found in Demosth. in Mid. Op. i. p. 570.

it subsequently became necessary to pay for the performance of them, though it had not been done at an earlier period. To this class belongs the duty of attending in the courts; and the investigation of the Attic state will prove to us, that the number of those who were to be paid, caused this expense to be one of the heaviest.

But as the states increased in power, the greatest expenditures were occasioned by the military and naval establishments. These expenditures were, for the most part, extraordinary; since the state in times of peace had no standing army, and no mariners to pay. But even in times of peace, large appropriations were needed for the support of the magazines and the ships; and unfortunately for Greece, the common condition of the more powerful states came at last to be that of war rather than of peace. If wars under any circumstances are costly, two causes contributed to make them especially so in Greece. The first was the custom which arose of employing hired troops. As long as wars were carried on by the militia of the country, which required no pay, the costs of them were not very considerable, as each one served at his own expense. But when hired troops began to be used, every thing was changed. We shall take another opportunity of showing how this custom, by which the whole political condition of Greece was most deeply and incurably disordered, continued to gain ground from the first moment of its introduction. Hence proceeded the pecuniary embarrassment of so many Grecian cities during the Peloponnesian war. The second leading cause is to be found in the progress of naval forces, and their increasing importance to the ruling states. The building, support, and fitting out of squadrons, which are always so expensive, must have been doubly so to the Greeks, who were obliged to import their timber and many other articles from a distance. The expense became still greater, when the cities began to outbid each other in the pay of their mariners; which they did, as soon as the Spartans were enabled by the Persian supplies to cope in this matter with their rivals.[1] Need we be astonished, then, at finding under such

[1] This is known to have been done during the Peloponnesian war as well by the Corinthians, Thucyd. i. 31, as by Sparta, which state received of the Persians more than 5000 talents (nearly five million dollars) for that purpose. Isocrat. de Pace, Op. p. 179.

circumstances, that the trierarchies, or contributions of the rich towards the fitting out of the galleys, were the most oppressive of all the public burdens?[1]

Different, therefore, as was the list of public expenses from that of modern states, we still find points of agreement. We have now to inquire, What were the sources of the public revenue? What in particular was the system of taxation?

There is but one state in Greece, that of Athens, respecting which any accurate information on this subject has been preserved. It would be too hasty an inference to say, that what was usual in that city was usual in the others. But though the particular regulations may have been very different, a great general similarity must certainly have prevailed; and it is that which we are now to consider. Such a resemblance was a natural consequence of the great preponderating power and political influence of Athens. In the states which were its allies, how much must necessarily have been regulated by its example! And the little information which we are able to collect respecting their revenues, appears to prove the general resemblance beyond a doubt. Special differences certainly existed.

It is to Aristotle, once more, that we owe a general view of this subject.[2] After classifying the sources of revenue in monarchies, with respect to the general no less than the provincial administration,[3] he continues; "The third kind of administration, is that of free states. For them, the principal source of revenue is from the produce of their own soil; the second from merchandise and the markets; the third from the contributions paid by the citizens in turn."[4]

[1] We do not find it mentioned, that the trierarchies, which were common in Athens, were usual in the other maritime cities; but the rich doubtless bore the burden of fitting out the ships. See, respecting Corinth, Thucyd. l. c.

[2] Aristot. de Re Familiari, ii. 1. This little work is, probably, not by the Stagirite. It is a collection of examples or excerpta, where less depends on the author than on the age in which it was written. Even its editor, Schneider, concedes that it bears marks of belonging to the period of the Persian empire, being at least as old as Aristotle or Alexander. And yet Aristotle himself may have made such collections; of which one may have reached us.

[3] Ἡ *βασιλικὴ* and *ἡ σατραπικὴ*. When the Greeks spoke of an empire, they always had in mind the empire of Persia.

[4] *Τρίτην δὲ τὴν πολιτικήν. Ταύτης δὲ κρατίστη μὲν πρόσοδος, ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γινομένων, εἶτα ἀπὸ ἐμποριων καὶ δι' ἀγώνων, εἶτα ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐγκυκλίων.* It is known from the orators, that these last are the burdens borne in turn by the rich, *λειτουργίαι*. Demosth. in Leptin. Op. i. p. 463. If the words *δι'*

When we learn, that these last were a sort of property tax for the richer class, and that the second could have been nothing but duties on articles of consumption, we perceive at once, what we are soon to prove, that in the Grecian states, our direct and indirect taxes were known and introduced, though in technical language the distinction was differently made. The subject deserves to be treated with closer attention.

In the political economy of the moderns, the taxes on lands and houses are considered the most important of all direct taxes. How far had the Greeks the one and the other? They certainly were acquainted with both. "In Menda," says Aristotle, "the common expenses of the administration are paid from the revenue derived from the harbours and duties; the taxes, on the contrary, on lands and houses are regularly assessed; but they are collected from those who are bound to pay them, only in times of a great want of money."[1] This example shows very clearly, that the Greeks knew the practical difference between direct and indirect taxes; but it still remains doubtful, whether the tax on the soil was a land tax in the modern sense, according to its square contents and quality; or whether it was a tax on the raw produce. The first is not probable. We hear nothing of a register of landed estates in Greece; though there existed such a one in the great empire of Persia. Where the taxes are treated of, the expressions appear rather to indicate, that a proportion of the produce was paid. It was commonly tithes, which were taken of fruits and of cattle; as Aristotle expressly mentions in the passages first cited.[2] In what degree these taxes were usual in the Grecian cities, is no where expressly related; nor do we know whether they were levied on certain estates, or on all lands. That they were very common, is hardly doubtful, since the remark of Aristotle is a general one.

Poll taxes were less frequently levied on the citizens (though we would not assert, that they did not in any

ἀγώνων are correct, the public games and assemblies are intended, with which fairs were commonly connected; otherwise it would be natural to conjecture ἀγορῶν instead of ἀγώνων. The sense remains the same.

[1] Aristot. de Re Famil. Op. ii. 393. Menda was a Grecian city on the coast of Macedonia, not far from Potidæa.

[2] Compare de Re Famil. ii. 1.

degree exist with respect to them) than on the inquilini or resident foreigners. These formed in most of the Grecian cities a numerous class of inhabitants, and were obliged to pay for protection, a sum[1] which was sometimes a poll tax, and sometimes an impost on property. We know with certainty, that such sums were paid by the foreigners at Athens.

However much the practical politician may be excited by increasing wants to exert his inventive powers, the character of the state settles in a certain measure the kinds of taxes. Where a community imposes its own taxes, the direct taxes, and among them those on property, will have the first rank. That each citizen, or rather, that the richer citizens (for the rule does not of course apply to the poorer classes) should share in the public burdens in proportion to their means, is so natural an idea, that it cannot but occur of itself. But when we consider the taxes on property as forming the chief division, we must premise two observations in connexion with that remark.

First: The taxes on property were not so regular, that they were paid from year to year according to the same fixed measure. The necessary sums were rather voted as circumstances required; which also decided the degree of rigour with which they were collected. Of this we have proof in very many examples in Demosthenes and others.[2] In times of peace, whole years might pass away, in which no such taxes were required to be paid; while in others they increased so much, that Isocrates could say, it was almost better to be a poor man than a rich one; because the poor were not exposed to them.[3]

Secondly: There were certain kinds of expenses, which were not estimated at a fixed amount, but were too considerable to be borne by any but the opulent; we mean those offices which each citizen was obliged to perform in his turn, and at his own expense (λειτουργίαι).[4] To this class

[1] Τὸ μετοίκιον. The regulations respecting this, and its amount, may be found in Harpocration, h. v.

[2] They were called in Athens the εἰσφοραὶ; not known, at least by that name in Athens, before the Peloponnesian war. Boeckh ii. 4. No one will doubt that they were introduced into other cities, though under different names.

[3] Isocrat. de Pace. Op. p. 185.

[4] In the broadest sense; in so far as the word comprehends not only the fitting out of the ships (τριηραρχίαι), but also the charge of the chorus (χορηγίαι), and the gymnastic games (γυμνασιαρχίαι).

belonged partly the charge of the public festivals and shows, banquets and bands of music connected with them; and partly, at least in Athens, and probably in other maritime towns, the fitting out of the galleys. The first class of these expenses, was by its nature a permanent one; and the other was almost, though not perfectly so. They were borne by the citizens in rotation; and those who were free one year, were obliged to defray them the next. But they, especially the first, were the more oppressive, as they were not fixed at any certain amount; but depended not merely on the wants of the state, but the pride of him who supplied them.

Taxes on property are attended with one great difficulty, that they cannot be apportioned out without a knowledge of the fortunes of each contributor. But they depend also more than any other on correctness of moral sentiment and on public spirit. Where these exist, (and they can no where more prevail than in such civil communities as the Grecian states,) there is no need of returns on the part of those who are to be taxed, nor of any inquisition on the part of the state. Confidence is reposed in the conscience of the contributor; and examples may be found in history, of states in which even a suspicion of any insincerity was almost unheard of.[1] In the Grecian cities, at least in Athens, very severe measures were in the later periods made use of against those, who were suspected of concealing the true state of their fortunes, or whom it was desired to vex in that manner. They could be compelled to exchange their property for the sum at which they had estimated it.[2] But in better times, such measures, though perhaps permitted, seem never to have been usual. A division was made into classes according to the income; such as had been established in Athens, by the regulations of Solon. These classes presupposed an estimate of property;[3] but whether this was made in the Grecian cities as accurately as the census of the Romans, is a question which we must leave undecided.[4]

[1] As in several of the late German imperial towns. The author is acquainted with one, in which the contributions were thrown into a box, unexamined; and yet the amount of the whole was previously known, with almost perfect exactness.

[2] The *ἀντιδόσεις*. See, on this subject, the speech of Isocrates, Op. p. 312, etc.

[3] *τίμημα*, Demosth. in Aphob. Orat. i. Op. ii. p. 3, etc.

[4] In some of the cities, great accuracy seems to have prevailed in this

The indirect taxes, by which we mean the duties paid on the importation and exportation of articles, as also on their consumption, were probably as common in the Grecian cities, as those above mentioned. The instance of the city Menda, which we have already cited, shows that they were preferred, at least in some instances, to the direct taxes. Much that related to them, was decided by the situation and chief employment of the cities. The duties were naturally a much more productive source of revenue to the maritime and commercial towns, than to the cities of the interior. But where these taxes were introduced, they were a constant source of income; while the taxes on property were each time imposed anew. From this it naturally resulted, that they were chiefly destined to meet the usual expenditures.

Our knowledge of the organization of the Grecian customs, is very imperfect. Yet we cannot doubt, that duties were almost universally common. But they were most probably limited to the sea-ports and harbours; in connexion with these, they are almost always mentioned;[1] I know of no instance of customs in the interior. They were, according to Aristotle, levied on imported and exported articles.[2] In Athens, the customs are frequently mentioned by the orators; in Thessaly they formed the chief source of the revenue;[3] and they were not of less moment in Macedonia.[4] When the Athenians became the masters of the Ægean Sea, they appropriated to themselves, in all subject islands, the collecting of the customs, instead of the tribute which had before been usual.[5] The same was done with the very productive customs of Byzantium, which all the commerce to the Black Sea was obliged to discharge,[6] just as

business. Thus in Chios, all private debts were entered in a public book, so that it might be known, what capital was lent out. Aristot. Op. ii. p. 390. In the Athenian colony Potidæa, in a time of war, when money was wanting, every citizen was obliged to specify his property with exactness, and the contributions (*εἰσφοραί*) were apportioned out accordingly. He who possessed no property, *κτήμα οὐθὲν*, paid a poll tax; his person being reckoned as a capital of two minæ, (about thirty dollars,) he paid the tax due on such a sum. Aristot. l. c.

[1] Hence the phrase *λιμένας καρποῦσθαι, to collect the customs in the harbours*, Demosthen. i. 15.

[2] Aristot. l. c. *τὰ εἰσαγώγιμα καὶ τὰ ἐξαγώγιμα.*

[3] Demosth. l. c.

[4] They were commonly rented out in that country for twenty talents; which sum Callistratus knew how to double. Aristot. Op. ii. p. 393.

[5] Thucyd. iv. 28.

[6] Demosth. Op. i. p. 475.

the commerce to the East sea has hitherto been obliged to pay a tribute in the Sound. This comparison is the more just, as the duties of Byzantium, no less than those in the Sound, have been the occasion even of a war.[1]

These examples, of which the number could easily be increased, are quite sufficient to prove, that duties were very generally exacted in the sea-ports. The principle according to which the customs were regulated, had nothing in view but the increase of the public revenue; and no design was connected with them, of encouraging and directing domestic industry. At least we have never been able to find any hint to that effect. But the tariff seems to have been very different in the several cities, and for the different articles of merchandise. At Byzantium, the duty was ten per cent. on the value of the wares.[2] The Athenians, on the contrary, when they imposed duties in the harbours of their allies during the Peloponnesian war, exacted only five per cent.[3] In Athens itself, there were, at least in the time of Demosthenes, several articles which paid a duty of but two per cent.[4] To this class belonged all corn introduced into Athens;[5] and several other objects, such as fine woollen garments and vessels of silver.[6]

We distinguish in our system of finances between duties on importation and exportation, and taxes on domestic consumption.[7] It may be asked, if this was also the case in Greece? I do not doubt that it was; but in the Grecian cities, as in Rome and perhaps in the whole of the ancient world, these taxes were imposed in but one very simple form. They were connected with the markets. Whatever was there offered for sale, paid a duty; and hence this duty is mentioned only with reference to the markets.[8] And I find no proof, that the system of taxing consumption was carried so far in any ancient state, as it has been in several modern countries.[9]

[1] Namely, between Byzantium and Rhodes.

[2] Demosth. Op. i. p. 475. [3] Thucyd. vii. 28.

[4] This is the πεντηκοστολόγος ἀπογραφή, *the tariff of the fiftieth penny.* Demosth. in Mid. Op. i. p. 558. [5] Demosth. in Neær. Op. ii. p. 1353.

[6] Demosth. in Mid. Op. i. p. 568, enumerates several.

[7] Such as the excise, licences, etc.

[8] In Aristot. ii. p. 388. ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ γήν τε καὶ ἀγοραίων τελῶν πρόσοδος. Hence the expression; τὰς ἀγορὰς καρποῦσθαι, *to collect the revenue from the markets.* Demosth. Olynth. i. Op. i. p. 15.

[9] In Babylon, there existed an antiquated law which was renewed by the

Beside the taxes already enumerated, there were other particular ones on various articles of luxury. Thus in Lycia a tax was paid for wearing false hair;[1] in Ephesus, ornaments of gold were prohibited, and the women ordered to give them up to the state. Examples are preserved by Aristotle, where in cases of necessity, single cities adopted various extraordinary measures, such as the sale of the public estates,[2] the sale of the privilege of citizenship, taxes on several professions and employments,[3] as of soothsayers and quacks, and monopolies, of which the state possessed itself for a season.

In all the Grecian cities, the indirect taxes, especially the duties, were most probably farmed. The custom of farming the revenue prevailed in a much greater degree in several of the monarchical states of antiquity; in the Grecian republics, it seems to have been restricted to the indirect taxes. It is generally known, that in Athens the duties were farmed; but the same was the case in Byzantium, in Macedonia, and in other places.[4] Demosthenes distinguishes three classes of persons who were interested in this transaction; those who rented this branch of the revenue; their bondsmen; and the inspectors and the receivers.[5] It would be superfluous to speak of the great evils of this arrangement; but has it not been preserved by much larger states in modern Europe?

One important question still remains: In the Grecian cities, who had the right of fixing the taxes? The political science of the moderns has regarded it as one of the most important points, as the peculiar characteristic of a free constitution, that the government should not be permitted to impose taxes without the consent of the people, given di-

governor appointed by Alexander, and which required that a tithe should be paid of every thing brought into the city. Aristot. Op. ii. p. 395.

[1] Aristot. Œcon. ii. Op. ii. p. 385.

[2] By the Byzantians. Aristot. l. c. p. 389. That which follows is also related by him in the same place.

[3] A general income tax of 10 per cent. on all employments, was laid by king Tachus in Egypt, at the instance of Chabrias. Aristot. l. c. p. 394. Though executed in Egypt, the idea was that of a Greek; and Pitt must resign his claim to the invention of the Income tax.

[4] See the passages cited above, which prove this.

[5] Demosth. Op. i. p. 745. τέλος τι πριάμενος, ἢ ἐγγυησμενάος, ἢ ἐκλέγων. Those who rented the taxes of the state, were of course obliged to procure safe bondsmen.

rectly, or by consent of its deputies. In most of the ancient republics, the same custom probably prevailed; yet it is remarkable that no particular value was ever set upon this privilege; and much less was it considered a criterion of political liberty. The whole system of taxation, we have already remarked, was not viewed from the same elevated point which is now taken; nor can this principle be fully developed, except where the representative system is introduced. But properly speaking, the whole subject was considered by the Greeks from a very different side. Their magistrates were bound to acknowledge the obligation of laying their accounts before the people. This was the characteristic of freedom.[1] Where this right is preserved by the people, it is of much less importance by whom the taxes are imposed.

But this question hardly admits of a general answer in the Grecian cities. It cannot be doubted that the difference of constitutions produced differences in this matter; but if from the want of documents this is only a conjecture, it is on the other hand certain, that the difference of the taxes must have produced such a variety.

The regular and abiding taxes were fixed by laws; which in part were expressly called ancient laws.[2] The sum which was allotted in Athens for the annual expense of the public sacrifices, was fixed by the laws of Solon at six talents.[3] For this purpose, no other appropriations were needed. The tariffs of the duties and taxes on consumption were in like manner permanent laws, which, as their very names indicate,[4] were doubtless granted by the people; who of course had the right of making alterations in them. Those public charges, which were borne in turn, the trierarchies and the providing of the chorus, were also established by ancient laws;[5] although these offices, especially the first, were, from their very nature, much influenced by the circumstances of the times; and hence they underwent greater and more frequent changes than any other imposts. That these regulations and their changes could not be made without the consent of the people, will not be doubted by any

[1] See above, p. 115. [2] Demosth. Op. i. p. 462.
[3] See Lysias in Nicomach. Or. Gr. v. p. 856.
[4] Νόμοι τελωνικοί. Demosth. i. p. 732. [5] Demosth. i. p. 462.

one, who knows that every thing which the Greeks called a law, νόμος, could proceed from no other fountain.

But what were the regulations respecting those extraordinary imposts, which were hardly less than permanent, those taxes on property, which we comprehend under the name of tribute (εἰσφοραι)? That these should have been fixed exclusively by the people, seems so natural in states where the highest authority is possessed by a popular assembly, that it may be thought superfluous to suggest this question. Yet we know that it was not so in Rome; where the taxes were fixed, not by the people, but solely by the senate. But in Athens, as we may learn from any one of the political orations of Demosthenes, the taxes needed always to be confirmed by the people. It would be too hasty to infer from Athens, that the same was true of all the other Grecian states. But wherever the financial regulations of the other states are mentioned, (unless they were in subjection to a tyrant,[1]) it is always done in expressions which authorize the conclusion, that the consent of the people or the assembly of the citizens was necessary.[2]

So much the greater variety seems to have prevailed in the administration of the public revenue, not only in the several states, but also at different periods in the same state. Those places and offices which were connected with that administration, were naturally the objects of the greatest competition; and this alone would be sufficient to explain the changes which were made. But must not the difference of the constitutions have exercised its influence? In states, of which certain families, distinguished for their wealth and descent, had made themselves the leaders, what could be expected, but that they should obtain the management of the public money? In the two principal cities of Greece, the most remarkable difference is perceptible. At Athens, the

[1] Where tyrants had possessed themselves of the government, they imposed taxes at their own pleasure, as they were not ὑπεύθυνοι; they also adopted various artifices to increase their revenue, such as debasing the coin, etc., of which Aristotle, Œcon. L. ii., has preserved various examples. But where they desired to preserve an appearance of decency, as Dionysius I. in Syracuse, who in other respects took so many liberties, this matter was laid by them before the ἐκκλησία. Aristot. l. c.

[2] In the examples which Aristot. l. c. cites of Clazomene, Potidæa, and other places, his phrase is ἐψηφίσαντο, or sometimes νόμον ἔθεντο, which, it is well known, can be understood only of the decrees of the people.

council of five hundred had the care of the public money; in Sparta, this had been secured by the Ephori. A great difference may be supposed to have prevailed in the other Grecian cities; certainly with respect to the persons who held the offices of collectors and accountants. But we have almost no historical information respecting any place but Athens.

Of all forms of government, those of free cities are perhaps the least adapted to the developing of an artificial system of finances. For in them the wants, and the means of satisfying those wants, are commonly very simple. Changes are difficult; for they presuppose the consent of the commonalty. They who propose them, can hardly expect thanks; but rather hatred, and even persecution. Hence ancient usage is preserved as much as possible; and when extraordinary wants occur, recourse is had to extraordinary measures, concerted for the moment, rather than to any change in the existing institutions. It is different in extensive monarchies, where every thing moves more firmly and more regularly; and though their practice is not so much founded on scientific views as on certain maxims, still it is in them that an artificial system of finances can be formed.

CHAPTER XI.

THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS.

UNLIKE the regulations of our modern states, the judiciary department did not form in Greece a distinct, independent branch of the constitution. On the contrary, it was so intimately connected with the rest, that it can with difficulty be made a separate object of investigation. Hardly any subject in Grecian antiquities is so intricate, or so difficult of explanation; and yet without a knowledge of it, no correct view of the ancient states can possibly be formed. Our present object is, to develope the general character of the judicial institutions, without entering into particulars re-

specting the organization of the Attic courts. All that we have to say upon this subject, will find a place in our inquiries concerning that state.

The want of accounts is the chief but not the only source of the difficulty, which attends this investigation with respect to every state but Athens. From the want of uniformity, as well as the foreign character of many of the regulations, it would be arduous to take a general survey of the subject, even if the historical documents were abundant. To gain a correct view of it, some attention must be paid to its history.

The judicial institutions of the Greeks were the creation of time and circumstances. The form, therefore, which they eventually assumed, could not well correspond to the requisitions of a theory. We are forced to content ourselves on many points with saying that it was so; without being able to give any satisfactory reasons why it was so.

The judicial institutions of a nation proceed from very simple beginnings. Where they are left to be developed by circumstances and the necessities of the times, they cannot but become more and more intricate; since with the progress of culture, new relations arise, both at home and with foreign countries. In the heroic age, kings sat on the tribunals of justice, though even then arbitrators were not unusual. There existed at that time no written laws; questions were decided by prescription, and good common sense, directed by a love of justice.

When nations begin to emerge from the rude condition of savages, the first necessity which is felt, is that of personal security, and next, the security of property. National legislation has always commenced with the criminal code and the police laws; the rights of citizens were defined more slowly, and at a later period; because it was not sooner necessary. The oldest courts of justice were established very early, probably in the times of the kings. Their immediate object was to pass judgment on the crime of murder, and other heinous offences. This was the case with the Areopagus, the most ancient court with which the Greeks were acquainted; and others were of almost as great an age.

The royal governments passed away; and the popular assemblies took their place. The existing courts of justice were then by no means abolished; although in the progress of

time, and amidst the revolutions in the forms of government, they could not but undergo various modifications.

In the states of modern Europe, the form of the judicial institutions was in a great measure the result of the form of the feudal. In the latter there were different degrees of fealty and submission; and hence arose the principle, that no man can be tried by any but his peers. Thus a difference in the courts was necessarily produced. The immediate vassal of the crown recognised only those for his judges, who stood in the same rank with himself, and owed fealty to the same master. The freeman and the villain could not stand before the same tribunal.

The same principle, that a man must be tried by his peers, prevailed among the Greeks. But its application must have produced very different results. The community consisted of citizens, who either were or claimed to be equal. It discussed all affairs relating to itself, and hence actions at law among the rest. Thus the common assembly performed the office of judges; and the foundation of the popular courts of justice was laid. A political notion now prevailed, a notion never adopted in our modern constitutions; that it was essential for a citizen to take a part in the administration of justice. Even in those of our modern states which in so many things resemble the Grecian, the German imperial cities, this idea could never have been suggested and applied. They had adopted the laws of an ancient nation, written in an ancient language; and to understand them, much learning was required, of which not every one could be possessed. It was not so in Greece. The laws were in the language of the country; and although their number gradually increased, they were still accessible to all. Neither was it necessary to retain them in memory, and have them always present to the mind. The orator during his speech, had a reader at his side with a copy of them. Whenever he referred to any law, it was read aloud; as is proved by a multitude of examples in Demosthenes and others. Every thing was, however, transacted orally. The judges were not obliged to peruse written documents; they listened, and gave in their votes.

All this appears very simple, and easy to be understood. And yet the judicial institutions of Greece, if we should form

our opinion from one state, were so confused, that it is difficult for the most learned antiquarians to find their way out of the labyrinth. The greatest errors are made by those, who, forgetting that the institutions in question were not formed systematically, but practically with the progress of time, endeavour to find the means of explanation in speculative ideas.

The first and most important difficulty is presented when we attempt to fix the characteristic difference between the public and private courts. This difference was not only general in the existing states, but was adopted by Plato himself in his sketch of a perfect colony.[1] These two classes were so distinctly separated, that different expressions were appropriated, not only for the general, but even the particular relations of the one and the other.[2]

Certain general ideas, according to which Plato makes the distinction, lay at the bottom of this division. "One class of judicial processes," says he,[3] "is formed of the suits which one private man, complaining of injustice, brings against another. The second class, on the contrary, is, when the state believes itself injured by one of the citizens, or when a citizen comes forward to its assistance." According to this explanation, nothing would seem simpler, than the difference between public and private processes. But if we compare the objects comprehended under each of the two classes, we shall find many things enumerated as affairs of the state, which to us do not seem to belong to this class.[4] Of this, two causes may be mentioned.

The first is the view which the Greeks entertained of the relation of the individual citizen to the state. The person of the citizen was highly valued; and could not but be highly valued, because the whole personal condition was affected by the possession of citizenship. An injury done to a private

[1] Plato de Legg. L. vi. vol. iv. p. 282.

[2] A public accusation was called *γραφὴ* and *κατηγορία*, to accuse any one *διώκειν*, to be accused *φεύγειν τὴν γραφήν*. A private suit was called *δίκη*, to bring an action *εἰσάγειν* and *εἰσφέρειν τινὶ δίκην*, to be defendant *ὀφείλειν τινὶ δίκην*. Such were the expressions at least in Athens.

[3] Plato l. c.

[4] In Athens, e. g., there belonged to this class, besides several other offences, murder, intentional wounds, adultery, etc. The public and private processes are enumerated in Sigonius de Repub. Athen. L. iii., and may be found also in Potter's Archæol. Græc. The subject is investigated by Otto: De Atheniensium Actionibus forensibus; Specimen I. ch. ii. Leipsiæ, 1820.

citizen, was therefore in some measure an injury inflicted on the state; and so far, almost every injustice suffered by the individual, was a public concern. Yet a difference existed even here, according to the degree of the injury; nor was it indifferent, whether the rights of person, or only those of property, had been violated.

A second circumstance also had its influence; prescription for the most part determined what was a crime against the public, and what was but a private concern. But what had once been established by prescription, was ever after valid as a law. Yet who can discover all the causes, perhaps frequently accidental, by which various suits came to be considered, in one age or another, as affairs of the public?

It would be ineffectual to attempt to draw very accurately the line of division according to the subjects. The most numerous and the most important, but not all criminal cases, were regarded as public concerns. This class embraced not merely offences against the state; though this idea lay at the foundation. We must rather be content with saying, that prescription had caused certain offences to be regarded as public, and others as private matters. The regulations respecting them were, however, in the Attic law very exact; and it was firmly established, which processes belonged to the state, and which to individuals.

The character of the two classes was essentially distinguished by this; that in the public affairs, a complaint might be made by any citizen; and in the private, it could be made only by the injured person, or his nearest relation;[1] for in the one case, the state or the whole community was regarded as the injured party; in the other, only the individual.

But whoever brought the suit, it was necessary in private and public concerns for the complainant to enter his complaint before a magistrate, and definitely state the offence which he charged against the accused. The magistrate, before whom the suit was thus commenced, was now obliged to prepare the action, so that it could be submitted to the judges. These judges were either the whole community, or some particular courts, which may perhaps be best denominated, committees of the people. For the tribunals consisted

[1] See the proofs in Sigonius, l. c.

for the most part of very numerous assemblies, the members of which were selected from the citizens by lot, and were required to be thirty years old, of a good reputation, and not indebted to the state. They were sworn to do their duty; they listened to the orators, both the accusers and the defendants, to whom a limited time was appointed; the witnesses were examined, and the affair so far brought to a close, that the court could pronounce its sentence of guilty or not guilty.[1] In the first case, the nature of the punishment remained to be settled. Where this was fixed by law, sentence was immediately passed; did the nature of the offence render that impossible, the defendant was permitted to estimate the punishment, of which he believed himself deserving; and the court then decided.

Those courts were therefore similar both in their organization and design to our juries; with this difference, that the latter are with us but twelve in number, while the former were not unfrequently composed of several hundreds. And this is not astonishing, for they occupied the place of the whole community, or might be regarded as committees of the same; for when suits began to grow frequent, the community could not always be assembled. But where the members that constituted the tribunal were so numerous, as in the Heliæa at Athens, it is hardly credible, that every action was tried before the whole assembly. It is much more probable, especially when suits were multipled, that the same court of judicature had several divisions, in which the trial of several causes could proceed simultaneously.[2]

As a difference was made between private and public actions, we might expect to find different tribunals for the one and the other. Yet this was not the case; suits of both kinds could be entered in the same courts. The difference must therefore have lain in the methods of trial and the legal remedies,[3] which the two parties could employ. We are astonished to find, that the rules respecting what suits should

[1] This was done in Athens partly by votes written on small tablets, and partly by white and black beans.

[2] We would not say, that all trials were necessarily brought before those courts. In Athens the police officers had a jurisdiction of their own; and affairs belonging to their department appear to have been immediately decided by them.

[3] As, e. g., the παραγραφή, the ὑπωμοσία, and others, in the public trials. Sigon. l. c. iii. c. 4.

come before each particular court were so uncertain, that it would be vain for us to attempt to settle any general principles on the subject. But at this moment we have in England an example, which shows how vain it is to expect exact regulations, where courts of justice have been formed and enlarged by circumstances. Criminal cases, it is true, belong exclusively to the court of the King's Bench; but it shares civil actions with the court of Common Pleas, and the court of Exchequer, in such a manner, that, with few exceptions, certain classes of suits cannot be said to belong exclusively to either of these tribunals.

Our remarks thus far on the organization of the courts apply immediately to Athens; but they will, without doubt, admit of a much wider application to the other Grecian cities. Yet on one point there existed a remarkable difference. Though the popular tribunals were generally introduced, they did not prevail in every state. For if I understand Aristotle rightly, there were no popular tribunals in Sparta, but all processes were there, as in Carthage, decided by magistrates.[1] If Sparta had had such courts, would they not have been mentioned? But when Aristotle says in general, that it is the leading characteristic of a democracy, that the citizens should be the judges of one another,[2] may we not infer, and is it not evident from the nature of things, that popular tribunals disappeared, wherever the sway of the few was established?

The example of Athens shows in a remarkable manner, how the institution of these popular tribunals could affect the whole character of a state. Such could be the case in Athens, where the greatest extent was given to the public trials, by permitting any who desired, to appear as accusers. The whole organization of the Grecian city governments leads us to believe, that most of the other cities had popular tribunals, which, without having exactly the same form, must have been similar to those of Athens. Such tribunals must have existed in Argos, before the introduction of ostracism, and in Syracuse before the similar method of banish-

[1] Aristot. Polit. ii. 11. *καὶ τας δίκας ὑπό τῶν ἀρχείων δικάζεσθαι πάσας, καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων, ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι.* Is *δίκας* in this passage to be understood of all suits at law, or, according to the more strict use of the word, only of private suits?

[2] Aristot. Polit. vi. 2.

ment by petalism came into vogue. But whether the public processes embraced elsewhere as many subjects as at Athens, and as many things, which to us seem to regard the private citizen alone, is a question which we cannot decide, for want of information.

This point has been entirely overlooked by those who have written on the judicial institutions of Greece; for they had Athens only in view, and treated the subject more as one of jurisprudence than of politics. And yet it is of all the most important. The more limited was the number of public suits, the smaller was the possibility of instituting them, unless some personal injury had previously been sustained. In the list of public offences at Athens, there were many, which, by their very nature, were indefinite. Hence it was easy to bring a public action against almost any one. We need but think of an age of corruption, to understand how Athens, after the Peloponnesian war, could teem with the brood of sycophants, against whom the orators are so loud in their complaints; and whom all the measures, first adopted in consequence of the magnitude of the evil, all the danger and punishments to which false accusers were exposed, were never sufficient to restrain.

Were other cities, at least the democratic ones, in as bad a condition as Athens? Here we are deserted by history; which has preserved for us almost nothing respecting the extent of the public processes and the popular tribunals. But if in Athens several adventitious causes, lying partly in the national character, and partly in the political power of Athens, (for the importance of state trials increases with the importance of the state,) contributed to multiply this class of processes; it by no means follows, that the number was much smaller in most of the other Grecian cities. Popular tribunals are the sources of political revolutions; and what states abounded in them more than the Grecian? The man of influence, always an object of envy, was the most exposed to accusations, where it was so easy to find a ground of accusation; but the man of influence had the greatest resources without the precincts of the court. He with his party, if he is conscious of possessing sufficient strength, has recourse to arms, and instead of suffering himself to be banished from the city, prefers to terminate the action by driving away his

enemies. Were we more intimately acquainted with the history of the numberless political revolutions in Greece, how often would this same succession of events recur? But though we are not always able to establish them by historical evidence, they cannot on the whole be doubted; and they distinctly exhibit the close connexion which existed between the states and their judicial institutions.

CHAPTER XII.

THE ARMY AND NAVY.

THOUGH wars were so frequent in Greece, the art of war did not make any considerable advances. The constitutions and the whole political condition opposed too many obstacles; and war never became a science, in the full sense of the word, till standing armies were introduced. This has already been satisfactorily proved by history. There were some individual commanders of great merit, who did all that talents could do; but all that they effected was personal. Besides, the extent of states sets limits to improvement. These bounds cannot be accurately marked, where genius and circumstances exercise so much influence; but the absolute strength must also necessarily be considered. The advancement and perfecting of the art of war require experiments on so large a scale, that small states cannot perform them.

After the republican constitutions of the Greeks were established, their armies consisted chiefly of militia. Every citizen was obliged to serve in it, unless the state itself made particular exceptions. In Athens, the obligation continued from the eighteenth to the fifty-eighth year; we do not know whether it was elsewhere the same; but a great difference could hardly have existed. Each citizen was therefore a soldier; even the *inquilini*, the resident strangers, were not always spared;[1] and there were times of distress,

[1] They were at least obliged sometimes to do naval service. Demosth. Phil. i. Op. i. p. 50.

when the very slaves were armed, usually under the promise of their freedom, if they should do their duty.[1]

The militia of a country may, under certain circumstances, very nearly resemble a standing army. Yet the principles on which the two are founded, are very different. The citizen who serves as a soldier, has for his object the defence of his family and his property; and hence the maxim in states, where the army is composed of citizens, that he who has the most to lose, will make the best soldier. In Rome the poorer class, (capite censi,) till the times of Marius, was excluded from military service; and it seems to have been hardly otherwise in Athens.[2] Yet this poorer class was or grew to be the most numerous; accustomed to privations, those who composed it were perhaps for that reason the best fitted for the duties of war. When, on the contrary, standing armies are formed, property ceases to be regarded; and the greatest number of enlistments is made from the needy part of the community. What a contrast between this and the Grecian institutions!

Considering therefore the moderate extent of the Grecian states, it was the less to be expected that any of them could assemble a large army, if the slaves were not enrolled. Even where every one was put in motion, the number remained limited; not more than ten thousand Athenians fought on the plain of Marathon. Large armies could be collected only by the union of many states; the most numerous ever collected in Greece, during its independence, was in the battle of Platææ.[3] But these considerable alliances were commonly of a temporary nature; and for that reason the art of war could not be much advanced by them. From the battle of Platææ till the age of Epaminondas, that is, during the most flourishing period of Greece, a Grecian army of thirty thousand men was probably never assembled in one place.

The Persian wars seem to have been suited to promote the improvement of military science. But after the battle of Platææ, it was the navy and not the land forces which

[1] Thucyd. iv. 5.

[2] Harpocration in Θῆτες. Yet it is evident from the passage, that the case was different in the time of Demosthenes.

[3] About 111,000 men. But only 38,000 were heavily armed; and of the light-armed troops, 37,000 were Spartan Helots. Herod. ix. 29, 30.

became of decisive influence. After that battle, no considerable one was fought by land; no large Grecian army was again brought together. By maintaining the ascendency in the Ægean Sea, Greece was protected.

The petty wars which, after the victories over the Persians, were carried on between the several states, could not contribute much to the advancement of the art. They were nothing but single expeditions, decided by single insignificant engagements.

No such advancement could therefore be expected till the time of the Peloponnesian war, which involved all Greece. But this war soon came to be carried on more by sea than by land; and the military operations consisted principally in sieges. No single great battle was fought on land during its whole course; besides naval science, therefore, the art of besieging may have made some progress, especially in the expedition against Syracuse. But as this expedition terminated in the total destruction of the army, it could have no abiding consequences.

Till the age of Epaminondas, Sparta and Athens are the only states which attract our attention. In Sparta, where the militia resembled a standing army, it would seem that the art of war might have made advances. But two causes prevented. The one was the obstinate attachment to ancient usage, which rendered changes and improvements difficult. The other was the remarkable scarcity of great commanders, a scarcity to have been least expected in a warlike state; but which may have proceeded from the former cause. If we possessed a history of Pausanias, written by himself, it would perhaps show us how his talents, limited in their exercise by the regulations of his native city, proved ruinous to himself, as in the case of the German Wallenstein, by making him a traitor. Leonidas has our admiration for his greatness as a man, not as a general; and the fiery Brasidas, well fitted to be the hero of a revolutionary war, like the Peloponnesian, fell in the very beginning of his career,[1] and no worthy successors appeared till Lysander and Agesilaus. And of the first of these two, it is

[1] Thucyd. v. 10. When we read his proclamation, addressed to the Acanthians, Thucyd. iv. 85, we believe ourselves brought down to the years 1793 and 1794.

known that he trusted rather in the Persian subsidies than in himself.

More could then have been expected from Athens. But here, as our preceding remarks have made apparent, the army was subordinate to the navy. From the commencement of the splendid period of that republic, its political greatness rested on the latter. This preserved to it the ascendency; its allies were maritime cities, and assisted with ships rather than with troops; and the destiny of Athens was decided on the sea, gloriously at Salamis, and tragically on the Hellespont.[1] In Athens, therefore, no strong motive could exist, to perfect the art of war by land.

Such were the obstacles in general; others lay in the manner in which the military affairs of the Grecians were organized. We mention first the situation of the commanders; at least in Athens and in several other cities;[2] in which not one, but several generals shared the chief command with one another, and even that usually for a short period of time.

Where a militia exists, the political divisions are usually military in their origin. Such was the case with the tribes in Rome and in Athens.[3] The ten wards of this last city had each its own leader; and these together were the generals.[4] So it was in the Persian, so in the Peloponnesian war.[5] That a similar regulation existed in Bœotia, is evident from the number of their commanders; and we learn the same respecting Syracuse, as well from the history of its war with Athens,[6] as from the elevation of Dionysius. In Athens, a kind of destiny secured in the decisive moment the preponderance to a superior mind, a Miltiades; but where the command was shared by so many, it is obvious that existing institutions could receive but little improvement.

Another still greater obstacle lay in the circumstance, that the troops were not paid. Before the Peloponnesian war, or at least before the administration of Pericles, no pay

[1] In the year 406 B. C., near Ægospotamos.
[2] As, e. g., in Thebes and in Syracuse.
[3] These were called *tribus* in Rome, φύλαι in Athens.
[4] The στρατηγοί, of whom ten were annually appointed.
[5] Compare the instructive narration in Herod. vi. 109, respecting the consultation previous to the battle of Marathon.
[6] Thucyd. vi. 63.

was given in Athens or in any Grecian city, except, perhaps, Corinth. Military service was the duty of a citizen; and he who served, was obliged to provide for himself. But he who receives nothing from the state, will the less submit to its commands. From that period, the custom of paying was so far introduced, that those who had actually taken the field, received a very small compensation.[1] With such a constitution, moral causes must have outweighed commands. Courage and patriotism can animate an army of citizens, but can hardly make a machine of them; and what fruits would have been gathered by him, who should have succeeded in the attempt?

Beside these difficulties, there existed in many states another, arising from the weakness of their cavalry, or a total want of it. Homer knows nothing of cavalry. It does not seem to have been introduced into the Grecian states till after the establishment of republican forms of government; since, according to the remark of Aristotle, the opulent citizens found in it at once a support of their power and a gratification of their vanity.[2] But whether a city could have cavalry, depended on the nature of its territory, and the quantity of pasture which it possessed. Where the territory was not favourable, the cavalry was not strong. Athens, where so much attention was paid to this subject, never had more than a thousand men; Sparta appears, before Agesilaus, to have had few, or perhaps originally none at all; the Peloponnesus was little adapted to it; and Thessaly, the only state of the mother country which possessed any considerable body of it, was not remarkably skilful in making use of it.[3] Where it existed, none but wealthy citizens could serve in it, for the service was expensive. This was the case in Athens;[4] and yet here the state provided for the support of the horses even in time of peace; and the weak but splendid cavalry formed no inconsiderable article in the sum of the yearly expenditures.[5]

[1] The Athenians paid from two to four oboli daily.

[2] On Sparta, consult Xenoph. Op. p. 596.

[3] See the account of their war with the Phocians. Pausan. p. 798. The forces of Thessaly seem to have consisted chiefly in cavalry; at least nothing else is mentioned. The surest proof of their little progress in the art of war.

[4] The knights, ἱππεῖς, formed the second class according to property.

[5] According to Xenoph. de Magist. Equit. Op. p. 956, it cost forty talents annually.

Previous to the Macedonian times, the distinction between heavy and light horse seems to have been unknown in Greece; though it would be too much to assert that a difference in the equipments no where prevailed. The Athenian horsemen were equipped much like a modern cuirassier, with breastplate, helmet, and greaves; and even the horses were partly covered.[1] From the exercises which Xenophon prescribes, to leap over ditches and walls, we must not conceive the armour as too cumbersome.[2] I find no accounts of that of the Thessalian cavalry; but from what Pausanias says, it could not have been very light.[3]

With respect to the infantry, the difference between heavy and light-armed troops[4] prevailed throughout all Greece. The former were armed for the attack and close conflict. They wore a coat of mail and helmet; the rest of the body was protected by the shield. For the attack they had both spear and sword. The light troops, unencumbered with that heavy armour, carried the javelin, with bow and arrows.[5]

The weapons continued, therefore, the same as those which we find used in the Homeric age. But many inquiries and many attempts were made to improve them in various respects. Whether a straight or curved sword was the best;[6] whether a longer or shorter shield deserved the preference;[7] above all, how the weight of the coat of mail could be diminished, and whether it should be made of metal or of some lighter substance,[8] were questions of no little importance. Yet previous to the Macedonian age, we hear of no changes which could give a new character to the whole; and therefore we must leave to the antiquarian all further particular researches.

[1] Xenoph. de Re Equestri, Op. p. 951, has described them minutely.

[2] Xenoph. Op. p. 944.

[3] Pausan. p. 797. The horsemen who had been thrown down, being unable to rise, were slain by the Phocians.

[4] Ὁπλῖται and ψιλοὶ. See Potter's Archæolog.

[5] Bow and arrows do not seem to have been favourite weapons; they are seldom mentioned, and only in connexion with certain tribes, as the Cretans. Javelins were preferred. These were carried by the cavalry, as appears from Xenoph. ll. cc.

[6] Xenoph. Op. p. 953.

[7] Hence the different names θυρεὸς and σάκος, the large shield, ἀσπὶς and πέλτη, the small one, etc.

[8] The invention of the lighter coat of mail distinguishes Iphicrates. Cornel. Nep. in Iphic. c. 1.

On the other hand, we ask leave, so far as one who has not been initiated into the art of war may venture his opinions, to offer some remarks respecting the progress made by the Greeks in the art which relates to the positions and evolutions of armies, all which we comprehend under the word tactics. We the more desire to do this, because it will afford us a favourable opportunity of expressing an opinion on some of their most distinguished generals. It can with truth be said, that the art of tactics is in some respects independent of the progress of the other branches of military science; and in others is necessarily dependent on them. It is independent, so far as we speak of taking advantage of situation and the ground. The leader of a savage horde may profit by his position, no less than the commander of the best-disciplined army. Each will do it in his own way. It is an affair of genius, and rules cannot be given on the subject. He can do it, to whom nature has given the necessary keenness and quickness of view. This art is therefore always the property of individuals; it cannot be propagated or preserved by instructions. Entirely the reverse is true of the drawing up of an army and the evolutions dependent thereupon. They rest upon rules and knowledge, which are lasting; though we readily concede that this is but as it were the inanimate body of the art, into which genius must breathe life. Modern history has shown by a great example, how those forms may continue in the most courageous and best-disciplined army, and yet produce no effect when the spirit of them has passed away. But here a subject is proposed to the historian, of which he can treat. Can this be done better than by comparing together several of the principal engagements, of which detailed accounts have been preserved? Inferences which may thus be drawn respecting the progress of tactics, can hardly be exposed to any considerable errors.

In the Persian wars, the victory of Marathon was the first splendid military action of the Greeks, or rather of the Athenians. Athens owed it to the heroic spirit of her Miltiades. It was he who turned the scale, when it was still a question, whether a battle should be ventured or not. The voices of the ten leaders, of whom Miltiades was one, were divided; the eleventh vote of the Polemarch was to

decide. At this moment Miltiades arose and addressed the Polemarch Callimachus.[1] "It now rests with you to reduce Athens to slavery, or, setting it free, to leave a reputation among men, such as neither Harmodius nor Aristogiton has left; for long as the city of Athens has existed, it has never been in any danger like the present. If it should submit to the Persians, it is already determined what it will suffer under its tyrants; should it be saved, it can become the first of Grecian cities. If we do not join battle, I fear a faction will confuse the minds of the Athenians, and make them Persian; if we fight, victory will be ours with the gods." History can relate of a great man nothing more important than his conduct in the most decisive moment of his life. Miltiades himself could not have foreboded how much depended on that moment; yet he gained his end, and Callimachus adopted his opinion. But besides the talent of the general, who knew how to avail himself of his position to cover his wings, the victory was not less decided by the discipline of the Athenian militia, accustomed to preserve their ranks even while advancing with rapidity. They ran to the encounter;[2] the first of the Greeks, who did so. The wings of the enemy were discomfited; and the name of Marathon became immortal among men.

The battle of Platææ, which happened eleven years later,[3] is one of those, respecting which we have the most accurate accounts.[4] The motions of the army on the preceding days, give it an importance for the student of tactics. In his evolutions the Persian general seems to have been superior to the Grecian; for he cut off all communication with them, and all supplies of water, and compelled them to change their encampment. But the want of cavalry in the face of an army which abounded in it, made every motion of the Greeks difficult; and when we remember the internal organization of the army, and the little power possessed by

[1] Herod. vi. 109.

[2] ἐν δρόμῳ, Herod. vi. 112. Herodotus says expressly, that they made the attack with closed ranks, ἀθρόοι; we must not therefore think of a wild onset. They had neither cavalry nor archers; just as the Swiss at Novara in 1513 were without cavalry and artillery; in each case the result was the same. When enthusiasm attacks, computation fails.

[3] In the year 479 B. C.

[4] Herod. ix. 28, etc. Plutarch. in Aristide, Op. ii. p. 510, etc., has made use of Herodotus.

the commander, not only over the allies, but even over his own Spartans,[1] we shall discover still greater difficulties, with which Pausanias had to contend. And yet the Grecians obtained a splendid victory; but it was far more the result of the desperate attack made by the Tegeans and the Spartans, than of artful evolutions. In the days which preceded the battle, Pausanias appears as a general of prudence and sound judgment; he owed the victory not to himself, but to a part of his army and to fortune.

Of the battles which the able and successful Cimon won of the Persians, history has preserved no details; but yet enough to show, that the science of tactics was not advanced by them. They were for the most part naval engagements; those which took place on land, were only unexpected attacks. After his death, Plutarch tells us expressly, nothing great or considerable was executed.[2]

The first campaigns of the Peloponnesian war show beyond dispute, that the art of war, in a higher sense, had made but little progress. They were only inroads followed by nothing decisive. We have already remarked, why, in the progress of that long and weary war, tactics gained so little.

The case was changed, when, after this war, Sparta, contending for the rank she had won, found her Agesilaus, and was yet obliged to yield the ascendency to Thebes. Here the decision was made by armies and not by navies. In the view of those states, therefore, armies rose in importance.

We will not refuse to Agesilaus any of the praises which Xenophon has lavished on him. He was a model not only of a Spartan, but of a Grecian general. In the Spartan method of war, he made one change; in his wars against the Persians in Asia, he was the first to form a numerous cavalry; and to show that he knew the use of it.[3] Except this he made no essential alteration in tactics. The proof of this is found in the description which Xenophon has given[4] of the battle of Coronea. The same usual position was taken;

[1] See in Herodotus, and Plutarch ll. cc. p. 517, the relation of the disobedience of Amompharetus, in confirmation of the remark which we made above, p. 233, on Pausanias.

[2] Plutarch. in Cimone, Op. iii. p. 217.

[3] But that too was only temporary. The battle of Leuctra shows how bad the Spartan cavalry was at a subsequent period. See Xenoph. Op. p. 696.

[4] Xenoph. in Agesil. Op. p. 659.

the usual method of attack, by opposing a straight line to a straight line; without any artificial evolutions, either before or during the battle.

If it should appear from all this, that the higher branches of the art of war, including tactics, had not made so considerable progress as might have been expected, from the greatest of commanders, we would not in any degree diminish the fame of those distinguished men. Their glory rests on something independent of the mere evolutions of their armies. The Grecian leader was more closely united to his soldiers; he was obliged to know how to gain the confidence of his fellow-soldiers, who at the same time were his fellow-citizens. This could not be done by commands; rank and birth were here of no avail; every thing depended on personal character; and to be esteemed a great man it was necessary to give proofs of greatness.

It is the glory of the Greek nation, that it produced in almost every science and art the man, who first clearly recognised the eternal principles on which it rests, and by the application of them, unconsciously became the instructer of posterity. In the art of war, such a man appeared in Epaminondas. His fame as a warrior is his least glory; the world should behold in him the noblest character of his nation. He was for his age, what Gustavus Adolphus was for a later one. If we take from each of these great men, the peculiarities of their times, it will be difficult to find two more congenial spirits, two characters more nearly resembling each other. The parallel we leave for others to draw; of both we never can hear too much; it is Epaminondas, the skilful soldier, whom we are now to consider. The idea on which his change in the method of war was founded, was as simple as the man himself; and we can hardly fail of observing, that it proceeded from his peculiar situation. With an inferior force he had to cope with a more powerful adversary;[1] and this is the true criterion of military genius. It did not escape him, that he could not succeed with the former order of battle, according to which one line was drawn up in front of the other. Hence he determined to concentrate the attack in one point with a part of his army, whilst he with-

[1] The Spartan forces in the battle of Leuctra were thrice as numerous as the Theban; and besides, till that time, had been reckoned invincible.

drew the rest; and his object was, in that one point to break through the hostile line. In this manner he was triumphant at Leuctra, where he fell upon the right wing of the Spartans. But at Leuctra, the success of the Theban cavalry had led the way to a successful issue; it is at Mantinea, that we see for the first time the full application of the new tactics, which are described to us by one profoundly acquainted with the subject. "Epaminondas," says Xenophon,[1] "advanced with his army like a galley with threatening prow; sure that if he could once break through the line of his adversaries, a general flight would ensue. He therefore determined to make the attack with the flower of his army, while he drew back the weaker part of it." Thus the illustrious Theban solved the great problem in tactics, by means of its position, to use the several parts of an army at will; the art of war which was thus invented deserved the name, and was the same which insured to Alexander the victory on the Granicus, as well as to Frederic at Leuthen. It is easy to be perceived, that the execution of the plan was a still greater effort than its invention. Troops far better trained than the usual armies of the Greeks, were needed. And it is in this very circumstance, that Xenophon, himself an experienced officer, places the great merit of Epaminondas.[2]

We may therefore say with truth, that the higher branches of the art of war began with Epaminondas to be understood. But even before him, a change had gradually taken place in the whole military regulations; a change of the most decisive importance.

We allude to the custom of paying the troops. In states which originally made exclusive use of militia, the form and the spirit of their military institutions must have been changed by the introduction of mercenary troops. These could not have the internal regulations of the militia; which were founded on the division of the citizens; and although the Swiss mercenaries of the sixteenth century have proved that battles can be gained even with hired soldiers, yet the ex-

[1] Xenoph. H. Gr. vi. Op. p. 596. We learn from the same passage how much the excellent Theban cavalry (formed by Pelopidas) surpassed the Spartan.

[2] Xenoph. Op. p. 645.

amples of those times have also proved that evils are inseparable from the custom.

The use of mercenaries in Greece, may be traced to a very remote period. The tyrants, those usurpers who made their appearance in the cities at so early a date, were doubtless the first to introduce it; because they needed an armed force to protect their usurped authority. But this force did not always consist of foreigners; but rather, especially in the early times, of an armed party of the citizens, or was selected from among the partisans of the tyrant;[1] and further, an institution which was regarded as unjust, could not continue, still less be adopted and regularly established.

Hired troops, of which we would here treat, began to be employed in the Grecian cities at a later period. In the beginning of the Persian war, at Marathon and at Platææ we hear nothing of them. In the Peloponnesian war, they were commonly,[2] and after these times, almost uuiversally employed. Several causes operated to produce this effect.

The first was the whole condition of private life. When luxury and the comforts of life were introduced after the Persians were known, it is not astonishing that the rich desired to be free from military service. On the other hand, the Peloponnesian war and the almost universal revolutions produced by it, had so increased the number of the poor, that there was a numerous class who made a profession of war, and were ready to serve any one who would pay them. But still more important was the fact, that with the Persians no less than the Greeks, the same change in domestic life produced the same consequences. The subsidies of the former first enabled the Spartans to hire troops. But they soon hired in their turn, and in greater numbers than the Greeks; and no mercenaries were so acceptable, none so indispensable to them as the Grecian. The high wages which they gave, like those of the British in modern times, allured nu-

[1] This was done by Pisistratus on his first usurpation; Herod. i. 59. In later times, (let the history of Syracuse be called to mind,) the hired troops of the tyrants were wholly or chiefly composed of foreigners.

[2] The hired troops of the Spartans, from the Peloponnesus, are mentioned as early as the times of Brasidas; Thucyd. L. iv. 80; those of Athens from Thrace, about the same time; Thucyd. L. v. 6; those of the Corinthians and others we find constantly mentioned. In the Peloponnesus, it was chiefly the Arcadians who served as mercenaries; hence the proverb among the poets; ἐξ Ἀρκαδίας ἐπικοῦροι, Athen. i. p. 27, for they did not serve for nothing.

merous troops across the sea; and we need but call to mind the ten thousand whom Clearchus led to Cyrus the younger, and with whom Xenophon made his retreat,[1] to be convinced that great multitudes followed this kind of life. The subsequent Phocian war[2] was conducted by the Phocians, who were aided by the treasures of Delphi, almost exclusively with hired troops; and Demosthenes is loud in his complaints and censure of a custom, which all his eloquence was not able to change.[3]

Of all writers, Isocrates has spoken the most distinctly on this subject. His long life continued almost through the whole period in which this custom arose; and the consequences were so distinctly visible in his old age, his patriotism could not but break forth in lamentations. Those very troops of Clearchus and Xenophon, troops which made the Persians tremble,—who were they? Men, says Isocrates,[4] of such reputation, that they could not reside in their native cities. "Formerly," says he in another place,[5] "there was no such thing as mercenaries; now the situation of Greece is such, that it would be far easier to raise an army of vagabonds than of citizens." The natural consequences of this state of things was, that he who had the most money, had also the most power. He could raise an army at will. But on how uncertain a foundation did this power repose! The rich man can be outbid by the rich; and Greece learned, what Carthage learned also with a more melancholy certainty,[6] that a state which trusts to mercenary troops, must finally tremble before them. "Unless," says Isocrates to Philip,[7] "to provide for the support of these people by establishing colonies of them, they will soon collect in vast troops, and be more formidable to the Hellenes, than the barbarians."[8]

We have already remarked, that in the eyes of the Greeks, the navy was more important than the army. They very early distinguished ships of war from merchant vessels; of which the consequence was, that, as the former belonged to

[1] In the year 400 B. C.
[2] Called also the Sacred war, from 357 till 347 B. C.
[3] See his Philippic and Olynthiac orations.
[4] Isocrat. Panegyr. Op. p. 71. [5] Isocrat. Or. ad Phil. Op. p. 101.
[6] In the wars with the mercenaries, 240—237 B. C.
[7] Isocrat. ad Philip. Op. p. 106.
[8] We learn from Xenophon's retreat, that they were formidable to their own commanders; just as were the Swiss at Milan.

the state, to build and fit out fleets was entirely a public concern. Yet to judge correctly of the condition and progress of naval science among the Greeks, we must not forget, that the scene of action for their squadrons was, and continued to be, limited to the Ægean and Ionian Seas. The expedition of Athens against Syracuse, is the most distant which was ever undertaken by any Grecian fleet of the mother country; with what success is known. Even the Black Sea, though open to their vessels of commerce, was hardly visited by their galleys of war, because no occasion ever required it. The seas which they navigated were full of islands; it was never difficult to find landing-places and harbours; and the naval expeditions were not much more than passages by sea. Further; Greece, especially the most cultivated eastern part of it, did not abound in wood; and though some of the western or inland districts[1] were better provided with it, the rivers, which were hardly more than mountain streams, afforded little opportunity for the transportation of timber. The cities, therefore, which built fleets, were obliged to seek their timber at a distance; we know of Athens, that it imported what it needed from Thrace.[2] The expense was therefore necessarily great; none but the richest cities were able to bear them; and hence it is easy to see, that limitations were produced, which make the exertions of several states for their navy, appear to us in a very extraordinary light. Finally; the manning of the fleets was attended with peculiar difficulties. Two kinds of men, mariners and soldiers, were employed. The latter were citizens, and belonged to the militia; but according to the earlier regulations, the citizens were not obliged to do service on board of the ships. Slaves were used in part, especially for the oars; and in part foreigners were hired. Such is the description given by Isocrates. "Formerly," says he,[3] "in the better times of Athens, foreigners and slaves were used for the management of the vessels; but citizens performed service in arms. Now the case is reversed; those of the city are compelled to serve as mariners,[4] while the soldiers consist of mercenaries." The manning of

[1] As Acarnania and Arcadia.
[2] Thucyd. iv. 108.
[3] Isocrat. de Pace, Op. p. 169. See Scheffer de Milit. Naut. ii. 3.
[4] Especially the Inquilini.

the fleets was therefore attended with great expense; and it is known respecting them from the Peloponnesian war, that Sparta could not have borne them but for the alliance and subsidies of Persia.

These causes are sufficient to limit our expectations of the naval affairs of the Grecians. Yet here, also, the different epochs must be distinguished.

We learn of Homer and of the Argonautic poets, that the Greeks even in the heroic age had ships which were fitted out for distant voyages. The piracy, which before that period had been so common, must have made it necessary for ships to be prepared, not only for carrying freight, but for fighting. These vessels were called long, by way of distinguishing them from the more ancient round ones, which were fit only for the transportation of merchandise; though we would by no means deny, that the former were also used for the purposes of commerce. It was characteristic of them, that all the rowers sat in one line. In such times of insecurity, fast sailing is the chief merit of a vessel; be it for the attack or for flight. This must have been promoted in the lengthened vessels both by the form itself, and the increased number of rowers; which gradually rose from twenty to fifty, and even more. Hence there was a particular class of ships, which derived their name from that circumstance.[1]

But the incident which made a real and the only epoch in the history of Grecian naval architecture, is the invention of the triremes. They were distinguished by the triple order of benches for rowing, placed one above the other.[2] It thus became necessary to build them much higher; and though swiftness may have been carefully regarded, strength and firmness must have been viewed as of equal importance. But even before the Macedonian times, and always after them, the chief strength of the Grecian fleet lay in the triremes, just as that of modern fleets in ships of the line of the second and third rate.

[1] The πεντηκόντοροι. See Scheffer de Varietate Nav. in Gronov. Thes. xi. p. 752.

[2] Scheffer de Milit. Naval. ii. 2. I believe this point, once so much contested, is now no longer doubted; although uncertainty still exists respecting the order of the rows. Compare the prints and illustrations in Antichità d'Ercolano, T. v. at the end.

The structure of the triremes would alone warrant the inference, that a naval force, that is, a squadron destined solely for war, and possessed by the state, did not exist in Greece till after these were invented. But there is in Thucydides[1] a passage, which in my opinion settles this point beyond a doubt. "When, after the abolition of monarchies, the cities became more wealthy, the Greeks began to build fleets, and to pay more attention to the sea. The Corinthians were the first to change the ships according to our present form; for in Greece the first triremes were built at Corinth; and it was the ship-builder Aminocles of Corinth, who built for the Samians four (such) vessels. But it was about three hundred years before the end of this war,[2] that Aminocles came to the Samians. The oldest naval battle with which we are acquainted, was fought between the Corinthians and the Corcyræans; since that time, two hundred and sixty years have elapsed."[3]

This testimony, more important than all the accounts of later grammarians and compilers, proves that it was in the seventh century that the Grecian cities began to support fleets. The account of the great historian is made much clearer by the inquiries respecting Grecian commerce, which show that the same period beheld the seeds of Grecian cities, planted on the sea-coast from Asia to Sicily, spring up and flourish in the genial beams of liberty. The year, it is true, is not mentioned, in which the first triremes were built in Corinth; but the whole connexion shows, that the invention was still recent in the age of Aminocles; and as the first naval battle between the Greeks was fought forty years later, it is obvious, that they were then but beginning to support fleets.

But at the same time we must confess that naval architecture, after this first great step, made no further considerable advances before the Macedonian age. Thucydides says this expressly; for he observes, that the Corinthians gave the ships the form which they continued to have in his time. Neither did it at once become a general custom to build triremes. Till the Persian wars, the use of the long ships and those of fifty oars was the most usual; the Syracusans and Corcyræans were, about this time, the first to have

[1] Thucyd. i. 13.
[2] About 700 years B. C.
[3] About 640 years B. C.

whole fleets consisting of triremes.[1] In these, many improvements may have been made; but as no essential change took place, we leave this subject, and many others relating to naval matters, to the industry of the antiquarian.

We would only add a few remarks on the naval tactics of the Greeks. Did they receive a scientific form earlier than the military? And if so, through whom, and by what means? And here the reader must not forget, that we are treating of the times previous to the dominion of Macedonia.

It is apparent from the preceding observations, that the Greeks had more reason to improve their naval than their military tactics. They were often obliged to contend with fleets, not only superior to theirs in number, but also in the excellence of the vessels; for in the Persian wars, the squadrons of the Phœnicians were arrayed against them. Even when the victory had been gained, the safety of Greece still depended on its maritime force. This formed the foundation of the greatness of the first of the Grecian cities. Naval actions, more than battles by land, decided the destiny of the states. What circumstances and relations could be more favourable to the display of great talents? And where may we indulge greater expectations, especially when we look through the lists of the men to whom Athens and Sparta intrusted the command of their squadrons?

We can best commence the history of the naval tactics of Greece, at the period in which we have descriptions of their engagements at sea. The earliest account which we possess, is of the battle which took place near the island Lada, off Miletus, between the Ionian fleet and that of the Phœnicians in the service of Persia. The navy of the Ionians had then reached its best state; it consisted of not less than three hundred and fifty triremes, while that of the Phœnicians was almost twice as large. We find that a premeditated position was taken in the days before the battle. In the divisions of the first line, there were intervals, through which those of the second could sail.[2] But the battle itself is not instructive, as the Persians previously succeeded in dividing the fleet of the allies.

When Xerxes invaded Greece, Themistocles gained the

[1] Thucyd. i. 14.

[2] Herod, vi. 12, etc. Here too we have an instance of how little could be effected by the commander.

glory of being his country's preserver by sea. But it must not be forgotten, that though he was the commander of the Athenians, he had not the general command of the allies. This post he had the prudence and moderation to yield, at least nominally, to Eurybiades the Spartan.[1] Still it was Themistocles who directed the whole, not by commands, but by persuasion; and in this art who was equal to him? Twice he ventured to meet the much superior navy of the Persians; first at Artemisium, then at Salamis. But in both instances he remedied his inferiority, not so much by artful manœuvres, as by choosing his situation. He would not meet the immense Persian fleet in the open sea, where the wings of the enemy would have unavoidably extended beyond his own. Hence he chose his first position at the northern entrance of the Strait of Eubœa,[2] and after the indecisive engagements of Artemisium, retreated through those straits to the Saronic bay; where the nook between Attica and the island of Salamis offered a station still more secure. In such a position, where the enemy is expected in close array, manœuvres are not further needed; but the relation of Herodotus leaves us in doubt, whether most to admire the discernment, or the prudence and adroitness of the commander.

Of the later naval engagements which took place in the course of those wars, we have only general accounts. The Greeks beat the Persians too easily. Where an enemy is despised, the art of war cannot make much progress.

We have particular accounts[3] of the naval fight, which, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, took place between the Corcyræans and Corinthians; and after which, both nations erected a trophy. The fleet of the Corinthians formed one line; that of the Corcyræans, on the contrary, was drawn up in three divisions. But the historian remarks, that no manœuvres took place; they grappled at once, and ship fought singly with ship. All that we read of the fleet of the Corcyræans, gives us no high opinion of their skill in naval tactics. In a second naval engagement with the

[1] On this and what follows, consult the interesting narrative of Herodotus, viii. 2.

[2] The Euripus, as it was called. The Persians sent a part of their squadron round the island, to block up the southern entrance, and thus cut off the retreat of the Greeks; but their squadron was destroyed by a storm. Herod. l. c.

[3] Thucyd. i. 47, etc.

Peloponnesians, they showed still less adroitness, and would have been ruined, had not the division of the Athenians covered their retreat.[1]

The naval tactics which were now known to the Greeks, consisted chiefly in sailing round, and sailing through the enemy's line.[2] The object of the first was, to extend the line beyond the opposite wings; of the second, to break through the hostile line. To prevent this, the other fleet was drawn up in two lines, both with intervals, so that the divisions of the second line could pass through the intervals in the first, and thus assist them, when assistance was needed. This order was particularly understood by the Athenians, who also adopted another method of attack, not with the prow, but obliquely from the side; so that the oars of the enemy's ship were broken, and the ships thus made unmanageable. In those matters, the Athenians were superior not only to the Spartans, but even to the Syracusans.[3]

The two last years of the Peloponnesian war were particularly remarkable for naval encounters; but for a knowledge of tactics, the engagement between the Spartans under Callicratidas, and the Athenians, near Lesbos, alone deserves notice; for it gives us an example of the management of a squadron in a double row. The Athenian fleet was drawn up in two lines, both on the right and the left wing. Each wing consisted of two divisions, each division of fifteen ships; and was supported by equal divisions in the second line; the centre was composed of one line. This order, says Xenophon,[4] was chosen, that the fleet might not be broken through. The Spartan fleet, on the contrary, formed but one line; prepared for sailing round or breaking through the enemy. The battle was obstinate; it was long before the Athenians gained the victory, as Callicratidas fell. His steersman, before the battle, had advised him to retreat, on account of the greatly superior force of the Athenians. "Were I to fall, Sparta could exist as well," was his answer.

The naval tactics of the ancients were further improved in the wars between the Romans and Carthaginians, and under the Ptolemies. In forming an opinion respecting

[1] Thucyd. iii. 77, 78. Xenoph. H. Gr. i. Op. p. 446.

[2] Περιπλεῖν and διεκπλεῖν. Thucyd. vii. 36.

[3] See the description of the fight in Thucyd. l. c.

[4] Xenoph. Op. p. 446.

them, two things should not be forgotten. First; less depended on the winds than in modern tactics; for the triremes were moved rather by oars than sails. Secondly; where battles were always fought near at hand, and the ships always ran alongside of each other, the manœuvres of the fleets could not be so various or so important, as where the ships remain at a certain distance, and manœuvres are performed during the whole action. But though the naval tactics of the moderns are more difficult and intricate, we must not infer that the naval battles of the ancients were comparatively insignificant. They decided wars in ancient times much more frequently than in modern; and if the loss of men is to be taken into consideration, it might easily be shown, that one naval battle of the ancients often swept away more men, than three or even more in our age.

CHAPTER XIII.

STATESMEN AND ORATORS.

The character of the statesmen in republics like the Grecian must, in many respects, differ from the statesmen of the modern European monarchies; and can be sketched with difficulty. Yet it is necessary to form a distinct conception of the sphere of action in which those men exerted themselves, who justly form the pride of antiquity. But it may seem the less superfluous to enter into this subject, since we shall thus gain an opportunity of forming more correct opinions respecting several of those men. Though Athens was their home and the theatre of their actions, they were the property of Greece; and are here to be held up as the representatives of so many others, of whom history has preserved for us less information, because they made their appearance in cities of less renown.

The different character of the Grecian states necessarily exercised an influence on the character of the statesmen, who appeared in them. Where the law exercised unlimited power, as it did in Sparta, there was no room for demagogues like those of Athens. But difference of time was as

influential as the difference of constitutions. How then could it be otherwise expected, than that with the increasing culture of the nation, there should be a change in the influence and the conduct of those who were at its head.

In the age of Solon, men first appeared in the mother country, who were worthy of the name of statesmen. Many had before that period been in possession of power, and not unfrequently had become tyrants; but none can be called statesmen, as the word itself denotes, except those who as freemen conduct the affairs of cultivated nations.

In Solon's age,[1] the relations of the Grecian states had not yet become intricate. No one of them exercised sway over the rest; and no one endeavoured to do so; even the importance of Sparta in the Peloponnesus was founded on her attempts to liberate the cities from the yoke of the tyrants. In such a period, when the individual states were chiefly occupied with their own concerns and those of their nearest neighbours, the statesman's sphere of action could not for any length of time be extended beyond the internal government and administration. The seven wise men, from whom the Greeks date the age in which politics began to be a science, were not speculative philosophers, but rulers, presidents, and counsellors of states; rulers, as Periander of Corinth and Pittacus of Mitylene; presidents, as Solon of Athens, Chilo of Sparta, Cleobulus of Lindus; counsellors, as Bias and Thales, of princes and cities.[2] Of these, Solon is the only one with whom we are much acquainted; he is known as a lawgiver, and also as a soldier and poet. But it was not till after the wars with Persia, that the men appeared whom we can call statesmen in the modern sense of the word. For it was then for the first time, when a contest arose with a nation to all appearances infinitely superior in power, and the question of existence was at issue, and when good counsel was not less important than action, that a greater political interest was excited, which employed the strongest minds. And this interest was not and could not be transitory. For it gave birth in Greece to the idea of supremacy, which a single state obtained and preserved

[1] Between 600 and 550 years B. C.

[2] See Diog. Laert. i. c. 1—5. The passages which relate to them, have already been collected and illustrated by Meiners and other writers on the history of philosophy. Meiners's Geschichte der Wissenschaften, i. p. 43.

for nearly seventy years; and which, as we have already remarked, became the foundation of its greatness and its splendour. Political affairs and negotiations were now to be judged of by a new criterion. The foreign relations were now the most important; and it was in conducting them, that the first statesmen were employed. But their sphere of action was by no means limited to Athens alone; it was in some measure extended over the whole of Greece.

The object of these men was, and could not but be, to gain influence in a community, in which some inequality was produced by birth, (as certain families, like those of the Eupatridæ, were held superior to the rest, forming a sort of nobility, and even a political party,) yet in which birth had very little influence on future consequence. In Athens, as in England, certain families or classes of families advocated certain political ideas and principles, by means of which the democratic and aristocratic parties were formed, and kept up amidst a variety of changes. But the history of Athens still abounds in proofs, that the influence possessed over the people by no means depended on birth. Here, as in the other similar states, there were two methods of gaining such influence; by deeds in war, and in peace by counsel. In some periods, military glory was the most esteemed; in others, influence could be gained without it. In the early period, during the war with the Persians, the commanders of the armies were also statesmen; and how could it be otherwise? But when the affairs of peace grew more important, a new course was opened to the man of genius. Yet it was long before the statesman, as such, could rise in Athens; the qualifications of a general long remained essential to his influence; though the age finally came, in which the former began to be of more consequence than the latter. We shall not therefore expose ourselves to the danger of being misapprehended, if we distinguish the three periods from one another; the first, in which the statesman was subordinate to the general; the next, in which the general was subordinate to the statesman; and the third, in which the statesman acted independently of the general. Without any elaborate argument, the reader will immediately perceive, that here a certain relation exists to the increasing culture of the nation; the mere military com-

mander may rule a nation of barbarians; but the statesman who has no pretensions to the qualifications of a general, finds no place except among a cultivated people. To mark more distinctly the limits of the three periods, we will call the first that of Themistocles, the second that of Pericles, and the third that of Demosthenes.

In the first age it is easy to perceive, that the qualities of a commander were of more importance than those of a statesman. The state was to be saved on the field of battle; and yet prudence was needed for its safety no less than courage. Themistocles himself may be regarded as the representative of this period. Destined by nature to become a demagogue rather than a general, he was still forced by the character and the spirit of his age to build his political influence on his military fame. He owed his greatness to the Persian war and Salamis. But as a general, he is perhaps the most perfect model of a popular leader, who effects less by commands than by persuasion and knowledge of men. His nation recognised in him the most prudent of its citizens; and he understood his nation better than any one, not merely collectively, but individually. Hence proceeded his influence. "He was most distinguished," says Thucydides,[1] "for the strength of his natural powers; and for this he is the most admirable of men. His understanding made him the most acute observer of every unexpected incident, without any previous or subsequent inquiries; and gave him the most accurate foresight of the future. Whatever he undertook, he was able to execute; and to form a true judgment on whatever was new to him. In doubtful matters, he could best tell what was to be done or to be avoided; and, in a word, he was the first for strength of natural powers, and for promptness of decision." Happy the state which is favoured with such a citizen! Even in great dangers it has no need to fear. He who considers the whole history of Themistocles, will admire him less for his deeds of heroism, than for the manner in which he preserved the courage of his nation, and in the decisive moment brought them to the decisive measure, rather to enter their ships and desert their native city, than subject themselves to the Persian yoke. Such things can be done only

[1] Thucyd. i. 138.

by a man of superior genius. It is true that his great talents were united to a character, which was not entirely free from selfishness.[1] But the interests of his country were never sacrificed to his private advantage. And in judging of Themistocles, it must never be forgotten, that he was the first who, without family, rose to eminence in Athens, and destroyed the power of the nobility.[2] This could never be forgiven him; and it is not strange, that, persecuted as he was by Sparta, he should have been overwhelmed by his foreign and domestic enemies. But when he quitted ungrateful Athens, his object was already accomplished. He had practically demonstrated that he understood the art which he vaunted, of making of a small state a large one. The reception with which he met in Persia, does no less honour to him than to Artaxerxes; and although it is doubtful whether he did not escape serving against his country by a voluntary death,[3] it is certain that he did nothing which could sully his fame.

If Themistocles shows how talents could rise in a state like Athens, Aristides is an example of the influence of character. His influence and his share in public business were grounded on the conviction of his honesty and disinterestedness; although he also needed the support of military glory. As early as at Marathon, he, as one of the ten generals, stood by the side of Miltiades; and had himself the magnanimity to yield to him the supreme command.[4] At Platææ, he was the leader of the Athenians; and after the liberties of Greece had been rescued by this victory, and Athens had established its supremacy in the alliance against Persia, he was appointed, at the request of the allies, to superintend the general exchequer, and performed the most difficult office of fixing for each of them its proportion of the annual tribute.[5] Thus Athens owed to him not much

[1] See in particular the relation of the corruption of the Grecian generals by the Eubœans. Herod. viii. 5.

[2] Plutarch. in Themistoc. Op. 1. p. 438.

[3] "He died," says Thucydides, "of disease. Some say he died of poison, which he took because he could not perform all that he had promised the king." Thucyd. i. 138. Thucydides says nothing of the tradition, that he destroyed himself by drinking bull's blood. Plutarch. Op. i. p. 498. The story seems therefore to have received additions; Thucydides speaks so decisively, that he could hardly have doubted the natural death of Themistocles.

[4] Plutarch. Op. i. p. 489.

[5] "Aristides," says Plutarch, "made inquiries respecting the territory and

less than to Themistocles, who had been his rival from youth. If political and moral principles rendered the union of the two impossible, (nothing but the urgent necessities of the country effected it for a short time,) it must not be forgotten, that Aristides, though probably of no opulent family,[1] belonged by his birth to the class of the Eupatridæ.

Cimon, the son of Miltiades, the third whom we should name in this first period, connects it, as it were, with the succeeding. He too was more of a general than a statesman. His policy had but one object, continual war against the Persians, as the means of preserving the unity of the Greeks. This he pursued through his whole life, from the battle of Salamis, (and he had been the first to give the example of deserting the city and entering the ships,[2]) till shortly before the glorious peace which he had promoted, but did not live to see concluded.[3] He seems, therefore, to have taken no further share in the internal affairs, than he was forced to do by his situation. For descended from a noble family, and a pupil of Aristides, possessing the principles of his political instructer, he desired the favour of the people, only as the means of preserving his character as a military commander; and yet he did not escape the lot which had fallen to Themistocles and Aristides. But his military fame procured his speedy return; and confirmed him, as it increased, in the possession of his place. It was by the means which Cimon used to preserve the favour of the people, that he held a place, as we have observed, between the first and second period. His liberality was not confined to citizens alone; even he began to attract attention by public improvements, made for the most part at his own expense. Themistocles had fortified the city and the Piræeus; and Cimon began to ornament them. With the Persian spoils he built a part of the walls of the citadel.[4] He caused the marshy ground at its side[5] to be dried and paved; he

revenue of the several states; and fixed accordingly the tribute of each state to general satisfaction." Plutarch. Op. ii. p. 535. "But even before that time it was his character, which had gained for Athens the supremacy. For the allies desired a president like him; and even invited him to assume the supreme command." Plutarch. ii. p. 532. He was at that time general of the Athenians with Cimon.

[1] How uncertain this was, appears from Plutarch. iii. p. 478.

[2] Plutarch. Op. iii. p. 181.

[3] He died in the year 449 B. C.

[4] Plutarch. Op. iii. p. 202.

[5] Called *αἱ λίμναι*.

prepared an abode for Plato and his philosophy, by converting the barren field, which occupied the site of the Academy, into a lovely, well-watered grove; and for the Athenians, he made the market-place their most favourite place of resort, by planting it with plane-trees.[1] He was intimately acquainted with the artists of his time, especially with the painter Polygnotus; to whose art and patriotism, the Athenians were indebted for the paintings which decorated the most celebrated of their public halls.[2]

Cimon may therefore justly be styled the precursor of Pericles, whose name we use to designate the second period. The time was arrived, when the arts of peace were to flourish no less than those of war; when almost every branch of the arts and of literature was to put forth its most beautiful and most imperishable blossoms.

Under such circumstances, and in a republic, of which no one could possess the direction without understanding the means of winning and preserving the respect and admiration of his fellow-citizens, it is obvious, that new qualities were necessary in the statesman, and new requisitions made of him. The reciprocal influence which exists between men of genius and their age, is perhaps one of the most interesting inquiries for which history presents us the materials. When we survey the several periods in which, at a greater or less distance, the remarkable changes of individual nations, and even of a large part of mankind, have taken place, we shall always find in them individual men, who may in some measure be regarded as the representatives of their age; and who frequently and justly lend their names to it. They can in a certain degree rise above their age; but they do not the less remain children of the time in which they live; and a history of mankind, as contained in the history of these leading minds, would perhaps be the most faithful that can be given. He who has truly delineated Herrman and Cæsar, or Gregory, or Luther, or Frederic, has sketched the chief traits of their respective ages. To be in advance of one's age, as is the usual mode of expression, means but to understand one's age correctly

[1] Plutarch. l. c.

[2] Plutarch. Op. ii. p. 178. Hence called the variegated, ποικίλη. It was adjoining to the forum.

in all its bearings; and to act on the principles which result from such knowledge. In this lies the secret of great men, that no one can betray them, because no one shares their penetration, or rather in many cases their presaging insight into the future. On hearing the age of Pericles mentioned, a crowd of glorious associations is called up; he who becomes more profoundly acquainted with it, soon finds that no pure ideal of perfection then existed. To behold the mere citizen of a republic, raising his nation, and by means of his nation all mankind, to a higher position, is a spectacle which history has never but once been able, under similar circumstances, to repeat, in Lorenzo the Magnificent. Enviable men, around whose brows the unfading laurel twines its verdure! If fame in succeeding generations, if the grateful remembrance of posterity, is no vain felicity, who would not willingly exchange his claims for yours?

In his political course, Pericles was guided by a simple principle; to be the first in his own city, whilst he secured to it the first place among cities. Its political preponderance depended on the preservation of its supremacy over Greece; and this was to be preserved, not by force alone; but by every thing which, according to Grecian ideas, could render a city illustrious. Hence he felt himself the necessity of improving his mind more variously than had hitherto been common in Athens; and he availed himself for that end of all the means which his age afforded him. He was the first statesman, who felt that a certain degree of acquaintance with philosophy was requisite; not in order to involve his mind in the intricacies of a system, but to exercise himself in thinking with freedom; and he became the pupil of Anaxagoras.[1] If before no orators, except those appointed by the state, had spoken in the popular assemblies, he was the first who came forward as a voluntary orator;[2] and the study of eloquence was necessary for him, although he never made the duties of an active statesman subordinate to those of a public speaker. Whilst he ornamented Athens by those master-pieces of architecture and the arts of design, he was not the patron, but the personal friend of a Phidias and

[1] In proof of this and the following account, consult Plutarch in the biography of Pericles. Op. T. ii.

[2] Plutarch makes a distinction between him and the orators appointed by the state; l. c. p. 601. See Petit. de Leg. Att. iii. 3.

similar men ; and who does not know, that his intimacy with Aspasia, his friend, his mistress, and at last his wife, imparted to his mind that finer culture, which he would have looked for in vain among the women of Athens. But all this he made subservient to his public career. He desired to be altogether a statesman, and he was so. "There was in the whole city," says Plutarch,[1] "but one street in which he was ever seen ; the street which led to the market-place and the council-house. He declined all invitations to banquets, and all gay assemblies and company. During the whole period of his administration, he never dined at the table of a friend ; he did but just make his appearance at the nuptials of his nephew Euryptolemus ; but immediately after the libation [2] he arose. He did not always appear even in the popular assemblies ; but only when important business was to be transacted ; smaller concerns he intrusted to his friends and the orators." Thus Pericles exhibited the model of a statesman, such as Greece had never yet seen, and was not to see again. His history shows, that he became great amidst the collision of parties ; all of which he finally annihilated ; and we need not therefore be astonished, if the opinions of his contemporaries were not united in his favour. We learn of Plutarch,[3] how zealously the comic poets attacked him. But he has gained the voice of one man, whose authority surpasses that of all the rest, the voice of Thucydides. "So long as he presided over the state in peace," says the historian,[4] "he did it with moderation; the state was preserved in its integrity, and was even advanced under him to its highest degree of greatness. When the war broke out, he showed that he had made a just calculation of his strength. The first in dignity and prudence, he was superior to all suspicion of corruption ; he therefore swayed the people almost at will ; he guided them, and was not guided by them ; for he did not speak according to their humour, but often opposed them with dignity and even with vehemence. If they were inclined to do any thing unreason-

[1] Plutarch. Op. ii. p. 601.

[2] That is, at the beginning of the repast. These little traits seem to me to designate the man, who never forgave himself any thing. What nobler object can be contemplated, than a great statesman, who, living entirely for his high calling, and living worthily of it, spares only moments for himself.

[3] As, e. g., Op. ii. p. 592. [4] Thucyd. ii. 65.

ably, he knew how to restrain them; if they suffered their courage to sink without reason, he could renew their confidence. His administration was therefore nominally the government of the people, but in reality the government of the first man." To a character described by such a master, no additions need be made; but we cannot omit to observe, that Pericles, though so great as a statesman, was not unmindful of the fame of military command. In this the rule of his conduct seems to have been, great prudence, and to undertake nothing without the greatest probability of success; and such was the confidence reposed in him, that, in the last fifteen years of his administration, he seems to have held the place of general without interruption.[1]

While we render to Pericles the tribute of just admiration, we ought not to forget that he was favoured by the circumstances of his times. A man like him is capable of effecting much when the state, of which he is the head, is flourishing, and the people itself is constantly unfolding talents and powers, of which he must be able to take advantage. Pericles himself never could have played his part a second time; how much less those who were his successors! Of these history has but one to mention, of whom we must take notice, because he belonged, in a certain sense, not merely to Athens, but to Greece; we mean Alcibiades. The age in which he appeared was altogether warlike; and of this he merits the blame. He needed, therefore, the qualifications of a general more than those of a statesman. Still it may be said with confidence, that even in better times he would not have become a Pericles, although he seemed destined by birth, talents, and fortune to play a similar part. Pericles regarded, in every thing, first the state and then himself; Alcibiades, on the contrary, first himself and then the state. Is more needed to delineate his character as a statesman? Vanity was his leading trait. He is thus described by the same great historian, who has drawn for us the picture of Pericles. "Although Alcibiades," says he,[2] "was distinguished among his fellow-citizens for his wealth and consequence, his desires were always greater than his

[1] Namely, after his victory over his antagonist, the elder Thucydides, who was supported by the party of the Optimates. Plutarch. Op. ii. p. 626, 627.
[2] Thucyd. vi. 15.

fortune; particularly of keeping splendid equipages, and supporting other extravagances; which contributed not a little to the downfal of the Athenians." His history is so well known, that it is not necessary to establish these remarks by any particular references; his whole life from beginning to end is a confirmation of them.

The men who have thus far been named, united, though in different degrees, the characters of the statesman and the general. By what means was such an entire separation of the two produced, as may be observed in the third period, which we have named from Demosthenes? The name alone explains to us distinctly enough, that the reason is to be looked for in the dominion of eloquence; but the question remains still to be answered, Why and from what causes did eloquence obtain so late its ascendency in politics?

We do not read that Themistocles and Aristides were skilled in oratory as an art. It is certain, that of all practical statesmen, Pericles was the first who deserved that praise; although it is uncertain whether he took advantage of the instructions which then began to be given by the teachers of eloquence.[1] But though the orations of Pericles were artfully composed, they cannot be called works of art in the same sense with those of Demosthenes and his contemporaries. As Pericles left no writings, it must remain undecided whether he wrote out his speeches word for word. A circumstance, of which the memory is preserved by Plutarch, appears to make this very uncertain. "He was accustomed," says the biographer,[2] "whenever he was to speak in public, previously to entreat the gods, that he might not utter, against his will, any word which should not belong to the subject." Does not this seem to show, that he was not accustomed to write his orations, and deliver them from memory, but that he rather left much to be filled up by the impulse of the moment? The speech which Thucydides represents him to have delivered,[3] is the work of the historian; but

[1] According to Plutarch, i. p. 594, the sophist Damon was his instructer; but, as it appears, rather his political counsellor, than his regular instructer in eloquence. He made use of the pretext, says Plutarch, of teaching him music. Gorgias of Leontium, who is commonly mentioned as beginning the class of sophists, can hardly have been his master. See the fragment from the Schol. ad Hermog. ap. Reisk. Or. Gr. viii. p. 195.

[2] Plut. Op. ii. p. 604.

[3] Thucyd. ii. 60.

we can judge from that and other similar discourses contained in the same author, of the character of public eloquence before and during the Peloponnesian war; since they could not but be composed in the taste and after the manner of the times. But how do they differ in style from those of the age of Demosthenes! How much less can those orations, great as are their various merits, be considered as classic models in the art of eloquence! We find in them little or nothing of an artificial plan; little of that rhetorical amplification and those figures and artifices, by which the later orators produced an effect on their hearers. We justly admire in them the strength of many of their thoughts, and single expressions and passages. But they seem to prove beyond a question, that the rhetorical style was not then formed at Athens. They have far more the character of martial addresses; they bear the impress of an age, in which the orator in the popular assemblies was at the same time the commander in war.[1]

And by what means did Grecian eloquence in public speaking gain that peculiar character, which it possessed in the age of Demosthenes? The origin and progress of public speaking always depends in a certain degree on external circumstances. It is not enough that the constitution leaves room for it; for then it would have come to perfection in other Grecian cities, and in Athens at a much earlier period than it did. Neither can we assume the artificial disposition of the parts of a discourse and the instruction given in rhetoric, as the standard by which to judge of the actual appearance of great political orators. External circumstances must also be such as to make the want of orators perceptible. And when can this take place in free republics, except in times—not of war, for there arms must decide; but rather in times of impending dangers, which may yet be averted by prudence and courageous resolutions? In such times the public speaker is in his place; he beholds the field of glory opened before him; and if no other motive than patriotism should lead him to ascend the stage from which the people was addressed, where could his bosom be warmed by a nobler inspiration?

[1] In the masterly sketch which is given by Cicero, in Bruto, cap. 7—13, of the succession of Greek orators, much instruction on these subjects may be found.

This was the case in Greece, and especially in Athens, during the age of Philip; for it was Philip who called forth a Demosthenes. Every thing which was needed to produce such an orator, had already been prepared. The form of government had long since made public speaking customary, and had opened a place for its influence. Eloquence was no longer regarded as merely a gift of nature, but as the fruit of study; and the orator spoke to a people, which was sufficiently well informed, to understand and estimate his merits. To this were added those external causes, the difficult relations of the times. Where could there have been a better field for great public speakers? Where would their appearance have been more easily accounted for? Where was it more natural, that the practical statesman should more and more apply himself to the study of eloquence, and thus the third period distinguished by us be introduced, in which the mere orator, without the talents of a military commander, could direct the affairs of the state.

But when we investigate the history of practical eloquence in Greece, (for we speak of that, and not of the theory,) we are soon led to remark, what deserves to be carefully considered; that in this last period of time, political eloquence and that of the bar became much more closely connected than before. The men who in the earlier times had stood at the head of the state, Pericles, Alcibiades, and the rest, did not make their way to eminence through the business of advocates. Though in individual cases, as Pericles in that of Cimon,[1] they appeared as accusers in public trials, they never made a profession of pleading in the courts of justice, as did the orators of the age of Demosthenes. This gives rise to an important question in the history of practical politics no less than of oratory. When did the advocates in Greece become statesmen; and by what means did they become so?

If I do not err, it is not difficult to prove, that during, and by means of the Peloponnesian war, the labours of the advocate and the statesman first came to be united. The state trials, as is apparent from our remarks in a preceding chapter respecting the judicial institutions, produced this

[1] Plutarch. Op. i. p. 610. And even then, as the writer remarks, he was rather apparently than really an accuser.

result. But these began to be numerous during and immediately after that war; and they could not have become very frequent, though individual ones occurred, before the spirit of faction, which supported them, had taken root too deeply to be extirpated. Of the orators with whom we are acquainted, Antiphon is the earliest who must here be mentioned. The sketch drawn of him by Thucydides, represents a man, who, properly an advocate, was drawn into public affairs against his inclination; and at last was obliged to defend his life for it.[1] Of his contemporaries, Andocides and Lysias, the first would probably have long played a conspicuous part in politics but for his restless spirit and his want of morals.[2] His rival Lysias, to judge from those of his orations which are still extant, was entirely an advocate; but these were chiefly delivered on such matters, as were considered at Athens to belong to public questions at law; and the eloquence of the bar naturally rose to a higher degree of consideration, as trials not only were multiplied, but also increased in importance. In this manner, by the multitude of public processes, the path was opened to the advocates to a share in the business of the state; and the ideas of orator and statesman became inseparable. This is no where more distinctly perceived, than in the writings of Isocrates, which are so often instructive on these subjects. He, who was only a teacher of eloquence, (for he was conscious of being too timid to speak in public,) esteemed himself no less a teacher of political science; and as he never delivered discourses concerning public affairs, he wrote respecting them.[3] Several of his essays are of the class which we call memorials, directed by him to rulers and kings; although his friends had warned him, how dangerous this kind of writing might prove for him.[4] They produced no greater effect than such writings commonly do, where they are not supported by personal connexions; but no one will deny, that his instructions contributed much towards the education of many orators and statesmen.[5]

Nothing would be more superfluous, than the desire of

[1] Thucyd. viii. 68. [2] Hauptmann de Andocide, ap. Reisk. vol. viii. p. 535.
[3] See in particular the introduction to the Panathenaicus. Op. p. 234, etc.
[4] Orat. ad. Philip. Op. p. 85.
[5] Cic. Brut. c. 8. Isocrates, cujus domus cunctæ Græciæ quasi ludus quidam patuit, atque officina dicendi; magnus orator et perfectus magister.

becoming the eulogist of that master in his art, whom the united voice of so many centuries has declared to be the first; and whose worth the only rival whom antiquity placed by his side, has described in a manner at once exact, and equally honourable to both.[1] We would not here speak of Demosthenes the orator, but of Demosthenes the statesman; and of him only as far as the man, the orator, and the statesman were most intimately connected in him. His political principles came from the depths of his soul; he remained true to his feelings and his convictions, amidst all changes of circumstances and all threatening dangers. Hence he was the most powerful of orators; because with him there was no surrender of his convictions, no partial compromise, in a word, no trace of weakness. This is the real essence of his art; every thing else was but secondary. And in this how much does he rise above Cicero! And yet who ever suffered more severely than he for his greatness? Of all political characters, Demosthenes is the most sublime and purest[2] tragic character, with which history is acquainted. When, still trembling with the vehement force of his language, we read his life in Plutarch; when we transfer ourselves into his times and his situation; we are carried away by a deeper interest, than can be excited by any hero of the epic muse or of tragedy. From his first appearance till the moment when he swallows poison in the temple, we see him contending against destiny, which seems to mock him with malignant cruelty. It throws him to the ground, but never subdues him. What a flood of emotions must have poured through his manly breast amidst this interchange of reviving and expiring hopes. How natural was it, that the lines of melancholy[3] and of indignation, such as we behold in his bust,[4] should have been imprinted on his severe countenance! Hardly had he passed the years of youth, when he appeared

[1] Cicero in Bruto, c. 9.

[2] He was naturally calumniated beyond any other. And yet they could bring no charge against him but his silence in the affair of Harpalus, (see below,) and that he was in Persian pay; which was the common charge against all who did not side with Philip. Could they have proved it, is it probable that they would have kept back their proofs?

[3] His adversary, when he insultingly said that Demosthenes "could weep more easily than other men could laugh," Æschin. in Ctesiph. Op. iii. p. 597. Reisk., uttered a deeper truth than he himself was aware of.

[4] Visconti, Iconographie, Pl. xxx.

in his own behalf as the accuser of his faithless guardians;[1] from whom, however, he was able to rescue only a small part of his patrimony.[2] In his next attempts, insulted by the multitude, though encouraged by a few who anticipated his future greatness, he supported an obstinate contest with himself, till he gained the victory over his own nature.[3] He now appeared once more as an accuser in public prosecutions,[4] before he ventured to speak on the affairs of the state. But in the very first of his public speeches[5] we see the independent statesman, who not dazzled by a splendid project, opposes a vast undertaking. When Philip soon after displayed his designs against Greece by his interference in the Phocian war, he for the first time appeared against that monarch in his first Philippic oration.[6] From this period he had found the great business of his life. Sometimes as counsellor, sometimes as accuser, sometimes as ambassador, he protected the independence of his country against the Macedonian policy. Splendid success seemed at first to reward his exertions. He had already won a number of states for Athens;[7] when Philip invaded Greece, he had already succeeded not only in gaining over the Thebans, but in kindling their enthusiasm;[8] when the day of Chæronea dashed his hopes to the earth.[9] But he courageously declares in the assembly of the people, that he still does not repent of the counsels which he had given.[10] An unexpected incident changes the whole aspect of things. Philip falls the

[1] In the orations against Aphobus, Op. ii. Reisk.

[2] Plutarch. iv. p. 700.

[3] Many stories came subsequently to be told about it; but the story of the pebble-stones which he put in his mouth, rests on the testimony of Demetrius Phalereus, who had heard it from the orator himself. Plut. iv. p. 709. The same is true of various other particulars.

[4] Against Androtion, Timocrates, and others. He was then 27 years old. Plut. p. 717.

[5] In the oration of the *συμμορίαι*, or *classes*, pronounced in the year 354 B. C. He opposed an offensive war against the Persians, for which the Athenians were ready, in the hope of effecting a general union of the Greeks. Here we already find the maxim, which formed the theme of his subsequent orations, as of the speeches of Chatham; To stand on one's own feet.

[6] Pronounced in the year 352.

[7] Achaia, Corinth, Megara, and others. Plut. iv. p. 720.

[8] Plut. iv. p. 722. A leading passage respecting his political activity.

[9] In the year 338 B. C.

[10] Plut. iv. p. 726. His enemies even then endeavoured to attack him, but in vain. The people assigned to him the funeral oration on those who fell at Chæronea; and by this did honour to him and to themselves.

victim of assassination;[1] and a youth, who as yet is but little known, is his successor. Immediately Demosthenes institutes a second alliance of the Greeks; but Alexander suddenly appears before Thebes; the terrible vengeance which he here takes, instantly destroys the league; Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and several of their supporters, are required to be delivered up; but Demades is at that time able to settle the difficulty and to appease the king.[2] His strength was therefore enfeebled, as Alexander departed for Asia; he begins to raise his head once more, when Sparta attempts to throw off the yoke;[3] but under Antipater he is overpowered. Yet it was about this very time that by the most celebrated of his discourses he gained the victory over the most eloquent of his adversaries; and Æschines was forced to depart from Athens.[4] But this seems only to have the more embittered his enemies, the leaders of the Macedonian party; and they soon found an opportunity of preparing his downfal. When Harpalus, a fugitive from the army of Alexander, came with his treasures to Athens, and the question arose, whether he could be permitted to remain there, Demosthenes was accused of having been corrupted by his money, at least to be silent.[5] This was sufficient to procure the imposition of a fine;[6] and as this was not paid, he was thrown into prison. From thence he succeeded in escaping; but to the man who lived only for his country, exile was no less an evil than imprisonment. He resided for the most part in Ægina and at Trœzen, from whence he looked with moist eyes towards the neighbouring Attica.[7] Suddenly and unexpectedly a new ray of light broke through the clouds. Tidings were brought, that Alexander was dead.[8] The moment of deliverance seemed at hand; the excitement pervaded every Grecian state; the ambassadors of the Athenians passed through the cities; Demosthenes joined himself to the number, and exerted all his eloquence and power to unite them against Macedonia.[9] In requital for

[1] In the year 336 B. C. [2] Plutarch. iv. p. 731.
[3] In the year 330 B. C.
[4] The oration for the Crown. The trial took place in the year 330 B. C.
[5] Plutarch. iv. p. 733. I leave it to the reader to form an opinion respecting the anecdotes which are there related. His accuser was Dinarchus, whose calumnious oration we still possess. Or. Gr. vol. iv. Reisk.
[6] Of 50 talents (not far from 45,000 dollars); Plut. iv. p. 735.
[7] Plut. iv. 736. [8] In the year 323. [9] Plut. iv. p. 737.

such services, the people decreed his return; and years of sufferings were at last followed by a day of exalted compensation. A galley was sent to Ægina to bring back the advocate of liberty. All Athens was in motion; no magistrate, no priest remained in the city, when it was reported that Demosthenes was advancing from the Piræeus.[1] Overpowered by his feelings, he extended his arms and declared himself happier than Alcibiades;[2] for his countrymen had recalled him, not by compulsion, but from choice. It was a momentary glimpse of the sun, which still darker clouds were soon to conceal. Antipater and Craterus were victorious; and with them the Macedonian party in Athens; Demosthenes and his friends were numbered among the accused, and at the instigation of Demades were condemned to die. They had already withdrawn in secret from the city; but where could they find a place of refuge? Hyperides with two others took refuge in Ægina in the temple of Ajax. In vain! they were torn away, dragged before Antipater, and executed. Demosthenes had escaped to the island Calauria in the vicinity of Trœzen; and took refuge in the temple of Neptune.[3] It was to no purpose that Archias, the satellite of Antipater, urged him to surrender himself under promise of pardon. He pretended he wished to write something; bit the quill, and swallowed the poison contained in it. He then veiled himself, reclining his head backwards, till he felt the operation of the poison. "O Neptune!" he exclaimed, "they have defiled thy temple; but honouring thee, I will leave it while yet living." But he sank before the altar,[4] and a sudden death separated him from a world, which, after the fall of his country, contained no happiness for him. Where shall we find a character of more grandeur and purity than that of Demosthenes?

It seemed by no means superfluous to exhibit a picture of Grecian statesmen during that period, by sketching the history of him, who holds the first rank among them. We learn from it, that the sphere of action of such men, though they are called orators, extended far beyond their orations.

[1] Plut. iv. p. 738. [2] Who saw a similar day of return.
[3] See, for the following, Plut. iv. p. 741.
[4] What a subject for the art of sculpture! and yet one, which has never, to my knowledge, been made use of. The artist would only need to draw after Plutarch.

From these, it is true, we chiefly derive our knowledge of them. But how differently would Demosthenes appear to us, if we were particularly acquainted with the details of his political career![1] How much must have been needed to effect such an alliance, as he was repeatedly able to form! What journeys, what connexions, what skill in winning persons of influence, and in managing mankind!

And what were the means which these statesmen of antiquity could command, when we compare them with those of modern times? They had no orders from the cabinet to execute. They had not the disposal of the wealth of nations; they could not obtain by force, what others would not voluntarily yield. Even the comparison which might be made between them and the British statesmen, is true only as far as the latter also stood in need of eloquence to confirm their influence. But the other means which Pitt could employ to form a party, were not possessed by Demosthenes. He had no presents to offer, no places to give away, no ribbons and titles to promise. On the contrary, he was opposed by men, who could control every thing by which covetousness or ambition can be tempted. What could he oppose to them, but his talents, his activity, and his courage? Provided with no other arms, he supported the contest against the superiority of foreign strength, and the still more dangerous contest with the corruptions of his own nation. It was his high calling, to be the pillar of a sinking state. Thirty years he remained true to it, and he did not yield till he was buried beneath its ruins.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE SCIENCES IN CONNEXION WITH THE STATE.

The relation which exists between science and political institutions, is of a twofold nature. It may be asked, What

[1] If the voice of history on this subject were not loud enough, this might be inferred from the calumnies of Dinarchus. It is not inconsistent with it, that Demosthenes may sometimes, in his negotiations, have been too much carried away by the liveliness of his feelings.

has the state done for the promotion of the sciences? And also, What influence in return have the sciences, or any particular branch of them, exerted on the state? Both questions deserve to be considered in the case of the Greeks.

Where the government is actively engaged in promoting the sciences, their previous existence may be inferred. To create them neither is, nor can be a concern of the state. Even where they are beginning to flourish, it cannot at once be expected, that they should receive public support; because they do not stand in immediate relation with the general government. They are the fruit of the investigations of individual eminent men; who have a right to expect nothing, but that no hinderances should be laid in the way of their inquiries and labours. Such was the situation of things in the Grecian states, at the time when scientific pursuits began to gain life. What inducement could the state have had to interfere at once for their encouragement. In Greece the motive which was of influence in the East, did not exist. Religion had no secret doctrines. She required no institutions for their dissemination. There certainly were public schools for instruction in reading, writing, and in music (poetry and song); over which teachers were appointed in all the principal cities; and the laws provided that no abuses dangerous to youth should find entrance to them.[1] But in most of them the masters were probably not paid by the state;[2] they received a compensation from their pupils. The same is true of the more advanced instruction delivered by the sophists; some of whom amassed wealth from their occupation; yet not at the expense of the state, but of their pupils.

Thus it appears, that excepting the gymnasia, which were destined for bodily exercises, and of which the support was one of the duties incumbent on citizens,[3] no higher institutions for instruction existed previous to the Macedonian age.

[1] See the laws of Solon on this point. Petit. Leg. Att. L. ii. Tit. iv. p. 239.

[2] I limit the proposition on purpose, for it would be altogether false to assert generally, that this never took place. Charonidas, in his laws at Catana, which were afterwards adopted in Thurium, had expressly enacted, that the school-masters should be paid by the state, Diod. xii. p. 80, as an affair of the utmost importance. Since the schools were so carefully watched over, may not the same have taken place in many other cities? This however is true only of the inferior or popular schools.

[3] The γυμνασιάρχαι; see Petit. iii. Tit. iv. p. 355.

But when the mass of scientific knowledge had accumulated; when it was felt how valuable that knowledge was to the state; when the monarchical constitutions were introduced after the age of Alexander; provision was made for such institutions; the museum of Alexandria and that of Pergamus were established; and it still remains for a more thorough investigation to decide, whether the state remained wholly inactive, while the schools of philosophy and of rhetoric were forming. Shall the Grecian republics, then, still continue to be cited, as has been done by the celebrated founder of a new school of political economy, in proof that the state should leave the sciences to provide for themselves? Should it not rather encourage and provide for them in countries, where the culture of most of them is in several relations necessary for its welfare? where the teacher of religion as well as the judge, where the physician as well as the statesman, stands in need of various kinds of knowledge?

But when that assertion is understood as implying that the state among the Greeks was wholly unconcerned about intellectual culture and improvement, but left these subjects to themselves, a monstrous error lies at the bottom of it. No states in the whole course of history have proportionally done more for them than the Grecian; but they did it in a different manner from the moderns. We measure intellectual culture by the state of science; for which our modern states, as is well known, have at times done so much and so little; the Greeks, on the contrary, were accustomed to find their standard in the arts. The state among the Greeks did little for the sciences, because it did every thing for the arts. The latter, as we shall more fully explain hereafter, were of more immediate importance to it than the former; while the reverse is true among the moderns. How then can we be astonished that the arts were the chief object of interest to the Grecian states?

The answer to the other question embraces a wider field: Among the Greeks, what consequences had the sciences for the state? And here we would in the first place treat of philosophy, and then annex to the inquiry on that subject, some remarks respecting history.

After so many acute and copious explanations of the Grecian philosophy, no one will here expect a new analysis of

their systems. It is our object to show how the connexion between philosophy and politics originated among the Greeks, how it was continued and increased, and what was its influence?

The philosophy of the Greeks, as of other nations, began with inquiries into the origin of things. The opinions of the Ionian school respecting it are generally known. If, as a modern historical critic has made to appear very probable,[1] they were at first connected with religious representations, as we find them in the Orphic precepts, they did not long remain thus united, for they were stript of their mythological garb; and in this manner the philosophy of the Greeks gained its independence, while in the East it always remained connected with religion. Still it is no where mentioned, that the philosophers who belonged to this school had made the state the object of their inquiries; yet if we consider Anaxagoras as of the number, his connexion with Pericles, and the influence which by means of his instructions he exercised over that statesman, are remarkable. But, as we observed in a former chapter, no instruction in a philosophic system was given; but in the application of some propositions in natural philosophy to practical politics. Plutarch has preserved for us the true object. "He freed Pericles," says the biographer,[2] "from that superstition, which proceeds from false judgments respecting auguries and prodigies, by explaining to him their natural causes." He who bears in mind the great influence exercised by this belief or superstition on the undertakings of the statesmen of antiquity, will not mistake the importance of such instruction; and he will also understand the consequences, which could follow this diminution of respect for the popular religion in the eyes of the multitude. The persecution of Anaxagoras for denying the gods, and exercising his reason respecting celestial things,[3] could not be averted by Pericles himself; who was obliged to consent to the banishment of the philosopher. And this was the commencement of the contest between philosophy and the popular religion; a contest, which was afterwards repeatedly renewed, and was at-

[1] Bouterweck. Commentatio de primis philosophorum Græcorum decretis physicis. See Gött. Gel. Anzeig. 1812. St. 11.
[2] Plut. i. p. 597. [3] Plut. i. p. 654, 655.

tended by further consequences, that we must not omit to observe.

Pythagoras, though somewhat younger than the founder of the Ionian school, was himself an Ionian of the island of Samos. Nevertheless he found his sphere of action not there, but in Croton in Lower Italy. Of no one of the Grecian sages is the history so involved in the obscurities of tradition and the marvellous; and yet no other became of such political importance.[1] If we desire to estimate the influence of his philosophy on the state, we must by all means distinguish the influence of the Pythagorean league on the cities of Magna Græcia, from the influence of his philosophy on Greece itself, after that league had come to an end.

If we subject to a critical investigation, that which antiquity relates in a credible manner of his society and their objects, we observe a phenomenon, which is in many respects without a parallel. And yet I believe this is most intimately connected with the aristocratic and democratic factions which may be remarked so frequently in the Grecian states. Pythagoras had deserted Samos, to escape from the government of Polycrates; and whatever scruples may be raised respecting his other journeys, no one has denied his residence in Egypt. At the time when he visited this country, probably under Amasis, who made it accessible to the Greeks, the throne of the Pharaohs was still standing, and the influence of the caste of priests unimpaired. From them it is certain that he adopted much, both in respect to dress and manner of living; and could it have escaped a man of his penetration, how much can be effected in a state by the union of men of influence; although he must have seen, that a caste of priests could never thrive among the Greeks? According to all which we hear respecting him, he was master of the art of exciting, not attention only, but enthusiasm. His dignity, his dress, the purity of his morals, his eloquence, were of such a kind, that men were inclined to ex-

[1] We cannot exactly fix the year of the birth or of the death of Pythagoras. It is most probable that he came to Croton about the year 540; he was certainly there at the period of the destruction of Sybaris, in the year 510 B. C. His league, which existed at that time, was afterwards, about the year 500 B. C., dissolved by Cylon and his faction. Little would remain to be added to the critical inquiries of Meiners respecting the Pythagorean Philosophy, if he had not almost wholly neglected to treat of the political doctrines of Pythagoras.

alt him above the class of common mortals.[1] A comparison of the history of the several cities in Magna Græcia, at the time of his appearing in them, distinctly shows, that the government, in the most flourishing of them, was possessed by the higher class. Against this order a popular party began about this time to be formed; and the controversies of the two soon occasioned the destruction of Sybaris.[2] Pythagoras, who was any thing rather than a friend to the mob, joined the party of the higher order; which in its turn found support in his splendid talents. But this was the period in which luxury had risen in those cities, and especially in the rich families, to a degree never before known. It could not escape a man like him, that this corruption of manners must be followed by the downfal of his party; and hence it was natural for him to resolve to found his political reform on a moral one.[3] Being intimately connected with the higher order, he united them in a narrower circle; and necessity soon occasioned a distinction to be made between the class of those who were on probation, and those who were already admitted.[4] Self-government was the grand object of his moral reform. For this end he found it necessary to prescribe a certain manner of life, which was distinguished by a most cleanly but not luxurious clothing, a regular diet, a methodical division of time, part of which was to be appropriated to the individual himself and part to the state. And this may have contributed not a little to form those firm friendships, without which not much influence on public affairs can be exercised in republics. His acquaintance with speculative and mathematical science need not here be mentioned, since it is altogether unknown to us, how far he applied it to political purposes.

When we consider, that his society, of which he himself formed the central point, but which had its branches in the

[1] See the passages in proof of this in Meiners, B. i. s. 405, etc. They are chiefly taken from Aristoxenus, one of the most credible witnesses.

[2] The party of the nobles, 500 in number, fled after their banishment from thence to Croton, and prayed for protection; which they received principally by the advice of Pythagoras. Diod. xii. p. 77. Wechel. The passages which prove that those cities had aristocratical constitutions, may be found in Meiners, i. 396.

[3] See the passages in evidence of this, and the incredible sensation produced by him, in Meiners, i. p. 396.

[4] Therefore in Herod. ii. 81, the Pythagorean sect is enumerated among the mysteries.

other cities of Magna Græcia, and according to some accounts even in Carthage and Cyrene, continued to exist for at least thirty years, we can realize that it may have borne not only blossoms, but fruits. His disciples came by degrees to fill the most important posts, not only in Croton, but also in the other Grecian cities; and yet at the time of the destruction of Sybaris, the sect must have existed in its full force; since Pythagoras advised the reception of the banished;[1] and in the war against Sybaris, one of his most distinguished scholars, the wrestler Milo,[2] held the supreme command. But when a secret society pursues political ends, it naturally follows, that an opposing party increases in the same degree in which the preponderating influence of such a society becomes more felt.[3] But in this case, the opposition existed already in the popular party.[4] It therefore only needed a daring leader, like Cylon, to scatter the society by violence; the assembly was surprised, and most of them cut down, while a few only, and with them their master, escaped. After such a victory of the adverse faction, the expulsion of the rest of the Pythagoreans who remained alive, from their offices, was a natural consequence; and the political importance of the society was at an end. It was never able to raise its head again.

With the political doctrines of the Pythagoreans, we are acquainted only from later writers, who are yet worthy of credit, and of whom accounts and fragments have been preserved, especially in the collections of Stobæus. "They regarded anarchy," says Aristoxenus,[5] "as the greatest evil; because man cannot exist without social order. They held that every thing depended on the relation between the governing and the governed; that the former should be not only prudent, but mild; and that the latter should not only

[1] Diod. l. c.

[2] Violent bodily exercises formed a part of the discipline of Pythagoras. Six times in one Olympiad, prizes at Olympia were gained in those days by inhabitants of Croton. Must not this too have contributed to increase the fame of Pythagoras?

[3] Need I cite the example of the Illuminati?

[4] Cylon, the author of that commotion, is described as the leader of the democratic party; and this is proved by the anarchy which ensued after the catastrophe, and continued till order was restored by the mother cities in Achaia.

[5] Stob. Serm. xli. p. 243. This evidence is taken either from Aristoxenus, or from Aristotle himself, and therefore, according to Meiners, not to be rejected.

obey, but love their magistrates; that it was necessary to grow accustomed even in boyhood to regard order and harmony as beautiful and useful, disorder and confusion as hateful and injurious." From the fragments of the writings of the early Pythagoreans, as of Archytas, Diotogenes, and Hippodamus,[1] we perceive that they were not blindly attached to a single form of government; but only insisted that there should be no unlawful tyranny. Where a royal government existed, kings should be subject to the laws, and act only as the chief magistrates.[2] They regarded a mixed constitution as the best; and although they were far from desiring unlimited democracies, they desired quite as little unlimited aristocracies; but even where the administration resided principally in the hands of the upper class, they reserved a share of it for the people.[3]

Though the political agency of the society terminated with its dissolution, the Pythagorean lessons by no means became extinct. They were extended through Greece with the writings of the Pythagoreans, who were paid with high prices; but in that country they gained political importance, only so far as they contributed to the education of individual distinguished men. Of these, we need only to mention Epaminondas.

In Greece, the sophists are generally considered to have been the first, who applied philosophy to political science, which then became a subject of scientific instruction. Yet Plutarch, in a remarkable passage,[4] speaks of a political school which had been kept up in Athens, from the time of Solon. "Themistocles," says he, "could not have been a pupil of Anaxagoras, as some contend. He was a disciple of Mnesiphilus, who was neither an orator, nor one of the physical philosophers;[5] but who was employed on that kind of wisdom, which consists in political skill and practical sagacity, and which, from the time of Solon, had been preserved as in a school." That a man like Solon should have gathered around himself a circle which he made acquainted with his thoughts and maxims, was not only natural, but

[1] Meiners considers all these writings as not genuine. His reasoning however does not apply to the political fragments, which are to be found in cap. xli. and xliii.

[2] See in particular the fragments of Archytas. Serm. xliv. p. 314.

[3] Compare the fragment of Diotogenes, cap. xlvi. p. 329.

[4] In Themistocles, Op. i. p. 440. [5] The Ionian and Eleatic sages.

was necessary for the preservation of his code of laws; and it was not less natural that his younger friends should in turn deliver to theirs the principles of that venerable sage. But the words of the biographer himself show clearly enough, that no methodical instruction was given; but principles of practical wisdom, consisting in maxims for the conducting of public affairs, and drawn from experience; maxims of which the few remaining poetical fragments of the lawgiver contain so valuable a store.

From this practical direction, the Grecian philosophers after the times of Pythagoras entirely withdrew; and devoted themselves altogether to metaphysical speculations. They were employed in inquiries respecting the elements, and the nature of things; and came necessarily upon the question, which has so often been repeated, and which never can be answered, respecting the truth or falsehood of the perceptions of our senses. We know with what zeal these inquiries were made in the Eleatic school. They employed in a great measure Xenophanes, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and others. If therefore we read of individuals among these men, that they attained to political eminence,[1] their philosophy was connected with their political station only so far as they thus became conspicuous; and because wise men were selected for counsellors. In one point a nearer relation existed between their philosophy and the state; we mean in their diminishing or attempting to diminish the respect for the popular religion. In a country where the religion was a poetical one, and where philosophy had become entirely distinct from religion, the spirit of free, unlimited speculation, on its awakening, could not but scrutinize the popular faith, and soon detect its weaknesses. This we hear was done by Xenophanes, who with equal boldness used bitter expressions respecting the gods, and the epic poets who have invented about the gods such indecent fables.[2] This contradiction between philosophy and the popular religion, is on the one side the most certain proof of the independence of the former; but it was also the point, in which the state and philosophy came in contact, not without

[1] As Empedocles in Agrigentum; who is said to have refused the diadem, and confirmed the liberties of the people. Diog. Laërt. viii. ii. 9.

[2] Diog. Laërt. ix. ii. 3.

danger to the state, and if not to philosophy itself, yet to the philosophers.

Yet however far the speculations of those reasoners were removed from the state and from politics, the spirit of the times and necessity created many points of contact; which serve to explain the appearance of the sophists, and the part which they acted. Without regarding their doctrines, we may find their external character designated by the circumstance, that they were the first who gave instruction for pay. This presupposes that the want of scientific instruction began to be felt; and this again implies, that independent of such instruction, the nation had made progress in intellectual culture. In other words; he who desired to become distinguished in the state, felt the necessity of improving his mind by instruction. He was obliged to learn to speak, and therefore to think; and exercises in these two things constituted the whole instruction of the sophists. But it was of great importance, that the minds of men had been employed and continued to be employed so much with those metaphysical questions, which, as they from their very nature can never be answered with certainty, are well suited for disputation, and admit so various answers.

From the copious inquiries which have been made respecting the sophists by modern writers of the history of philosophy,[1] and from the preceding remarks, it is sufficiently evident that they were a fruit of the age. It is

[1] Yet even after all that has here been done by Meiners, Tenneman, and others, many things remain obscure; for the explanation of which, the foundation must be laid in a more accurate chronology of the sophists. The learned dissertation of Geel *Historia Critica Sophistarum, qui Socratis ætate Athenis floruerunt* in *Nova Acta literaria Societatis Rheno Trajectinæ* 1823, treats only of the age of Socrates; yet it explains the difference between rhetoricians and sophists; and the causes of the origin of the sophists. Even the sophists before the Macedonian times (of a later period we here make no mention) did not continue the same; and we should do Gorgias and Protagoras great injustice, were we to place them in the same rank with those, against whom the aged Isocrates in his Panathenaicus, Op. p. 236, and De Sophistis, p. 293, makes such bitter complaints. Gorgias, Protagoras, and Hippias, were commonly called the elder sophists; of whom Gorgias is said to have come to Athens in the year 427 as ambassador, although this is not mentioned by Thucydides. But it is evident from Aristophanes, who brought his Clouds upon the stage, for the first time, 424 years B. C., that at that epoch the sophists had already been long established at Athens. It appears that the great celebrity and wealth of the sophists commenced in the times of Gorgias and the following. In the Clouds, Socrates and his pupils are represented, so far from being rich, as poor wretches, who do not know how they are to subsist from one day to another.

worthy of remark, that the most celebrated of them came from the most various parts of the Grecian world; Gorgias, who begins the series, from Leontium in Sicily; Protagoras from Abdera on the coast of Thrace; Hippias from Colophon in Asia Minor; not to mention a multitude of those who were less famous. This is a remarkable proof, how generally, since the Persian wars, a literary spirit had begun to animate the nation. Most of those men, it is true, removed to Athens; to which place Gorgias was sent as ambassador during the Peloponnesian war; because this city, so long as it held the first rank, opened the widest and most profitable theatre for their exertions; but they also often travelled through the cities of Greece in the train of their pupils; met with the kindest reception; and were employed as counsellors in public affairs, and not unfrequently as ambassadors. They gave instruction at a high price to all young men who joined them, in every branch of knowledge deemed essential to their education. This undoubtedly occasioned that boasting of universal knowledge, which has been laid to their charge; but it must also be remembered, that in those days the extent of the sciences was still very limited.

The sophists at first embraced in their course of instruction, philosophy as well as rhetoric. But that which they called philosophy was, as with the scholastic philosophers, the art of confounding an opponent by syllogisms and sophisms; and the subjects about which they were most fond of speculating, were some of those metaphysical questions, respecting which we ought finally to learn, that we never can know any thing. This kind of reasoning, since disputation and speaking were taught, was very closely connected with rhetoric. Subsequently the sophists and rhetoricians formed distinct classes; but the different classes which Isocrates distinguished in his old age,[1] could hardly have been so decidedly marked in his youth.

The precepts and the very name of the sophists became odious among the ancients; and it would be in vain to attempt to free them entirely from the reproaches, which were cast on them by sages and by the comic writers. But yet they cannot be deprived of the glory of having made

[1] Isocrates, Op. p. 293, etc.

the higher class of their nation sensible of the necessity of a liberal education. They rose rapidly and extraordinarily, because they were deeply connected with the wants of the times. In states, where every thing was discussed orally, and where every thing was just beginning to bloom, the instructers in logic and rhetoric could not but be acceptable. But in two respects, they soon became injurious and even dangerous to the state; by reducing eloquence to the mere art of disputing, and by degrading or ridiculing the popular religion.

The first seems to have been a very natural consequence of the condition of the sciences at that time. The more limited is the knowledge of men, the more bold are they in their assertions; the less they know, the more they believe they do and can know. Man persuades himself of nothing more readily, than that he has arrived at the bounds of human knowledge. This belief creates in him a dogmatical spirit; because he believes he can prove every thing. But where it is believed that every thing can be proved, there naturally arises the art of proving the contrary proposition; and the art of disputing among the sophists degenerated to this. The art of confounding right and wrong, objected to them by the comic poets, may have had a very injurious influence on social life; but a greater evil resulting from it was the destroying of a nice sense of truth; for even truth itself becomes contemptible, when it is believed, that it can as well be refuted, as established, by an argument.

That the popular religion was held in less esteem, was probably a consequence of the more intimate connexion, which existed between the elder sophists and their predecessors and contemporaries of the Eleatic school. In these accusations injustice has perhaps been done to some of them; for it may be doubted whether Protagoras deserved the name of atheist;[1] yet no circumstance probably contributed so much to make them odious in the eyes of the people.

If to these things we add their lax moral principles, which consisted in lessons of prudence, how life could be

[1] He had only said he knew not whether the gods existed or not; yet for this he was banished from Athens, and his writings were burnt. Sext. Emp. ix. 57. That the atheism of Prodicus is uncertain, has been already observed by Tenneman. Gesch. d. Phil. i. S. 377.

made easy and be enjoyed, but which doubtless assisted in procuring for them pupils and followers, we can survey all the evil influence which they exercised. And yet these very aberrations of the human understanding may have been necessary, to awaken the minds which were to point out better paths.

The son of Sophroniscus is the first among these. He began the opposition to the sophists. Just as Philip called forth a Demosthenes, the sophists produced a Socrates. After all that antiquity has left us concerning him, and all the observations of modern historians, he is one of the characters most difficult to be understood, and stands by himself, not only in his own nation, but in the whole history of the culture of our race. For what sage, who was neither a public teacher, nor a writer, nor a religious reformer, has had such an influence on his own age and on posterity, as he? We willingly concede, that his sphere of action has far exceeded his own expectations and designs. These hardly had reference to posterity. Every thing seems to indicate, that they were calculated for his contemporaries alone. But it may with justice be remarked, that this only increases the difficulty of an explanation. For who will not ask; How could this man, without intending it, have had an influence on all centuries after his time? The chief reason is to be found in the nature of his philosophy; yet external causes came to his assistance.

After so many have written upon his philosophy, it would be superfluous to delineate it anew. It made its way, because it immediately related to the higher matters of interest to man. While the sophists were brooding over mere speculations, and their contests were but contests of words, Socrates taught those who came near him, to look into themselves; man and his relations with the world were the objects of his investigations. That we may not repeat what has already been so well remarked by others, we will here allow ourselves only some general observations respecting the philosopher himself and his career.

His influence was most closely connected with the forms of social life in Athens; in a country where these are not the same, a second Socrates could never exercise the influence of the first. He gave instruction neither in his house, nor

in any fixed place; the public squares and halls were the favourite scenes of his conversations. For such instruction a proper audience can be found only in a nation, in which private life is in a very high degree public in its nature. This was the case with the Athenians. Such a method of teaching could be effectual among them, because they were not only accustomed to pass a large portion of the day in places of public resort, but also to speak of almost every subject which could occur. It was here that the sophists passed much of their time, not to give formal instruction, which, as it was paid for, was given in a definite place, but, as Plato reproaches them, in order to gain rich young men as pupils. The war which Socrates had once for all declared against them, made him from choice, and most frequently, pass his time where he could expect to find his adversaries, as well as his friends and followers.[1]

The manner in which he taught, was not less important. It was by conversation, not by continued discourse. He had therefore adopted the very manner which is most suitable to public places. But in two respects, his conversation, apart from the matter it contained, was distinguished from the common intercourse of life. The one was the irony which he knew how to introduce, especially in his attacks on the sophists; the other and more important, was the conviction which he often expressed, that he spoke from the impulse of divine power. Socrates differs from the whole class of men, whom we embrace under the name of prophets; for, while these appear as the immediate envoys and messengers of the divinity, he did but occasionally insinuate his claim to this character, although he never denied it. He neither desired to found a new religion, nor to improve the existing one; which was necessarily the object of the prophets. The appearance of a Socrates was therefore the noblest result of the separation of philosophy from religion, a merit belonging solely to the Greeks; in

[1] From this point of resemblance, I think we may explain how Aristophanes could confound Socrates with the sophists. He represents him as giving instruction for money, and in a house of his own, appropriated to study (φροντιστήριον); and these two circumstances are true of the sophists, but not of Socrates. I can therefore discover in *his* Socrates nothing but the representative of the sophists. To be sure the comic poet would have better provided for his reputation with posterity, if he had brought a Prodicus or Gorgias upon the stage instead of Socrates.

no Eastern nation could a Socrates have found his sphere. But he became a martyr to his doctrines. It would be superfluous to prove anew, the groundlessness of the charges, that he denied the popular religion, and was a corrupter of the youth.[1] But we will not neglect to observe, that by his death he produced even more important consequences than by his life. If he had been snatched away by sickness, who knows whether he would have been remembered more than other meritorious instructers? His friends and pupils would have spoken of him with respect, but hardly with enthusiasm. But the poisoned cup insured him immortality. By his death, in connexion with his doctrines, he exhibited in reality one of those sublime ideal conceptions, of which the Grecian nation alone is so fertile; he presented what till then had been wanting, the image of a sage who dies for his convictions.

The philosophy of Socrates had no immediate relations with politics. Its object was man, considered as a moral being, not as a citizen. Hence it was indirectly of the more importance to the state; since it was nothing less than an attempt to meet the ruin, with which the state was threatened by a false kind of philosophy. This object was not fully attained; but must the blame of the failure be attributed to Socrates?

From his school, or rather, from his circle, a number of distinguished minds were produced, who in part differed from each other in their opinions and systems, as opposite poles. This could not have happened, but because Socrates had no system, and hence laid no chains on the spirit of inquiry. He would but excite the minds of others; and hence we perceive how there could have been among his associates, an Antisthenes, who made self-denial, and an Aristippus, who made enjoyment, the basis of ethics; a Pyrrho, whose object it was to doubt, and a Euclid, who was eager to demonstrate. As the philosophy of these men was in no manner connected with politics, we pass over them, that we may not leave unmentioned the greatest of all the pupils of Socrates.

To comprehend the character of Plato, a genius would be

[1] See, beside the works on the history of philosophy, the Essay of Tychsen, Ueber den Process des Socrates, in Bibl. d. alten Litt. u. Kunst. St. I. 2.

required, hardly inferior to his. Common or even uncommon philosophic acumen, industry, and learning in this case are not sufficient. The mind of Plato rose above visible objects, and entered on the higher regions, where exist the eternal first forms of things. To these his eye was undeviatingly directed, as the only regions where knowledge can be found,—since there is nothing beyond opinion in the world of the senses,—and where real beauty, goodness, and justice dwell eternal and unchangeable as the Divinity, and yet distinct from the Divinity. He who cannot follow Plato to those regions, and feel with him, in the veil of mythological fables, what he himself felt rather than knew, may make many valuable and correct remarks respecting that philosopher, but is not capable of presenting a perfect and adequate image of him. The attempt to give a body to that which is ethereal, is vain; for it then ceases to be ethereal. But the relation in which he stood to his nation can be very distinctly delineated. In him the poetic character of the Greeks expressed itself philosophically. It was only in a nation so thoroughly poetical, that a Plato could be produced.

Socrates had contemplated man as a moral being; Plato's philosophy embraced the social union. Long before him, the state had so far become an object of speculation, that writers had endeavoured to sketch the model of a perfect constitution. No more immediate occasion for such exercise could be found than in the Grecian cities, which formed as it were the model of a chart of free states; which, by means of their wants and changes, almost necessarily conducted the reflecting mind to such objects of thought. The first distinct attempt of this kind, as we expressly learn from Aristotle,[1] was made by Hippodamus of Miletus, who must have been a contemporary of Themistocles.[2] The marked separation of the three classes of artists, agriculturists, and soldiers, and the division which he makes of land into sacred, public, and private land, remind us of the Egyptian institutions. Not only his plan, but that of Phaneas of Chalcedon, is discussed at large by Aristotle. Investigations of

[1] Aristot. Polit. ii. cap. 8.

[2] According to Aristotle, he was employed in the construction of the Piræeus, which was the work of Themistocles.

constitutions and codes of laws now became subjects frequently treated of; they could hardly have much practical influence, since the days were past in which new lawgivers could have appeared in Greece. Of many works composed in those times, none have come down to us but the two treatises of Plato. These, especially that of the republic, are intelligible only to those who comprehend and bear always in mind, that the Greeks regarded a state as a moral person, which governs itself, and cannot be swayed by any impulse from a higher power,[1] nor be governed by another. Then it is no longer difficult to explain the close and indissoluble union between morals and politics, a union which modern writers have so frequently called in question.

During the days of the freedom of Greece, almost every grand question connected with theoretical or practical philosophy, was made the object of inquiry and discussion. The later writers may perhaps have answered them differently and with greater acuteness; but to the earliest belongs the great merit of having presented to the reflecting mind, the objects after which they should strive. The relations of the later systems of Grecian philosophy to the earlier ones, show how far the Stoic system was allied to the Cynic, the Epicurean to the Cyrenaic, that of the later sceptics to that of Pyrrho and the Eleatic school,—these subjects we leave to be explained by some writer, who is capable of giving, not a voluminous, but succinct and spirited account of the efforts made among the Greeks by the understanding, as employed on subjects of philosophy.

If the relations of philosophy to the political institutions must be estimated by its reaction on them, the reverse is in some measure true of the science of history. This stands in connexion with the state, inasmuch as it is the result of the changes and destinies of the state. It is true, that history was not long limited among the Greeks to their own nation. As there was free intercourse with foreigners, accounts and traditions respecting their origin, manners, and revolutions became common. But every thing proceeded from the history of their native country; this always remained the

[1] We would here especially refer to the following excellent treatise. J. L. G. de Geer. Diatribe in Politices Platonicæ Principia. Trajecti ad Rhenum, 1810.

central point. And here again we perceive the just views of the Greeks. Is not each nation the nearest object to itself? And next to the present moment, what can interest it more than its own previous condition?

This was early and very generally felt; and if historical accounts have been preserved but scantily or not at all, the fault is to be attributed, not to the want of exertions to insure that end, but to the imperfection of the means which the nations could control; that is, not merely to the want of an alphabet, but of the materials which are used in writing. Persepolis, Thebes, Mexico,—do not all these furnish distinct proofs of the truth of our remark?

But not less depended on the circumstance, whether any persons, a peculiar class or caste in the nation, were commissioned to record the events as they passed. Where a priesthood existed, the preparing of the calendar, however imperfect or perfect it might be, was their business; and to this it was easy to add the writing of annals.

The Greeks had no such separate order of priests; and hence we hear nothing of any annals which they possessed.[1] Yet religion still did something for history. A multitude of relations, preserving the memory of early events, were associated with the consecrated offerings in the temples. How often are these referred to by Herodotus! and the historical remarks of Pausanias are almost always made in connexion with them. But they could neither fix a succession of time, nor do more than confirm single facts.

The history, therefore, of the Greeks emanated from an entirely different source, from tradition; and since this supplied poetry with its subjects, the poets remained for centuries the sole preservers of traditional accounts. But it does not follow, that Grecian history was an invention, because it was originally poetical. Indeed, it never entirely lost that character. The subjects of history, as presented by tradition, were only interwoven with fictions. But it is obvious of itself, that the character of the Grecian traditions must have had a great or even a decisive influence on the character of their history.

[1] Where a sort of hereditary priesthood existed, as in Sicyon, from the earliest times, a sort of annals was connected with it. They seem, however, to have consisted chiefly in an enumeration of the succession of priests, and therefore hardly deserve the name.

By means of the original and continued division of the nation into many tribes, the traditions were very much enriched. Each tribe had its heroes and its deeds of valour to employ the bard. To convince ourselves of this, we need but cast a glance on the tales of the Grecian heroes. Individuals among them, who were more distinguished than the rest, as Hercules and Jason, became the heroes of the nation, and therefore the favourites of the poets. And after the first great national enterprise, after Troy had fallen, need we be astonished that the historic muse preferred this to all other subjects?

All this is too well known to need any more copious exposition.[1] But much as Homer and the cyclic poets eclipsed the succeeding ones, historic poetry kept pace with the political culture of the nation. This union we must not leave unobserved.

That advancement in political culture was, as we observed above, connected with the rising prosperity of the cities in Greece and of the colonies. The founding of cities (κτίσεις) therefore formed an essential part of the earlier history. But cities were founded by heroes; and the traditions respecting these things were therefore intimately connected with the rest. Who does not see, how wide a field was here opened for historic poetry? Such narrations had always a lasting interest for the inhabitants; they were, by their very nature, of a kind to be exaggerated till they became marvellous; and were connected with accounts of the most ancient voyages; stories of the wonders of foreign and distant countries; the island of the Cyclops, the garden of the Hesperides, the rich Iberia, and others. What could afford more agreeable nourishment to the imagination of a youthful people? What could be more attractive to the poets?

Hence there arose among the Greeks a particular class of historic poems, which, though in subject and form most intimately connected with other poems, were yet specially commemorative of the founding of the several cities. The class embraced, it is true, cities of the mother country;[2]

[1] See Heyne, Historiæ scribendæ inter Græcos primordia. Comment. Soc. Sc. Gotting. vol. xiv.

[2] Especially Athens. Here is the source of the lake Atthides. So too Eumelus has celebrated in song the oldest history of Corinth. Bibliothek d. alten Litt. und Kunst. ii. 94. Of narratives respecting colonies, we would

but chiefly related to the colonies; for their establishment, intimately interwoven with the history of heroes, offered the richest materials.

History continued to be treated in a poetical manner, till near the time of the Persian wars. How deeply, therefore, must the poetic character have been imprinted upon Grecian history? Experience has taught that it was indelibly so. When the first writers appeared who made use of prose, this character was changed only with respect to the form, but by no means to the matter. They related in prose what the poets had told in verse. This is expressly stated by Strabo.[1] "The earliest writers," says he, "Cadmus of Miletus, Pherecydes, Hecatæus, preserved the poetic character, though not the measure of verse. Those who came after them, were the first to descend from that height to the present style of writing." The opinion of Cicero seems therefore to have been ill founded, when he compares the oldest historians, and particularly Pherecydes, with the earliest annalists of the Romans, Fabius Pictor and Cato,[2] whose style was certainly not poetical.

The larger number and the earliest of the narrators of traditions,[3] as Herodotus styles them in distinction from the epic poets, were Ionians. Epic poetry was followed by narrations in prose, in the very countries where it had been cultivated most successfully. History has left us in uncertainty respecting the more immediate causes of this change; but has not the East always been the land of fables? Here, where the crowd of colonial cities was springing up, which were founded toward the end of the heroic age, that class of narrations which relate to these subjects found the most appropriate themes. In explaining therefore the origin of historic science among the Greeks, it may perhaps be proper to remember, that they participated in the character of the oriental nations; although they merit the glory of having subsequently given to that science its true and peculiar character.

But in the period in which the prose style of narration was thus forming, the improvement of historic science ap-

cite that of Herodotus on the origin of Cyrene; of which the poetic source seems unquestionable. How many similar relations in Pausanias betray the same origin!

[1] Strabo, i. p. 34.

[2] Cicero de Oratore, ii. 12.

[3] The λογογράφοι, as Hecatæus and others.

pears to have been promoted by several very natural causes. The larger number and the most celebrated of those mythological historians lived and flourished in the latter half of the sixth century before the Christian era; that is, not long before the commencement of the Persian wars.[1] Of these the earliest are said to have been Cadmus of Miletus, and Hecatæus of the same place, Acusilaus of Argos, Pherecydes of Syros, Charon of Lampsacus, and several others whom Dionysius of Halicarnassus enumerates. They belong to the age in which the nation was rising in youthful energy; when it was already extended to the west and the east, and its flourishing cities were engaged in various commerce; when it had become acquainted with many nations, and travelling had begun to be common. From the title of the works of these narrators of traditions, it is evident that they were not careful to limit themselves to the accounts, which they found in the ancient epic poets; but that they took a wider range, embracing the history of cities and nations, and also the description of the coasts of the countries. A proof of this is found in the catalogue of the writings of Hellanicus the Lesbian, one of the latest of them.[2]

These remarks, when considered in connexion, will serve to show us the character of history before Herodotus. It was in its origin entirely Grecian; and even when the sphere of observation was extended to foreign countries, kept pace with the political advancement of the nation. It preserved its poetical character, and therefore did not become critical; but it was developed with perfect freedom; and was never held by the priests in bondage to religion. As poetry had for a long time been the means of its preservation, it became in some measure the play of fancy (although epic poetry was much more restricted than the subsequent lyric and tragic); but in return, as it was propagated by no hieroglyphics, it could never, as in Egypt, degenerate into mere symbolical narration. When it came to be transferred from poetry to prose, it was necessarily connected with improvements in the art of writing; and the deficiency of our accounts on this subject[3] is one of the chief reasons why we

[1] Between the 60th and 70th Olympiad, or 540—500 years B. C.

[2] See Creuzer's Historic Art among the Greeks in its Origin and Progress. Compare Dahlmann's Historical Inquiries, in the Life of Herodotus, p. 108, especially on Hecatæus.

[3] See Wolfii Prolegom. p. xl. etc.

are so little able to mark the progress of its particular branches. But whatever influences these causes may have exercised, the great reason which retarded historic science before Herodotus lay in the want of subjects.

Before the Persian wars, there was no subject capable of inspiring the historian. The Trojan war, the Argonautic expedition, all great undertakings, belonged to tradition, and hence belonged more than half to poetry. The narrations of the origin of the individual cities, accounts of distant nations and countries, might gratify curiosity, might afford amusement; but nothing more. There existed no great national subject of universal interest.

At length came the Persian wars. The victory at Marathon first awakened a spirit of valour; whether this was more inflamed by the defeat at Thermopylæ, or the victory at Salamis, it is difficult to say; with the battle of Platææ, freedom was saved. What a subject for the historic Muse!

The subject, from its very nature, belonged exclusively to history; and poetry had no share in it. It was no subject of hoary antiquity, nor yet of the present moment; but of a period which had but recently passed away. And yet it came so variously in contact with tradition, that an historian in a critical age would often have been compelled to take his walks into the regions of mythology. How much more, then, at a time, when the bounds between history and tradition had not yet been in the slightest degree marked out!

Herodotus employed himself on this subject, and managed it in a manner which surpassed all expectation.[1] Many

[1] Dahlmann in 1823 published his careful criticism on the life of the father of History, in the second volume of his Historical Inquiries. Herodot.; aus seinem Buche sein Leben. The critic recognises the value of the great historian, to whose just fame I hope by this work to have contributed something; yet he proves, that on many points an uncertainty prevails, sufficient to warrant a difference of opinion. I count among them, the time of the composition and publication of the work of Herodotus. Certainly, in its present form, it is not the production of his youth; and it is quite as improbable that it could have been written after his seventy-seventh year. The mention by Dahlmann of several events as late as 408 B. C., warrants an inference only as to the time when Herodotus published his work, not as to the time when he wrote it. The death of Amyrtæus of Syncellus, as Dahlmann remarks, and as the new Armenian edition of Eusebius confirms, happened eight years earlier, that is, 416 B. C.; and if the Darius, mentioned i. 130, is Darius Nothus, it is surprising that he is not more precisely designated. The most natural inference is, that Herodotus, as a young man, collected his materials on his travels, wrote it at Thurium in the maturity of manhood, about 444 B. C., but did not publish it till his old age. That he formed his design early and

things, it is true, served to facilitate his labour. Many attempts had been made to explain the earliest history of cities and nations; travelling had been rendered easy by the extensive commerce of the Grecian cities, and several of his predecessors are known to have visited many countries;[1] the mythological writers (λογογράφοι) had already formed the language for prosaic narration; and the nation for which he wrote was already awake to the beauties of historic composition. Still he was the first who undertook to treat of a purely historical subject; and thus to take the decisive step, which gave to history its rank as an independent science. Yet he did not limit himself to his chief subject, but gave it such an extent, that his work, notwithstanding its epic unity, became in a certain sense a universal history.[2] Continuing the thread of his story from the times when controversies first arose between the Hellenes and the barbarians, till those when at Platææ the war was terminated so gloriously for the Greeks, Hellas, attacked but liberated, became the great subject of his narration; opportunities were constantly presenting themselves, or were introduced, of interweaving the description and history of the countries and nations, which required to be mentioned, without ever losing sight of his chief object, to which he returns from every episode. He had himself visited the greater part of these countries and nations; had seen them with his own eyes; had collected information from the most credible sources. But when he enters upon the antiquities of the nations, especially of his own, he makes use of the means afforded him by his age; and here his work borders on those of the earlier historians (the λογογράφοι). It is no longer necessary to appear as his defender; posterity has not continued unjust towards him. No writer has received more frequent confirmation by the advances which, within the last thirty years, have been made in the knowledge of nations and countries, than Herodotus, who was formerly so often the object of ridicule. But our sole purpose was to show in what manner the science of history had been elevated by his choice of a subject; and how this

travelled to further it, cannot be doubted. How many an additional inquiry was necessary as he composed it! It was a work fit to employ a long life.

[1] As Hecatæus and Pherecydes.

[2] Only the history of the Assyrians he reserved for a separate work; i. 184. This he probably never wrote. Dahlmann, p. 227.

choice was intimately connected with the impulse given to the political character of his nation.

The first great step had thus been taken. A purely historical subject, relating to the past, but to no distant period, and no longer belonging to tradition, had been treated by a master, who had devoted the largest part of his life to a plan, framed with deliberation and executed with enthusiasm. The nation possessed an historical work, which first showed what history is; and which was particularly well fitted to awaken a taste for it. As Herodotus read his work to all Greece assembled at Olympia, a youth, according to the tradition, was incited by it to become, not his imitator, but his successor.[1]

Thucydides appeared. His predecessor had written a history of the past. He became the historian of his own time. He was the first who seized on this idea, on which the whole character of his work depends; though others, especially the ancient cities, looked for it in his style, his eloquence, and other secondary matters. By this means he advanced the science of history in a higher degree than he himself was aware of. His subject made him necessarily a critic.

The storm of the Persian wars had been terrific, but transitory. During its continuance, no historian could appear. It was not till after its fury had for some time abated, and men had regained their composure of mind, that Herodotus could find a place. Amidst the splendour of the victories which had been gained, under the shade of security won by valour,—with what emotions did the Greek look back upon those years! Who could be more welcome to him than the

[1] That Thucydides was not present as a hearer of Herodotus, is clearly proved by Dahlmann, p. 20 and 216. Had he, as a youth of sixteen in the year 456 B. C., listened to Herodotus, he must have formed his purpose of becoming an historian at least two-and-thirty years before he carried it into effect, and before he had chosen a subject; for his biographer, Marcellinus, informs us, that he did not write his history till after his exile, that is, after the year 424 B. C. The narrative of Lucian, that Herodotus read his history aloud at Olympia, contains no date; the assumption that it was in 456 B. C., rests on the anecdote about Thucydides, which Lucian does not mention. Why then may it not have taken place at a later day? Lucian may have coloured the narrative, but hardly invented it. That such readings took place, not before the whole people, but only before those interested, follows of course; and if Herodotus read not his whole work, but only a part of it, (and his work was probably finished by portions,) the difficulties suggested by Dahlmann disappear. These remarks are designed not to prove the truth of the narrative, but to show that it does not involve improbabilities.

historian, who painted for him this picture of his own glory, not only as a whole, but in its parts! The age of Thucydides, on the contrary, was full of grandeur, but of difficulties. In the long and obstinate war with one another, the Grecian states sought to overturn each other from their very foundations. It was not the age of wars only, but of revolutions with all their horrors. Whether a man were an aristocrat or democrat, a friend of Athens or of Sparta, was the question on which depended fortune, liberty, and life. A beneficent reverse rescued Thucydides from the whirlpool; and gave him that immortality, which the capture of Amphipolis never could have conferred on him.[1] The fruit of his leisure was the history of his age; a work he himself proposed to write, and actually wrote, for eternity.[2]

This is not the place to eulogize the man, who remained calm amidst all the turbulence of the passions, the only exile that has written an impartial history. His acquaintance with states and business, his deep political acuteness, his style, nervous, though occasionally uncouth,—have all been illustrated by others. We will only allow ourselves to show, by a few remarks, how much historic science was advanced by the nature of his subject.

The undertaking of the man who was the first to form the idea of writing the history of his own times, and of events in which he himself had a share, must not be compared with that of the modern writer, who compiles it from many written documents. He was compelled to investigate every thing by personal inquiry; and that, too, in a period when every thing was misrepresented by passion and party spirit. But antiquity had not inwrapped his subject in the veil of tradition, nor had it in its nature any epic interest. The subject was thoroughly prosaic; setting before the writer no other aim, than that of exhibiting the truth. In this lay the sole interest; and to ascertain and repeat the truth, is all which we can fairly demand of the historian. We honour and respect him, because, penetrated with the consciousness of his dignity, he never for a moment becomes untrue to it.

[1] After Amphipolis had been taken by Brasidas, Thucydides was accused of having come too late to the assistance of that city, and was banished by the Athenian people; he actually passed twenty years in exile in Thrace, where he possessed valuable mines. Let Thucydides himself be heard on this subject, iv. 104, and v. 26.

[2] Κτῆμα εἰς ἀεί. Thucyd. i. 22.

A sentiment of reverence accompanies us from the first to the last leaf of his work. Not the historian, History herself seems to address us.

But to what new views must he have been led, when, with the desire of arriving at truth, he turned his eyes to the form under which history had thus far appeared! It was his immediate aim to relate the events of his own times; but the preceding age could not remain wholly excluded from the sphere of his observation. It appeared to him clothed in the mantle of tradition; and he who scrutinized every thing with care, was not caught by its delusive splendour. He endeavoured to contemplate antiquity as it was, to take from it this false glare, leaving nothing but the light of truth; and thus was produced that invaluable introduction which precedes his work.

By such means Thucydides was the inventor of an art, which before him had been almost unknown, the art of historic criticism; without being conscious of the infinite value of his invention. For he did not apply it to all branches of knowledge, but only to his subject, because it was a natural consequence of that subject. The historic Muse had made him acquainted with her most secret nature; no one before or after him has drawn the line more clearly between history and tradition. And what is this, but to draw the distinction between the historic culture of the East and West? and—if we recognise how much depended on this historic culture—between the whole scientific culture of the East and West? For to repeat a remark, which has already been cursorily made, the great difference between the two consists in this; in the West, the free spirit of criticism was developed, and in the East never.

It is therefore just to say, that Thucydides advanced a giant's step. It is just to say, that he rose above his age; neither his own nor the following could reach him. Poetic tradition was too deeply interwoven with Grecian history, to admit of an entire separation. A Theopompus and Ephorus, whenever the heroic age was to be discussed, drew their materials with as little concern from the writers of mythological fables and the poets, as if Thucydides never had written.

A third step yet remained to be taken; and it was in some respects the most dangerous of all; to become the his-

torian of one's own exploits. This step was taken by Xenophon. For when we speak of his historic writings, his Anabasis so far surpasses the rest, that it alone deserves to be mentioned. But this new step may with propriety be called one of the most important. Would that he who ventured to take it, had found many successors! By the mildness and modesty of his personal character, Xenophon was secured from the faults, into which men are so apt to fall, when they describe their own actions; although these virtues and the nature of his subject could not give his work those superior qualities, which the genius of Cæsar knew how to impart to his Commentaries.

Thus, in the period of their freedom, all the principal kinds of history were developed among the Greeks. What was done afterwards, can hardly be called progress, although the subjects of history grew more various and more extensive with the enlarged sphere of politics in the Macedonian and Roman age; and the idea of a universal history was more distinctly entertained. But after the downfal of liberty, when rhetoric became prevalent and was applied to history, the higher kind of criticism ceased to be employed in it. The style, the manner in which a subject was treated, was regarded; not the subject itself. The essence was forgotten in disputes about the form. We have abundant proofs of this in the judgments of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who has nevertheless been usually mentioned as the first of these critics.

CHAPTER XV.

POETRY AND THE ARTS IN CONNEXION WITH THE STATE.

Whether in our inquiries on the political institutions of Greece, their poetry and arts must be considered,—will hardly be made a question by any of my readers. Almost every one of the preceding chapters has served to show how closely they were connected with the state. Yet our remarks must be limited to the question: What was the nature, and what were the consequences of this connexion?

But even in answering this we might be carried very far, if we were to pass the bounds which the character of this work prescribes. In speaking of poetry, we would principally consider the dramatic; since we have already spoken of the epic. But the drama can hardly be discussed, separate from lyric poetry. We place the arts in immediate connexion with poetry, because nature herself had united them among the Greeks; among whom the arts are as it were the key to poetry. The remark of a modern critic[1] is perfectly true, that the masterpieces of the plastic art furnish the best commentary on the tragedians. Although it is not always the same persons whom the poets and the sculptors bring before us, we yet derive from them our conceptions of the ideal forms. He who has seen the sublime figures of Niobe and Laocoon, can easily represent to his mind an Electra or an Œdipus in the forms under which they floated in the mind of the poet.

With the advancing culture of Greece, the connexion between poetry and arts and the state increased; and was most intimate in its flourishing age. Even the earliest lawgivers of the Greeks regarded poetry as the chief means of forming the character of youth; and of exercising an influence on their riper years. But in an age when there was as yet no literature, poetry could not be separate from song; and was commonly accompanied with an instrument. Hence came the meaning of the word music, which embraced all this together. Yet this is chiefly true of lyric poetry, which, as the immediate expression of the feelings of the poet, was much more intimately connected with song than the epic. If we do but bear constantly in mind the leading idea which the Greek had framed of a state, as a moral person that was to govern itself, we can comprehend the whole importance, which music, in the wider sense of the word, possessed in the eyes of the Grecian lawgivers. It seemed to them in that age, when there was as yet no philosophic culture, when the feelings and the management of the feelings were of the greatest moment, the best means of influencing them; and we need not be astonished, when we read in Plutarch[2]

[1] A. W. Schlegel, über dramatische Kunst und Litteratur, Th. i. s. 67. A. W. Schlegel, on Dramatic Literature.

[2] In his essay De Musicâ. Op. ii. p. 1131.

and other writers, of the great severity with which the laws, especially in Sparta, insisted on the preservation of the ancient music, and the established tunes. It may be difficult in our days, when music is no longer considered the lever of national force,[1] to form any distinct idea of those institutions of the ancients. But as human nature is never untrue to itself, institutions which are founded on it are always preserved to a certain extent and under certain forms. In the nineteenth century, in which there is no longer any danger of corrupting a nation by changes in music, (although it would be very presumptuous to give a hasty opinion on its influence and effects,) no regiment is raised without its band; and the commander, who instead of a warlike march should order a dirge to be played, would justly incur the same reproaches with him, who in ancient days made an unseasonable use of the Lydian instead of the Dorian measure.

Lyric poetry was moreover intimately connected with the popular religion; or was in fact a result of it; for hymns in praise of the gods are mentioned as its first fruits.[2] It was therefore important to the state as a support of the popular religion, particularly by contributing to the splendour of the festivals. For when was a festival celebrated by the Greeks, and the songs of the poets not heard? But they received their greatest importance from the institution of choral songs. These choruses, even independent of the drama, were the chief ornament of the festivals; and were composed of persons of various ages. There were those of youths, of men, and of the aged; which responded to each other alternately in song.[3] As the festivals were a public concern, so too were the choruses; and we have no cause to be astonished, that the preparation of them formed a part of the civil burdens.

The choral song at the festivals was as ancient as the

[1] That in his times, when music was used only in the theatres, it had lost its ancient application, is the complaint of Plutarch, ii. 1140.

[2] "Music," says Plutarch, ii. p. 1140, "was first made use of in the temples and sacred places in praise of the gods, and for the instruction of youth; long before it was introduced into the theatres, which at that time were not in existence."

[3] See in particular the whole oration of Demosthenes against Midias, who had abused Demosthenes as *choragus*, or leader of the chorus.

heroic age, or at least as the times of Homer.[1] Although it was capable of receiving great ornaments, and did actually receive them, it did not necessarily require any great preparations. The similar spectacles which modern travellers have witnessed in the islands of the South Sea, especially the Society Islands, carry us back to the earlier world of Greece. The drama was the result of those choruses; but from its nature it could only be a later fruit of the poetic spirit of the nation.

The drama interests us here only in its connexion with the state. But this inquiry goes very deeply into its nature. A question arises of a twofold character: What did the state do for the drama, and in what respects was the drama, by its nature and organization, connected with and of importance to the state?

Dramatic poetry, whose object is to give a distinct and lively representation of an action, always requires decorations, however splendid or paltry they may be; and an assembly, before which the representation may be made. Dramatic poetry is therefore essentially more public than that of any other description. Of all kinds of verse, this concerns the state the most nearly. Among the Greeks we may add, that it was an affair of religion, and therefore an essential part of their festivals. But these festivals were entirely an affair of the state; they belonged, as has been observed above, to the most urgent political wants. Here then we find a reason why the state should not only have so much encouraged dramatic exhibitions, but have even considered them no less essential than the popular assemblies and popular tribunals. A Grecian state could not exist without festivals, nor festivals without choruses and plays.

In what manner the state encouraged the drama, we know only with respect to Athens. But that the other Grecian cities in the mother country, and also in the colonies, had their theatres no less than Athens, is apparent from the remains of them, which are almost always to be found wherever there are traces of a Grecian city. The theatres were built and decorated at the public expense;

[1] See the Hymn. in Apoll. v. 147, etc. respecting the choruses at the Ionian festivals in Delos.

we find in Grecian cities no instance, as far as my knowledge extends, where private persons erected them, as was usual in Rome. Their structure was always the same, such as may still be seen in Herculaneum ; and we must therefore infer, that all the external means of representation remained the same ; although the wealth and taste of individual cities introduced higher degrees of splendour ; which in our times we may observe in our larger cities, compared with the smaller or provincial towns. But from the remains of the Grecian theatres, the size and extent of these buildings are apparent, and their great dissimilarity in this respect to modern ones. If they had not been regarded as a real want, and if the emulation of the cities had not also exerted its influence, we might doubt whether sufficient means could have been found for erecting them.

The bringing forward of the single plays belonged to the civil burdens, (λειτουργίαι,) which the opulent were obliged to bear in rotation, or which they voluntarily assumed. We can hardly doubt, that these regulations in other cities resembled those in Athens, though on this subject we have no distinct testimony. Thus the state threw these expenses in part upon private persons ; but the matter was not the less a public concern, for this expense was considered as a contribution due to the state. But another regulation may astonish us still more than this ; the regulation by which money was granted from the public treasury to the poorer citizens, that they might be able to visit the theatres. This was the case in Athens, though not till the times in which the state began to sink under the moral corruption of its citizens. The desire of pleasure may in such periods degenerate into a sort of phrensy ; and the preservation of tranquillity may demand sacrifices, which are reluctantly made even by those who consent.

Though the oldest dramatic essays among the Greeks may be of a more remote age, there is no doubt that Æschylus was the father, not only of the finished drama, but also of the Grecian stage. It was not, therefore, till after the victories over the Persians (he himself fought in the battle of Salamis) that a theatre of stone was erected in Athens ;[1]

[1] The occasion is related by Suidas in Πρατίναϛ. At the representation of a play of Æschylus, the wooden scaffold, on which the spectators stood, gave way.

and all that concerns the drama began to be developed in that city. The contests of the poets, which were introduced there at the festivals of Bacchus, and which, though they cost the state only a crown, rewarded the poet more than gold could have done, contributed much to excite emulation. It was about this time that Athens began to be the seat of literature, and in the scale of political importance the first state in Greece. Hence we can explain the remarkable fact, that the dramatic art seemed in that city as at home. Athens directed the taste of the other cities; and without being the capital in the same degree as Paris and London, her great superiority in intellectual culture secured to her that supremacy, which was the more glorious, as it rested not on violence, but on the voluntary concession of her pre-eminence.

I am acquainted with no investigation of the question, in what manner, after the erection of a stage at Athens, theatrical amusements were extended throughout the other Grecian cities. The ruins which remain in them leave it still uncertain when they were built; and where can we find dates to settle this point? But so many vestiges make it highly probable, that the drama was introduced into the other cities before the Macedonian age. Neither tragic nor comic poets were at home in Athens exclusively; but started up in the most various regions of the Grecian world.[1] Athenian poets were invited to resort to the courts of foreign princes.[2] A king of Syracuse was himself a tragic poet.[3] In the same city, Athenian captives regained their liberty by fragments from the tragedies of Euripides. The inhabitants of Abdera, when their fellow-citizen Archelaus played the part of Andromeda, were seized with a theatric passion bordering on madness.[4] Other proofs, if necessary, might be found. It may seem doubtful, whether the same may be said of the comic drama; which in Athens was of so local a character, that it could hardly have been understood in the other cities; or at least much of its wit must have been lost. But is it

[1] Abundant proof may be found in Fabricii Bibl. Gr. T. i. in the Catalog. Tragicorum et Comicorum deperditorum.

[2] Euripides was invited to repair to the court of Archelaus, king of Macedonia.

[3] Dionysius the elder. A fragment of his has been preserved in Stob. Eclog. i. iv. 19.

[4] Lucian. de conscrib. histor. Op. iv. p. 159, Bip.

safe from the few remaining pieces of a single comic poet to judge of the hundreds produced by a multitude of others, and no longer extant?

To answer the other question, In what relation the theatre among the Greeks, from its very nature, stood to the state, we must distinguish its two chief divisions. Before the Macedonian age, while comedy was still permitted to preserve its republican character,[1] tragedy and comedy, as there were no intermediate kinds,[2] remained as different from each other as seriousness and mirth. They had no points of contact.

Tragedy, introducing upon the stage the heroes of Greece, was the representation of great events of the elder days, according to the ideal conceptions of the Greeks;[3] comedy, on the contrary, was the parody of the present; as we shall hereafter illustrate more fully. In these explanations, the whole difference of the two has been expressed.

Tragedy was in certain respects a result of epic poetry. For this had always preserved the recollection of the heroic age; without which the tragic poets would have had to contend with no less difficulties, than the moderns, when they have borrowed subjects from the fables of the North. It was only necessary to mention the name of the chief person, and the whole story of his adventures was recalled to every mind. Hence the artificial weaving of a plot, was only so far a duty of the poet as the nature of the drama requires; grandeur and liveliness of manner were, on the contrary, far more in the spirit of the heroic world. Not the event, but the character of the action, was important. Whether the issue was fortunate or unfortunate, was a matter of indifference; but it was necessary that the action should be in itself sublime; should be the result of the play of the passions;

[1] The old comedy, as it was called.

[2] The satiric drama, as it was called, was not an intermediate class, but a corruption of tragedy.

[3] Two plays, the Persians of Æschylus, and the Destruction of Miletus of Phrynichus, formed exceptions. But they had no imitators; and the last-mentioned poet was even punished for it by the Athenians. Herod. vi. 21. Here too we observe the correct judgment of the nation, which desired, in the tragic drama, an excitement of the passions; but purely of the passions, without any personal allusions. This was possible only in subjects taken from early times. But still a certain regard for historic truth, as contained in the traditions, was required by the Grecian taste. Subjects altogether fictitious were unknown. The consequences of this deserve to be illustrated at large. If the tragic drama was thus limited to the traditions respecting the heroes, it at the same time obtained a certain solemn support which gave it dignity.

and should never depart from the gravity, which is as it were the colouring of the world of heroes. In this consists the tragic part of the drama. But though the final event was in itself indifferent, the poets naturally preferred subjects in which it was unfortunate for the chief personages. In such the tragic interest was the greatest; the catastrophe the most fearful; the effect least uncertain. A tragic issue suited best the whole character of the kind of poetry.

The tragic drama could have but few points of relation with the state. The political world which was here exhibited, was entirely different from the actual one of the times; the forms of monarchy alone were introduced on the stage. The same remark, therefore, which has been made respecting the epic, is true also of the tragic poetry of the Greeks. The violent commotions in the ancient royal families, and their extinction, were not represented to make them objects of contempt or hatred, and to quicken the spirit of republicanism; but solely because no other actions equally possessed the sublimity of the tragic character. But the moral effects which were produced by these representations may have been politically important. Whilst the Grecian continued to live in the heroic world, that elevation of mind could not so well disappear, which is seen so frequently in the acts of the nation. If Homer and the epic poets first raised its spirit to the sublimity belonging to it, the tragic poets did much to preserve that elevated tone. And if this elevated spirit formed the strength of the state, they have as strong a claim to immortality, as the military commanders and the leaders of the people.

Comedy was more closely allied to the state; as we may presuppose from the circumstance, that it had relation to the present and not to the past. We have explained it above to be the parody of the present,[1] that is, of the contemporary public condition, in the sense in which the Greeks understand this expression. Private life, as such, was never the

[1] A. W. Schlegel, in his work on Dramatic Literature and Art, i. p. 271, considers the characteristic of comedy to have been, that it was a parody of tragedy. It certainly was so very frequently, and thus far his remark is correct. Tragedy was a part of the public life; the parody of tragedy was therefore a fit subject for the comic stage; and the relation between the tragic and comic poets was such, that the latter were naturally fond of ridiculing the former. The readers of Aristophanes know this. Yet we must be very careful how we thus confine the range of comedy. It was not essentially a parody.

subject of comedy, except so far as it was connected with the public. But these points of contact were so many and so various, that the comic poet could not but frequently present views of private life. The relation of comedy was therefore altogether political, so far as we comprehend every thing public under this word. But the scenes which were exhibited were not represented with fidelity, but were caricatured. This seems to have been agreed upon by a silent convention; and therefore such representations could not injure those against whom they were directed, much more than the caricature prints of our times. We would not be understood to justify unconditionally the incredible impudence of the Grecian comic poets, in whose eyes neither men, nor morals, nor the gods were sacred. But a public tribunal of character is an actual necessity, where a popular government exists; and in those times what other such tribunal could have existed than the theatre? Whatever excited public attention, whether in persons or in things, it might be expected, would be brought upon the stage. The most powerful demagogue, in the height of his power, did not escape this fate; nay, the people of Athens itself had the satisfaction of seeing itself personified, and brought upon the stage, where it could laugh at itself, till it was satisfied with mirth;[1] and—crowned the poet for having done it. What is our freedom of the press, our licentiousness of the press, compared with this dramatic freedom and licentiousness?

But though the ridicule of the comic poets could not much injure the individual against whom it chanced to be directed, the question is still by no means answered, What consequences had the comic drama for the state, and for morals, which with the Greeks were inseparably connected with the state? Those judgments passed on public characters may have had some influence, but not a great deal; unless perhaps to make men more cautious; and this was no small consideration. When we see that Pericles, notwithstanding all the attacks of the comic poets,[2] was not to be deposed, and that even Cleon, when he had been made a public jest in the person of the Paphlagonian, lost nothing of his influence, we cannot make a very high estimate of

[1] As in the Knights of Aristophanes.
[2] Specimens of them may be seen in Plutarch. Op. i. p. 620.

that advantage. So far as morals are concerned, it is true, that the ideas of propriety are conventional; and that it would be wrong to infer from a violation of them in language, a corresponding violation in action. The inhabitant of the North, who has not grown accustomed to the much greater licence given to the tongue by the southern nations, may here easily be mistaken. The jokes of Harlequin, especially in his extemporaneous performances, are often hardly less unrestrained than those of Aristophanes; and the southern countries are not on that account on the whole more corrupt than the northern, although some offences are more common in the former. But the incredible levity with which the rules of modesty were transgressed, could not remain without consequences. Another important point is the influence of comedy on the religion of the people. The comic poets were careful never to appear as atheists; that would have led to exile; they rather defended the popular religion. But the manner in which this was done, was often worse than a direct attack. Who could appear with reverent devotion at the altar of Jove, after growing weary with laughing at him in the Clouds, or after having seen him pay court to earthly beauties? Even on the minds of the most frivolous nation in the world, indelible impressions must have been made.

The ancient comedy has commonly been called a political farce; and the expression is just, if we interpret the word political in the wide sense in which we have explained it. It is sufficiently known, that, after the downfal of the popular rule, there was no longer any field for this ancient comedy, that it lost its sting in the middle comedy as it is termed, and that the new was of an entirely different character.[1] As this new kind lost its local character with the personal allusions, the old obstacles to its diffusion throughout the Grecian world no longer existed. And though we may doubt whether the plays of Cratinus and Aristophanes were ever acted out of Athens, no question can certainly be raised with respect to those of Menander and Diphilus. But as this new species of theatrical composition was not introduced

[1] The difference of these kinds is best explained in the excellent work of Schlegel, i. p. 326.

and perfected till the Macedonian age, the subject does not fall within the sphere of our observations.

With our notions we should think the connexion of the arts with politics much less than of the theatre; and yet it was among the Greeks even closer and more various. The encouragement of the arts is in our times left chiefly to private taste; and is greater or smaller according to the number of amateurs. The state takes an interest in them only to prevent their total decay, or for the sake of some particular design.

The case was entirely different in the period when they flourished among the Greeks. The arts with them were exclusively public, and not at all an affair of individuals. They afterwards became so, yet never in the same degree as with us; nor even as with the Romans. These positions require to be further developed and more accurately proved.

By the arts we mean the three great branches of them, architecture, sculpture, and painting. On each of these we have some remarks to offer.

Architecture is distinguished from the two others by the circumstance, that its object is use no less than beauty. Not only the moderns, but the Romans of the later ages, endeavoured to unite them both; and in this manner private buildings became objects of art. Among the Greeks, a tendency to this seems to have existed in the heroic age. In a former chapter, we remarked that in the dwellings and halls of the kings, there prevailed a certain grandeur and splendour, which, however, we shall hardly be willing to designate by the name of scientific architecture. When the monarchical forms disappeared, and living in cities, and with it republican equality, gained ground, those differences in the dwellings disappeared of themselves; and every thing which we read respecting private houses in every subsequent age, confirms us in the idea, that they could make no pretensions to elegance of construction.[1] It would be difficult to produce a single example of such a building. But we find express evidence to the contrary. Athens was by no means a fine city like some of our modern ones, in which there are

[1] It follows of course, that the testimony of writers of the Macedonian, or the Roman age, are not here taken into consideration, since we are not treating of those times.

whole streets of palaces occupied as the dwellings of private persons. A stranger could have been in Athens without imagining himself to be in the city which contained the greatest masterpieces of architecture. The splendour of the city was not perceived till the public squares and the Acropolis were approached.[1] The small dwellings of Themistocles and of Aristides were long pointed out; and the building of large houses was regarded as a proof of pride.[2] But when luxury increased, the houses were built on a larger scale; several chambers for the accommodation of strangers and for other purposes were built round the court, which commonly formed the centre; but all this might take place, and yet the building could lay no claims to beauty. If a town, which was, it is true, but a provincial town, may be cited to corroborate this, we have one still before our eyes. A walk through the excavated streets of Pompeii will be sufficient to establish our remark. Where the pomp and splendour of the public edifices were so great as among the Greeks, it was not possible for private buildings to rival them.

Architecture, as applied to public purposes, began with the construction of temples; and till the time of the Persian wars, or just before, we hear of no other considerable public edifices. The number of temples remarkable for their architecture, was till that time a limited one; although, in the age just preceding the war with Persia, this art had already produced some of its first works among the Greeks. In Greece itself the temple of Delphi was the most celebrated, after it had been rebuilt by the Alcmæonidæ.[3] There was also the temple of Apollo in Delos. But it was about this time, that the invention of the Ionic order by the Asiatic Greeks in addition to the Doric, which had been used till then, constituted a new epoch in the history of architecture. The splendid temple of Diana at Ephesus, erected by the joint exertions of the cities and princes of Grecian Asia, was the first building in this new style.[4] About the same time Polycrates built the temple of Juno in Samos. The temples

[1] Dicæarchus de Statu Græciæ, cap. 8. Huds.

[2] Demosthenes reproaches the wealthy Midias with his large house at Eleusis, which intercepted the light of others. Op. i. p. 565. [3] Herod. v. 62.

[4] See the instructive disquisition; Der Tempel der Diana zu Ephesus, von A. Hirt. Berlin, 1809.

which afterwards formed the glory of Greece, those of Athens on the Acropolis and elsewhere, were all erected after the Persian war. So too was the temple of Jupiter at Olympia. As to the temples in Lower Italy and Sicily, we can fix the epoch in which, if not all, yet the largest and most splendid of them, the chief temples of Agrigentum, were erected; and that epoch is also subsequent to the Persian war.[1] And if those of the ancient Doric order, at Pæstum and Segestus, belong to an earlier period, they cannot to one much earlier; as these cities themselves were founded so much later than those in Asia Minor. Just before and after the Persian war, arose that prodigious emulation of the cities, to make themselves famous for their temples; and this produced those masterpieces of architecture.

The other principal kinds of public buildings, which were conspicuous for their splendour, were the theatres, the places for musical exhibitions, the porticos, and the gymnasia. Of the theatres it has already been observed, that they were erected subsequently to the Persian wars. The same is true of the halls for music. The porticos, those favourite places of resort to a people who lived so much in public, belonged in part to the temples,[2] and in part surrounded the public squares. Of those in Athens, which by their works of art eventually eclipsed the rest, we know that they were not built till after the victory over the barbarians. Of all the public edifices, the gymnasia are those respecting which we have the fewest accounts.[3] They were probably erected at a distance in the rear of the temples; though many of them were distinguished by excellent works of art.

This line of division, carefully drawn between domestic and public architecture by the Greeks, who regarded only the latter as possessing the rank of one of the fine arts, gives a new proof of their correct views of things. In buildings destined for dwellings, necessity and the art are in constant opposition. The latter desires in its works to execute some grand idea independent of the common wants of life; but

[1] A more accurate enumeration of the chief temples of the Greeks, and the periods in which they were built, is to be found in Steiglitz, Geschichte der Baukunst der Alten. Leipzig, 1792.

[2] As, e. g., the λέσχη at Olympia, respecting which Böttiger in his Geschichte der Mahlerey, B. i. s. 296, etc., has given us a learned essay.

[3] On those at Athens, consult Stieglitz in loc. cit. p. 220.

a dwelling is intended to meet those very wants, and is in no respect founded on an idea connected with beauty. The temples are dwellings also, but the dwellings of the gods; and as these have no wants in their places of abode, the art finds here no obstacle to its inventions.

The plastic art[1] and painting bore to each other, among the Greeks, the opposite relation to that which they have borne in modern times. The first was the most cultivated; and though the latter attained the rank of an independent art, it never was able to gain the superiority. It is not for us here to explain the causes of this; we need only mention one, which to us is the most interesting. The more public the arts are among any people, the more naturally will the plastic art surpass that of painting. The works of both may be public, and were so among the Greeks, but those of the former are far better suited for public monuments than those of the latter. The works of painting find their place only on walls; those of the plastic art, existing entirely by themselves, wherever there is room for them.

The works of the plastic art, statues and busts, were, in the times of which we speak, (and among the Greeks, with a few limitations, even in subsequent times,) only public works, that is, designed to be set up, not in private dwellings, but in public places, temples, halls, market-places, gymnasia, and theatres. I know of no one instance of a statue that belonged to a private man; and if there exists any example, it is an exception which confirms the general rule.[2] It may be said, that it is only accidental that we know of no such instances. But if any taste of that kind had prevailed at Athens, we should find traces of it in the comedians and orators. If these are consulted in vain for such indications, we are justified in concluding that no such private tastes existed.

Phidias and his successors, till the Macedonian age, did not therefore labour to supply with their works the houses and collections of individuals. This by no means implies,

[1] The phrase *plastic art* is used, because there is no other which embraces at once the works of stone and of bronze.

[2] Or can the anecdote be cited, which Pausanias relates, p. i. 46, of the cunning of Phryne to gain possession of the god of love made by her lover Praxiteles? Even if it be true, the fact is in our favour; for she consecrated it immediately as a public work of art in Thespiæ, Athen. p. 591; in which city alone it was from that time to be seen. Cic. in Ver. ii. iv. 2.

that they did not receive applications from private persons. If they had not, the incredible multitude of statues, which we have already mentioned, could never have been made.[1] This subject is so important, that it demands to be treated of more at large.

The great masters were principally employed for the cities. These, or the men who were at their head, (as the example of Pericles informs us,) bespoke works of art, or bought them ready made, to ornament the city and the public buildings. We have distinct evidence, that the great masterpieces of Phidias, Praxiteles, and Lysippus, owed their origin to this. Thus were produced the Jupiter at Olympia, the Minerva Polias at Athens, by the first; the Venus at Cnidus, as well as at Cos, by the second; the Colossus of Rhodes, by the third. Yet numerous as were the applications of cities, the immense multitude of statues could not be accounted for, unless the piety and the vanity of individuals had come to their assistance.

The first assisted by the votive offerings; of which all the celebrated temples were full. These were by no means always works of art, but quite as often mere costly presents. Yet the collections of statues and pictures which belonged to those temples, consisted, for the most part, of votive offerings.[2] But these were as often the tribute of gratitude from whole cities, as from individuals.[3]

The vanity of individuals contributed to the same end, by the custom of erecting statues, commonly of bronze, to the victors in the games.[4] When we remember the multitude of these games in Greece, the number of statues will become intelligible; especially of those of bronze, of which

[1] The infinite wealth of Greece in treasures of this kind, has been so clearly exhibited in a late discourse of Jacobs, that it has now become easy to form a distinct idea of them. Jacobs, Uber den Reichthum Griechenlands an plastischen Kunstwerken und die Ursachen desselben.

[2] Not to mention Olympia and Delphi again, we refer to the temple of Juno in Samos, Strab. L. xiv. p. 438, of Bacchus at Athens, Paus. i. 20. The temple of Diana at Ephesus was so rich in works of art, that according to Plin. xxxvi. 14, a description of them would have filled several volumes.

[3] The temples received such presents not only during the lifetime of the donors, but as legacies. A remarkable instance of this is found in the will of Conon, who left 5000 pieces of gold (στατῆρες) for that purpose. Lys. Or. Gr. v. p. 639.

[4] See the passage in Pliny, xxxiv. 9. His remark that a statue was erected in honour of every victor at Olympia, seems hardly credible. Cf. Paus. vi. p. 452.

in many instances more than one cast was made; as the native cities of the victors would hardly fail in this manner to appropriate to themselves the fame of their citizens, which formed so much a subject of pride.

Painting, from its very nature, seems to have been more designed for private use. Yet in the age of Pericles, when the great masters in this art appeared in Athens, it was hardly less publicly applied than the art of sculpture. It was in the public porticos and temples, that those masters, Polygnotus, Micon, and others, exhibited the productions of their genius.[1] No trace is to be found of celebrated private pictures in those times.[2]

Yet portrait painting seems peculiarly to belong to private life. This branch of the art was certainly cultivated among the Greeks; but not till the Macedonian age. The likenesses of celebrated men were placed in the pictures which commemorated their actions; as that of Miltiades in the painting of the battle in the Pœcile, or pictured hall in Athens; or the artists found a place for themselves or their mistresses in such public works.[3] But, properly speaking, portrait painting, as such, did not flourish till the times of Philip and Alexander; and was first practised in the school of Apelles.[4] When powerful princes arose, curiosity or flattery desired to possess their likeness; the artists were most sure of receiving compensation for such labours; and private statues as well as pictures began to grow common; although in most cases something of ideal beauty was added to the resemblance.[5]

[1] See Böttiger. Ideen zur Archæologie der Mahlerey. B. i. s. 274, etc.

[2] It is true, Andocides reproached Alcibiades, in his oration against him, of having shut up a painter, who was painting his house; Or. Gr. iv. p. 119. But this was not the way to obtain a fine specimen of the art. Allusion is there made to the painting of the whole house, not of an isolated work of art; and we are not disposed to deny, that in the times of Alcibiades, it was usual to decorate the walls with paintings. On the contrary, this was then very common; for the very painter Archagathus gives as his excuse, that he had already contracted to work for several others. But these common paintings are not to be compared with those in the temples and porticos; which, as Böttiger has proved, Ideen, &c., s. 282, were painted, not on the walls, but on wood.

[3] Polygnotus, e. g., introduced the beautiful Elpinice, the daughter of Miltiades, as Laodice. Plut. iii. p. 178.

[4] This appears from the accounts in Plin. xxxv. xxxvi. 12, &c.

[5] A confirmation, perhaps a more correct statement of these remarks, is expected by every friend of the arts of antiquity in the continuation of Böttiger's Ideen zur Geschichte der Mahlerey. That in this period busts of in-

We have ventured directly to assert, that the arts in their flourishing period belonged exclusively to public life; and were not, according to the general opinion, which seems to have been silently adopted, divided between that and private life. Be it remembered, this is to be understood only of works of art, in the proper sense of the expression; that is, of those which had no other object but to be works of art; of statues, therefore, and pictures; not of all kinds of sculpture and painting. That the arts connected with private wants were applied to objects of domestic life, to articles of household furniture, to candelabra, vases, tapestry, and garments, will be denied by no one, who is acquainted with antiquity.

It was not till a Lucullus, a Verres, and others among the Romans, had gratified their taste as amateurs, that the arts were introduced into private life; and yet even in Rome an Agrippa could propose to restore to the public all the treasures of the arts, which lay buried in the villas.[1] We should not therefore be astonished, if under such circumstances the ancient destination of arts among the Greeks should have been changed, and they should have so far degenerated as to become the means of gratifying the luxury of individuals. And yet this never took place. This can be proved as well of the mother country, as of the richest of the colonies.

Pausanias, in the second century after the Christian era, travelled through all Greece, and saw and described all the works of art which existed there. And yet I know of no one instance in all Pausanias of a work of art belonging to a private man; much less of whole collections. Every thing was in his day, as before, public in the temples, porticos, and squares. If private persons had possessed works of art, who would have prevented his describing them?

Verres plundered Sicily of its treasures in the arts, wherever he could find them; and his accusers will hardly be suspected of having concealed any thing. But in this accusation, with one single exception,[2] none but public works

dividuals became for the same reason so much more numerous, has been illustrated by the same scholar in his Andeutungen, s. 183, etc.

[1] Plin. xxxv. cap. ix.

[2] Namely, the four statues which he took from Heius. Cic. in Verrem ii. iv. 2. Yet they stood in a chapel (sacrarium), and were therefore in a certain measure public. The name of Heius seems, however, to betray that the

of art are mentioned. What shall we infer from this, but that no considerable productions of the fine arts were possessed by private persons in Sicily?

So deeply therefore was the idea fixed among the Greeks, that the works of the artists were public, that it could not be eradicated even by the profanations of the Romans. And this is the chief cause of their flourishing. They thus fulfilled their destiny; belonging, not to individuals, but to cultivated humanity. They should constitute a common property. Even in our times, when individuals are permitted to possess them, censure is incurred if others are not allowed to enjoy them. But even where this privilege is conceded, it is not a matter of indifference, whether an individual or the nation is the possessor. The respect shown to the arts by the nation in possessing their productions, confers a higher value on their labours. How much more honoured does the artist feel, how much more freely does he breathe, when he knows that he is exerting himself for a nation, which will esteem its glory increased by his works, instead of toiling for the money and the caprices of individuals!

Such was the condition of the arts in Greece. When emulation arose among the cities to be distinguished by possessing works of art, a field was opened for a Phidias and Polygnotus, for a Praxiteles and Parrhasius. They were better rewarded by glory than by money; some of them never worked for pay.[1] Need we then add any further remarks to explain why the fine arts declined with liberty? Philip and Alexander still saw a Lysippus and an Apelles; but with them ends the series of creative minds, such as no other nation has ever produced.

But the taste of the nation for the arts and their produc-

family was not of Grecian origin. But what does one such exception, and in such an age, prove respecting an earlier period?

[1] Polygnotus painted the Pœcile for nothing; Zeuxis, in the last part of his life, would receive no pay for his pictures, but gave them away. Plin. xxxv. 36. Thus a partial answer is given to the question, how the cities could support the great expense for works of art. Besides, in Greece as in Italy, the works of the great masters did not become dear till after their death. The little which we know of their personal condition and circumstances, represents them for the most part as men of fine feelings and good fellowship, who, like the divine Raphael and Correggio, in the moments sacred to mental exertion, raised themselves above human nature, but otherwise enjoyed life without troubling themselves much about money. Phidias for all his masterpieces did not receive a third part as much as Gorgias for his declamations.

tions, did not end with those artists. They had taken too good care to perpetuate that fondness. When the Grecians had lost almost every thing else, they were still proud of their works of art. This excited even in the Romans respect and admiration. "These works of art, these statues, these pictures," says Cicero,[1] "delight the Greeks beyond every thing. From their complaints[2] you may learn, that that is most bitter to them, which to us appears perhaps trivial and easy to be borne. Of all acts of oppression and injustice, which foreigners and allies in these times have been obliged to endure, nothing has been more hard for the Grecians to bear, than this plundering of their temples and cities!"

We have thus far endeavoured to consider Greece from all the points, in which she made herself glorious as a nation. Who is it, we may finally ask, that conferred upon her immortality? Was it her generals and men of power alone; or was it equally her sages, her poets, and her artists? The voice of ages has decided; and posterity justly places the images of these heroes of peace by the side of those of warriors and kings.[3]

CHAPTER XVI.

CAUSES OF THE FALL OF GREECE.

The melancholy task of explaining the causes which led to the fall of Greece, has been facilitated by the preceding investigations. Most of them will occur to the reader; we have only to illustrate them somewhat more at large, and arrange them in a manner to admit of being distinctly comprehended at a single view.[4]

If the constitutions of the individual Grecian states were defective, the constitution of the whole Grecian system was

[1] Cicero in Verrem, ii. iv. 59. [2] Of the robberies of Verres.

[3] See Visconti, Iconographie ancienne. Paris, 1811.

[4] See Drumann's carefully written History of the Decline of the Grecian States. Berlin, 1815. To have occasioned such works is the highest pleasure for the author. So too in reference to the thirteenth chapter I may cite, Bekker's Demosthenes as a Statesman and Orator. 2 vols. 1815. The best historical and critical introduction to the study of Demosthenes.

still more so. Though geographically united, they cannot be said to have formed one political system. A lasting union was never established between the Grecian states; and a transitory and very imperfect one was effected only in times of danger, as in the Persian wars.

But even this imperfect union was productive of important results. The league which was then established, produced the idea of the supremacy of an individual state. It has already been shown, in what manner Athens managed to acquire this rank, and in what manner that city turned it to advantage; but we have also shown, that a partial supremacy alone existed, embracing only the seaports and the islands, and therefore necessarily resting for its support on the dominion of the seas on each side of Greece, and consequently on a navy.

This was a result of the political relations and the nature of the league. But the consciousness of superiority excited those who were possessed of it to abuse it; and the allies began to be oppressed. Athens, having once established its greatness on this supremacy, would not renounce it when the ancient motives had ceased to operate after the peace with the Persians. Individual states attempted to reclaim by force the independence, which was not voluntarily conceded to them. This led to wars with them; and hence the dominion of the sea was followed by all the other evils, of which even Isocrates complains.[1]

The chief reason of this internal division did not lie merely in vacillating political relations, but more deeply in the difference of tribes. There was a gulf between the Dorian and Ionian, which never could be filled up; a voluntary union of the two for any length of time was impossible. Several causes may be mentioned, as having contributed to render this division incurable. The tribes were divided geographically. In the mother country, the Dorian had the ascendency in the Peloponnesus, the Ionian in Attica, Eubœa, and many of the islands. Their dialects were different; a few words were sufficient to show to which tribe a man belonged. The difference in manners was hardly less considerable, especially with relation to the female sex, which among the Dorians participated in public life; while amongst

[1] Isocrat. de Pace, Op. p. 176.

the Ionians it was limited to the women's apartments within the houses. And the common people were very much influenced by the circumstance, that the festivals celebrated by the two were not the same.

But the division was made politically incurable by the circumstance, that Sparta was, or at least desired to be, considered the head of the whole Doric tribe. This state, both in its public and private constitution, was in almost every respect the opposite of Athens. As the laws of Lycurgus alone were valid in it, the other Dorian cities did by no means resemble it; but as it was ambitious of being their head, its influence prevailed, at least in the mother country. But that influence was often extended to the colonies; and though the Persian authority may have repressed the hatred of the tribes in Asia Minor, it continued with the greatest acrimony in Sicily. In the war of the Syracusans against the Leontini, the Dorian cities were on the side of the former; the Ionian on that of the latter; and the cities of Lower Italy in their choice of sides were influenced by the same circumstance.[1]

This hatred, preserved and inflamed by the ambition, common to both, of obtaining the supremacy over Greece, was finally followed by that great civil war, which we are accustomed to call the Peloponnesian. Of nearly equal duration, it was to Greece what the thirty years' war was to Germany;[2] without having been terminated by a similar peace. As it was a revolutionary war in the true sense of the expression, it had all the consequences attendant on such a war. The spirit of faction was enabled to strike such deep root, that it never more could be eradicated; and the abuse which Sparta made of her forced supremacy, was fitted to supply it with continual nourishment. Who has described this with more truth or accuracy than Thucydides? "By this war," says he,[3] "all Hellas was set in motion; for on all sides dissensions prevailed between the popular party and the nobles. The former desired to invite the Athenians; the latter, the Lacedemonians. The cities were shaken by sedition; and where this broke out at a less early

[1] Thucyd. iii. 86.

[2] It lasted from the year 431 till the year 404, when it was terminated by the taking of Athens.

[3] Thucyd. iii. 82. We have selected only a few remarks from a passage written for all succeeding centuries.

period, greater excesses were attempted than any which had elsewhere taken place. Even the significations of words were changed. Mad rashness was called disinterested courage; prudent delay, timidity. Whoever was violent, was held worthy of confidence; whoever opposed violence, was suspected. The crafty was called intelligent; the more crafty, still more intelligent. In short, praise was given to him who anticipated another in injustice; and to him who encouraged to crime one who himself had never thought of it."

From the words of the historian, the effect of these revolutions on morals is apparent; and yet no states rested so much on morals as the Grecian. For were they not communities which governed themselves? Did not the laws enter most deeply into private life? and was not anarchy a necessary consequence of the moral corruption? This was soon felt in Athens. Throughout the whole of Aristophanes, we see the contrast between the better times that were gone by, and the new, in all parts of public and domestic life; in poetry, in eloquence, in education, in the courts of justice, etc.; and finally in a celebrated dialogue, the ancient and the modern customs are introduced, disputing upon the stage.[1] And who can read the orators without being astonished at the incredible corruption of morals?

This leads us to a kindred topic, the desecration of the popular religion. The careful student of the history of the Grecian nation will observe this increase, as he approaches the age of Philip; and though other causes may have had some influence, we can only thus explain the origin of a religious war like the Phocian. The causes which produced the decay of the popular religion, may for the most part be found in a former chapter. It would be useless to attempt to deny, that the speculations of the philosophers had a great share in it; although the better part of them were strenuous to prevent such a result. Aristophanes was certainly unjust in attributing such designs to Socrates, but he was right in attributing it to philosophy in general. The question now arises: On which side lies the blame? On that of philosophy, or of the popular religion? It is not difficult to answer this question after what we have already

[1] The Λόγος δίκαιος and ἄδικος in the Clouds.

remarked of the latter. A nation with a religion like that of the Greeks, must either refrain from philosophical inquiries, or learn from philosophy that its religion is unfounded. This result cannot be urged against the philosophers as a crime, but only a want of prudence, of which they were guilty in promulgating their positions. The care taken by the best of them in this respect, has already been mentioned; and that the state was not indifferent to the practice of the rest, is proved by the punishments which were inflicted on many of them. But though the systems of the philosophers were restricted to the schools, a multitude of philosophic views were extended, which to a certain degree were adopted by the common people. In Athens, the comedians contributed to this end; for whether with or without design, they extended the doctrines which they ridiculed.

The most melancholy proof of the decay of religious feeling, is found in the Phocian war and the manner in which that war was conducted. In the time of Thucydides, Delphi and its oracle were still revered;[1] although the Spartans began even then to doubt its claims to confidence.[2] When all the former relations of the states were dissolved by the Peloponnesian war and its consequences, those toward the gods were also destroyed; and the crimes committed against them, brought on their own punishment in a new civil war and the downfal of liberty. The treasures stolen from Delphi, with which the war was carried on, suddenly increased the mass of specie current in Greece to an unheard of degree; but increased in an equal degree luxury, and the wants of life.[3] And if any portion of the ancient spirit remained, it was destroyed by the custom of employing mercenary soldiers, a custom which became every day more common, and gave a deadly chill to valour and patriotism.

Thus the evils of which the superior policy of a neighbour knew how to take advantage, were the result of defects in the political constitution; in that very constitution, but for which the glorious fruits of Grecian liberty never could have ripened. But amidst all the disorder, and all the losses, not every thing perished. The national spirit, though

[1] Thucyd. v. 32.
[2] Thucyd. v. 16.
[3] See a leading passage on this topic, in Athen. iv. p. 231.

it could hardly have been expected, still remained, and with it the hope of better times. Amidst all their wars with one another, the Greeks never ceased to consider themselves as one nation. The idea of one day assuming that character animated the best of them. It is an idea which is expressed in almost every one of the writings of the pure Isocrates;[1] and which he could not survive, when after the battle of Chæronea, the spirit of the eloquent old man voluntarily escaped from its earthly veil, beneath which it had passed a hundred years. Yet the echo of his wishes, his prayers, and his instructions did not die away. The last of the Greeks had not yet appeared; and the times were to come, when, in the Achæan league, the splendid day of the greatness of Hellas was to be followed by a still more splendid evening. So certain is it, that a nation is never deserted by destiny, so long as it does not desert itself.

[1] See especially Panathen. Op. 235.

HISTORICAL TREATISES:

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES
OF THE REFORMATION.

THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRACTICAL INFLUENCE
OF POLITICAL THEORIES.

THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE CONTINENTAL
INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF

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AN INQUIRY INTO

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

OF

THE REFORMATION,

BEING A PRELIMINARY ATTEMPT AT AN ANSWER TO
THE QUESTION PROPOSED BY THE FRENCH NATIONAL INSTITUTE.

WRITTEN IN THE YEAR 1802.

TO THE READER.

THE following treatise was written in answer to a question proposed by the National Institute of France, as the subject of a prize essay for July, 1803,—viz. "What has been the influence of the Reformation on the political position of the different states of Europe, and upon the diffusion of knowledge?[1] This question, in itself so interesting, attracted my attention the more because the whole course of my studies have been directed towards it. I resolved therefore to attempt an answer to it; but when I had nearly finished the first part, which regards the *political* consequences of the Reformation, I learned from my late friend Von Villers that I should have him for a competitor. Upon this I withdrew myself, and his essay, which proved the successful one, and of which several editions have been published, is universally known. In the mean time I committed my work to the press, even before the day appointed for sending in the essays, but confined it to the political part of the question. The sheets were forwarded as soon as printed to my friend, and he has himself remarked in his preface, that he made use of them in working out this portion of his subject. Any

[1] Quelle a été l'influence de la Reformation sur la situation politique des differens Etats de l'Europe, et sur le progrès des lumières?

service which I may thus have rendered him, he amply repaid me four years after by undertaking the translation of my essay upon the *Influence of the Crusades*, which then obtained the prize at Paris. I have thought it right to preface these remarks; partly, in order to show the relation in which my essay stands to that of my late friend; partly, to excuse the style of the treatise, which could not from the circumstances assume the character of a scholastical and learned dissertation.

It does not pretend to afford the learned historian any thing new in the detail, but aims at presenting a *variety and abundance of general views*, which appear to me to be far from superfluous, inasmuch as a clearer light may thus perhaps be thrown upon the history of modern Europe.

The great political changes by which the destinies of mankind are permanently affected, and which we are accustomed to call by the general name of revolutions, may be divided, as regards their origin, into two classes. The first includes those which are the work of single individuals, the slaves of passion, who have devoted their lives to conquest, and founded their greatness upon the ruins of the states which fortune has enabled them to overthrow. These may be termed purely warlike revolutions, as they assume that character from the first, and war is their immediate aim.

Such were the exploits of Cyrus and of Timur, and of many other celebrated heroes, who, though at the head of civilized nations, have made conquest at once the first and last object of their career. Phenomena of this class may be highly interesting from their results, but in their origin they are less so, as they usually flow from one source, and that for the most part an unhallowed one — ambition.

The second class is of a very different character, and may be best expressed under the joint name of *moral and political*, as its foundation is laid in the moral nature of man. Under this we range those revolutions which have been prepared by popular ideas, slowly spread, but finally become prevalent; and which, by the direct contrast in which they

stood to the existing order of things, could not but cause violent struggles and great changes in their passage from theory into practice. Like the stream which loses itself in the earth but a short way from its source, as if to accumulate its strength in secret, and breaks forth again a great river, these revolutions arise at moments when they are least thought of, and exhibit signs of strength which the most accurate observer could not have foreseen. These differ therefore from the former by being in the highest degree interesting, as well in their origin as in their consequences. Their general characteristic is that they are prepared long beforehand, and by a process which can hardly ever be discerned.—They thus afford the practised observer abundant employment from the very first; as it is not easy to discover their true origin, even though the immediate cause of their breaking out should be evident to the eye. They differ from the former also in this, that they seldom arise from one, but usually from many and different sources, and these, becoming united, form a torrent which finally bursts through every bulwark, and sweeps away whatever attempts to stem its course.

In order that ideas should become generally adopted and effective, they must be such as can be readily appreciated by the great mass of the people, and of sufficient interest to induce action as well as belief. Religion and politics are the only topics of this nature. Knowledge in its more difficult branches must always be confined to a limited number; nor do we ever read of wars caused between different nations by different systems of philosophy, although it may have chanced that some particular doctrines, by passing into popular opinions, have exercised an influence over their dealings with each other. On the other hand, the ideas of God and of our country are too deeply interwoven with our moral nature to allow of their being entertained merely as objects of reason, and not of the affections also. In fact, the less defined they are, the greater influence do they appear to exercise; and hence it is that they possess the power of acting like electricity, even upon the most uninformed minds, and impart energies to them which assume with ease the character of enthusiasm, or even fanaticism.

Religious notions, it is true, do not seem to have a very

near connexion with political, but, even if the union of the state with its acknowledged forms of worship were less strict, these could seldom be overthrown without entailing the fall of more than can be originally foreseen.

Who shall define the channel of the torrent which has burst its bed? or who sets limits to the earthquake?

But however awful these shocks may be, it is by them more especially that the fortunes of our race are determined.—The moral, like the physical world, owes its purification and its maintenance to the storms which sweep over it.—But centuries and their generations must pass away, before the operation of them is so fully developed as to allow the dim eye of human intelligence to embrace and give judgment upon the full extent of their results. And when this time at length arrives, when the inquirer at last may fairly enter upon his task, what occasion could he select, on which it would be more becoming to feel diffident of his own powers, and to bear continually in mind that his horizon is at best but of scanty extent, and that to review the unlimited universe of the history of man belongs only to a Being himself illimitable?

Since the fall of the Roman empire made way for the erection of the states of modern Europe, this portion of the world has witnessed three revolutions such as we have described. The deep degradation of its inhabitants during the middle ages is chiefly attributable to the want, for many centuries, of an impulse which might call the minds of men, and not merely their bodies, into activity. Hence that overwhelming barbarism which in the tenth and eleventh centuries threatened to extinguish the last gleams of civilization, till at the close of the latter the Crusades were set on foot, and awakened the decaying spirit of mankind from the slumber which threatened to be its last. These expeditions, although fruitless in their immediate event, laid the foundation of a new order of things in Europe. Owing to them the peasantry was freed, although neither quickly nor universally, from the bondage of the feudal law; and while the young Muse of the Knighthood was gathering boldness to utter its conceits in castle and hall, they gradually, by the commerce which they brought to Europe, were the means of establishing in her towns that class of free citi-

zens, on whose prosperity the future fate of nations was to depend.

After a lapse of four centuries Europe sustained a second and still greater change in the Reformation. And as this agreed with the former in the point of their common and immediate origin from religion, although both were undoubtedly of great political importance, it was reserved for our own age to witness a third species of revolution, which, springing immediately from political ideas, obtained an immediate political tendency; and which, when its results are fully developed, will perhaps furnish the historian of future times with even richer materials than either of those which have preceded it.

The National Institute, in requiring a development of the consequences which resulted to the political progress and general illumination of Europe from the Reformation, has chosen a subject worthy of itself. It is a proposition which has never been satisfactorily answered, but which is now ripe for discussion.—Near three centuries have elapsed since that mighty change began to operate; its consequences have developed themselves in all their principal features; the clouds of prejudice and passion, which at first float over an age of great revolutions, and deny a clear view to the observer of the time, have now been long dispersed; and the historian must be content that his own feeble vision should bear the blame, if it cannot embrace the wide prospect before him.

The present inquiry is not directed to the consequences of the Reformation, as it affected the *intelligence* and *civilization* of mankind—this subject is left to others. We shall simply investigate the political results of that event as they affected Europe—and these we shall class under two heads: the 1st, comprising the changes in particular states. The 2nd, those which were wrought in the social and political system of Europe.

In an undertaking of this sort it is evident that the author must be prepared to lay aside the prejudices which his education, his country, and his religion, throw in his way—that he must resolve moreover not to sacrifice the truth, although known and acknowledged, to the brilliancy which invests what is new and paradoxical.—These, I say, are necessary

and evident conditions.—It is only as to the sense in which the term "Consequences of the Reformation" may be fairly used that any observation need be made. On this, however, the full attention of the reader is required, as it must necessarily determine the main features of our inquiry.

The consequences of every event are partly *immediate*, partly *mediate*.

The character of *immediate* consequences is that they must result of themselves from the very nature of a given event, and therefore be of the same stamp with it. The immediate consequences of a religious revolution can be concerned only with religion; and therefore as regards the revolution we are here speaking of, they include nothing but the changes in doctrine or worship of particular portions of the Christian Church.

The *mediate* consequences of an event differ from the former in not flowing from the essence of that event, but in being produced by accidental relations, connexions, and changes of circumstance, in such a way, however, as that without the existence of that event they would not themselves have existed.

It is at once evident that the sphere of the immediate consequences of every event must be comparatively much smaller than that of the mediate. But on this account a view which should be confined only to the former would be very partial; and although it may be urged that the chain of mediate consequences is endless, and therefore incomprehensible by the eye, since each operation gives an impulse to another and a new one, we must remember that the imperfection of our nature imposes a limit, and by subjecting us to the thraldom of time, restrains our view to that which is already determined.

Moreover we have a standard of easy application by which the degrees of distance may be judged. Are all the circles which we form by throwing a stone into the water to be held uncertainly defined, because those on the verge gradually escape the eye?

The influence of the Reformation on the politics and intelligence of Europe belongs to the class of mediate consequences, and the National Institute, by proposing such a question, has shown the extent over which it is intended that

our inquiries should spread. It could not escape the proposers of the question that its chief interest lay in this very point—that on this very account it must needs be a proposition, the answer to which would bring a special ray of hope to the age in which *we* live. The distant results of every great revolution have deceived the expectations of the actors; and there is perhaps no higher gratification to the historian than to follow out the wonderful perplexities of the thread of events on which the fortunes of our kind depend. Submitting to its guidance he wanders on as in a labyrinth, which, amidst rocks and precipices, often opens to his view a landscape of surpassing beauty; and wrapped in wonder he catches amid the storm of ages the voice of Him who tells us, "that *His* ways are not our ways!"

Lift up your eyes then, ye whom in your turn Fate has appointed to be the witnesses, the actors, the victims, of a Revolution! Ye who have lost a father, a brother, a friend, alas! perhaps your all! On the funeral piles of the Inquisition, on the battle-fields of Mühlberg, of Nördlingen and Lützen, innocent blood flowed as freely as our own age has seen it flow! and yet the clouds at length dispersed, and the day-star shone down upon a peaceful and a better world. The horizon clears up now faster than then, and perhaps we ourselves may yet witness those better times which it was in that case the lot only of later generations to enjoy.

Although the original tendency of the Reformation was very far from political, the intimate connexion which in those days subsisted between Church and State rendered it unavoidable, that, as its influence widened, such a tendency should rapidly be acquired. It is true that at the commencement of the sixteenth century those relations were no longer in their full force, which during the preceding period had knit the whole of Western Europe as it were into one empire, composed of a number of princes whom the pope either held or claimed to hold, as vassals to the spiritual supremacy of his office. The temporal authority which had been established by Gregory the Seventh was already broken down, not only by the disobedience and boldness of many of these spiritual sons of the Church, but, and that perhaps in a still greater degree, by the errors of the Roman see itself. A

schism of seventy years, (1378—1449), at one period of which two popes, at another three, were busied in excommunicating each other, had rendered the Christian world disaffected, and had caused the assemblage of those general councils which asserted the fatal doctrine of their authority even over the head of the Church. But notwithstanding this, Church and State were far too closely interwoven throughout the Christian world, to allow of any change being wrought in the former which should not recoil on the latter. Although continual opposition was made to the claims of the pope to be recognised as arbitrator in secular matters, still by the spiritual jurisdiction of his office, and in several other ways, he exercised many most important rights, without denying which a Reformation could hardly even be imagined. As soon therefore as a measure of this kind were set afoot and began its necessary interference, the princes could not remain unmoved—neutrality was out of the question—and they were compelled to declare themselves either for or against it. In the latter case they set themselves in opposition to a party within their own dominions, to which oppression would unavoidably give a political character; in the former they became the direct adversaries of the pope, and in this, as in the other, the political tendency of the Reformation was soon decided.

The moment at which it assumed this form necessarily doubled its importance. When the Reformation broke out there was no longer any great moral interest which could influence politics and breathe into them a spirit of life. Italy, it is true, had been taught a more refined policy by the necessity of maintaining the balance among her states, and this had spread even beyond the Alps, but under the hands of Ferdinand the Catholic it had assumed the form of mere systematical deceit. The influence which the nations of Europe had up to that time exercised by their representatives, upon their own affairs, began either to disappear entirely, or to become weak and unimportant. What shall we say of the Spanish Cortes under Ferdinand and Isabella, and still more under their successors? What of the English Parliament under Henry the Eighth? What of the assembly of the States-general in France under Lewis the Twelfth? All the threads of political power were in the hands of some

few potentates who only abused their trust by spinning them into a web of wretched intrigue for the gratification of their own passions.—Whoever wishes for a proof of this, need only glance into the history of what passed in Italy at that time ; and especially at the senseless league of Cambray and its romantic consequences.

The nations of Europe looked on unmoved while this game of vice and folly was played at their expense ; and this apathy was seasonably timed for their own more easy subjection to despotism, as it accorded with the increased means of tyranny which the treasures of the New World, then first discovered, put at the disposal of their masters.

In order to awaken Europe from this moral slumber, there was wanted a *new and mighty interest* which should exercise a common influence over both people and princes ; and in contemplating which the meaner spirit of cabal, till then most honoured, should be forgotten. Such an interest, both as to novelty and greatness, the Reformation created ; and we thus obtain the proper point of view from which to estimate its political importance. Instead of the vulgar impulses of selfishness, Religion became the mainspring of politics ; and we soon find hardly any political interest which was not more or less a religious interest, hardly any political party which was not more or less a religious one, nay, hardly any war which was not in a greater or less degree a war of religion. It matters not how far philosophers may hold the doctrines for which men struggled to be right or wrong—the destinies of mankind depended upon their acquiring an interest in what was great and exalted ; and that religion *is* in practical effect both great and exalted, even the atheist, who scorns it in theory, must confess. It may be that, with the new interest which was here awakened, a host of prejudices and passions, which in partial instances led to error, was awakened also.—But this hindered not the progress of the whole !

To require that the human race should advance without interruption to its more perfect state, by the path which reason points out, is to mistake our nature, and to forget that we are not creatures of pure reason, but of reason mixed and alloyed with passion. It is difficult for individual man to tread that path, but for the crowd, which only approaches its object by circuitous ways, it is impossible.

FIRST PART.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE REFORMATION UPON THE INTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT STATES OF EUROPE.

GERMANY.

It was natural that the state in which the Reformation commenced should be the first to feel its consequences; but besides this, the internal condition of Germany was such as to make these consequences more violent here than elsewhere. The adherence of several of its princes to the Reformed doctrines facilitated the organization of a powerful party, which watched over their infancy, and prevented them from being crushed or set aside, in a manner which would have been impossible in any country less divided within itself. It is well known that the elector, Frederic the Wise, of Saxony, the ruler of the state in which Luther came forward, was the first who did the Reformation this service, although he was soon followed by others. It was thus at once made an affair of state; and by being soon after formally and openly treated as such, and brought, in 1521, before the diet of Worms for decision, it became so highly important in a political point of view, that its very condemnation could only serve to make it still more so.

At the time of Luther's appearance, Germany, as a state, was little more than a cipher in the political system of Europe. Full of strength within, it was yet unable to apply its power.—Its constitution, formed upon *prescription*, was scarcely better than a chaos. Even though the Golden Bull (1356) had sufficiently determined the relations between the head of the empire and the chief of its princes, who could say what the mutual rights of the emperor and the remaining states truly were? The degree of authority which he should possess was thus commonly dependent upon the character and personal power of the emperor. Under the long reign of Frederic III., who slumbered away above half a century upon the throne, (1440—1492,) this authority was nearly annihilated; and under that of Maximilian I., notwith-

standing the new institutions, it was, as regarded its own interests, but little augmented.

On the other hand, there was not one of the remaining princes of Germany whose power was sufficient to command respect. They lived more like patriarchs than princes; the ruler of a country appeared to be little more than the chief proprietor in it. Moreover, there was scarcely a prospect that any house would be able to raise itself to sudden eminence. The undivided transmission of property was observed only in the electoral states: in the others, according to custom, the lands of the father were divided among his sons; and, as their marriages were often blessed with even too rich an abundance, it was difficult for a single family to amass any great and secure possessions in land. This weakness of individuals necessarily rendered the power of the whole body inconsiderable. It is true the princes met at the diets to discuss their common interests; but Frederic III. had not even been at the trouble of once attending these meetings in person; and his son, whose numerous projects required proportionate funds, came, for the most part, only to harass the states for supplies. In fact, if the impetuous advance of the hereditary foes of Christendom, who had for fifty years been securely settled in the east of Europe, had not frequently compelled the Germans to make common cause against them, there seems to be no reason why the bands of the empire should not have been wholly dissolved.

It was the Reformation, and the Reformation alone, which suddenly breathed new life into this decaying body, and gave it the political importance which it has since possessed. Many of the German princes soon declared in its favour (whether from conviction or on other grounds it matters not); while, on the other hand, the new sovereign of the empire found it in accordance with his interests to condemn it. Charles V. soon discovered that in the advocates of the Reformation he had to deal with a party which was forming against himself; and although his original repugnance to the Protestant doctrines, as they now began to be termed, may perhaps have been founded upon religious conviction, yet the hatred which he entertained towards them soon became purely political. Charles V., however, was not the

man to allow himself to be blinded by passion; it was to him only the groundwork of a project which soon occupied his whole attention, as far as it was directed to the government of Germany, and the design of which was to maintain and increase the imperial power by the suppression of the party opposed to him. As soon, however, as this party perceived their danger, a closer alliance, among the Protestant princes and states, was the natural consequence.

Thus, after the league of Smalcald, (1530,) both parties stood, prepared for war, awaiting the contest; nor would this have been so long delayed, had not the emperor been engaged upon some other of his numerous undertakings. When, at length, a lapse of sixteen years had brought matters to the point he wished, and he fairly took the field, (1546,) the result showed that the courage of his opponents was not equalled by their abilities; while the issue of the battle of Mühlberg (1547) seemed to exceed even his boldest hopes. He had scarce, however, begun to enjoy the fruits of his victory, when the daring hand of a stripling tore from his grey head the laurels which a few days sufficed to lose, but which it had taken a life of labour to collect; and Maurice, by the treaty of Passau, (1552,) dispelled all the dreams of ambition in which Charles had so long revelled.

Such, in a few words, was the progress of events which occurred in the German empire at this momentous crisis, and which determined its future fate. But even then Germany had ceased to be the Germany of olden times. The new and mighty interest which had been awakened, produced a corresponding change in the politics of the empire. Its princes had learnt to estimate their power; they had found themselves in a position which obliged them to call it into action; and, although the preliminary treaty of Passau, confirmed as it was by the subsequent peace, concluded, 1555, at Augsburgh, had secured equal constitutional rights to both the new and the old party, it was impossible that they should relapse into their former indolence, and with it, into their former political nonentity. Although the words of peace were on men's lips, they had not put away resentment and distrust from their hearts; the new energy which the Reformation had imparted to politics remained in full force; the two parties watched each other ready armed for

a struggle; or if they laid aside their weapons for a moment, it was only to resume them upon the first appearance of danger.

Besides this, the previous peace had been procured too cheaply to allow of its being durable. Great revolutions are not to be decided by the struggle of a moment; and more than this the fortunate attempt of Maurice can hardly be considered. Notwithstanding the peace, Germany resembled the sea while still heaving from the effects of a storm, and for a long time it remained under the influence of revolutionary feelings, which promised a new explosion at every moment; indeed, were it not for the explanation, which is afforded by the personal characters of the three immediate successors of Charles V., history could scarcely present a more extraordinary phenomenon than the continuance of this state of things down to the year 1618, when the thirty years' war at length broke out. The treaty of Westphalia, which concluded it, finally and fully decided the strife between the two parties, and gave to the German empire that constitution, which, down to our own times, has been considered the palladium of its existence.

Thus to the Reformation and its consequences the German body owes the form which it has since assumed, and the vital spirit by which it is animated. It was scarcely conceivable that such a political body, comprising as it did so many and such different states, should for a length of time be kept in activity by any one common interest. For such a purpose what point of union should we have been inclined to select? A desire of aggrandizement, or at least of a powerful influence over the affairs of foreign nations? Such a desire could not exist in a state which, although amply endowed with means of resistance, possessed scarce any of attack.—Perhaps a common commercial interest? Germany had no such interest, nor could have, owing to its geographical position and its division into small states. There remains therefore but one—that which depended upon the necessity of a common resistance to attacks from without. History however shows, by abundant instances, that such causes are transitory, and that with them the interest they call up must pass away also; and the history of Germany in particular has shown how easy the enemies of the

empire found it to acquire friends in a state so composed, and to make war upon Germans by the assistance of Germans. The internal union of this body of states was, therefore, nothing but a slow and lingering disease; which, while it maintained a show of health in its subject, was on that account preparing it the more surely, either for total dissolution, or for subjection—it matters not whether to its own superior, or to a foreigner—but in both cases for its destruction.

It was only by a *Spirit of Disunion* that it could be fairly roused into life; and this the Reformation produced by giving separate and peculiar interests to the Protestant and Catholic parties. It cannot be denied that it was impossible accurately to foretell what the consequences of these divisions might be. The interference of foreign powers in the contest appeared, as in fact it was, inevitable; a concurrence of fortunate circumstances, however, averted the consequences which were thus threatened, and that often more successfully than could have been expected. Moreover, if the separate interests of the two parties had been of such a nature as to render it impossible that they should become subservient to the interests of the empire, or, still worse, if they had been opposed to it, a total dismemberment might have been the result. Luckily, however, this was not the case; neither interest contained in itself any thing contrary to the rights of the head of the empire, or of the individual states: they centred upon the subject of religion and the rights connected with it; and, after abundance of feud and warfare, it was sufficiently ascertained by experience, that the establishment of the Corpus Evangelicorum—which did not receive its definite form till long after the thing itself had existed (1653)—tended to no irremediable division between the diet and the empire. On the contrary, the mutual watch which the two parties kept upon each other, and the constant attentiveness which they showed, often with good reason, sometimes in a degree almost ridiculous, to the slightest advances of their antagonists, afforded a warrant for the maintenance of the German Constitution, at least in its principal parts, which could certainly not have been furnished in any other way. From this more elevated point of view, all those dissensions, debates, and wars, which the Reformation produced in the interior of this body, ap-

pear in a more gentle light; they are reckoned only as the means to an end; and if it was the Reformation which at its commencement breathed new life into the empire, it was the Reformation also which for a long time maintained this life and assured its political existence.

AUSTRIA.

The house of Austria—which of all the dynasties of modern times has lost and won the most—was the first to found its political schemes upon the disturbances of the Reformation. Fate presented it at this crisis with a prince who was superior to all his contemporaries in political talent, and at least equal to any of them in power. It requires abilities of a rare kind to make their possessor feel at home in a new order of things such as a revolution is apt to produce. A great genius alone is capable of rising above the routine of previous experience and custom, and of calculating the combinations by which its measures are to be directed. But however willing we may be to do justice to the political talents of Charles V., it was impossible that he should from the first be able to foresee the course which these violent revolutions would take, at least by any direct process of calculation.

The relation in which he stood to the pope, as Protector of the Church, made him from the beginning an opponent of the Reformation; but his political designs in Germany were not formed till he found in the league of Smalcald (1530) a party armed in direct opposition to himself. The maintenance of the respect due to the majesty of the empire required that this should be suppressed; but then its suppression, even though the existing forms of the constitution should be observed, could hardly be effected without the introduction of absolute power into Germany. That this plan was frustrated, and in a way which no previous calculations could have determined, has been already observed; but still the new doctrines were not the less important as regarded the organization of the Austrian monarchy, even though it did not play a prominent part in the game.

We may remark here, that in the hereditary duchy of Austria, the power of the reigning house became nearly absolute—while that of the states was reduced to a mere shadow—by the suppression of the Protestant party under

Ferdinand II. It derived also the greatest possible advantage from the use which it made of the religious disturbances in Hungary and Bohemia. The house of Hapsburg may thank the Reformation for the opportunities which it afforded them of converting both these states from electoral into hereditary dominions; and of rearing in the latter an absolute sovereignty on the ruins of their ancient national freedom. When the battle of Prague (1620) left the rebellious nation a prey to the tyranny of its conqueror, the moment was not let slip. It was robbed of its privileges, and Bohemia became in FACT an hereditary kingdom, although politicians were still left to dispute whether it should be *called electoral* or not.

The fate of Hungary, although not so immediately decided, was not less owing to the religious disputes of the Reformation. The new doctrines found so ready an admittance here, that the supporters of them soon formed a counterpoise to those of the older creed, and at length, by the peace of Vienna (in 1606) and the capitulation of king Matthias (1608), obtained not only the free exercise of their religion, but, by the latter event, equal political rights with them. The history of Hungary, however, has made it sufficiently known how little the collisions of party were put an end to by these concessions; how little the promises made to the Protestants were observed; how advantage was taken of the excitement which prevailed to introduce foreign troops, and, notwithstanding all remonstrance, to maintain them in the country; and, lastly, how systematically the most crying oppression was practised, till at length (1670) produced conspiracies, the extinction of which necessarily augmented the power of the government. The web of strife, however, was not yet broken off, and its meshes had so thoroughly entangled the Protestant contests with those of Transylvania and the Porte, that it is almost impossible to follow out the separate threads. The dealings with the Protestants, however, evidently formed the groundwork of the tissue. Preparations were thus gradually made for the step which was at length (1687) successfully taken, and the electoral kingdom became hereditary. Nor were the advantages which Austria thus obtained the less important because Hungary has hitherto resisted, with tolerable success, all the attempts which have been made to overturn its remaining rights as a nation.

However little cohesion, then, there may be between the different parts, in themselves so powerful, which compose this monarchy, it chiefly owes to the Reformation, and to the manner in which its consequences were applied, whatever unity and internal stability it possesses. The late changes in Europe have increased its power, both by extending its dominions, and by teaching it how to apply its resources. It has now[1] no distant territory to protect; but placed as it is in continual opposition to powerful adversaries, and deprived of the outworks which formerly guarded it, it must make the best use of those advantages to which the Reformation prepared the way, in order to maintain the proud station which it at present occupies.

PRUSSIA.

The foundation of the Prussian monarchy was one of the earliest works of the Reformation. It was doubtless beyond mortal power to foresee that so noble a structure should ever be raised upon it. Such a result required a concurrence of fortunate circumstances, and a taskmaster to guide the work, such as hardly any state could show within the annals of a like period of time. And yet the thing is so—without the Reformation, Europe would have had an elector of Brandenburgh, but no king of Prussia. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, Prussia was still under priestly dominion, being attached to the Teutonic order which had conquered it; and which, with its grand master, continued to govern it. But scarcely had the new doctrines spread themselves, and pointed out a way by which spiritual princes might render their power hereditary, than Albert, grand master of the Teutonic order in Prussia, and a scion of the house of Brandenburgh, made the first successful attempt of this kind.

As early as the year 1525 he secularized his dominions, and formed them into an hereditary duchy, though as a fief of Poland, and became by his marriage the founder of a line, of which the last female descendant, Anne, espoused John Sigismond, then electoral prince of Brandenburgh, and afterwards elector. When Prussia came into the possession of the electoral house of Brandenburgh, it was still a fief; but by the treaty of Wehlau, (1657,) and more fully

[1] It must be remembered that this was written in 1802. Tr.

by the peace of Oliva, (1660,) it was declared a sovereign principality, and its feudal tenure was done away; in 1701 it was raised to a kingdom, and stepped, or at least gradually advanced, into the first rank of European powers.

Although the Reformation, however, was the means, as we have shown, of laying the first stone of the Prussian monarchy, it cannot be said that it conduced greatly to its further erection, unless we are prepared to consider the acquisitions, which it made at the peace of Westphalia, as resulting from that event.

The Reformation has, in fact, exercised a much smaller influence on the double part which Prussia has played in foreign policy, both as one of the powers of Europe, and as one of the first states in the German empire, than is commonly supposed. The causes of this may be sufficiently gathered from the short chronological sketch which we have just given. During the whole period throughout which the interests of religion continued to act as a mainspring in European politics—that is, down to the peace of Westphalia, and the time of Lewis XIV., the house of Brandenburgh was still too weak to exercise any decisive influence upon the German body, to say nothing of Europe at large. As it gradually after this acquired strength under the great elector and its two first kings, the Reformation, as we shall hereafter have to observe, lost all political power, and a new interest took its place. The second, and minor game, which Prussia had to play in the empire, was to maintain the balance against Austria. But Prussia did not fairly become the rival of Austria till the conquest of Silesia by Frederic II., and their relative position was wholly uninfluenced by religion. Besides, although Prussia or Brandenburgh was one of the most powerful, and finally the most powerful, of the Protestant states, it cannot be considered as the head of that party. This pre-eminence belonged, as is well known, from the first, to Saxony; and when Prussia became the more powerful of the two, the matter was no longer of consequence, since this *party*, although it retained the forms of one, was fast losing its essential character as such.

FRANCE.

It was chiefly from Switzerland that France derived its share of the Reformation; and although it was thus influ-

enced rather by the doctrines of Zwingle than those of Luther, yet the political sphere of these two reformers was so nearly the same, that it would be impossible to define that of the one without ascertaining that of the other also. In no other country of Europe, not even in Germany, had the Reformation been so speedily advanced as in Switzerland. The energetic character of these mountaineers leads them to a rapid decision; and the more confined the ideas of a race of herdsmen may be, the more earnestly do they cling to those which they have once adopted. While in Germany the two parties were still engaged with capitulations, the civil war broke out in the cantons, (1530,) and seemed to threaten a total dissolution of the confederacy. Fortunately, however, a short struggle sufficed to produce a lasting peace; and although the mutual hatred of the parties did not immediately pass away, it was not again thought necessary to shed blood for its satisfaction. Bitter feelings gradually subsided; public attention became directed to other subjects; and the enviable fate of this country, which general opinion seemed to agree in considering holy and inviolable, removed it from a participation in the affairs of the rest of Europe, which might easily have lit up the flame of discord anew.

The numerous relations which existed between Switzerland and France, afforded peculiar facilities of access to the Reformation from this quarter; could it have been expected then that a nation, which perhaps may be said to exceed all others in the quick perception of ideas, should long remain indifferent to it? Francis I., however, knew too well how much the kingly power had to fear from a party whose church principles were almost purely democratic, to allow of his encouraging it; the oppression and persecutions of his son gave it consistency, and prepared it for resistance; and when under his weak descendants it lent itself to the ambitious purposes of men in power, it assumed the character of a formidable opposition. The history of the bloody wars which were thus prepared, and which occupied the latter half of the sixteenth century, down to the edict of Nantes, (1562—1598,) is so well known that we need not do more than allude to them; the permanent influence which they exercised upon the political condition of France, is, however, too important to be passed over. This influence

may be considered under two points of view, and these in apparent opposition to each other. It prepared the way on the one hand for the absolute power of the king, and yet on the other it seems, even after the fall of its party, to have maintained a spirit of resistance in the nation.

It is a common phenomenon in great monarchies, that the power of the government does not become firmly established, and either wholly, or in great part, absolute, till it has undergone a struggle with some strong party in opposition to it. At the moment when such a party has been suppressed or disarmed, every thing is open to the sovereign; and even the remaining props of national liberty may be easily put aside. In France the government found such an opposition as we describe, in the party of the Hugonots. It is true that it was the government itself, which by its persecutions, its duplicity, and utter cruelty, converted a friendly *sect* into a *party* of political opponents. This cannot be denied—the cry of death which was raised on St. Bartholomew's night, and echoes to all ages, is too strong an evidence of this; but still an unprejudiced observer must confess, that the foundation of any stable government in France must needs have remained impossible, as long as this party continued to hold arms in its hands.

The edict of Nantes had undoubtedly softened down their violence:—on such fearful storms as had here raged, a period of calm must at any rate follow—; but the events which occurred after the murder of Henry IV. served to show how formidable the Hugonots still were.

It was difficult for any great and effectual measures of government to be carried through without coming in contact with them; for such a party cannot for any time exist without involving its own interests with the interests of the state, in such a multiplicity of ways as to afford abundance of real, or, what is in effect the same, imaginary points of excitement. The struggle which Richelieu maintained against the Hugonots was, therefore, a necessary struggle, if any permanent order of things was to be established in France: he wished to disarm but not to extirpate them; and the condition in which they were left by the peace of Rochelle, (1629,) was such as, in accordance with law, they ought to have been placed in; although, at the same

time, no one will pretend to extenuate the persecutions in which the intolerance of subsequent governments led them to indulge, down to the revocation of the edict of Nantes.

But in proportion as we find it easy to show the truth of our first remark, do we find it difficult to adduce historical proof of the other, its apparent contradiction, viz. that the maintenance of a spirit of resistance in the people was owing to the Hugonot party. It is not however the less true on this account: for in the first place, we cannot doubt that such fearful disturbances as those which were caused by the religious disputes in France, must have left traces in the national character which could not easily be effaced. But, besides this, history has not left us without proofs. It is well known that, after the time of Richelieu, the spirit of opposition which had been raised, passed into the parliament of France. The degree of influence which the Reformation exercised in this case cannot be clearly determined without lengthened details. But it would be difficult to deny such an influence altogether, since by the edict of Nantes the Protestants were allowed a share in the counsels of this body—although their admittance is neither the only nor the principal source, to which we should seek to refer it. Of this, as of their other rights, the Protestants were again deprived by the revocation of the edict; but the spirit of the party was not destroyed by its suppression; it acquired new life, with such modifications only as the change of times rendered necessary, under the garb of Jansenism. A full development of its progress is beyond the limits of this treatise; but we may observe, that the history of literature shows plainly enough that this party derived warmth and vigour from the flame, which the learned disputes of the Protestants and their opponents had kindled in the theology of France. These debates were succeeded by others which produced the great catastrophe of our own day, and by which the Reformation and its political consequences were thrown into the background; but on that account became, in the full sense of the word, more peculiarly the property of history.

ENGLAND.

The Reformation was of still more importance to England than to France; the new doctrines were triumphant here,

as they were, and continued to be, suppressed there; and these two nations—the antipodes of each other in so many respects—were destined to a still wider difference by disagreeing on this point. The important consequences which resulted to the two countries, in their relation to each other, and to Europe in general, from this circumstance, belong to the second division of our subject; we have here only to consider the effects thereby produced upon England itself.

The progress of the Reformation was of a peculiar kind in this country, as we might expect from its insular character. Henry VIII. viewed it only as a means of gratifying his passions and serving his personal interest, and as such, in fact, he used it; but a tyrant, who was guided by the whim of the moment, and incapable of forming any permanent scheme, could not employ it with the ability of Charles V.; while by his supremacy he exercised a more violent despotism over the conscience and opinions of his subjects than the pope would ever have dared to attempt. During the short reign of his son and successor, Edward VI., (1547—1553,) the Reformation was really introduced; but as the bigoted intolerance of his sister Mary (1553—1558) again overturned the feeble and scarce completed edifice, it was reserved for the long and well-conducted reign of Elizabeth (1558—1603) to lay its foundation anew, and upon more secure ground.

The Articles of belief in England were changed; the supremacy of the Roman see was shaken off; but in other respects the framework of the hierarchy was left untouched. By the act of supremacy, renewed under Elizabeth as it had first been passed under Henry, the king stepped into the place of the pope; and this supremacy was probably the chief advantage which accrued to the crown from the Reformation. In times when religion was so inseparably connected with politics, such unlimited spiritual dominion necessarily tended, in substance if not in form, to render the temporal power unlimited also; and the "High Commission" of Elizabeth gives a sufficient example of the uses to which it might be applied. Again, as the Head of the Church required instruments by which it might act as such, the existent hierarchy was left almost unaltered in its ancient form. The Episcopal Church was thus established; which received its definite rule of faith for the first time under

Elizabeth (1571). The English Church, therefore, was distinguished by the peculiarity of its organization in retaining the higher spiritual orders—the archbishops and bishops—with seats and voices in the Upper House. In this manner the hierarchy remained interwoven with the constitution; and the question which we are interested in answering here, regards the value and consequences of this institution to the state.

It was the belief, very naturally resulting from the king's supremacy, that the hierarchy would prove a firm support to the throne at its head, which preserved that body; a belief which afterwards furnished the Stuarts with their favourite maxim: "No bishop, no king." Nevertheless, the connexion asserted in this sentence is by no means so directly evident as to make it unreasonable to inquire whether it had any truth at bottom, or was merely the product of fanaticism.

The political power of the bishops, and their direct influence upon the state through the House of Lords, is too insignificant to have been much relied on. If we are, therefore, to attribute any meaning to the above expression, it must be this: that by uniting the interests of the heads of the church with those of the crown, it was designed, that not only their support, but that of the people itself, should be secured. The political importance of the bishops, therefore, depended upon their influence with the people. And consequently, as soon as the schismatics had acquired strength, and formed themselves into a religious, and as such, into a political party, experience showed that the bishops, although nominally the props of the throne, were but a feeble support. They fell with it, and they were restored with it.

As regards the general question, how far the hierarchy of a state may be called the safeguard of the throne, this must depend chiefly upon the spirit of the times; since by it their influence over the minds of the people is determined. In times of religious fanaticism this may be very great, and the permanence of the throne may be inseparably linked with that of the hierarchy. The progress of events, however, gradually dissolves these ties; and the throne of Great Britain at present rests upon very different support from that of the hierarchy, which is neither important, nor inviolable, except as forming an integral part of the constitution.

But if the Reformation on the one hand laid the foundation of an increase of the kingly power in England, it did not do this without creating a disaffected party on the other; which, when the helm of state passed into a less experienced grasp, was the means of raising a storm under the violence of which the throne gave way, and for a long time remained prostrate.

In times like those such a Reformation as that in England, which was in a certain sense only half a Reformation, was necessarily a dangerous undertaking. A period of revolution will not submit to partial measures, because it is a period of fanaticism. What else then could be expected, than that, in the eyes of the *pure* reformers, the remaining framework of the hierarchy should be deemed an abomination? that Episcopalians and Catholics should be held to differ in little except in name? And when the Church of England was finally guarded about by limits which excluded all other communions from a participation, not only in it, but in the most important political rights, how could it be otherwise than that a contest should ensue? Then, as the religious principles of the insurgents were purely democratic, what was more natural than that the fate of the hierarchy should include that of the throne?

Considered from this point of view, the events of the English revolution, which are too well known to require any further notice, appear in their proper light, as one connected whole. With the restoration of the throne the dominant church was restored also; but when, by the famous Toleration Act of William III., (1688,) the penal laws against the Dissenters were removed, they could no longer form a political party. With the Catholics it was no doubt different; but their number in England was too small to cause apprehension. There may certainly be times, and there have been in England, when the introduction of a Test Act may be necessary; but whether its continuance conduces most to security or danger, is a question which I shall leave others to answer. However this may be, the general interests of Great Britain remained inseparably connected with the Reformation; and by it, after one of the most wonderful revolutions of destiny, the throne was opened to that family under whose glorious dominion England witnessed the ap-

pearance of what may, in every sense of the word, be termed her golden age.

But while speaking of the mistress of the sea, let me be allowed to throw a glance upon that neighbouring island, which having been subject to her for centuries, has been deluged with blood, whenever it has dared to shake the fetters which bound it. While the Reformation spread its blessings, sooner or later, over other lands, Ireland appears to have been destined only to feel its curse. The wounds which it dealt here, were too deep to be scarred over; and even since the efforts of a more liberal policy have been directed to their cure, it must be left to time to decide whether the means applied will be sufficient.

Long before the Reformation, the inhabitants of Ireland had been expelled from part of their possessions by English colonists; and a hatred of their conquerors had been engendered, to which the Reformation gave new vigour. The Irish remained Catholic, if for no other cause than that their oppressors were Protestant.

Being again plundered of a considerable portion of their lands, when James I. sent over a new host of colonists, their disaffection was increased; and during the civil wars under the hapless Charles, a fearful insurrection broke out, (1641,) which cost above a hundred thousand of the Protestants in Ireland their lives, and went near to exterminate them altogether.

The civil war now raged for ten years without interruption, till it gave Cromwell a pretext for new acts of injustice, the real object of which was to reward his soldiers. Maltreated, plundered, and hunted into a corner of the island, the Irish saw three parts of their country in the hands of strangers. But even thus the measure of their unhappiness was not yet full. The same revolution which restored, and improved, the English constitution, and secured the national freedom, was to the ill-fated Irish a source of new persecutions, and of final subjection. When William III. had established his authority here with the sword, (1691,) the miserable remnant of their lands was torn from them by proscription; and what was even worse than this, a *legal* despotism was soon after established, such as no other country of Europe has ever witnessed. By the statutes of Anne, (1703,) the Catho-

lics, as long as they adhered to their religion, were incapable of holding land either in freehold or lease, and were denied the means of public education.

In other countries where the subject was the bondsman of his master, care at least was taken of him, and sustenance supplied. Personal freedom was left to the Irish, that it might become a burden and a curse to them. By an organized system of oppression, the people were reduced to a horde of brutal paupers; and the consequences were such as might have been expected. The Irish revenged themselves whenever they could, and their revenge was that of barbarians, because they had been made such. It was in vain that under George III. a less inhuman system of government began to improve whatever still admitted of improvement; in vain that the independence of America released Ireland from her commercial fetters (1782); a feeling of misery so long endured is not to be forgotten within a few years; the traces of such deeply-impressed barbarism are not wont to disappear in a single generation.

The revolution of our own day found Ireland in that convulsive state into which it had been thrown by those of former times, and while still under this influence it was exposed to a new and bloody crisis, which was followed by the Union, in 1800.

By this measure the two countries were formed into one state, and the Irish parliament incorporated with that of Great Britain. It does not appear, however, that its beneficial results will be fully developed till the political equality of the Catholics and Protestants of Ireland shall have been finally established, by the admission of the former into parliament.[1]

THE UNITED NETHERLANDS.

While other states were either shaken or new-modelled by the Reformation, there was one which was created by it.

[1] It is now six years since the emancipation of the Catholics—thus spoken of by Prof. Heeren twenty-seven years before it took place—was resorted to as a preferable alternative to civil war. Had it been the free gift of the legislature, instead of being extorted by the threat of rebellion, the merits of the measure might have been more fairly tried. As it is, however, the Catholics of Ireland appear to have forgotten the measure itself in their triumph at the mode in which it was obtained, and instead of developing, as our author hoped, the beneficial effects of the Union, the passing of the Catholic Relief bill is likely to prove the means of defeating it altogether. Tr.

From the midst of its disturbances the republic of the United Netherlands came forth like a bright star between the pauses of the storm; while, by the mode of its origin, its fate became inseparably connected with the Reformation; and its fall or maintenance dependent upon the fall or maintenance of Protestantism. By the course of events, this republic was almost immediately involved in the most intricate windings of the general politics of Europe; nay, it was so placed as gradually to give them a new direction. Under this most interesting point of view we shall consider it in the next division of our treatise; here we must be allowed to cast a glance upon the influence of the Reformation on its internal constitution.

The founders of this state had, at first, no thoughts of forming a republic. In fact, how could such a project have arisen in an age when there were no republican ideas abroad in Europe? Their views were of far narrower compass; they only sought the maintenance of their old rights and privileges, which were threatened by the despotism of Philip II., and especially by the introduction of the Inquisition.

Fifteen years were thus allowed to elapse from the beginning of the disturbances in 1566, before the Netherlanders formally shook off their allegiance to Philip II., and put it beyond his power to end the quarrel by concession. Even then, however, they had become so little accustomed to the idea of a republic, that they seemed to think it their immediate duty to look about them for a foreign master, requiring only that he should respect their ancient rights and privileges. First they applied to France, then to England —and it was only when Francis of Alençon had clearly proved his incapacity for such an office, and Elizabeth had on grounds of higher policy declined it, that they became republicans—merely because they had no other resource. Their old notions, however, appear still to have been their only guides; and in pursuance of them they established that shapeless confederacy, in which they did not themselves clearly know who was the sovereign. The maintenance of the rights of the states in the several provinces was considered the most important object to be attained; the central government formed itself as circumstances allowed or required; and the republic would have gained but little firmness from it, if amidst many and great deficiencies it had not possessed

the one advantage of allowing free scope to the individual activity and genius of her great men.

In such a state of things, the Reformed religion, although it was the main cause of the insurrection, and, when established as the national mode of worship, the foundation of the republic, could exercise no direct influence upon its further organization. But as the whole existence of this state was grounded on the Reformation, and as it was to religious enthusiasm that its citizens owed their heroic spirit, we must not be astonished that the bigotry of Protestantism was no where else carried so far, or so deeply rooted, as here. The consequence of this was, that the Protestant clergy had much more easy access to the springs of public opinion in this than in any other country; and thus acquired the means of exercising a considerable influence upon the affairs of the state;—an influence of which the history of the republic affords but too many traces. The twelve years' truce of 1609 had no sooner afforded a short period of repose, than the clergy were busy in lighting up the flames of party violence; and Arminians and Gomarists persecuted each other with the same animosity as the Protestants and Catholics had in former times displayed. It is well known by what ties these religious differences became connected with politics, and thus produced the first and bloody struggle between the party of the states and the Orangists. No sooner was it apparent that the doctrines of Arminius found their chief supporters in the higher and more educated classes, and among the members of the states, than Maurice of Orange declared himself for the opposite and orthodox party, and at the head of the majority of the nation dared to bring Oldenbarneveld to the block (1619).

Although it was religion, however, which gave a pretext to the parties for a commencement of the feud, with which the subsequent history of this state is almost exclusively concerned, the true cause must be sought elsewhere. It lay in the very groundwork of their constitution, and it is only by a full explanation of this—a task beyond our limits—that it can be clearly pointed out.

SWEDEN.

In the four kingdoms which, as long as Poland existed, formed the north of Europe, the political consequences of

the Reformation displayed themselves in a very different manner. The most remote of these, by its situation, its religion, and, more than all, by the barbarous condition in which it was, lay beyond the influence of the storm. Of the other three, one owed its existence and its greatness—although transient—to the Reformation; another, its prosperity and its constitution; the third, dates its downfal from the same source. And thus we see that, in the moral as in the physical world, what is deadly poison to one often proves the means of saving life in another!

At precisely this epoch, while the Reformation was spreading in Germany with a rapidity which nothing could check, the north of Europe had arrived at the political crisis which determined its future fate. The Union of Calmar, the parent of so much discord and warfare, was dissolved; and Gustavus Vasa restored (1521) the throne of Sweden to its former independence. But notwithstanding his courage and the progress which he made, and in spite of the favourable position in which he was placed by the insurrection in Denmark and the expulsion of his rival, king Christian II., he yet found himself in a situation which secured to him rather the name than the power of a king. It cannot be denied, however, that Gustavus Vasa ranks among the greatest princes of all ages. He was not simply acquainted with the common turns of policy by which mere intriguers attain their end; but rising, as great men are wont to do, beyond the age in which he lived, he seems to have embraced ideas of public economy which may well excite our admiration, since, as they were then unknown to the rest of the world, they must have been the product of his own acuteness and ability. Even Gustavus Vasa, however, would scarce have found the resources with which his genius furnished him sufficient, had not the Reformation brought others to his assistance, upon which the foundations of his greatness may, in fact, be said to have rested. What, in truth, could the most talented prince have effected on a throne, the income of which did not supply a third part of its necessary expenditure, and in a country where a powerful nobility stood side by side with a still more powerful body of clergy, whose possessions had swallowed up the lands of the crown, and which was likely to find that a

native sovereign would not prove the best instrument for securing and extending its usurpations? Under such circumstances, a mind of even moderate capacity would have perceived that the Reformation afforded the best means of securing the stability of the government; but the difficulty in this, as in all other cases, lay in the execution; and here it was that the superior genius of Gustavus displayed itself. Too weak in himself, he succeeded in gaining over the nobility by the prospect of large acquisitions from the forfeited estates of the clergy; and with this support he was enabled to meet the decisive crisis which was brought on at the diet of Westerås, (1527,) and which terminated in the submission of the clergy and the resignation of their estates into the hands of the king, to be disposed of as he thought fit. Conspiracies and tumults, set afoot in distant parts of the kingdom, remained the only, and impotent means, by which they sought to avenge themselves.

Thus the Reformation also established a new order of things in Sweden, though without taking from the clergy their rights as an estate of the realm; and exercised a decisive influence upon the fate of this kingdom, and through it upon that of the North, and even for a considerable time upon Europe in general. There now wanted only the hereditary succession of the crown, which Gustavus Vasa likewise introduced, to put means at the disposal of the kings of Sweden, by which they might attain to a *supremacy of the North*, which would in turn affect the rest of Europe. The Reformation, while it made them masters in the North, opened the way to them, as its champions, of acquiring the *supremacy of Europe*. Supported by their own genius, they played this exaggerated part for a longer time than the state of their resources would have led us to expect. The consequences, which resulted from this, will be more fully developed in the part of our work which treats of the influence of the Reformation upon the political balance of Europe.

DENMARK.

The internal condition of Denmark bore, at this period, a great resemblance to that of Sweden. The nobles and priests were here also the ruling party, and gave to what was then an electoral kingdom, more the appearance of an

aristocracy than of a monarchy. The dissolution of the Union of Calmar, and the restoration of the Swedish throne, although considered as losses by Denmark, were yet, as soon as the possession of Norway was secured to it, perhaps as great advantages to this country as to Sweden itself.

The kings of Denmark had hitherto exhausted themselves in struggles, for the most part fruitless, to secure their dominion over Sweden; and the disadvantages of these wars were naturally, on that account, much greater to Denmark than to Sweden. By the dissolution of the Union of Calmar, the former was restrained within its true sphere; and after a few ineffectual attempts to extend itself beyond this, it was taught to prize that golden mediocrity, the maintenance of which has ever since proved the palladium of Danish prosperity.

The Reformation acquired its political importance in Denmark nearly in the same way as in Sweden. It was introduced very early, and by the confiscation of the estates of the clergy gave the first opportunity of extending the power of the crown. But although Christian III. accomplished this important object, the aristocracy was much less broken down in Denmark by the propagation of the new doctrines than it had been in Sweden, because it was here accomplished without the aid of a revolution. Moreover, the king was not only obliged to divide the estates of the clergy with the nobility, but to share them very unequally. He received for his share only the lesser half, the demesnes of the bishops; and even from this a considerable portion was deducted for the purpose of pious foundations. The project of converting the electoral into an hereditary succession was not in those days to be for a moment entertained; on the contrary, every change of government produced the exaction of harder conditions from the king. Denmark remained, therefore, even by its constitution, much behind Sweden. That which was rapidly effected in Sweden by a revolution, was slowly prepared here by the spirit of the times.

It required the enterprising reign of Christian IV., and the decisive superiority of the middle orders over the nobility, to obtain the adoption of that constitution which Frederic III. (1660) introduced, under a rare combination of fortunate circumstances, and with still rarer success in the result. The only fundamental articles of it, were the here-

ditary succession of the crown, and the maintenance of the Lutheran religion as that of the state.

POLAND.

The difference between the language of Poland and that of the other countries of western Europe, appeared to offer an obstacle to the progress of the Reformation, which could not easily be overcome. The Latin language, however, then almost universally adopted in writing, assisted the Reformation in this, as it did in many other difficulties; and, during the latter half of the fifteenth century, although somewhat later than in the other countries which we have mentioned, the new doctrines made steady and even bold advances here. Besides the evangelical communion, another, viz. that of the Socinians, was formally established in Poland, which, although it proceeded from the former, was not acknowledged by it, and was not openly tolerated even in Germany. The majority of the nation thus separated itself, under the common title of Dissenters, from the ancient Church, which was not, however, thereby deprived of its political rights, in the undisputed possession and exercise of which it was allowed for a considerable time to remain.

We might perhaps expect to find, that the introduction of this new body of ideas had assisted the march of national improvement, and that the rather, because the difference of opinion between the Socinians and the other Protestants appeared to call for the exercise of faculties, which would naturally tend to the enlargement of the mind. But as the new sects here neither were, nor had, in the beginning, any occasion to become, political parties, they were wanting in that principle of activity which gave them life elsewhere: and the Reformation stood for nothing more in Poland, than a change of some few abstract doctrines, which might be amply debated upon without making the debaters either wiser or more enlightened. There was here therefore a total absence of that wholesome ferment which the Reformation caused in other countries; and which, finally, after the grosser parts had been worked off, produced an aggregate of pure truths and enlarged views. The great body of the people was thus much less enlightened by the Reformation in Poland than elsewhere; and it was on that account a

very dangerous gift. The two parties hated while they tolerated each other; and there only wanted a spark to set men's passion on fire, and kindle such a flame as could be extinguished only under the ruins of the state.

This spark fell amongst them when Charles XII., a monarch of the *Lutheran* persuasion, invaded Poland as a conqueror, and formed a party in the country for the advancement of his own ambitious designs. Although this faction consisted in a small part only of Dissenters, it was sufficient that any of them supported it, to make their opponents consider the name of Dissenter synonymous with that of a partisan of Sweden; and the more confined their views, the more violent became the mutual hatred of the parties, which naturally pressed with greater force upon the supporters of Charles XII., as soon as he became incapable of defending them.

After the diet in the year 1717, when the Dissenters were first subjected to a spoliation of their public rights, the precedent was never left unemployed, even when there could be no longer question of a Swedish party in the state. The oppression of the Dissenters now became a political maxim; and, under the skilful direction of the Jesuits, it was pursued so far as to leave them nothing besides the memory of their former advantages, except fruitless petitions and complaints.

Thus the storm was prepared here only after it had subsided in other quarters; and the consequences were easily to be foreseen. In a country, the constitution and internal feuds of which had for a long time opened the way to foreign interference, these religious contests could not fail to be of fatal effect as soon as any neighbouring power learnt how to employ them. Catharine II. soon perceived the advantages which she might derive from them; and under the pretext of *protecting the Dissenters* laid the foundation (1766) of the Russian power in Poland.

Shall I describe the further series of events, the consecutive scenes of that national tragedy? Shall I recall the madness of the civil war, the insolence of the oppressor, the violation of the rights of the people, the persecutions, such as no nation has endured since the fall of Carthage? The cabinets of Europe have already too sore a testimony against

them, in the cries of the victim which they offered up in Prague as a sacrifice to their unhallowed policy.

The reader will rather turn his eyes in sorrow from that desolating scene, and let them rest upon the cheering prospect which is presented by the restoration, even though partial, of this shattered state, and its establishment under a better constitution.

THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF EUROPE.

The countries which we have hitherto mentioned complete the sphere over which the revolution of the sixteenth century extended its influence. Bursting forth in Germany, the central point of Europe, it shook all around it with the violence of an earthquake. Still, however, there were countries in this quarter of the world in which its impulse could not be felt; and it is the more interesting to examine these, because the Reformation, if not positively important, was negatively so to several of them.

While Russia, for the reasons which we have stated above, was uninfluenced by it in the east of Europe, Spain and Portugal were equally so in the west, and Italy in the south. The geographical situation of these countries will not afford a sufficient explanation of this phenomenon; mountains and plains are no barriers to the progress of opinion.

It is true, the strict vigilance of the Spanish government made it difficult for the new doctrines to gain admittance there; but in Italy the Inquisition held out no such terrors as in Spain; and who, moreover, will, in these days, doubt that all the bulwarks of spiritual and worldly policy are too feeble to restrain the current of ideas? The causes of it lie deeper, and can only be explained by the individual characters of these nations. The old religion was one evidently designed rather for the feelings than the reason of its followers; the new, while it rested every thing upon a change in doctrinal points, and withdrew all that might affect the senses from its form of worship, appealed for its influence to the understanding, and despoiled both fancy and feeling almost wholly of their idols. It was suited to the North, but not to the South. The calm and investigating spirit of the German nations found in it the nourishment which it required and sought for; and hence the geographical limits

of these, from the coasts of Scotland and Norway to the Helvetian Alps, formed in their chief extent the limits of the Reformation. The more vivid imagination and sensitive feelings of the people of the South, especially of the softer sex, found little to please them in its tenets. Who would seek to deprive the women of Spain and Italy of their Madonna and their saints? The attempt would be a vain one, or, if successful, with these accessories of religion, their consolation and their peace would vanish also:

Where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise.[1]

It was not, therefore, owing to the prohibitions of the government, but to the character of the nations themselves, that the Reformation found no support among them. Whether this was their gain or their loss can hardly now be a question. By their almost total exclusion from that great ferment of ideas, which in other countries of civilized Europe gave activity and life to the human intellect, they were thrown behind the general progress of this quarter of the world; and thus, while the example of Poland affords from amidst its ruins a warning, that patriotism and the most heroic spirit are but feeble supports to a nation, unless guided by national improvement, these countries teach the not less important truth, that it may not in the end prove so advantageous to a state to have escaped the storms of a revolution, as those who are the witnesses of it commouly believe.

SECOND PART.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE REFORMATION UPON THE GENERAL POLITICS OF EUROPE.

THE view which we have presented of the influence exercised by the Reformation upon the individual condition and constitution of nearly all the countries of Europe, will assist us in the more general consideration of its effects upon the *politics of Europe as a body.*

[1] (Ein wahn der uns beglückt
Ist eine wahrheit werth, die uns zu boden drückt.)

The interests which it called into life continued for a century and a half to act as the mainspring of European politics; and when, in the age of Lewis XIV., these gave way to others—those of commerce—their impulse was weakened only by degrees, and carried its operations even into the eighteenth century.

I propose to consider this extensive subject, in its main features at least, under three points of view. 1st, As to the organization of society in general. 2ndly, With regard to the political balance or mutual relations of the states. 3rdly, As to commerce and the colonial system.

I. *The effects of the Reformation upon the organization of society.*

It is impossible that an event of such great practical importance as the Reformation, should have taken place without causing considerable changes in the constitution of civil society. The fall of the papal hierarchy was of itself sufficient for this in the countries which adopted the new doctrines. But there were other and more distant consequences, which were at first perhaps beyond the reach of calculation.

The *first* and almost inevitable effect of the Reformation upon civil society in general, was, that *Religion became a part of the constitutional basis of all governments.* In the middle ages the Catholic religion was universally dominant, but the constitution was no where expressly founded upon it; there was no where a direct law that it should be the religion of the state; that its rulers should acknowledge no other. Although Dissenters were not tolerated, and heretics, as they were termed, were persecuted, this was no immediate affair of the state, but of the Church and its superior; if the state concerned itself in it, as in the case of the Waldenses in France, it was only at the desire of the latter. But when by the Reformation the interests of politics and religion became mutually involved, this condition of things was altered.

In the countries which had embraced Protestantism, the new religion was almost universally declared to be that of the state; not only were its professors alone allowed the free exercise of their rites, but many offices unconnected with religion, as well as the right of sitting in the assemblies of the nation, were confined to them; in many it was made a necessary condition of accession to the throne.

The same thing took place in the Catholic states; and wherever the question was doubtful it was formally determined by treaties and articles of peace, which were often dearly purchased.

It is true that the Christian religion is, by its doctrines, totally unconnected with politics. It merely inculcates submission to existing authority, and decides nothing, as to the constitution of states, with preference of any particular form. Nor did any of the parties into which its advocates were separated by the Reformation, introduce the subject into their doctrinal canons; and although the more democratical church government of the Lutherans, and especially of the stricter sects, appeared to be favourable to republicanism, this had no necessary connexion with the affairs of the state, nor could have, except under temporary circumstances.

Experience has, in fact, abundantly shown, that the most absolute monarchy, as well as the freest republic, are alike compatible either with Catholicism or Protestantism. The more unphilosophical, therefore, must that policy appear which required that one or other of these should form the basis of government, and thus breathed a spirit of intolerance into the nations of Europe, for which they have been obliged, even in our days, dearly to atone. Although heretics were no longer brought to the stake, was it not sufficiently degrading to be reduced into an inferior caste by the mere tenure of a few opinions? Was it not in the eye of reason more than strange that a man might or might not hold the lowest constable's office, in this place or that, according as he believed, or disbelieved, the doctrine of transubstantiation? An impartial observer, however, will attach less blame to those who established such institutions, than to those who allowed them to continue without any necessity. It is easy to perceive, that at the time of their origin they were the result of unavoidable circumstances. As soon and as long as religious parties combine a political character with their other and more peculiar one, it is under this character that the state must contemplate them; and the exclusion of religious Dissenters, if not from the state altogether, at least from all active share in its administration, may be a requisite security. But what was absolutely necessary at one time does not continue so for ever; and we might

therefore expect that the severity of these laws should have been gradually diminished, even though there might have been some hesitation in doing them away at once and altogether.

And yet it needed a new revolution to induce the adoption of these views by several of the first nations of Europe, and among them, by our own. And can any one acquainted with the progress of events expect that even now this example will be followed by all; even the *new* constitution of Spain strictly forbids the exercise of every form of worship except the Catholic. There certainly exists no truth more simple, than, that every one is justly entitled to adore his God after his own manner; and, that the state requires a religion, but not that it should be established as that of the state.[1] The simplest truths, however, are those of which men are in general least easily convinced, because they are usually opposed to prejudices, and still more because they clash with interests. But obstinately to refuse conviction even after they have become the prevalent ideas of the day, can be termed nothing else than to begin a contest with the spirit of the age, the issue of which will in all probability be fatal.

A *second* and not less general political consequence of the Reformation was, *The extension and increase of the power of the princes of Europe.*

We include this among the most general consequences, because it displayed itself not only in those countries which adopted, but also in those which rejected, the Protestant doctrines.

In the former this increase of power was derived from several sources. In the first place, the revenues of the princes were undoubtedly augmented by the confiscation of church property. But, with the exception of Sweden, this augmentation could hardly exercise any considerable influence upon the great states of Europe. This was partly owing to the character of the princes themselves; and partly to the absence of all those general ideas on political economy by

[1] It is here that the real question arises—If the state requires a religion, can this be better secured than by an established church? Professor Heeren seems to think that it can, but he has here treated the subject too vaguely to admit of our judging upon what grounds his opinion is formed. Tr.

which it might have been turned to advantage. Henry VIII., who was the chief gainer, dissipated his large revenues without aim or method. In Denmark the kings were obliged to resign the better portion to their nobility; and the majority of the German princes were noble-minded enough to apply the forfeited property of the Church to the foundation of useful establishments, especially of those for public education.

The fall of the hierarchy, however, was of itself sufficient to make way for an increase of power in the princes. From this time forth no exemptions could be claimed, no papal or episcopal jurisdiction exercised within their dominions, unless by their permission. Foreign interference, which had been so especially formidable to the weaker princes, now ceased altogether, and they were left sole masters over their own people. But the chief cause of their increase of power lay still deeper, and was common alike to the Catholic and the Protestant princes. The increased activity which the religious and political interests of the Reformation had called forth, necessarily tended to enlarge their sphere of action, even though there was no express provision to that effect introduced into the constitution. The influence of the Reformation in this respect upon the German princes, and upon the empire, has been noticed above. No previous sovereign of England had possessed such absolute power as Elizabeth; we have seen that the autocracy of the French monarchs was grounded upon the fall of the Hugonots; while the national freedom of Spain may be fairly said to have owed its ruin to the continual wars in which its kings were engaged, as defenders of the ancient faith, and to the *royal* Inquisition which they established.

In this way the Reformation created a new order of things in Europe. Its princes, by becoming masters of their own dominions, through the cessation of the feuds in which they had previously been engaged, found themselves in a situation to extend their views to other countries, and upon this foundation the subsequent structure of European politics was raised.

A *third* change, of great importance to the condition of civil society, was brought about, in the Protestant states at least, by the *altered position of the clergy*. It is true, that

even in these countries they had by no means wholly lost their political influence. The Reformation being in its fundamental character a *doctrinal* revolution, and the first question, in the half political, half theological, disputes to which it gave rise, being as to the admission or rejection of particular articles of belief, the divines became indispensable to the princes, and were frequently adopted as their counsellors, and even ministers, although with no direct title as such. It requires but a slight acquaintance with the history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to be aware of the pernicious consequences which resulted, in many instances, from the blind enthusiasm of these zealots, who were too frequently wont to consult their passions in the counsels which they gave. Still, however, an impartial judge will not deny that, on the whole, the clergy were brought nearer to their proper character of teachers of the people, by the Reformation; and even in Catholic states it can hardly now be doubted, that by the expulsion of the spiritual orders, especially of that of the mendicant-friars, a very considerable evil was removed.

It is true that another order took the place of these immediately on their destruction, which, like the growth of the ivy upon the oak, gradually wound itself round almost every branch of the European system, and was even powerful enough to bend many of them to its purpose; the society of the *Jesuits*, however, although it might not have arisen had the Reformation not taken place, yet owed its first progress to the missions in which it was concerned. Any attempt to point out the advantage which it afterwards derived from these, would be as vain as the expectation of those who believe that with the restoration of the order its former influence would be restored. The great law of the material world—that "bodies once moved do not return to the same place under the same conditions"—is equally binding upon the political. But, besides these, there were other effects of the Reformation upon society, which although more distant were also far more important; their visible connexion with religion being, however, slight, it must be judged of only by the results.

As it was the Reformation which first breathed a spirit of activity into men's minds, it was natural that this should

be directed to subjects in immediate connexion with it, and religion thus became the favourite topic of debate. But as with activity a feeling of independence and a fondness for inquiry were also produced, the powers which had been called into existence were soon engaged upon other pursuits; the horizon had been expanded in every direction; and amidst the freedom of opinion thus created, whatever bore upon civil society, its constitution, and perfection, became the subject of universal attention. In this, Protestantism was undeniably far advanced beyond Catholicism.

The great question, as to the relations in which the government and the people should stand to each other, received its first practical answer in the Protestant countries of Europe; and amidst all the modifications which the forms of their constitutions assumed, it was in them for the first time plainly perceived that the interests of the rulers and the subjects are one and the same. Up to the Reformation these had been formally distinct in all the great states of Europe; the people appeared to exist only that they might furnish taxes; the government, that it might indulge its caprices; even the internal policy of Lewis XII., although justly appreciated, was directed rather by his heart than his head, and remained in those times without imitators. But the Reformation, by restoring the freedom of men's minds, imparted to them a loftier character; and laid the foundations of that nobler political freedom, which may be as perfectly coexistent with the most absolute monarchy as with a republic; because it depends not upon the form of the constitution, but upon the spirit of the government and of the nation. The rejection of the maxim, that the people were to be considered merely as instruments, and the open acknowledgment on the part of the chief Protestant princes, that they enjoyed their dignity solely for the advantage of the people, gave rise to that more perfect system of political economy, by which, as a general feature, the majority of the Protestant states have been distinguished above the Catholic.

However absurd it would be to attempt to point out in the Protestant religion, the causes of the erection of such governments as those of Great Britian and of Prussia, it is equally certain that, without Protestantism, such constitutions and such modes of administration could never have been

formed. To it, in fact, belongs the first vigorous exertions of which the human intellect became capable, when it had shaken off the fetters which had so long crippled and restrained it. It is true, that these examples were not lost upon several of the Catholic states; but we may fairly say, that, when they discovered the need they had of such institutions, they resorted to their Protestant neighbours as possessing the models which they should imitate. Did not the immortal Colbert form his views upon the policy which he saw pursued in the Netherlands? Did not Joseph II. aim at rivalling the example set before him by Frederic the Great? Was not the progress of civil society among the small states of Protestant Germany far beyond that of Catholic Italy? Was there, before the time of Leopold II.,—who, by his institutions in Tuscany, opened a path which the character of the nation has prevented it from pursuing,—was there, I say, a single state in Italy of which it could be said, that its mode of government had become sensibly improved? It is in vain to seek an explanation of these phenomena in chance, or in the character of the princes. The means of acquiring knowledge and experience were too ample, the succession of princes too long, to allow of such solutions of the problem.

It was Protestantism which, although slowly, yet surely, shed these blessings over the human race. And if Great Britian has prevented the love of constitutional liberty from becoming wholly extinct; and, by its victory over the adverse elements of society, has become the model upon which, with certain varieties, the states of the continent are at this moment forming their governments, has not all this been produced by the same cause? Would Spain, even that Spain which most rigidly excludes Protestantism, ever have received her new constitution without it? And would not this very constitution have been, in all human probability, more usefully and excellently framed, had the light of Protestantism shone down undimmed upon her people?

II. *Effects of the Reformation upon the mutual relations of the states of Europe.*

All other changes which the Reformation may have produced in the social condition of the nations of Europe, have reference to the extension of their ideas, and are, therefore,

beyond the limits of this treatise. We proceed, then, to the examination of our second question: viz. In what manner did it acquire an influence upon the mutual relations of the states of Europe; or, in other words, upon the system of a political balance of power?

As this influence, however, was not always of the same importance, nor of the same kind, it is requisite to a clear view of the subject, that we should divide it into several periods. And we shall hereafter see, that, in almost every case, the middle and the end of the century afford data for our division; not merely in point of time, but according to distinctions in the subject itself. We shall thus have *five* periods, of which the first will embrace the times of Charles V. and Francis I., or the first half of the sixteenth century; the second, those of Philip II. and Elizabeth, or the latter half of the same century;—the third, those of Richelieu and Gustavus Adolphus, being that of the thirty years' war, or the first half of the seventeenth;—the fourth, those of Lewis XIV. and William III., or the second half of that century;—while the last, in which there is no need of accurate division, will take in the eighteenth century generally.

FIRST PERIOD, 1517—1556.

After the commencement of the sixteenth century, the states of Europe, by interweaving their interests, and by the alliances and counter-alliances which were thus caused, formed a *political system* in a much higher sense of the word than had been the case during the middle ages. The increase of civilization, by creating so many new sources of excitement, necessarily causes a greater complication of relations among the states which it affects, and is of itself sufficient to produce that character of unity, which gives an interest to the history of modern Europe. In an aggregate of states, too, such as the European, the *principle of a balance of power* became the more speedily developed, on account of the great differences of strength which existed amongst them. It was the immediate interest of all to prevent any single state from acquiring such a pre-eminence as would enable it to prescribe laws to the rest; and in such a case, the more unequal the power of the individual members, the more frequent are the alliances; and, consequently,

the more complicated and firmer the mutual connexion of the states. In a system of this kind, the most powerful is taught, that the oppression or annihilation of a weaker state, but one which it finds a useful ally, is far from being a matter of indifference; and thus states of the second, or even of the third order, become elevated to a degree of political importance which they could not otherwise attain; and which is the security upon which their very existence depends. Mere selfishness must thus yield to policy; and since the most gifted men of our own times have recognised the necessity of restoring, as far as possible, the shattered edifice which the storms of the revolution shook to the earth, the author who treats of it can hardly venture to doubt that it is the only one worthy of an enlightened age.

The Reformation, for a considerable time, exercised the principal influence upon the workings of this system, although it cannot be said to have been the original cause of its existence. The idea of a balance of power was spread over Europe, with other political notions, by the Italians, among whose states—perfectly independent as they were up to the end of the fifteenth century—it had been planted, watched over, and brought to maturity, and then again suffered to decay and become useless; but the almost incredible vacillation, which the general policy of the first fifteen years of the sixteenth century shows to have prevailed, is an evidence that the science was as yet without sure foundations, and that the main principles of the practical politics of Europe were still undermined. The history of no other era presents such a web of projects and counter-projects, of alliances and counter-alliances; but it is not improbable that this very abundance was a token that the want of more secure principles was felt, while these were the only remedies which could be applied; and thus the political system of that day may be likened to an unwieldy mass, whose centre of gravity has not yet been ascertained. The sudden rise of the house of Hapsburg, by the union of the imperial throne and the most important Austrian possessions with the Spanish monarchy, put an end to this vacillation. The character which France was destined to support in the general scheme of European politics, was now at once determined; the rivalry of Francis I. and Charles V. laid the

foundation-stone of the system of the balance of power; while the policy of Henry VIII., whose vanity was busied with the idea that he should be able to decide the strife between the rivals, and the much more permanently important alliance made by Francis I., as early as 1530, with the Porte, gave it an extent which embraced Europe from one end to the other. Thus the emulation of the two chief powers of the continent lent the first impulse to general politics, and has continued to influence them, although with occasional interruptions of its force.

Down to the middle of the sixteenth century, the Reformation cannot be said to have interfered materially in determining the relative position of these great powers, or in advancing the political system of which we speak. The ineffectual efforts of Francis I. to draw the members of the league of Smalcald over to his interest, hardly deserve to be noticed. But still, as even during that period the Reformation, in a certain degree, founded two new powers—Sweden and Prussia—which were destined afterwards to rank among the most important members of the European body of states, it thus prepared the way for a future development of the system. The new life which it breathed into the German empire was of much more immediate importance: for as the Protestant princes were obliged to unite in opposition to the emperor and his supporters, a political balance was established, which, as we have before said, remained for a long time the principle of life upon which that body depended, while it exercised a most decisive influence upon the political system of Europe in general. Statesmen of enlightened views soon came to the conclusion, that the disturbance of the balance of power in Germany, by the suppression of the Protestant party, would afford the house of Austria an opportunity of acquiring the supremacy in that country, and thus entail the disturbance of the political balance of Europe itself; this is amply proved by the share taken by Sweden and France in the thirty years' war, and, at a still earlier period, by the alliance between Henry II. and Maurice of Saxony.

The reason why the Reformation did not, and could not, acquire any immediate influence over the politics of Europe was evidently this, that neither of the great powers before

mentioned espoused its cause. Had Francis I. allowed it a free entrance into France, had the Protestant doctrines become prevalent in that kingdom, then the limits of the religious differences throughout Europe would have decided those of the political. But as this was not the case, the rivalry between France and the house of Hapsburg afforded the Reformation no opportunity of acquiring influence from the struggle. In order to make it the mainspring of European politics other circumstances were necessary; and these the latter half of the sixteenth century produced. These may be easily seen in the *Revolution of the Netherlands*, and the *Introduction of a new Rule of Faith into England.* Both of these, however, as well in point of time as of their reaction upon the rest of Europe, are so closely connected that they do not admit of a separate consideration.

SECOND PERIOD, 1556—1603.

No other event of this period acquired so rapid, so great, and at the same time so durable, an influence upon the general politics of Europe, as the Revolution of the United Netherlands.

Its origin may be reckoned among the consequences of the Reformation.

The limited abilities of Philip II. would not allow of his raising himself above the prejudices of his education and his age; his pride and tyranny would not be satisfied with the use of any but violent means; while his unwearied activity served only to fan the flame which it sought to extinguish.

Thus he was himself the founder of the new republic, and here, as elsewhere, freedom was the child of despotism.

From the very first this revolution acquired, not merely a political tendency, but one which was directed towards the general politics of Europe. The insurgents had to sustain a contest with one of the first powers of Europe; and although an impartial historian cannot deny them the credit of having made good their own cause by their own strength, yet they were themselves very far from being convinced of the possibility of so doing, and believed themselves obliged to look around for assistance from without. By their dealings with France and England—and in neither case were these dealings without results, (though more effectual in the

latter than in the former)—the interests of the scarce-formed republic became interwoven with those of the chief powers of Europe; and born, like Minerva, with arms in its hand, like Minerva, too, it at once took its seat in the council of the gods.

By the intervention of foreign powers in the Netherlands, a new political system was formed in the west of Europe. Had not France been occupied by its religious wars at home, which made it impossible for her kings, of themselves too weak, to take an effectual share in the disputes of other states, she would have found no difficulty in uniting the new republic with herself by secure ties; as this, however, was not done, Elizabeth reaped the advantage of the situation in which her neighbours were placed.

As she had herself restored the Protestant religion in England, and had founded her power upon its maintenance, her interests accorded with those of the Netherlands on this important point; and an alliance between the two states might, under these circumstances, be naturally expected. But however much we may admire the prudence and moderation which Elizabeth displayed in this most brilliant portion of her reign, it was yet impossible for her fully to determine the ultimate consequences of her acts. As the most powerful of the Protestant princes of Europe, she was universally considered the champion of that religion; while Philip II. was, on the other hand, acknowledged as the defender of the Catholic faith. Thus religion and politics became more closely united, and the doctrine, that Catholicism was a support of absolute power, while Protestantism favoured the freedom of the people, although but partially true and not formally acknowledged, became gradually developed, and was adopted as the favourite maxim of more than one cabinet; nay, finally, cost the Stuarts their throne. The former of the two propositions it would be difficult to prove, while the latter is true only inasmuch as a Protestant party under a Catholic government might, by oppression, be rendered rebellious, and thus become dangerous to it.

Thus, in the last half of the sixteenth century, the political system of Europe assumed a different form from that which distinguished it in the first. France and Austria were then the chief states of Europe, and the balance of power

depended upon their emulation; but as France was now occupied with its own internal dissensions, and Austria, its strength much diminished by the separation from Spain, was kept inactive by the incapacity of Rudolf II., Spain and England stepped forward in their stead. In the rivalry between the two former powers, religion had little to do; in that of the latter, religion and politics were inseparably united. In the one case, every thing depended upon the forces by land; in the other, the navy was of great importance, the army of hardly any: while from the defeat of the invincible armada, Europe dates the use of the term "Naval Powers," which, till then, the science of politics either did not admit at all, or understood but partially.

Such were the elements of the new system of which the republic of the Netherlands became every year a more distinguished constituent. It soon attained to a separation from Spain, though such an act was far from its original design; and quickly reached a degree of importance which rendered the assistance of any foreign power superfluous. But the path of fame upon which it entered was new to the ambition of Europe, whose nations gazed in wonder upon the goal to which it led. Even while its existence as a state was yet uncertain, this upstart power grasped the whole commerce of the world as its portion, and thus supplied itself with resources for a struggle which was longer and more desperate than that of Greece with Persia.

Thus, in the midst of the monarchies of Europe, arose a republic which first presented this quarter of the globe with the example of a commercial state supported by naval power; and if, as we have shown, its rise may be attributed to the Reformation, to the Reformation also belongs the principle of life which commerce served to breathe into politics, after the direct influence of religion had expired.

THIRD PERIOD, 1603—1648.

In the first half of the seventeenth century the system of a balance of power in Europe was both altered and extended; the influence of the Reformation, however, far from being diminished during that period, showed itself in its greatest force. The death of Philip II., (1598,) and of Elizabeth, (1603,) put an end to the rivalry of Spain and England,

which had, in fact, been mainly founded upon the personal dislike which these crowned heads entertained towards each other; and England, falling into the indolent hands of James I., was soon in a situation which precluded any effectual participation in the affairs of other countries; while amidst the troubles which attended the reign of his unfortunate son, it was totally shut out from them.

On the other hand, France had recovered her internal security since the accession of the Bourbons; and the judicious government of Henry IV. and Sully, had in a wonderfully short time healed up the wounds inflicted by the civil war. France then resumed her proper station in the political system of Europe; her old jealousy of the Spanish-Austrian house revived of itself; but in the schemes of Henry IV. it was considered only as the means to an end, only as the foundation of a new system by which Europe was to be remodelled.

It is needless to dwell upon the celebrated project of a European republic; the prosecution of which would either have wholly spared this quarter of the world a war of thirty years, or, which is more probable, have accelerated its commencement. With the death of its author (1610) not only did this scheme pass away, but instead of rivalry with Spain a friendly connexion was established; and France, falling a prey to the petty factions of the court, sank back into a state of weakness and vacillation, which ended only when Richelieu (1624) laid his firm grasp upon the helm of state.

But though the murder of Henry IV. prevented France from taking the first part in the great tragedy of which Europe was to be the stage, it yet delayed, although it could not wholly avert, the tragedy itself. The scene of it was already chosen, and as Germany during the *thirty years' war* obtained this melancholy preference, its fate became connected with the destinies of Europe.

The general point of view from which the origin of this war must be considered, has been given above. After the religious peace of Augsburg—a peace *far too easily* obtained—the maintenance of a balance between the two parties had become the constant object of German politics. But, if we throw a glance over the internal affairs of the empire, from the date of that peace till the commencement of

the great war, (1556—1618,) we shall see, at once, how feebly order was maintained. Among the articles of the peace itself, the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*,[1] which the Protestants did not acknowledge, had laid a train to light up future wars. But, besides this, there were ample opportunities for mutual complaint; the old party could, with difficulty, bring itself to consider the new as possessed of equal rights with its own; and, without tracing the proofs of it historically, we may feel morally convinced that the Protestants were usually wrong. Hence religious grievances formed a standing article of discussion in the diets of the time; and, had not the Turkish war occasionally compelled a temporary union, and directed public attention to other matters, peace could hardly have been so long maintained. The personal qualities of Ferdinand I., and still more of his worthy successor, Maximilian II., were of great effect in preserving quiet for a time; but under the protracted and sluggish reign of Rudolph II., the materials of discontent accumulated so rapidly that the two parties stood, even then, in arms against each other. In 1608 the *Protestant union* was formed, which caused, in turn, the organization of the *Catholic league.*

In the mean time, however, the Protestant party was so unfortunate as to be divided against itself. The religious separation of the Lutherans from the Calvinists had had its political influence in Germany as elsewhere; and the jealousy, which existed between the electoral houses of Saxony and the Palatinate, especially after the latter had put itself at the head of the union, estranged the former from the common cause. If any balance of power, therefore, had before existed between the two parties, it was now at an end. But the greatest evil by which the Protestants were oppressed, was the want of a leader of sufficient power and ability to give firmness to their confederation; for without this the first active measures of a party lead to its own dissolution.

After the death of Maurice of Saxony, the Protestants were not fortunate enough to reckon among their princes—

[1] The reservatum ecclesiasticum respected the question, Whether the future freedom of religion should be extended only to the secular orders, or also to the ecclesiastical.—v. Heeren's Manual, p. 47.

certainly not among those who formed the union—a single man who joined the requisite talents with the requisite influence, even in a moderate degree; while the league was admirably provided with a leader in Prince Maximilian of Bavaria.

Thus the elements of disorder were scattered, not only throughout Germany, but in other countries, and especially in the chief of those which constituted the Austrian monarchy; and when Ferdinand II. was named as successor to the throne, (1617,) it became evident from his known impatience of temper, that the crisis would be immediately brought on. No one could determine, however, where the first blow would be struck;—as it chanced, this was in Bohemia—but the war would probably have been the same in all material points had it occurred elsewhere. The fire of dissension now spread with fearful rapidity, and wrapped half Europe in its flames, which, after raging thirty years, were only partially got under; their total extinction being delayed till eleven years later (1659).

Although any thing like detail relative to this war is wholly beyond our present limits, we must yet trace out the chief epochs in it, that we may thus show the extensive changes in the political system of Europe, of which, by means of it, the Reformation became the cause.

We are by no means to imagine that the thirty years' war was, from beginning to end, conducted upon one plan, or even directed to one object. No one, in fact, could at its commencement have anticipated either its duration or extent. The saying of Cato the elder, that, "war feeds itself," proved here, as elsewhere, unfortunately, too true. From time to time, and just as the flames appeared on the point of being extinguished, some new interest would be called into action and revive them with fresh fuel. Nevertheless, amidst all changes of affairs, and intermixture of political interests, religion formed the groundwork of the whole; and the thirty years' war must, therefore, in a general view, be considered as an effect of the Reformation.

In its origin, it was merely a civil war, confined to the Austrian monarchy, and having for its object the subjection of the Bohemian insurgents. This object was fully attained by the battle of Prague; the war therefore might have ap-

peared to be at an end. But the ease with which success had been obtained, led to new projects.

The conquered party in Bohemia was in connexion with the Protestants of the empire, and had chosen a king in the person of the unfortunate Frederic of the Palatinate, who was chief of the Protestant union. This prince, deprived of his hereditary possessions, and under the ban of the empire, was now wandering as an exile, attended by two adventurers, and a handful of troops. His territory lay open for attack, and seemed to promise a secure booty. Not only his own incapacity, but also that of the other members of the union, had been so clearly proved, that it did not seem to require even another battle such as that of Prague, to annihilate the Protestant party—especially as it had already been weak enough to allow itself to be disarmed without opposition.

It is probable, however, that the latter object may not have entered directly into the views of the emperor at that time; but the more it could be brought forward the greater was his temptation: and the more speedily he was opposed, the more confident became the opinion that the supremacy of Germany was at stake.

But about this time (1621) war broke out again in another country. After a twelve years' truce between Spain and the Netherlands, Philip IV., although but lately come to the throne, began the contest afresh. And this new war almost necessarily fed, as it was in turn fed by, the troubles in Germany.

In this case, as in the other, religion was the cause of difference; while the houses of Spain and Austria, which had long been estranged, had at the accession of Ferdinand II. become again so closely united that the interests of the two were now the same. The war, then, was carried on here and in Germany at the same time: but with its change of object it had acquired a higher degree of importance—the subjection of Bohemia was a matter which touched Austria alone; that of Germany and the Netherlands was a subject of interest to all Europe.

The interference of foreign powers in the German war, was naturally to be expected under these circumstances; and France, above all, must have found in its ancient rivalry with Austria abundant reasons for preventing the supe-

riority, which the conquest of Germany would have given to that power. But then, France, until the ministry of Richelieu, (1624,) was under a divided government, and guided by no steady system of policy; and even he was at first too much occupied with the internal affairs of the kingdom to take an active part. Still, however, he intrigued in the north of Europe: and it was he who animated Gustavus Adolphus to come forth as the avenger of the Protestant cause, after the battle of Lutter (1626) had checked the attempt of Christian IV. of Denmark to interfere in the affairs of Germany.

This first participation of the north of Europe in the interests of the south and west, formed an entirely new feature in the European system, and was as important in its consequences as it was new. Up to this time the northern powers had formed a system of their own, which, partly owing to the Polish and Swedish wars—these being also caused by religious interests, which had become mixed with family feuds—had for forty years been firmly kept together; between it and the rest of Europe, however, there had as yet been no permanent causes of contact.

These the Reformation produced; and *by its means was Europe for the first time framed into one political system.* At a time when it was deeply felt that the maintenance of the balance in Germany was extremely uncertain, the want of a northern power sufficiently formidable to oppose Austria became evident. This part Sweden undertook, and thus arose a new order of things in European politics.

There can be no doubt that Sweden was the state best qualified by its superior organization, and especially by its possession of such valuable lands, as it in those days held, upon the Baltic or gulf of Finland, for the task which it undertook; nor is this less certain because the sequel showed that the extraordinary abilities of its king were of more consequence than its internal resources. The splendid career of Gustavus Adolphus ended early by his death at Lutzen; and yet late enough to secure to Sweden its influence in the affairs of Germany, and at the same time in those of Europe. Even the changes caused by the fortune of war, had little effect upon the position thus gained; especially when even Richelieu, after the defeat at Nordlingen,

(1634,) ceased to be a mere spectator. From this time Sweden ranked among the first powers of Europe, and the famous treaty of Westphalia appeared to secure it in this place, by the important possessions in Germany which were by it assigned to the Swedes.

It has been often questioned whether Gustavus Adolphus, had he lived, would not have been fully as dangerous an enemy to the freedom of Germany as Austria was. The answer to this will be easy, if we suppose—what, in the case of such a prince, we surely may—viz. that he would have obeyed the dictates of sound policy. There was only one character by adhering to which Sweden could maintain itself in the superiority which it had attained—that of the head of the Protestant party in Germany. As head of this party, it had obtained the most decided influence over the affairs of Germany. As such it still stood forth as the state which opposed Austria. As such it was the natural ally of France; and, as such—a consequence of all these advantages—it maintained its rank among the first powers of Europe. If such a supremacy as this—which might doubtless be oppressive to more than one state of the German empire, since every thing depended upon the mode in which it was exercised—if this, I say, is to be termed the annihilation of the freedom of Germany, it *must necessarily* have been included in the scheme of Gustavus Adolphus. But if he aimed at more than this, he himself marred the glorious character he had undertaken, and sought that which he could not long have held. The dominion of the weaker over the stronger, which temporary causes produce, may last for a while, but it is against nature that it should be of long duration. It was impossible that Germany should have been reduced into a province by Sweden.

The peace of Westphalia put an end to both the German war and that in the Netherlands. This peace was prized more than any ever was before, and that often beyond its deserts. It caused, undoubtedly, *three* important results; since, in the first place, it secured the constitution of Germany, and with it the existence and the rights of both parties. In the second, it produced a recognition of the independence of the republic of the United Netherlands. And in the third, it determined the relation in which Sweden

and France should severally stand to Germany. Nevertheless, however important these points may be, and with however much justice we may consider this treaty as the basis of the German constitution, such as it was up to the revolutions of our own day; too much is undoubtedly ascribed to it, when, as often is the case, it is also considered as the origin of the balance of power in Europe. It never occurred to the negotiators of the peace to regulate the general principles of European policy, nor indeed could it, since they had no commission so to do. The most important and intricate relations existing between the chief powers of Europe were, therefore, naturally left unexamined, nay, in part wholly unmentioned. The war between Spain and France lasted full ten years more, down to the Pyrenean peace; the question whether Portugal should maintain its independence of Spain, was still longer doubtful. Not a thought even was bestowed upon the continental relations of England, because in those days such relations were not in existence; while those of the east of Europe remained undetermined in their main features till the peace of Oliva, which was twelve years later (1660). Although, therefore, we find the Westphalian peace treated in historical works as the origin of the balance of power in Europe, this is only one of the many instances which occur, of historians dealing with that as a general principle, which can be truly affirmed only in a narrower sense.

The first half, therefore, of the seventeenth century was the period during which the political influence of the Reformation upon almost every part of the European political system was at its height, especially since England was also involved, at this very time, in civil wars, caused by religious sects, and leading to the establishment of a national church; and the party of the Hugonots was forcibly disarmed in France.

But the springs of action in morals and in politics gradually lose their strength, like those in material mechanism: and this was the case with the Reformation. The proof of it we shall presently find in the history of the second part of the seventeenth century.

FOURTH PERIOD, 1648—1702.

The government of France is entitled to the credit of having been the first to raise itself above the narrow views

to which the bigotry of the other powers confined them. Richelieu, by leaguing himself with Gustavus Adolphus—a cardinal with a Protestant king—was the means of pointing out to Europe that political and religious interests might be separately considered.

The age of Lewis XIV. caused the gradual spread of this opinion. His political schemes had little to do with religion, and the latter interest would at that time have wholly lost its influence upon the political progress of Europe, had not one of its chief states, viz. England, been still powerfully affected by it. The conflict of factions, in whose causes of strife religion mingled with politics, had been too fierce in that country to allow the ferment to be stilled at once, even by the Restoration (1660); and the mad policy of the last Stuarts gave it too good cause for continuance. For whilst the introduction of Catholicism appeared to them to promise that of absolute power, and was on that account their object, the nation, on the other hand, came to the firm conviction that the national freedom depended upon the maintenance of the Protestant faith. The state of constant alliance in which Lewis XIV. stood with both Charles II. and James II., gave this maxim a practical influence over the rest of Europe; and thus Lewis XIV. was forced, wholly against his will, to assist in raising William III., his most zealous opponent, to the throne of England, upon the fall of the Stuarts.

If this occurrence may be considered as a consequence of the Reformation, it must also, to a certain degree, be considered the last by which it exercised a *general* influence upon the politics of Europe. This important change laid the foundation of the antipathy which has since existed between England and France. But, although the Pretender was occasionally used as a bugbear to England, it was fed by means very different from those supplied by religion, whose place was now occupied by commerce. And as the republic of the United Netherlands has ever since attached itself to England, the naval powers formed, in the scales of Europe, the principal counter-balance to the great influence of France.

Even in the German empire, where the influence of religion upon politics might have been chiefly expected to

remain in force, it now died away; and a very different result was in preparation, from what the most prescient soothsayer could have foretold at the time of the Westphalian peace. The schemes of conquest nourished by Lewis XIV., and the renewed aggression of the Turks, (who, fortunately, had been engaged against the Persians in Asia during the thirty years' war,) put Germany in such a position as to oblige the two religious parties to lay aside their quarrel, although they retained their hatred to each other. Thus the pressure of circumstances caused alliances in which religion had no share; and some of the most powerful Protestant princes might be seen uniting their arms with those of the emperor, in order to oppose themselves, at one time, in the west, at another, in the east, to the enemy who pressed in upon them. The just apprehensions which had been caused by the superiority of Sweden, began to fade away of themselves, after the battle of Fehrbellin (1675). The profusion of Christina, and the wild projects of her successors, had exhausted the kingdom; and although the wonderful abilities and extraordinary undertakings of Charles XII. enabled him, for a season, to raise the spirit of the nation even above its natural pitch, and to fit it for unheard-of exertions, yet, even at that time, it was sufficiently evident that a country so little favoured by nature, must needs be left behind amidst the growing prosperity of the rest of Europe. But though Sweden was thus on the decline, there was another state in the north of Germany which was destined to supply, ay, and more than supply, its place in the politics of Europe.

It has been pointed out above in what degree the *Prussian monarchy* owed its origin to the Reformation; but, though this power may in a certain sense be said to have succeeded to the influence of Sweden, yet there was a marked difference in the mode in which this influence was exercised upon the political system of Europe. While the latter kingdom, owing to its unfavourable geographical position, and the scantiness of its resources, could not possess any great influence over that system, except under a confluence of fortunate circumstances, the influence of Prussia, as soon as the kingdom attained a certain degree of strength, necessarily became far more firm and lasting.

Up to this time, there had been wanting in the machinery of Europe, a state which might keep the North and South securely together. This was supplied by Sweden for a time, but owing to the causes above remarked, it could not long maintain such a position. Prussia, since its accession to the first rank of European powers, has been enabled, by its situation as a country, extending alike to the east and the west, to supply this want. And the spread of its dominions in both those quarters makes it probable that it will continue to do so.

FIFTH PERIOD, 1800.

The causes, owing to which the Reformation had begun, even in the last century, to lose its political influence, are evident from what we have already said; and the same causes, joined to others still more powerful, operated in a still stronger degree during the period which we are now to consider. As we are taught, generally, by the nature of things, that springs of moral action retain their vigour for a certain time, and then begin to relax, so we learn from history that, once lost, such energies can never be restored. They operate by means of the immediate relation in which they stand to the prevalent opinions of the day; and as these, according to the laws of our nature, are subject to constant although gradual changes, the energies dependent upon them must be so likewise.

The age of Lewis XIV., especially the first half of it, down to the peace of Nimeguen, had so much to attract the eye, that amidst the crowd of new and important occurrences, which presented itself to the attention and the admiration of the French, the views of that nation could not but be greatly extended. And although the estimation in which matters of religion were held cannot, on the whole, be said to have decreased, yet, as art and literature became more flourishing, their productions divided public attention.

What occurred in France, occurred gradually in the rest of civilized Europe; and it became every day better understood that there were other objects, besides those of religious controversy, upon which men's minds might be engaged. We must be careful, however, not to push this assertion too far. The spirit of intolerance had, owing to the causes above explained, become too deeply impressed upon the

minds of the European nations; and, for a long time to come, not only maintained its influence upon private life, but showed itself without disguise in the administration of their internal affairs. The revocation of the edict of Nantes (by which Lewis XIV., in spreading the industry and skill of French artisans over the rest of Europe, unintentionally repaid it, in some degree, for the evils which his wars had caused) gave proof of what we say, in France; while by the famous clause which was added to the fourth article of the treaty of Ryswick, Lewis XIV. also provided a new cause of dissension between the Catholics and Protestants in Germany, the operation of which was for a long time perceptible. But, powerful as might still be the influence of this destructive spirit, in the manner which we have now described, it as undoubtedly ceased to interfere with the mutual relations of the different states, and the higher system of politics upon which these depend. It was from the higher regions that the clouds of prejudice first disappeared, but a long interval elapsed before the sun of knowledge was strong enough to drive them out from those beneath. In the mean time it was chiefly from individual circumstances, as they arose, that politics received their direction.

While the enterprises of Lewis XIV., and the wealth amassed by the successful trade and manufactures of the Dutch, had, during the last period, assigned different spheres to religion and to politics, the *vacant succession to the throne of Spain* gave rise, at the close of the century, to a new source of interest; and one so great and important, that the whole of Western Europe was occupied by it for nearly fifteen years. During the same, and even a longer period, a war of equal fury was carried on in the East, by which that quarter of Europe was subjected to a complete revolution of affairs. A power of the first rank was forming itself here, which could have nothing to do with either the Catholic or the Protestant interest, since it belonged to neither of the two parties—and the glorious career of Eugene and Marlborough, of Charles and Peter, presented a scene so different from any that Europe had hitherto beheld—the duration of it was so long, and the impression which remained from it so deep, that it was impossible to return to the opinions by which politics had previously been governed. The position

of almost all the powers of Europe was thereby wholly altered; and this change, joined to the mediocrity of talent displayed by most of the regents and ministers who immediately succeeded, caused an uncertainty in general politics which, from 1720 to 1740, was not unlike that which characterized the first sixteen years of the sixteenth century. There was the same abundance, and the same change of alliances and counter-alliances—France united itself with England, and Austria made the recognition of the Pragmatic sanction the chief object of her policy! But in all this religion had no share; the hereditary enmity of France and England seemed to be lost in their alliance; and a trading company to the East Indies was considered of far higher importance than any theological dispute. To put an end to these continual changes in the politics of Europe there was wanted the genius of some great man, who should possess sufficient independence to act for himself, and sufficient strength to make his plans effective. This want was supplied by Frederic II. The treaty of Breslau (1742) laid the foundation of a new system for the maintenance of the balance of political power in Europe, of which Prussia and Austria were the chief members, while France, by siding first with the one and then with the other, degraded herself to the rank of a second-rate power.

The difference in religion between the two monarchies had, however, no influence in this; even in the German empire, where the irritation of the two parties was most likely to continue, it gradually disappeared; and every thing went to prove that religion had lost its power as a spring of action in politics, and could be misapplied for the purposes of faction at utmost only in a nation which, like that of the Poles, had taken no real share in the beneficial progress of political knowledge.

It thus became possible that Europe should be shaken by a new and mighty revolution, in which religion had no further share than that the necessity of its existence in the different states became the more evident, the greater the efforts which were made to destroy it. And finally, that very country, among the foremost of whose ancient constitutional principles was that of the greatest possible maintenance of religious equality among its classes, when it was lately en-

gaged in changing its form of government, seems to have thought that an incidental notice at the close of the discussion was sufficient for matters the consideration of which would formerly have been its first care; nay, it is possible that they might not have been alluded to at all, had they not been connected with other questions which still retained their importance.

III. *Effects of the Reformation upon Commerce and the Colonial System.*

The third point of view in which we have to consider the political effects of the Reformation, is that which regards the influence exercised by it upon trade and the colonies. Perhaps, at first sight, this influence may appear so distant, as hardly to be considered within the circle of our inquiry; but we shall easily succeed in showing how imperfect it would be should we pay no attention to this subject.

The Reformation created the republic of the United Netherlands, and, *through it*, the trade of Europe with the whole world. But, however clear this truth is, it may perhaps be objected to it, that commerce would have spread without the assistance of the Reformation, since the passage to both Indies had been previously discovered, and both Spain and Portugal had already set the example. But, putting aside the fact, that what *might perhaps* have happened cannot enter into our estimate, thus much still appears certain, viz. that without the Reformation trade would have made much slower progress, and might perhaps never have been brought to that height which it has really attained. It needed that bold and enterprising nation which sprang from the necessity of the circumstances in which it was placed, and which, regarding commerce only as the source of its freedom and its existence, devoted itself to the pursuit with all the energy which it could command.

After the year 1595 the Dutch speedily, and in all quarters, surpassed those who till now had governed the Indies. The prosperity of Portugal was already checked by its unfortunate union with Spain (1580—1640); and the narrow policy upon which the colonial trade of Spain itself was conducted, rendered it impossible that any general system of commerce should spring from it. On the other hand, how rapid was the progress of this trade in the hands of the

Dutch; and how much more rapid even might it have been had it been freed at the right moment from the fetters of monopoly! May not this, however, which must be allowed as regards the Dutch, be also fairly alleged, although in a less degree, of the English? Was it not during the reign of Elizabeth that the Drakes and Howards of England unfurled her flag upon the most distant seas? Was it not the spirit of Protestantism which gave them the victory over the invincible armada, and thus enabled them to lay the foundations of that dominion of the seas, and that system of universal commerce, to which no previous ages ever offered a parallel? Finally, was it not this spirit which animated the free maritime towns of Germany, and raised them to an eminence, which even in the times of general revolution secured to them the respect of the first powers of Europe? We may reason, therefore, as we choose upon the progress which commerce would have made *without* the Reformation, but this much must always be admitted, viz. that to the Reformation it owes the *speed* of its growth, and the *form* which it subsequently assumed.

The *Colonies* are so closely connected with commerce—having been founded with a view to its convenience—that they appear hardly to require any separate mention. If we have shown that without the Reformation there would have been no Dutch East India trade, there would without it have been no colony at the Cape or at Batavia. I am the more willing, however, to leave all further prosecution of this inquiry to the writers of commercial history, because it might easily lead me to the consideration of questions foreign to my present purpose, and even expose me to the imputation of wishing to attribute to the Reformation consequences too remote to be traced. Nevertheless, the Reformation had so immediate an influence, in another way, and in another quarter of the globe, upon the origin and progress of a colonial state, now flourishing and mighty, and which appears destined in future centuries to guide the commerce of the world, that I cannot pass over this circumstance in silence. Who were those exiles who set themselves down upon the coasts of a new world, in the forests of North America, because in that older land from which they came they were not suffered to worship their God after *their own* fashion?

Were they not, to the amount perhaps of four-fifths of their number, men banished across the ocean by the disturbances caused by the Reformation in England? It is true that these plantations were founded during the reign of Elizabeth, but it is a notorious fact in history that the stormy period of the Stuarts was also the period of their first prosperity.

But with their religious freedom the colonists brought also the seeds of their political independence, which, once planted in the soil of America, must have sprung up, and sooner or later borne fruit—and this, perhaps, even without such advantages as were thus afforded it. It is of the nature of colonies—and in this consists their immense importance to mankind—to set in motion a new mass of political ideas. In a new country, beyond the sea, all cannot be as it was in the old. In the case of America, therefore, even had its connexion with the mother country been more close than it was, the ultimate result would probably have been the same—we know, however, that its dependence upon England did not long continue firm; we know that each of the provinces had already formed its internal constitution upon principles so purely republican, that when they threw off their common allegiance, they possessed the inestimable advantage of having no further revolution to undergo, and scarce any, except the central government, to form.

Thus the political consequences of the Reformation spread themselves even beyond the ocean: and thus it is an undoubted truth, that without the Reformation there would have been no free states of North America! Reader, look beyond the Atlantic, to that new world where Europe is represented in its young and vigorous offspring! then look back to Luther and Tetzel—and then attempt, if thou darest, to foretell the effect of revolutions!

A SKETCH OF

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION AS IT AFFECTED PHILOSOPHY.

A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE JUBILEE OF THE REFORMATION.

[The following lecture was delivered in Latin by the author, when acting as Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy,

at the Jubilee of the Reformation, on the second of November, 1817. At the desire of his friends, however, it was translated by himself and published in the "Reformations Almanac" of 1819. The place and occasion of its delivery prevented a fuller development of the subject; it is, therefore, given only as a supplement to the above treatise.]

If it should appear strange or incongruous to any present, that the Faculty of Philosophy should not only claim a solemn interest in the celebration of this day—a day consecrated to the recollection of that reformation of our faith which was begun three hundred years ago—but should further demonstrate it by a public act; they will cease from their astonishment when they more fully consider the many and great benefits which are owed to it, not only by theology, but by all those sciences which tend to develope the faculties of mankind. For the principle which we are accustomed to admit as true, in all great revolutions, whether of our own or of earlier times, viz. "that their progress and operations have proved much more extensive than the originators of them proposed, and that they could by no means be confined within the limits which these prescribed to them," —this principle may with equal certainty be applied to the Reformation.—It is true, indeed, that, even with regard to single events, it is often difficult for the historian to ascertain the causes from which they proceed: but now, after the lapse of three centuries, our position has become such, that we may, with confidence, give judgment upon those general consequences which have resulted from so great a change. These, however, have been so well explained by several distinguished writers that it would be thought superfluous to trace them out anew; we shall, therefore, confine ourselves to a slight consideration of that part of its influence which was exercised upon philosophy.

It cannot be supposed that it would enter into the plan of the Reformers—men occupied more with things appertaining to God than to man—to found new systems of philosophy. Still, however, they perceived that philosophy stood in no less need than theology of being purified from the subtleties of the schoolmen; and the man most impressed with this, was one whose memory is immortal, and whom we

justly place next after Luther—Melancthon. "I desire," says he in his discourses, "a sound philosophy; not those empty words to which nothing real corresponds. For only one system of philosophy can be allowed, and that must be the least sophistic, and must pursue the true method." These are, in truth, golden words of thine, Melancthon, and of which one might well say, that they had been written for our times! But the papal authority once shattered and broken, the tie once dissolved which had bound philosophy so closely to the doctrines of the church—how could it be otherwise than that its progress, like that of religion, should be more free and unconstrained? To endeavour fully to trace this out would require too much digression and be alien to this place and occasion; but we may be allowed to point out that which the annals of philosophy most clearly show, viz. that it has shed a new light upon those countries alone, in which religion was cleared of its errors by the Reformers. Among the Spaniards, and in other nations to whom these were denied all access, the doctors of the schools still reign triumphant; and we in vain look among them for a Leibnitz, a Hume, a Locke, or Kant, and others, who like these opened out the fountains of a purer philosophy. Can this be a mere accident? Or must we not rather admit that it resulted from the nature of the Reformation? Lest, however, any one should still doubt, we will endeavour in a few words to show more plainly the advantages which philosophy owes to the Reformation.

We may fairly begin by laying it down that the Reformers caused it to be thought allowable to speculate freely as to *God, and what appertains to Him.* We are willing to admit that questions touching the Divine nature and substance (as the phrase ran) were frequently proposed by the schoolmen, and answered in a variety of ways; but whoever reads their works must allow, that they sought much more frequently to exercise their ingenuity in subtle and often impertinent questions, than to propose any thing worthy of the majesty of the Godhead. For as they were obliged to keep themselves within the limits prescribed by the Church, in order to avoid the charge of heresy, what else could be expected than that they should lose themselves in curious and idle investigations? On the other hand, the propagators of

the Reformed faith, although they took, and rightly took, the Holy Scriptures as the foundation of theology, yet by no means required that philosophy should rest upon the same grounds. A wide field was, therefore, opened to its inquiries; and thus it became possible for that system of knowledge to be founded and to be developed by the genius of great men, to which we rightly give the first place among philosophical systems—viz. that of *natural theology*, which, setting out from the idea of a Supreme Being, undertakes to prove that there is a God: that he exists independently of the world: and that he is the cause of the existence of the world. How excellently Melancthon has treated this subject will be acknowledged by those who consult his work on physics, in which the proofs of God's being and of his government of the world, (which have been more fully illustrated by philosophers of later days,) are to be found clearly and evidently set forth. And though amongst more modern inquirers there may be some, who have not only used, but abused the freedom procured them by the heroes of the Reformation, and thus either lost themselves in atheism or advanced far towards it, yet it is an acknowledged truth, that the abuse should not vitiate the use; while the writings of those men, to whom not only their own but subsequent times have assigned the first rank among philosophers, afford proofs that their speculations upon the nature of the Godhead were pursued in a modest and reverent spirit.

In the company, or at least in the train, of this better method of thinking and speaking of God and religion, came that improved philosophy of *human life*, which forms the subject of our *second* assertion. That the schools of the sophists of those days should, by their undivided attention to logic, have wholly excluded practical philosophy, was naturally to be expected. This practical philosophy rests upon inquiries into the nature of man; it must be shown what the disposition of our nature and its powers are: what suits, what is repugnant to it, and consequently, what is to be desired, and what shunned. It must be inquired what seeds of virtue or vice are implanted in us; what is the nature of our passions, what the method of controlling them? Finally, in what consists true happiness, what the object of our life should be, and how we may best attain it? Now,

although the princes of Greek philosophy had reasoned admirably upon all these topics, although they had been treated of by Aristotle, whose name was for ever in their mouths, yet the schoolmen cared little for them, and sought their reputation only in useless disputes.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that it was not till the light of the Reformation had arisen, that a system of practical philosophy, really deserving of the name, could be formed; especially as regards that branch of it, which is rightly considered the most important—the philosophy of moral conduct. Here, too, Melancthon first broke the ground in his "Elements of Ethics," which appeared at Wittenberg in the year 1550; and in which he forsakes his usual adherence to Aristotle, and after refuting the doctrines of Epicurus and the Stoics, defines virtue to be the obedience of the will to such rules of action as are in practical accordance with the commands of God. It is hardly necessary to remark, that no other branch of philosophy has been cultivated with greater diligence or success among the more enlightened nations—the Germans, the French, and the English; a point upon which we may justly pride ourselves, since none is more adapted to the nature and wants of men. Time and place forbid the enumeration of the writings of those immortal authors, especially those of Great Britain, who have treated of it; of whom we may say, as the Greeks did of Socrates, that by their means philosophy has been called down from heaven to walk upon the earth.

The Reformation may, therefore, justly claim the credit of having applied philosophy to the improvement of morality; and, generally, of having brought it back to the common purposes of life. It was no longer wasted upon the solution of problems, which required acuteness perhaps, but which, to use Melancthon's expression, had no correspondent realities. It did not, however, confine itself within the limits of private life, but having once emerged from the gloom of the schools into the light of day, undertook the *improvement of public life*. The example was set in Great Britain, and speedily followed elsewhere, of discussing those most important questions which relate to the constitutions of states, their administration and government; and out of this we have seen a new and improved order of things proceed, not only

in Europe, as in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and elsewhere, but even beyond the ocean, in America, where the seeds of new constitutions were sown, and are now in the perfection of their growth. To trace this out, however, is the province of history; for my part, I conceive that I have sufficiently proved the proposition from which I set out, and to which I return: viz. That by those who follow the banners of philosophy, the day, which we are now celebrating, must be accounted a festival—a festival dedicated to events which have procured us that without which there can be no philosophy, and no true enjoyment of life—"*The right of thinking as we will, and of speaking as we think.*"

ON THE

RISE, PROGRESS, AND PRACTICAL INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL THEORIES,

AND ON THE

PRESERVATION OF MONARCHICAL PRINCIPLES IN MODERN EUROPE.

If we except the last ten years of the past century from our review, we shall find that the states which composed the political system of modern Europe, were constituted without any reference to general theory; they arose for the most part out of the feudal system, and gradually accommodated themselves to the circumstances which new times and new events produced. It would therefore be idle to expect that any, even the most perfect of them, should correspond with an abstract theory of government. The spread of intellectual acquirements, however, produced in several of these states an attention to political reasonings, and these in turn led to speculative systems, and schemes of new constitutions. The influence of the latter began, long before the disturbances of our own day, to exercise a political influence, and this at last became so great that it has been customary to

attribute those violent revolutions which caused the ruin of more than one existing government, to these very speculations.

The questions which I propose to examine are, "How the spirit of inquiry with regard to distinctions in the forms of government first arose in modern Europe?" "How this became the source of political reasoning?" "How this again formed the base of abstract theories?" "What practical influence the latter exerted generally; and what in particular upon the late revolutions?" With these another, and that of the highest practical importance, becomes naturally associated, viz. "What is requisite for the maintenance of the monarchical principle in constitutional governments?" In this case the inquiry will be directed only to the "constitution," not to the administration, of "power in the different states"—no thinking man, however, can regard this subject with indifference: I only hope that the mode in which it is treated may be equal to its importance!

It might at first sight appear as though a reference to actual history would be a superfluous labour; speculation, it may be urged, arose of itself, and was independent of reality. Why then turn to it for assistance? We shall soon, however, perceive that this was not the case; and that, if the spirit of political speculation *did* rise above the politics of the day, it was from the latter that it derived its origin, and that it never became wholly independent of them. These questions, therefore, will admit of no other solution than what may be obtained by connecting them with history, and drawing our answers, in part at least, from it.

In order to create a spirit of political speculation it is necessary that there should be some outward stimulant, as well as a considerable degree of philosophical education in the people among whom it is to arise.

The external causes which induce thought and argument on these subjects, are struggles, when such take place, with regard to the forms of the constitution. The neighbourhood of various states governed in various manners, with the relations and contrasts between them—and above all, the formation of new states by colonization.

If to these qualifications, habits of philosophical inquiry

of a higher order be added, should men have taught themselves to rise from the particular to the general, from facts to principles, the path is opened for political speculation.

It was thus that it arose and perfected itself among the Greeks, where external causes were so many and so various. —And in support of this view its opposite was sufficiently proved during the middle ages, throughout which it was impossible that any traces of such speculations should appear.—The feudal systems, strictly so called, admitted of no free citizenships, and allowed no varieties of government.— That which was dignified by the name of freedom, was in general nothing but a contest of the nobility against their princes, which if it failed, begot a despotism ; if it succeeded, was the signal of club-law and anarchy.

Amid such scenes as these, there was little room for political speculation, even if the total absence of philosophical ideas had not rendered it impossible.

Among those countries in which it might have been expected to give the earliest signs of life, Italy was undoubtedly the first; all the ordinary causes appear to have united here—a number of small states arose near each other—republican constitutions were established—political parties were every where at work and at variance; and with all this, the arts and sciences were in the full splendour of their revival.

The appearance of Italy in the fifteenth century recalls most fully the picture of ancient Greece. And yet in Italy political theories were as few, as in Greece they had been many! a result both unexpected and difficult to explain.

Still, however, I think that this phenomenon may be in a great part accounted for, if we remember that there never was a philosophical system of character or influence which prospered under the sky of Italy. No nation of civilized Europe has given birth to so few theories as the Italian— none has had less genius for such pursuits.—The history of the Roman philosophy, a mere echo of the Grecian, proves this of its earlier ages, nor was it otherwise in its later.

At the revival of science Plato and Aristotle were the chief and only guides, and even when the trammels of this superstition had been broken through, Italy produced no original minds whose life and works formed an era in phi-

losophy.—If, then, speculative science in general made no great advance here, we cannot reasonably expect that that part of it which has reference to politics should have made any, since, from its very nature, it must be one of the last branches which are put forth from that stock.

This incapacity for theory, however, had the effect of directing the Italians more immediately to practice, and they were considered the deepest and most accomplished politicians of Europe.—But as they held diplomacy to be an empty name, unless it included cunning and intrigue, they by this view offered another impediment to a right cultivation of the subject.

Their highest principles of policy were nothing better than a collection of maxims, and these never ripened, nor could ripen, into a science. The only writer of that period who need be mentioned here, is Machiavel; and his works afford the strongest confirmation of what we advance.—His "Principe," and his "Discorsi sopra Livio,"[1] are full of reasoning such as we have described, the result partly of his historical studies, partly of his own experience; and they contain sufficient evidence that a practical attention to history was in force at this period, and that the Italians were likely enough to prove good historians, but not great theorists.

The first quarter of the sixteenth century witnessed the breaking out of the Reformation. I have endeavoured in a former treatise to prove the fact, and point out the manner of its acquiring a political tendency; I have also followed up its practical results. That, by its influence on Germany, on the Netherlands, on England, and for a considerable period on France, it became the origin of political freedom in Europe, can be a matter of doubt only to those who "having eyes, see not;" and this once admitted, it will not be difficult to show that the same causes led to its being the origin of political speculation also.

Meantime, however, we must remember, that the very essence of the Reformation, and the first direction of its power, rendered it impossible that this should be the case,

[1] [This critique appears to have escaped M. Artaud in his laborious treatise on the life and works of the Florentine secretary. But to judge from the manner in which he has met some similar observations of Raumer, it is one to which Machiavel's most ardent admirers can hardly object. See Machiavel, son Genie et ses Erreurs, par M. Artaud, vol. ii. p. 490. Tr.]

either immediately, or even mediately, without some interval of time—the activity to which it aroused the human intellect was exerted then, and long after, upon subjects wholly unconnected with political speculation. It is not necessary to dwell upon this point here, for who can be ignorant, that for a considerable time religious controversies, and those alone, were capable of exciting general interest? Still, however, all this being admitted, it cannot but seem strange, that the great practical influence which the Reformation exercised upon the constitution of the various states, should have been so partially and so slowly followed by any attempt at theory on the principles of their formation.

I do not speak of Germany—here the point in dispute was the relation which should exist between the states and the emperor, and, as immediately connected with it, that between the Protestant and the Catholic parties—and this the sword decided.

But the state in which such views might have been first expected, was the republic of the United Netherlands.—The Reformation called that state into existence—the banner of liberty was there formally displayed—republican maxims were those chiefly adopted and cherished—the state itself became deeply involved in the general politics of the day, and knowledge was at the same time busy among its members; and yet the speculative part of government was left almost wholly untouched!

The causes of this, however, will soon become evident if we look to the main object of the revolution by whose means that state was formed: innovations in the constitution were the last things it had in view—it struggled rather to maintain and assert the old rights and privileges of the states; necessity alone induced the Netherlands to shake off their allegiance to the king of Spain; that accomplished, they turned to seek other masters, and the states finally became republican, merely because they could find none. Was it likely, then, that political theories should spring up here, where no new schemes of government called for their interference?

In the mean time, however, the republic had a long struggle for independence to maintain.—It came in various contact with foreign powers, and was more or less connected with the great wars of the time.

Though no questions, therefore, were raised as to the dif-

ferent forms of the constitution, yet it was impossible but that some should arise as to the mutual rights and relations of states.

This subject received the attention of one of the republic's greatest citizens, and produced the famous work of Hugo Grotius "De Jure Belli et Pacis."

It is true that this treatise led its author into some researches, respecting the natural rights of man, and the principles on which they are founded, without which he thought he could not attain to a just view of his subject. But the theory of civil government could gain little from a work devoted to another and separate inquiry; while the manner in which this inquiry itself is conducted, is by no means attractive to readers of our own time.

Grotius was more a man of learning than a philosopher, and he has encumbered his work with a mass of historical and philological research, which could not possibly turn to its advantage.—Still, however, it must rank among the highest efforts, not only of his own, but of all subsequent times; for it was no mean advantage to point out that there is, or at least that there ought to be, a law of nations. Moreover, the great name which Grotius had acquired, and which associated him, not only with the most distinguished men of learning, but, as a statesman, with the princes and courts of his day, secured his principles an admittance into the circle in which they were most likely to obtain a ready practical influence.[1]

[1] [The following defence of Grotius is interesting, as coming from the pen of the late Sir James Mackintosh: and it will be the more appreciated as the pamphlet from which it is taken is now rarely to be met with.

"Few works were more celebrated than that of Grotius in his own days, and the age which succeeded. It has, however, been the fashion of the last half century to depreciate his work as a shapeless compilation, in which reason lies buried under a mass of authorities and quotations. This fashion originated among French wits and declaimers, and it has been, I know not for what reason, adopted, though with far greater moderation and decency, by some respectable writers among ourselves. As to those who first used this language, the most candid supposition that we can make with respect to them, is, that they never read the work; for if they had not been deterred from the perusal of it by such a formidable display of Greek characters, they must soon have discovered that Grotius never quotes on any subject till he has first appealed to some principles; and often, in my humble opinion, though not always, to the soundest and most rational principles.

But another sort of answer is due to some of those who* have criticized

* Paley, pref. to *Moral and Political Philosophy* (to whom we may add Prof. Heeren, in the passage of the text).

The treatise "De Jure Belli et Pacis" may, on the whole, be considered as a fair earnest of what the spreading intelligence of the day might eventually produce.

The religious disturbances and wars of the Hugonots in France took place at the same time as the establishment of the republic of the Netherlands, and appear to have been much more calculated to excite a spirit of political speculation.

It was question here not only of preserving what was old, but of forming what was new. The Hugonot party, if it never actually established a republic, was yet much more inclined to republicanism than the insurgents of the Netherlands.—But then the times of civil war are not the times of quiet contemplation, and of theory; and as the tumult became more wild, the pursuits of literature gave way wholly to violence and bloodshed, or, if they still attracted attention, it was only for purposes of theological debate.

Still, amidst these disturbances, one writer made his appearance, who attracted too much notice to be lightly passed over.—This was John Bodin,[1] the author of a work "De Republicâ;" he was not only a man of learning, but took a share in the transactions of the time, and spoke in favour of the Hugonots, whose religion he had from the first embraced, at the diet of Blois.—This did not, however, prevent him

Grotius, and that answer might be given in the words of Grotius himself. He was not of such a stupid and servile cast of mind, as to quote the opinions of poets or orators, of historians and philosophers, as those of judges from whose decision there was no appeal. He quotes them, as he tells us himself, as witnesses, whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty, and the fundamental principles of morals. On such matters poets and orators are the most unexceptionable of all witnesses; for they address themselves to the general feeling and sympathies of mankind; they are neither warped by system, nor perverted by sophistry; they can attain none of their objects; they can neither please nor persuade if they dwell on moral sentiments not in unison with those of their reader: no system of moral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of human nature, and the according judgments of all ages and nations. But where are those feelings and that judgment recorded and observed? In those very writings which Grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. The usages and laws of nations, the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the sentiments of orators and poets, as well as the observation of common life, are, in truth, the materials out of which the science of morality is formed; and those who neglect them are justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophize, without regard to fact and experience, the sole foundations of all true philosophy."—*A Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations, etc.*, p. 17. Tr.]

[1] Johannis Bodini, *De Rep.* lib. vi., first published in French, 1576, but revised, enlarged, and translated into Latin by himself, 1584. Bodin was born 1529, and died 1596.

from being much esteemed by Henry III., with whose brother, Francis of Alençon, he was still more intimately connected.

As a political writer he claims a distinguished place; indeed, few have surpassed him in philosophical distinctness of ideas, or in a general, and at the same time accurate, acquaintance with the constitutions both of ancient and modern times. The whole course of his inquiry bears a certain resemblance to that pursued by Aristotle, but he is far from being a servile imitator, and it is undeniable that he materially advanced the science of government.

Some of its most important principles he was the first to embrace and define. He begins from a conception of the state as "a number of families, whose common concerns are directed by a supreme power, justly exercised." The supreme power consists in "the right of making laws, and seeing that these are executed."[1] We here find the germ of that principle of the distinction between the two powers (the legislative and the executive) which owes its full and careful development to later writers. He was the first who asserted the "Indivisibility[2] of the supreme power or sovereignty," (Majestas,) from which he argued that the common opinions with respect to mixed governments, rested upon entirely false grounds, since these are impossible without a separation of the sovereignty. He has defined more accurately the limits of what we term "absolute monarchy, (regia potestas,)" of "despotism," and of "tyranny," than any[3] subsequent writers. He has the great merit of having put in a clear light one of the most important truths of government, and one to which he was himself much attached, (viz.) "That the form of the constitution will not afford any direct argument as to the spirit in which a state is governed, and that the latter may be very republican in a state which is properly monarchical,[4] as well as despotic under the forms of a republic." Finally, he was the FIRST who, carefully avoiding to set up any perfect ideal constitution, which he would every where apply, gave a full explanation of all the circumstances of climate and of national peculiarities, whether mental or bodily, which ought to be considered in framing the constitution of a state.[5] [6]

[1] *De Republicâ*, lib. ii. p. 275. [2] Ib. lib. ii. p. 275. [3] Ib. lib. ii. p. 313, sq.
[4] Ib. lib. ii. p. 305, sq. [5] Ib. lib. v. p. 767, sq.
[6] [Although Bodin may be deservedly praised for the *adoption* of the two

This division of his work would do no discredit to Montesquieu himself, whose precursor, and that no unworthy one, he was.

Notwithstanding these and other undeniable merits, and in spite of the approbation which it drew from the best of his contemporaries,[1] Bodin's work did not attain to that practical influence which it deserved.

The seed which he scattered fell upon a soil as yet too little prepared to receive it, and the observation before made, that political speculation can never support itself except in connexion with philosophy, is here remarkably established. The nation was not yet ripe.

The state of France, during the seventeenth century, was not such as to lead us to expect the requisite maturity. As soon as the Hugonots were suppressed, or at least disarmed, Richelieu laid the foundation of the absolute power of the crown, and Lewis XIV. confirmed it without any further resistance from the people. Even if a spirit of political inquiry had by chance arisen among individuals, where was it to find means of increase? Surely not among a people who not only submitted without a murmur to the fetters which were imposed upon them, but who went so far in their greediness for fame rather than freedom, as to be proud of the chains they wore.

We must, therefore, turn to another land, to one in which, by the concurrence of more fortunate circumstances, the theory of civil government became fully developed, and acquired a great practical influence—an influence moreover exerted rather to preserve than to destroy—I mean, to England.

It might be mentioned here almost without a rival, were it not that Geneva, the smallest state in Europe, makes its pre-eminence in this respect somewhat doubtful.

The progress which the theory of government made in England is mainly attributable to the circumstances of that

last points, and for the expansion of the former of them, he is indebted to ARISTOTLE'S *Politics* for the sound philosophy by which they are distinguished. Aristotle, it is true, has drawn a picture of the government under which he imagines the greatest happiness may be obtained, but he has expressly stated what previous conditions are necessary to its formation, and how unfit it would be for a society in which these were wanting. TR.]

[1] [The testimony of De Thou and others may be found under the article Bodin, in Bayle. TR.]

country, and to understand these we must give a cursory glance at the history of its constitution. This was at first a branch of the great feudal system, which was the origin of most of the European governments, and which had been introduced in its full rigour by William the Conqueror in 1066, when he took possession of England. The feudal customs fell into disuse here, as elsewhere, for the vassals were not slow in taking advantage of the circumstances of the times, and even under the immediate successors of the Conqueror obtained considerable privileges, which, by degrees, ripened into a formal warrant of their liberties, and were embodied in Magna Charta (1215).

It was not, however, the armed opposition which the nobles offered to their sovereign, for this was of much more frequent occurrence in other countries: nor was it the growth of a middle order: nor yet the representation of this order in parliament, which gave to the British constitution its peculiar character; for all these phenomena are to be found alike in the French and Spanish histories. The causes of it lay *in the different shape which rank assumed in England, compared with other countries, in the variety of relations which existed between the nobles and commons, and by means of which it became possible to constitute the Lower House in such a form as it afterwards assumed.*

We might expect that a subject, which has received so much attention from the best writers, should be clearly understood, but it neither is, nor indeed ever will be.

The early history of the British parliament, especially during the thirteenth century, when its limits were first defined, is more scantily supplied from original documents than can well be believed. And yet this ought not to astonish us if we remember that in England, as in other countries of Europe, during the middle ages, no institution of any note arose at once and from a preconcerted scheme, but that they were all of gradual formation, and dependent on the changes of men's wants and circumstances. Thus many things which afterwards became of the highest importance were very far from being, or, at least, from appearing so, at first: and it was consequently impossible for the chroniclers of the day to perceive the advantage of recording them. We must be content, therefore, to receive such accounts of

the British parliament as we have of the other institutions of the middle ages.

The separation of the higher from the lower nobility took place in other countries of Europe as well as in England, but in no other country did the latter so entirely unite with the middle orders, as to rank with them in one house, and become thus wholly distinct from the peers. But if the question be proposed, as to How the separation of the upper and lower nobles actually took place? if it be asked How it happened that the inferior nobles sent deputies chosen from the counties instead of appearing in person? When this first became customary? When the towns first returned members? (not when they are first noticed by the chroniclers as having done so.)—And, lastly, When and how the deputies from the counties became united in one body with those from the towns?—We can only say that the most careful inquirers into British history can give nothing but probable surmises on the subject, and are totally unable to support their opinions by any historical references. This general uncertainty will be at once evident to any one who will examine the various and very different accounts which are given by English historians of the origin of their constitution. Some, and those of the first rank, have not scrupled seriously to assert, that the early Britons brought their liberties with them from the forests in which they dwelt!

Without going more deeply into these questions, which would be here misplaced, it is sufficient to remark, that the British constitution had received the impress of its most important characters long before England could boast of any degree of political liberty superior to that enjoyed by other states. It had its Upper House composed of the lords spiritual and temporal, and its Lower House composed of members for the towns and counties; but what was this great parliament, not only before the time of the Tudors, but even under their dominion, except an instrument of command, which Henry VII. and VIII., and their successor Elizabeth, knew most excellently how to apply to the furtherance of their own designs?

Here, again, we have a palpable example how little we may argue from the form to the spirit of a government; meantime, however, this form was more perfect than could

be found elsewhere, and it needed only a confluence of fortunate events to give it life, and breathe sentiments of freedom into the people.

This the Reformation effected.—Not only by it was the religion of the land altered, but its political greatness, under the reign and guidance of Elizabeth, securely founded. By this *greatness*[1] the spirit of the people became awakened; but as it did not proceed immediately from the constitution, it was necessary that the latter should receive a shock, nay, for a time, a total overthrow, before it could be fully appreciated, and by being restored, and at the same time indissolubly connected with religion, could be looked up to as the palladium of British freedom.

The history of the troubles which produced the civil war, which overturned the throne, and which terminated with the restoration, are sufficiently known, and require barely to be alluded to. The only question in connexion with which they have any interest here, refers to the probable causes of their having been more favourable to the development of political speculation than the disturbances of any other country, and that in such a degree as to have produced and matured some of its noblest fruits.

The obvious reason of this, in my opinion, is, that the troubles and wars in England were not brought about, as in other countries, merely by practical grievances, *but that they depended, from the first, upon theoretical points of dispute*, which necessarily led to more extended inquiries.

Thus, when the Stuarts mounted the British throne, (1603,) they brought with them a maxim which was preserved and passed from father to son as an heirloom, and which James I. was imprudent enough to assert upon every occasion, even in open parliament, viz. "That the kingly power emanated for God—that it was therefore absolute, or if not actually so, that it ought of right to be so—that what were termed the "rights" of the people and the parliament, were not properly so called, but merely grants and privileges, which had been allowed to them by the crown, and which the crown might therefore resume as easily as it had bestowed them." These principles, however, were in direct opposition to the ideas which the Reformation had rendered current, and

[1] See the treatise *On the Political Consequences of the Reformation.*

which had more particularly obtained with the Presbyterian and Puritanic parties, then rapidly spreading in England, and which from the form of their religious government were inclined to carry republican, and even democratic, principles into the government of the state. Elizabeth had entertained no less exalted an idea of her power than the two first Stuarts, in fact she had exercised it with more freedom than they: but then she had avoided what the pedantic folly of James I. led him to indulge in, and had not brought her maxims before the public, and thus made a common talk of matters, which the interest of princes should teach them to conceal as the mysteries of their craft, the "Arcana dominationis."

These principles, and the collisions between the king and the parliament, which resulted from them, formed the train which lighted up England with the flames of civil war. They brought Charles to the scaffold, and overturned the throne. But even when the restoration had caused a seeming tranquillity, the fire still smouldered in its ashes. The restoration was rather the work of party spirit, and of a passing change in public opinion, effected by the experience of anarchy and the despotism of the sword, than of calm and well-exercised reason.

The opportunity which then presented itself of amending the defects of the constitution passed by unemployed. And Charles II. received the crown on the same doubtful understanding of its authority, as that on which it had been held by his ancestors. Would that he had been as worthy of it even as his unfortunate father! As it was, he adopted the very principles which cost the latter his life, while he enhanced their tendency to despotism by his own disposition to enforce them. The attempt of his brother to introduce tyranny and priestcraft, and the consequences of his folly, need hardly be alluded to.

Every circumstance of the time—the continued disturbances—the party distinction of Whigs and Tories in which they ended—the rapid growth of literature under Charles II., all conspired to advance political speculations to the utmost. —But as these speculations proceeded immediately from the practical affairs of life, it was unavoidable that they should carry some traces of their origin along with them. The

questions chiefly debated were those to which the transactions of the day naturally led, and the decision of which was invested with a direct practical importance. All these questions may be reduced under one head, viz. Whether the kingly power should be absolute or not? or, what was considered equivalent, Whether the sovereignty belonged to the king or to the people? On such a subject as this, no one, who bore the least affection to his country, could remain wholly without interest: we must not therefore be astonished at the earnestness with which the dispute was carried on.

It would appear almost incredible to any one unversed in the writings of the time, to what an extent the assessors of the kingly power proceeded, and on what grounds they sought to rest their claim. One of these must be here mentioned, who, it is true, has long sunk into the oblivion which he deserved, but who must not be passed over in this place, as his treatise entitled "Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings,"[1] served as a whetstone on which the great writers of the opposite side sharpened and improved their wits. It was to the extravagant, and in some degree ludicrous tenets of Filmer and his school, that the cause which they advocated chiefly owed its fall. For, as they derived the kingly power immediately from God, they were forced into historical deductions for their proof. They had recourse, therefore, to the sacred annals: but as, unfortunately, the kingly power does not there date beyond a particular era, they fell back upon the patriarchs, and asserted boldly that Abraham and Noah, and lastly, that Adam himself had been kings. In order to make this good they endeavoured to show that the kingly power proceeded from the paternal, and that, accordingly, kings, being the fathers of their people, might exercise as unrestricted an authority over them as fathers over their children. But as all children, by the very fact of their birth, become subjected to the government of their father, it follows of course that no man can be born free: and again, as the paternal authority has been transferred to the kings of the earth, all men come by their birth under this absolute power, and are in fact born as a sort of property and appendage to it. By these steps Filmer arrived

[1] It forms part of *The Political Discourses* of Robert Filmer, Bart. London, 1682.

at the conclusion that the most absolute despotism is fairly founded, and as such he defended it, asserting that both the persons and goods of the subjects are nothing more than the property of the prince, with which he may do as he pleases; that on this account every opposition of the subjects is open rebellion, and that in no possible case can a king be deposed from his authority.

The absurdity of these propositions, which became inevitable as soon as the attempt was made to deduce the kingly power historically from God, would probably have decided the fate of the theories to which they belonged, even without any attack from without. But amongst the supporters of absolute power, another writer appeared, who may claim his rank with the first thinkers of all ages, and who defended his opinion with very different weapons from those of Filmer—that writer was Thomas Hobbes. Of his philosophical works those which are here referred to are his treatise "De Cive" and his "Leviathan."[1]

External causes may, to a certain degree, have induced Hobbes to come forward as the champion of absolute power. He not only belonged to the royal party, but was tutor to Charles II. when an exile in France. Nevertheless, this influence most assuredly did not extend further than to give his mind a turn of thought natural to the events of the time, and to his own peculiar circumstances. We should do him great injustice, were we to suspect him of fawning or hypocrisy. His character is much more that of a logical and consistent reasoner of the highest order, who never advanced a proposition which he for a moment doubted that he could establish in its fullest sense.

Hobbes is remarkable for having been the first who sought to ground the theory of government upon natural right, and what is termed "the state of nature." This notion of a "state of nature," from which men are supposed to have advanced into civil society, (however differently it may have been entertained,) has formed the basis of all subsequent

[1] The "*De Cive*" forms the third division of his *Elementa Philos.* The "*Leviathan*," sive de materia formâ et potestate civitatis, is only a further development of it.

Hobbes was born 1588, and died 1679. His *Elementa* appeared first in 1650, and the *Leviathan* 1651, in the time of Cromwell. His works were first published in 1668 in a perfect form.

speculations, down to the time of Rousseau; and from the indefiniteness of the idea which it introduced, has contributed not a little to perplex the theory of government.

If by "the state of nature"[1] we are to understand the condition of men who are not formed into one community, and who do not acknowledge the relations of civil life, it cannot be denied that nations have existed, and still exist, in this condition. But in order to determine the limits between the state of nature here understood, and the civil community to which it is opposed, we must have a clear idea of what that civil community implies.

Now, theorists usually define the latter as constituted by the possession of sovereignty, whether exercised by the whole body, or by a few, or by one of its members. This definition, however, is of little practical use in the study of history, for there are many nations to which it would apply, and yet of whom it would be hard to say that they form a state, and live in civil society. All the great pastoral tribes are, or at least were, in possession of sovereignty as independent nations; and this sovereignty was exercised by the heads of particular families among themselves; and yet no one would argue that the Calmucs, or the Kirgisian and Arabian Bedouins, form what is properly termed a state (*Civitas*). This, in fact, if we use the word in its common historical sense, can only be constituted by a people, whether great or small, *which possesses and permanently inhabits one particular country;* or in other words, *fixed places of abode and possessions in land* form the second *necessary* qualification of every state, in the practical sense of the word. The reason of this is, that the whole institution, or assembly of institutions, which we term a state, attains its development and application only by property in land. The first, though not the only object of a state, is the *security of property:* now, although moveables are just as much property as land, yet it is only where the latter has been appropriated that the right of property attains to its full importance: and not only this, but the necessity of de-

[1] [For a further examination of this juggling phrase I cannot do better than refer the reader to Mr. LEWIS's *Remarks on the Use and Abuse of some Political Terms.* London, 1832. Doctor FERGUSON's *Essay on the History of Civil Society,* contains many beautiful and just observations on the true meaning of the words. TR.]

fining its different forms by laws is then for the first time perceived, because land is, from its nature, the only permanent object of this right.[1]

Although a state, then, may be conceived in theory to exist without property in land, yet in reality the one can never exist without the other; and it is the neglect with which this fact has been passed over, that has mainly contributed to give to political systems that character of visionary speculation, which must in all theories attend the omission of such points as are necessary to their practical application.

A sufficient proof of this is furnished by the notion of a "state of nature," and the uses to which it has been put.

For if this imaginary condition be opposed to civil society, and the latter can only exist where there are fixed abodes and landed property, we must conclude that all nations unprovided with these are living in a state of nature. From this it follows, that "the state of nature" embraces under it all those conditions which may be imagined to exist before the institution of civil society. But as among these there are marked gradations, gradations which cannot escape the merest tyro in history, the only conception of "the state of nature" at which we arrive, is negative; that is, it excludes what does not belong to it, without defining what does: it excludes "civil society," but it does not define the positive condition which the term "state of nature" is intended to denote.

This consideration, however, did not once enter the minds of our theorists. Each contemplated *his own* state of nature as something positive, and gave such a description of it as best pleased himself. No wonder, then, that there should be a little variety in the picture!—Hobbes conceived the first design.

[1] [Thus, in early times, the law of England seems to have taken no cognizance of moveable property, but to have confined itself to "things that are in their nature more permanent and immoveable, as lands and houses, and the profits issuing thereout." And although commerce, by the vast increase of moveable property which it has caused, has naturally induced great changes in the legal contemplation of it, yet the distinction even in name between "real" and "personal" property, the different laws of descent which they follow, and the greater solemnities requisite to the transfer and devise of the former, compared to what are imposed by law upon the latter, show the secondary place which moveables still occupy. See BLACKSTONE, *Com.* B. II. c. xxiv. TR.]

According to him, men in the state of nature live in continued hostility to each other. When in this condition, they are all equal, since they have a mutual right to make war upon, and even to kill each other. They all have the will to commit injuries, and therefore scruple not to do so—a war thus arises of all against all, and the danger becomes universal, as the weaker must ever yield to the stronger.—It is natural, meantime, that some protection should be sought against these dangers; nay, it is evident that neither individuals, nor even the whole race of man, could suffice to keep up a war at once universal, and in all probability eternal—men perceived this, and on this account forsook the state of nature, and formed themselves into civil society, which is therefore the offspring of fear.

On this hypothesis, the instability of which is apparent from what we have before said, Hobbes constructed his political theory. The second step he took led him into a new hypothesis.—Out of this state of nature it would have been impossible to advance without some specific agreement: and hence arose the principle, since considered so important, that "*the state is founded upon a compact.*"[1]

This compact consisted in a general agreement of all[2] to submit their private will to the will of one—it matters not whether this be one individual, or one assemblage of persons—whose will should thus become the will of all. Whoever procures his will to be thus respected, possesses the sovereign power and majesty: he is the prince, the others are his subjects.—As soon, therefore, as the sove-

[1] [The idea that the state is founded upon a compact, cannot be said to have been originated by Hobbes, although he was perhaps the first who in modern times made this the only and necessary commencement of society. Hooker, who died half a century before the *Leviathan* was published, (but whose *Eccl. Polity*, although constantly referred to by Locke, appears to have escaped the notice of Prof. Heeren,)holds very express language to that effect. "So that in a word, all public regiment, of what kind soever, seemeth evidently to have arisen from deliberate advice, consultation, and composition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no impossibility in nature, considered by itself, but that men might have lived without any public regiment." *Eccl. Polit.* i. He also speaks of "times wherein there was as yet no manner of public regiment." *Ib.* It is also distinctly laid down in the *Parliamentary Declaration* of 1648: "They (the parliament) suppose it will not be denied that the first institution of the office of a king in this nation was by agreement of the people, who chose one to that office for the protection and good of them who chose him, and for their better government, according to such laws as they did consent unto." Tr.]

[2] *De Cive*, v. 6. Submissio voluntatum omnium unius voluntati.

reignty is thus intrusted to the ruler, all private will is at once submitted to him.—He is in no wise bound by the laws which the others may prescribe—he unites in himself the supreme executive and legislative authority,[1] and is therefore in every way absolute, inviolable, and irresponsible. —Moreover, the power which has been granted to him cannot ever be revoked, for as the nation has transferred this, it no longer constitutes what, morally speaking, may be termed one person, but exists only as an aggregate of individuals.

It is true that the original act may have settled the sovereignty either upon one man, or upon a certain number, or even on the greater part of the people. And thus Hobbes would not by his theory exclude either an aristocracy or a democracy, provided either of these forms were pure and absolute. But then he wished also to prove that a monarchy is far preferable to the other two, and thus he became its advocate, not only generally, but in its most unlimited character of despotism. Mixed constitutions he held to be *ipso facto* absurd, since they imply the division of the sovereignty, which, according to him, is a contradiction of terms.

These are the principal opinions of Hobbes, who may without doubt claim to be considered as the founder of political speculation in modern times—none of his predecessors had treated the subject with so much acuteness and power of reasoning. He rose above common experience, and having once established his theory of a state, he guarded it well about. His system rested upon these three positions: 1st, The supreme power is indivisible: 2nd, The supreme power may be transferred: 3rd, When transferred its unity must be maintained.

The converse of the second of these (viz.) that the supreme power is intransferable, was at a later period advanced by Rousseau, who was thus unavoidably led to consider a democracy as the only just form of government. Hobbes, on the other hand, attained by his view to the most unlimited monarchy and aristocracy, without, as we have said, wholly excluding democracy. The only condi-

[1] Imperium absolutum, *De Cive*, vi. 13. Hobbes has no general term for the executive power, he characterizes it according to particular acts of the government.

tion on which he insisted, was that the form, whatever that might be, should be simple and unrestricted.

The high character which belongs to Hobbes among the political writers of his day, might lead us to expect that he should have acquired great practical influence. This, however, was not the case; and it may partly be accounted for by the fact, that the constitution of his own country was formed upon wholly different principles from those which he advocated. But even among the supporters of absolute kingly power, he was not usually appealed to as their best defence. Filmer, whom we have before spoken of, although immeasurably inferior to Hobbes, yet attained to much greater authority; in fact, he was singled out by the best champions of the opposite party as the worthier enemy of the two. The reason of this appears to be, that Filmer's work was in much better accordance with the prevailing spirit of the time than that of Hobbes. The latter so far excelled his age in method and power of abstract reasoning, as to stand alone and unappreciated. Again, Filmer had interwoven religion with his politics, and quoted the Bible for examples and authority; and as this was then the prevalent tone, we can understand how his solemn trifling came to attract more attention than the philosophical arguments of Hobbes.

It would be superfluous to dwell upon other and less known writers, who came forward in support of absolute power, as the theory of politics was very little advanced by them; and it is far from my intention to give a literary history of the science. I prefer passing at once to the *advocates of free constitutions* who appeared at this time in England; and among these more especially to Algernon Sidney, and John Locke. Both had for their immediate object a reply to Filmer, but neither was content with his discomfiture. Algernon Sidney[1] was one of those characters which the disturbances of a revolution are so apt to produce. From his earliest youth he was an enthusiastic adorer of republican freedom; and the circumstances amidst which he lived, served amply to encourage a spirit which

[1] He was born 1622, and beheaded 1683, on a charge of high treason, which could not be substantiated. Under William III. this judgment was reversed, and his innocence solemnly acknowledged.

persecution only confirmed. For many years he wandered in exile, and when at length he returned to his native country, it was to be condemned without cause, and die upon the scaffold. His own often rehearsed motto,

> Manus hæc inimica tyrannis
> Ense petit placidam sub libertate quietem ;

gives a truer history of his opinions and character than any longer story could tell.

Sidney wrote his famous "Discourses on Government" in answer to Filmer, and this polemical design teaches us at once that we are not to expect from them a regular system of politics. Moreover, he had no natural turn for speculative pursuits; and his philosophy of government consisted in a few favourite maxims, which he sought to prove alternately by abstract reasoning and reference to history. The first position of Filmer's which he attacked, was that in which he deduced the kingly power from God. He argued that so far from this, God had committed the choice of their government entirely to mankind. It is, therefore, in strict accordance with nature, that nations should rule themselves, or at least choose their own rulers.

All "magistratical power" then, if rightly derived, must be derived from the people; and the government must be instituted with a view to the advantage of the governed, and not of the governors. The amount of power which is intrusted to the magistracy, depends upon the people who make that trust: and as every nation has a right to establish its own form of government, so every nation has a right to alter or do it away at will. It is clear that these principles would admit of a monarchy as well as of a constitution; but although their author does not wholly reject the monarchical form, he takes no trouble to conceal his preference of republicanism, the advantages of which he endeavours, often feebly enough, to prove. It is evident from this short abstract, that the theory of government gained very little at the hands of Sidney. He ranks, however, among the most spirited defenders of liberty, and his unjust fate has rendered his memory sacred. With regard to his work, which could only be published after his death, in the reign of William III., we may fairly say that his name has done more for it than it has done for his name; it never has been forgotten, but

it has never taken a place among the classics of his country. This, indeed, the form of it would not permit, for while its polemical interest necessarily expired with the short-lived reputation of Filmer, there was nothing in the vagueness and unphilosophical arrangement of its parts which could supply the deficiency.

If Algernon Sidney then *did* contribute, and assuredly he did, to awaken a spirit of freedom among his countrymen, it was rather by his life and death than by any thing that ever came from his pen.

John Locke,[1] of whom we have now to speak, requires a very different notice. He is to be reckoned among those who have acquired, and still continue to exercise, a great national influence; for whatever opinion we may entertain of his powers of thought, it is undeniable that to him England chiefly owes the direction of its philosophical pursuits.

Those of his writings with which we have here to do, are his two treatises of government.[2] The first of these, as its title denotes, was in answer to Filmer; but the second goes further, and being an attempt to establish the general theory of government, bears more directly upon our subject.

In it Locke proceeds, as Hobbes had done, from "the state of nature;" but the vagueness which we before attributed to the idea of such a state, is at once shown by the very different picture which he gives of it from that sketched by Hobbes. The latter had asserted that, in "the state of nature" every man was in continual warfare with his neighbour. Locke, on the other hand, imposes upon men in this state a natural law, by which they are bound alike to provide for their own safety, and to abstain from injuring that of others. By the same law, persons who may have suffered injury are permitted to exert themselves in self-defence, and to retaliate so far as at once to procure reparation to themselves, and to prevent the aggressors from any renewal of their attacks. In spite, therefore, of his own doctrine, with which he combats Filmer and Hobbes, that all men in the

[1] He was born 1632, spent a portion of his life abroad, especially in France, and died 1704.

[2] The two treatises of government. In the former, the false principles and foundation of Sir Robert Filmer, Bart., and his followers, are detected and overthrown. The latter is an essay concerning the true original extent and end of civil government.

state of nature are free and equal, he allots to every one a degree of power over his neighbour sufficient to punish the transgressors of the natural law, and thus to maintain its authority.

This view of the state of nature reduces it to a condition in which men are under no government but that of reason. Such a condition may certainly be *imagined*, but until men learn to shake off the passions, which at present hold a divided sway with reason, and become wholly devoted to the latter, it can never be realized. While if it were, we may ask what necessity there would then be for any government at all? That it would be necessary, however, Locke declares, and that because where every man is judge in his own cause, it is impossible that he should act without being prejudiced by his own interest.

The most important advantage which resulted from the inquiries of Locke, was the assertion of universal freedom and equality as the birthright of mankind, in opposition to the tenets of Filmer and his followers with respect to the dependence, and even slavery, which they held to emanate from the paternal authority. Locke therefore was the first who advanced the doctrine of the natural rights of man, in as far as these are maintained by personal freedom, and the security of property, which he was at much more pains to define and establish than any of his predecessors had been.

As Locke made the state of civil society to proceed from that of nature, by the act of surrender, according to which every man resigned his individual right of punishing the violators of the natural law into the hands of a public and acknowledged officer; it follows, of course, that the constituents of a state should be all free men, and that personal freedom should be an essential condition of the union. Locke, however, was not content with this, for the whole tenor of his work is directed to show that the British constitution is strictly in conformity with the general principles of government, and therefore a just and reasonable form. He thus introduces, beyond the personal freedom on which he openly insists, the condition of political freedom, or participation in the legislature. The origin of a state presupposes the voluntary agreement of all those who are to become members of it; these, by uniting themselves, form a

political body; and this body must be directed by the will of the majority, or else remain inefficient. As each individual, therefore, must submit his own opinion to that of the majority, which thus becomes the *legislative power*, this power is supreme, whether the constitution be of one kind or another, whether the power be transferred into the hands of many or of a few. It must, however, be distinguished from the *executive*, which is subordinate to the other, and has for its object the observance and fulfilment of the laws.

In pursuing this scheme Locke was led to inquire more particularly into the distinction between the legislative and executive powers, and the principles which he thus established form another and essential cause of gratitude to him as a political theorist. No writer before him had so distinctly separated these elements of a constitution from each other, or ascertained so closely both their several characters and mutual relation. But whilst he was busied in claiming a superiority for the legislative over the executive, and in securing the exercise of it either wholly, or in part at least, to the people or their representatives, he was thus gradually preparing his way to the maxim, that *no constitution is to be considered a right one in which the legislative and the executive powers are not lodged in different hands.* In an unlimited monarchy, therefore, where the two powers are united in the ruler without control, the proper relations cannot be established, and the prince is to be regarded as occupying the same position towards his subjects as that which every man held towards his neighbour in the state of nature.

This development of the doctrine of a distinction of powers in the state, was absolutely necessary to complete the theory of government, and Locke cannot be denied great merit for accomplishing it, as well as for pointing out the advantages of a free constitution. He thus prepared the ground which subsequent writers, however little they otherwise agreed with him in principle, yet made use of to establish their own. But then, on the other hand, he did not foresee the consequences to which his doctrines might lead; for although there can be no doubt that the legislative and executive powers ought to be *considered as separate in theory*, yet how far they ought to be *separated in practice*, is a wholly different question.

An entire separation of the two in practical politics can never be accomplished—nor indeed did Locke ever intend it—he assigned the prince a share in the legislative, and thus differed from Hobbes by admitting a mixed constitution, while the latter rejected all division of the sovereignty, and admitted only the pure forms. Notwithstanding this, however, the theoretical distinction of these elements led to the maxim that they ought to be separated as *much as possible* in practice; and thus the way was opened to most serious errors. Subsequent experience has unfortunately shown that anxiety on this point is any thing but unfounded, and if we examine the evils which have resulted from it, we shall be obliged to confess, that no theory ever produced so much mischief by being misunderstood as this.

As far as England was concerned, however, the principles of Locke needed no qualification, and we can easily understand how they should become the text book of the nation. That separation of the executive and legislative powers which he required, was here in force, for although the king had a share of the latter, it was yet essentially in the hands of the parliament. Those maxims which were considered by the people as most sacred and most important, viz. that no taxes should be imposed except with the consent of their representatives, that all men's rights were equal in the eye of the law, and the like, were definitely expressed by Locke; and thus his theory corresponded in all its essential points with what actually existed. This accordance alone would have secured Locke a very great authority; but besides this, he was acknowledged as the first philosopher, and one of the most classical writers which the nation possessed; and his work thus became current, if not among the mass of the people, at least among the well-informed and educated part of it. There were other circumstances also which tended to spread his influence, and especially the fact that several of the most eminent *practical statesman* of Great Britain, we need only mention Chatham as one—recognised his principles upon every occasion in parliament; and thus added to his character for abstract philosophy that of the surest practical discernment.

The general consent of a great and intelligent nation, which has produced so many of the most profound philo-

sophers and ablest statesmen, is always entitled to our attention; nor have we the remotest wish to take from the undoubted merits of Locke: but we may observe, that the almost blind respect which was paid to him, has been one of the causes of that abatement in the study of political science, which to a certain degree still continues.—To argue against Locke has been considered as an infallible proof of disaffection to the constitution.

Nevertheless, England has since his time had many political writers, and those of the first order, but their pursuits have received a different direction, and have been changed from inquiries as to the rights and forms of government, into questions of political economy.—Men's opinions on constitutional points, as far as these are practically concerned, have become settled, partly by the constitution under which they live, and partly by the writings of Locke. On the other hand, the more evident relations of government and the new wants which have been continually arising, were calculated to draw general attention to political economy. And as under the Stuarts the theory of government owed its rise to the revolutionary times immediately preceding, so the circumstances of later days naturally led to the theories of political economy. It does not belong to our plan to mention the great writers who have appeared in this department. From them Europe has gained its whole knowledge of the science, and their influence, far from diminishing, must continue to increase.

However highly we may estimate the services which Locke rendered to the science of civil government, it was unavoidable that a theory which had reference only to one particular state, should be partial and incomplete. This will be at once evident if we apply his principles to other countries, which we are, to a certain degree, accustomed to consider among the best governed of Europe.

According to him, none of those states in which the power of the prince is unlimited, i. e. in which the legislative and executive powers are united in his person—admit of any approach to civil society, properly so called—in fact, they present nothing but slavery. These expressions must of course be taken with some degree of latitude, but the theory which seeks to confine the idea of a state within such narrow limits, cannot be reconciled with actual history.

If states, such as Denmark and Prussia, are not even to deserve the name of states, if their constitutions are not for a moment to be considered rightful constitutions, we must be allowed to suspect, that the fault lies rather in the theorists than in the states themselves. And so in truth it does; Locke, like all his predecessors, and his successors down to Kant, adopted for his foundation the division into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. But as long as this division prevails, no theory which is founded upon it can be secure. And one of the chief reasons of this is, that the important distinction between unlimited monarchy, as far as this results from the union of the two powers, or, as it is better termed, autocracy, and despotism, cannot be drawn. Hence these two forms, although essentially different, are continually mistaken for each other.[1]

While outward circumstances were thus advancing the theory of politics in England, Geneva presented a similar, and yet a very different appearance. This small state deserves to be reckoned among the most remarkable in Europe, and from its immense influence upon the practice of politics attracts the attention of the historian more than many other states which far exceed it in size. From a curious assemblage of circumstances, speculation on the science of government attained to a degree of vigour here, which was not equalled in any other part of Europe, and which at once produced its consequences—some cheering and beneficial; others, alas! dangerous and destructive.

The names of Calvin, and Servetus, of Voltaire, of Rousseau, and Necker, bring a throng of recollections to the mind; but in order to obtain a full view of the subject with which they are connected, we must bestow a passing glance upon the position and history of Geneva itself.

The geographical situation of this town undoubtedly contributed to produce a collision of ideas, such as could not easily take place elsewhere. Placed upon the borders of France, Italy, and Switzerland, it enjoyed a degree of intellectual prosperity to which each of the neighbouring states contributed its share. Still, however, the peculiar character of Geneva was determined by the development of its inter-

[1] In order to avoid repetition I must refer my reader to what I have said on this subject, in my Historical Researches, *African Nations*, vol. ii. App. IV. p. 413, of the English translation.

nal relations. To this the Reformation mainly contributed —for on their conversion to its principles, the Genevese (1533) expelled the bishops, who had till then been, in a certain degree, their rulers; although, as in other places, a municipal constitution had gradually been formed to restrain them. From that time Geneva maintained its independence, notwithstanding the attempts of the princes of Savoy: and the goods of the clergy, which had been confiscated, were applied to the foundation of that university, which has since reckoned so many distinguished men among its members. In the mean time, it was reserved for John Calvin, who established himself here as a Reformer, to enable Geneva, by his single efforts, to turn the Reformation to such account, as regarded its political importance, as could never have been hoped for without his assistance.

This extraordinary personage, a Frenchman by birth, and as much endowed with vigour and activity as he was furnished with learning, was chosen to fill the professor's chair; and not only acquired great political importance by the influence which the rigid church discipline, established by him at the Reformation, secured to himself and to the clergy, but became, as a *general* reformer, the head of that party which took its name from him.

Of this party Geneva naturally became the chief resort, and from it they spread themselves in all directions, and especially towards France, where, under the name of Hugonots, they caused disturbances from which the most sanguinary civil wars took their rise. But, besides the presence of Calvin, there was another reason for the religious importance of Geneva, and one of a more enduring character.

The new doctrines were no where else taught in the French tongue; and thus Geneva necessarily became the school of the French reformed clergy, and, by extending its sphere, involved itself more deeply in general politics.

To these circumstances Geneva was considerably indebted for the features which so peculiarly distinguished it—but not to these alone.—The manner in which its internal relations were established was of no less influence. In the same year as that in which Calvin settled at Geneva, (1536,) a change was wrought in the constitution of this state upon which its future character depended. The municipal con-

stitution, as far as it had been formed under the bishops, was purely democratical. The citizens' assembly, (Conseil general,) which included every householder who enjoyed the rights of citizenship, deliberated upon all important matters, and elected annually, from its own members, four chief officers, or syndics, who were obliged to give an account of their proceedings to the assembly. To those syndics it had, for a considerable time, become customary to join assessors, whose number had gradually been increased to twenty-five, and the body thus formed was called the smaller council (Petit conseil). Causes which will not admit of being historically proved had induced the addition of other assessors to the smaller council. The number of these was (in 1526) fixed at two hundred, but afterwards amounted to two hundred and fifty; and thus the great council (Grand[1] conseil) was formed, in which the smaller council had seats and voices, and of which it formed the select committee.

It was naturally to be expected, that when the bishops were expelled, and the state thus became wholly free, these institutions should not only be preserved, but should acquire a much greater importance than before. Up to that time, however, the members of both councils, as well as the syndics, were annually chosen by the citizens' assembly, and could, therefore, be only considered as delegates of the latter.

But in the year 1536, at a moment when general attention was fully occupied by matters of religion, it was carried, *that the two councils, the great and the small, should re-elect themselves annually*, subject, however, to an inquiry into the conduct of their members.

It was very difficult at that time for the citizens to perceive the consequences of such changes: they could not, however, but show themselves. In the midst of a democracy the seeds of an aristocracy had been sown, the growth and prosperity of which there was scarce any thing left to control.

The two councils had a common interest; they naturally became permanent bodies—naturally I say, for what could be more natural than that the annual election should, when it was thus left to themselves, become an empty form? A slight acquaintance with the course of affairs in small states

[1] We must not confound the great council (Grand conseil) with the Conseil general, or citizens' assembly.

will tell us, moreover, that this aristocracy could not avoid becoming an aristocracy of particular families. Meanwhile, however, it lasted for a considerable time without becoming a cause of dissension; and for that reason was able to establish itself the more firmly. The continued attempts of the dukes of Savoy to subdue Geneva also contributed to divert the attention of the citizens, and at the same time to create a spirit of unity, which the last ineffectual effort in 1602, the well-known *escalade*, served greatly to confirm.

While there was yet no great disparity of possessions, while strangers were freely admitted to the full rights of citizenship, and while those connexions were kept up between the upper and lower classes which were established by sponsorship, (a tie which may not unaptly be compared to the *patronage* of the Romans,) disturbances were not much to be feared. But all this became changed, when at the revocation of the edict of Nantes, (1685,) a host of Hugonots fled from France to Geneva. From that time the rights of citizenship began to be more sparingly imparted, and the Genevese formed themselves into distinct classes by the separation, among the citizens themselves, of the "*Citoyens*," or elder citizens, (whose family had possessed that right for four generations,) from the new citizens, or "*Bourgeois*," and among the mere inhabitants, of the "*Habitans*" from the after settlers or "*Natifs:*" and with this distinction of classes arose also a distinction of rights. The new trades which the refugees imported with them, produced a great increase of wealth; and men's minds became more at leisure for the consideration of political questions. In 1707 the contest between the aristocracy and the democracy fairly commenced, and was from time to time renewed in a manner which furnishes the most instructive commentary on the struggles of the patricians and plebeians in Rome, with which it agreed as well in other points, as in the fate of its martyrs—its Fatio, Micheli, and others. The historical details of these events do not belong to our plan, but it is well worthy of attention that they frequently arose upon questions closely connected with the theory of politics, which was then assuming a new form.

In none of the other and larger states of Europe were those difficult points, regarding the sovereignty of the

people, the limits between the legislative and the executive, and so forth, discussed so practically as in Geneva.—It presented the curious spectacle of a small, almost the smallest free state of Europe, preserving in the midst of the great monarchies by which it was surrounded, so striking a resemblance to the republics of antiquity, as to furnish a commentary on them, such as the whole continent besides could not supply. But there is another point on account of which it is still more remarkable, viz. the interference of several of the greater states, especially of France, with its internal affairs, and the manner in which that interference was conducted. Almost all the ministers who had charge of the foreign affairs of France—Fleury and Choiseul under Lewis XV.—Vergennes and Necker under Lewis XVI.—took a very great and active interest in the politics of Geneva; but notwithstanding the immense disparity of strength, their interference was always cautious and respectful, to a degree which could have been *necessary* only towards a much more important state. And even when, in extreme cases, it became unavoidable for the support of one or other of the parties, that troops should be advanced upon Geneva, still its independence was never violated. Indeed the eighteenth century may claim as a phenomenon peculiarly its own, the instance of an army furnished by three powers, France, Sardinia, and Switzerland, and assembled before the gates of a town, not for the purposes of conquest, but solely with a view of restoring by its presence the tranquillity of the town itself. No political system which has not for its foundation a sacred respect for property and a desire to maintain the balance of power can present such scenes!

Whilst these repeated disturbances, and the cautious interference of the great powers which they produced, gave to Geneva an importance in the eyes of Europe which no other state of the same rank could boast, they were also the cause of its becoming the central point of speculations on the theory of government. It affords a striking example of the power which the freedom of a republican constitution possesses to awaken a spirit of general inquiry, while it at the same time shows that the spirit thus roused will naturally attach itself to the subject of politics, should these lie more immediately within its reach.

But besides its form of government, Geneva had another advantage in the identity of its language with that of France. By this means it derived full benefit from every step which the latter made: all the new ideas which arose in France obtained immediate circulation there. And thus, before we come to "the citizen of Geneva," whose influence on the theory of politics was so extensive, we must first cast a glance upon the progress which speculations of this nature had made in France.

The age of Lewis XIV. had not been by any means favourable to them, but under his successors they had fairer scope. The spirit of the nation received a sudden impulse from the hand of one, who in respect of the attention which he excited, became to the French what Locke was to the English. He and Locke, however, held such different views with regard to the existing constitutions of their own countries that this is the only point on which a comparison will hold.

Before Montesquieu, the French nation possessed no writer on political subjects whom they esteemed sufficiently to consider an authority; but no sooner had the "Esprit des Loix"[1] appeared, than it obtained so great an influence as to render all attacks upon it ineffectual, except in furthering its success. In these days, however, we may ask what the real worth of this book is, and what has been effected by it?

The whole of Montesquieu's work *emanated from the study of history.* It is true that he does not deserve the praise of having earned by these studies the name of a general historian: they were too confined for that. He had studied the history of Rome deeply, that of Greece with much less attention; of that of the other nations of antiquity he knew hardly any thing. His acquaintance with the East, a quarter full of importance to his inquiries, was confined to what a few books of travels could supply. Of the histories of the middle and modern ages, those of France had interested him most, those of Germany and England next. The limits of his historical studies were therefore extremely narrow; but yet they embraced that diversity which was requisite for his purpose; and, moreover, he had pursued these studies in a spirit such as none of his predecessors could

[1] It was first published in 1748.

boast, not even Machiavel, who, as the founder of *practical* history among the moderns, might otherwise claim a place beside him.

The object of Montesquieu was to attain by the study of history to a knowledge of the very essence of states and political constitutions—to distinguish the peculiarities of each form; and thus to deduce maxims for the administration of the different branches of legislature under different constitutions.

His field was therefore of boundless extent and proportionate abundance; but then the subjects which it embraced possessed of themselves the highest practical interest, and had they been treated with only moderate ability, the first attempt on so large a scale could not have failed to attract the reader. How much more, then, when they were in the hands of a man so gifted as Montesquieu! Indeed, interesting as we have declared the subjects to be of which he treats, it was not to them, but to his *manner of treating of them*, that his work owes the great and permanent sensation which it produced. The method which he adopted of giving no finished descriptions, but of only hinting as it were by outline; of never exhausting his subject, and yet of saying so much on it in so few words; of busying not only the reason, by philosophical argument and definition, but the imagination, by the pictures which he often substituted in their room—above all, those lightning flashes of genius which, perhaps, blind as often as they illustrate—all this was admirably calculated to secure him assent and admiration among a people such as his own.

His work contained inexhaustible *matter of thought* for those who wished to think; whilst those who were too indolent for such exertions might console themselves with the belief that they had gathered from it an abundance of *ready-made thoughts*, and these of the brightest description.

This exuberance of genius, however, was unaccompanied by a *true philosophical spirit*. The mind of Montesquieu was well adapted for deriving shrewd remarks from experience; but for all matters of speculation, as far as that consists in the definition and distinction of abstract ideas, he was almost totally unfit—nay, he does not even seem to have once felt the want of it! The very first pages of his work show,

what has before been justly objected to him, that the author of the Spirit of the Laws was incapable of defining rightly what laws are; and it is evident throughout that he had not a clear notion of the first principles of the science of government. If any one should think these expressions unjust, he had better attempt to derive from Montesquieu's own words an idea of the essential character of the different kinds of government, of despotism, aristocracy, democracy, etc. This formed the very foundation of his scheme, and yet if we examine it, we shall not wonder at any uncertainty or weakness which we meet with in the superstructure.[1]

But although the general theory of government gained so little from Montesquieu, although his whole work could pretend to be nothing more than an *assemblage of maxims*, the justness and applicability of which it was left to the reader

[1] It was not without due consideration that I first published my opinion of a writer of such high authority, and one whose real merits I fully acknowledge. I repeat it now with greater confidence, as his last French Reviewer has fully confirmed it, in his admirable work, *Commentaire Critique sur l'Esprit de Loix, par* Le Comte Destuth De Tracy, 1812; translated, with notes, by Professor Morstadt, *Heidelberg*, 1820.

The French translator of this treatise, in my *Melanges Historiques*, Paris, 1820, has endeavoured to soften down this criticism, by stating in his note, what I am most ready to admit, viz. That I have only considered the state of science, and not the circumstances of the time. These, however, do not appear to me to have much to do with an opinion as to the progress of the theory.

[The following passage is the first sentence in Montesquieu's 'Spirit of Laws:'—"Les loix dans la signification la plus étendue, sont les rapports nécessaires qui dérivent de la nature des choses: et dans ce sens tous les êtres ont leur loix; la Divinité a ses loix, le monde matériel a ses loix, les intelligences supérieures à l'homme ont leurs loix, les bêtes ont leur loix, l'homme a ses loix." Now, objects widely different, though bearing a common name, are here blended and confounded. Of the laws which govern the conduct of intelligent and rational animals, some are laws imperative and proper, and others are closely analogous to laws of that description. But the so called laws which govern the material world, with the so called laws which govern the lower animals, are merely laws by a metaphor. And the so called laws which govern or determine the Deity, are clearly in the same predicament. If his notions were governed and determined by laws imperative and proper, he would be in a state of dependence on another and superior being. When we say that the actions of the Deity are governed or determined by laws, we mean that they conform to intentions which the Deity himself has conceived, and which he pursues or observes with inflexible steadiness or constancy. To mix these figurative laws with laws imperative and proper, is to obscure, and not to elucidate, the nature or essence of the latter. The beginning of the passage is worthy of the sequel. We are told that laws are the necessary relations which flow from the nature of things. But what, I would crave, are relations? What, I would also crave, is the nature of things? And how do the necessary relations which flow from the nature of things differ from those relations which originate in other sources? The terms of the definition are incomparably more obscure than the term which it affects to expound." Austin, *on Jurisprudence*, p. 191. Tr.]

to determine, it did not on that account work less effectually. It contained, in the first place, an inexhaustible treasure for the practical study of history; and although there are many single opinions and assertions in which we may not agree with Montesquieu, yet his labours served sufficiently to point out the advantages which might be derived from the study of history, as well as the manner in which these pursuits should be directed in order to attain them. Besides this, it derived great influence upon the spirit and way of thinking of the people of France, from the occurrences of the time at which it appeared. During the regency of the Duke of Orleans, as well as after the succession of Lewis XV., the most shameless corruption pervaded the whole government; the main cause of this was usually held to be the systematic suppression of the national freedom, the remains of which were occasionally perceptible in the struggles with the parliament; while it ought, with much more truth, to have been attributed to the state of morality, especially among the higher orders, to which no constitutional forms could have offered an impediment. The favourite maxims of Montesquieu were thus readily appreciated by the spirit of the day—his unrestrained attachment to mixed constitutions, especially that of Great Britain, could not fail to procure him a host of supporters. He met public opinion half way—was it astonishing then that he should be received with so much applause?

The spirit of political discussion was fairly awakened by him among his countrymen, never again to be lulled to rest, and from that time forth legislation, and the best modes of adapting it to the end proposed, became one of the subjects to which thinking men chiefly turned their attention. Montesquieu, therefore, contributed largely towards including it in the subject-matter of philosophy, although his own inquiries proceeded from the study of history, and not from the philosophy of the day.

In fact, of all those men who were at first distinguished, as they are now branded, with the name of philosophers, not one had attained to any eminence in France till long after Montesquieu had began to busy himself on his 'Spirit of Laws.'[1]

With all the imperfections and deficiencies of his work,

[1] According to his own account, Montesquieu was occupied for twenty years on that work. See the end of his preface.

Montesquieu has the merit then of having directed men's inquiries into *the paths of experience*. From the diffusion of his principles reform indeed might have been expected, but not revolution; for although he was the enlightened supporter of a limited monarchical constitution, he had not on that account endeavoured—even in France—to shake the foundation upon which the existing order of things had for so long rested. He was far from desiring general political equality; on the contrary, he maintained that under a monarchy, the leading principle of which ought, according to him, to be *honour*, the existence of a nobility is requisite, to prevent despotism on the one hand, and the tyranny of the people on the other; nor did he ever reject the clergy as an estate of the realm, although he wished some restriction of their privileges, especially with regard to their *jurisdiction*.[1] If, therefore, the idea of *a monarchy limited by representation of the people*, became cherished by the greater part of the people of France, as the result of the first national assembly proved to be the case, this must be mainly attributed, next to the example supplied by England, to the work of Montesquieu. That this very national assembly, however, far outwent the intentions of Montesquieu, by laying down the principle of universal political equality, need not, after what we have said, be any further insisted upon.

And this brings us back to the point from whence we started, viz. a review of the theorists of Geneva, and especially of him whose work became the text book of revolution. How far it was adapted to this purpose, how far the principles practically applied were really contained in it, is a point well worth our determining. But in order to gain a just view of the "Contrat Social," we must first bestow a glance upon its origin.

The "Contrat Social" originated in a manner directly contrary to the "Esprit des Loix"—the latter was the result of experience, supplied by the study of history; the former was the product of *pure speculation*, which Rousseau had been led to apply to politics from his earlier inquiries as to the *origin of a disparity* among mankind. Nevertheless, however abstract the studies of Rousseau may have been, it is very certain that the theory of government which he en-

[1] *Esprit des Loix*, ii. cap. 4.

tertained, could have been entertained by none but "the *citizen of Geneva;*" not that the principles which he advocated were those which obtained a practical influence in Geneva, but if any speculative thinker had set himself to mould the opinions favoured by the democratical and opposition party into a political system, and to establish them upon philosophical grounds, such a work as the "Contrat Social" must inevitably have been the result. It requires a very slight acquaintance with this treatise to perceive that Rousseau had continually before his eyes a small and free state, as being, in fact, the only one in which his principles could, to their full extent, become applicable. We may therefore justly say, that had it not been for the political progress of Geneva, the "Contrat Social" would never have been written. While, on the other hand, the already great, although indirect, influence of this little republic upon the practical politics of Europe, became by it immense.

It was not Rousseau's design, as it was Montesquieu's, to produce a rich collection of political rules and maxims, scientifically arranged—he sought rather to *establish the general principles of government upon a philosophical foundation.* In accordance with the object of our present work, it must be shown how he accomplished this, and more especially, how, in so doing, he diverged from the paths of his predecessors, and was thus led off to a different conclusion.

Rousseau, although he differs from both Hobbes and Locke in his description of it, proceeds, like them, from a "state of nature," out of which he supposes men to have advanced into civil society by a *voluntary contract.* This contract, however, is not concluded between the people and their rulers, but between the different members of the community itself, and must, as no man has a natural right over his fellow, be the result of unanimous agreement. This "pacte social" has no other object than to procure social institutions, under which the power of *all* may be exercised for the protection of the persons and property of *each.* *Each* individual, while he thus associates himself with *all*, being yet under the authority of none but himself, and thus as free as before. All the articles of the contract may be reduced to this one: that every man resigns himself and his rights, without reserve, to the society; or, in other words, that he puts him-

self and his person under the direction of the *will of the community*. In this manner the society forms itself into a *moral personage*, or a body which, as such, is intrusted with sovereignty, and becomes the sovereign. This sovereignty, however, is nothing but the exercise of the will of the community, and, as such, is not only intransferable, but also, as a natural consequence, indivisible.

But as the exercise of the will of the community is effected by legislation, *the legislative power* must of necessity be lodged with the people—*the people, then, is sovereign;* and, as its sovereignty is intransferable, can never cease to be so. This power cannot be exercised in any other way than by assemblies of the people, in which every man gives his vote, and the vote of every man is as good as that of his fellows. The idea of popular representatives, as exercising the sovereignty of the people, is an absurdity, since that sovereignty cannot be transferred. Representatives, so called, can be nothing more than agents, whose resolutions must be submitted to the people for ratification. When this social contract was established, all who took a part in it were free, and of equal rights. And the maintenance of this freedom, and this equality, is necessarily the object of all legislation, as without it society could not exist.

The equality here meant, however, does not require that all power, and all property, should be absolutely equal; but only that the power of no man shall be sufficient to commit violence; and that the wealth of none shall be so great as to enable them to buy others; the poverty of none such as to induce them to submit to being bought.

But as the state, in its corporate capacity, not only wills, but acts, there must be an *executive* as well as a *legislative* power. This requires *a government*, i. e. a body interposed between the sovereign and the subject.[1] This government, however, is nothing more than a *committee appointed by the sovereign people*, the establishment of which does not require, or even admit of, a mutual contract, inasmuch as it is in perpetual dependence on the sovereign power. As regards its constitution, it may consist of one, or more, or all;

[1] That is, the people may be considered both as sovereign (inasmuch as they make laws), and as subject (inasmuch as they obey them). Sovereign and subject here apply to the same persons in two different relations.

from which variety the three forms of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy have arisen[1]—although the last of these, considered as an *executive* government, is an absurdity. On the whole, it appears to be best that this power should be lodged in the hands of one; but then it is impossible that great monarchies should be well governed—and besides, an hereditary monarchy has very great disadvantages.

These are, according to Rousseau, the general grounds of all government. We shall now find little difficulty in remarking the points on which he differed from his predecessors, Hobbes and Locke.

With Hobbes, Rousseau agreed in founding political society upon a contract; but then Hobbes supposed this contract to be between the community and its own constituted authorities, and that it was a contract of *absolute submission*, by which it transferred the sovereignty without reserve. The original contract of Rousseau, on the other hand, was only between the individuals who by that act established civil society; between these, again, and the government there was not, nor could there be, any agreement, as it consists only of commissioners, deputed by the sovereign people. Thus the several routes of Hobbes and Rousseau separated at the first step, and that with no prospect of reuniting, as they were directed towards two opposite marks; that of Hobbes to unlimited monarchy, that of Rousseau to the absolute power of the people. The two are alike only in this point, that both tended to despotism, although Rousseau has the advantage in phrase, for the despotism of a mob, blinded by its own passions, may still retain the honourable title of liberty, while it is denied to the single tyranny advocated by Hobbes. It would be useless to pursue further our comparison between them, as their points of difference are sufficiently perceptible.

With Locke, Rousseau proceeded a few steps further before he separated from him. He asserted with him the ori-

[1] Rousseau was, as far as I know, the first writer who felt, although he did not fully explain, the double meaning of the word democracy; viz. as signifying either *a form of constitution*, or *a form of government*.

I must refer, on this subject, to my treatise already mentioned. See above, p. 336, note [1].

As a *form of government* Rousseau considered, and rightly, that a democracy is absurd.

As a *form of constitution* it was precisely what he sought to establish.

ginal freedom and equality which the defenders of unlimited monarchy denied. And consequently he agreed with him also in making the social state to proceed from a contract among freemen.

Security of person and property was held by both to be the chief object of civil union. And they both agreed in considering the legislative power as peculiarly belonging to sovereignty—that sovereignty being by either ascribed to the people, or bulk of the society. But then, according to Locke, the sovereignty might be *transferred*—according to Rousseau it is *wholly intransferable:* according to Locke it might be *divided* among different parties—according to Rousseau it must remain *undivided* in the hands of the people. At this point, then, the two paths separate, and it is easy to see the conclusion to which that of either necessarily led—Locke arrived at the *Representative System* and a *limited Monarchy*, by the union of which the legislative power, although partially shared by the prince, is mainly in the hands of the representatives of the people: Rousseau could not, according to his principles, admit any form but *pure Democracy*, as far as that consists in the legislative functions being exercised by the whole body of the people without any transfer to representatives, or any participation of other powers in the government.

I trust that these observations will suffice to explain the chief points which characterize the several political systems which we have examined, and to distinguish them from each other. All that can be accomplished by pure speculation towards laying the foundations of civil society, and determining the best methods for its constitution, appears to have been achieved by these three authors. Hobbes and Rousseau take their place at either extreme—the one in support of the total transfer of the sovereignty into the hands of the regent—the other to assert that the sovereignty is wholly intransferable by the people whose right it is; whilst Locke holds a middle course between the two.

It remains that we should consider these systems, especially that of Rousseau, with regard to their *practical application.*

They all three proceed from a *contract*, which, as founded on the supposition that it was framed by a people who never,

till then, had constituted a state, neither has, nor ever could have taken place. All the three, then, thus at once forsook reality, and struck into paths which threatened new dangers at every step which carried them away from it. The political principles of Hobbes were, however, less exposed than those of the other two, because the absolute power which he sought to establish upon rightful grounds, cares little for such support, and can maintain itself without it. Moreover, the course of events in his own country deprived them alike of authority and of practical adoption there.

The doctrines of Locke, on the contrary, had for the most part been already applied in England, and only had the effect of supplying other countries with philosophical reasons for that attachment to the British constitution which had become almost universal throughout Europe previous to the late revolutions. As a contrast to this, the system of Rousseau floated like Aristophanes' City of the Birds, free and without support in the air. For while Rousseau asserts that the *will of the community* is always just, and has for its object the general good of the community, he is undoubtedly right that the common will, as far as it is the result of pure reason, will be directed towards that which is best for the community. But then, this *common will* must remain to all practical purposes an empty vision, unless it has some *organ* by which it may be clearly and surely expressed. This Rousseau would have done by the voice of the assembled people itself, but he neither can, nor does deny that this method is often fallacious, or, to use his own words, that the will of *all* does not always express the common will. The people may be often deceived and led astray, and Rousseau knows no expedient against it, except—that we ought to be on our guard.[1]

None, then, of these metaphysical speculations on government can be said to have done much for the practical application of the science. But even if we were disposed to agree with Rousseau as to the organ by which the *common will* is to be expressed, no great harm would be done, for his system could not possibly take effect in a state of any considerable size. By denying all transfer of the sovereign will to representatives, he requires, at the outset, that there should

[1] This important chapter is to be found in the *Contrat Social*, ii. 3.

be general assemblies of the people which must be convened upon every occasion; and it is easy to see that, however readily this might be accomplished in small towns and their adjacent territory, it would be wholly out of the question in larger states—nay, Rousseau himself declares that these can only be formed by federations of the smaller. If, therefore, that party in France, which looked upon his writings as their standard, had wished to act consistently, there can be no doubt of what his fate would have been had he been then alive. As an opponent of the representative system, which they established to its full extent, and as a supporter of federative republics, which according to their principles was a capital crime, he would have been doubly destined to the guillotine!

Nevertheless, Rousseau's influence upon the revolution was incalculably great; not in the sense of his being the originator of it, for that would be a short-sighted view, but inasmuch as the *direction* which the revolution took was in a great measure determined by him. Some great name, some high authority was required; several of his ideas were, therefore, taken up—that of the sovereignty of the people—of general freedom and equality—and that of the greatest possible separation of the legislative and executive powers—and were made the foundations of the new system. It was no doubt Rousseau, who first expanded and perfected these notions, although he did not originally propose them; but even if he had desired the total overthrow of existing things in order to establish his own system, (and there is no reason to accuse him of such a wish,) he would never have tolerated a *partial* application of it. This was to *abuse*, not to *use*, and it would be unjust therefore to make him answerable for it.

Nevertheless, however willing we may be to acquit Rousseau of any design of causing revolutions, yet it cannot be denied that not only those which Europe has experienced since his time, but those which threaten it still, may be traced to the principal maxim upon which his system rests.

This maxim is the sovereignty of the people. The danger with which it threatened the practice of politics did not, however, consist in the maxim itself, for the *sovereignty may doubtless be in the hands of the people.* It was rather

in Rousseau's belief that this *sovereignty may be associated with monarchy.* The boundary line between monarchy and republicanism was thus wholly effaced, and the way prepared to errors for which Europe has already in part atoned, and still atones most dearly. It might surely have been thought, that after the science of government had been treated of for centuries, after it had been laid down upon every occasion, that monarchy and republicanism are forms of government in direct opposition to each other, it might have been thought, I say, that the peculiar character of each would have been fully understood, and their limits distinctly marked: but when a philosopher, such as Rousseau, either does not know, or pays no attention to this; when the practical policy of whole nations, and of their representatives, is carried on without any respect to it,—we have a right to conclude that either these lines have never been clearly drawn, or (which amounts to the same thing in practice) that they have in time become forgotten. And yet there could not be a moment at which such an error would be more fatal than the present. We have no longer to consider mere speculation and theory, the question which concerns us is one of fearful practical importance.

Europe, after having apparently escaped from the dangers of democracy, is on the verge of seeing either monarchical republics, or republics under the name of monarchies, occupying the chief places among her states. I hold these to be more formidable dangers even than those from which she has escaped. Of the comparative advantages of monarchies and republics nothing general can be asserted. It is possible to live happily or unhappily in either, according to the turn which events may take. But we may be sure that a nation (with individuals we have nothing to do) can never be happy in a pseudo-monarchy or a pseudo-republic, because such a form of government is contradictory to itself.—The history of Poland, as it was, affords at once a warning and an example!

We wish, therefore, either for *actual* monarchies, or *actual* republics. Now the European political system has been for centuries monarchical. All the chief states received the name of monarchies, and were so in reality.

The free states belonging to it were of the second or third

rank. Nothing, therefore, short of the most violent revolutions could be supposed capable of changing this character into its opposite.

What, then, is the boundary between the two? We know only one, and that must be determined by *the possession of the sovereignty or chief power*. The essential distinction of monarchy consists in this being held by the prince—that of a republic in its being possessed by the people, or a certain portion of them. A republic, as well as a monarchy, has but one chief officer, but then the relation in which this officer stands to the people is very different in the two—in a monarchy he is *above*, in a republic he is *below*, the people. In the former he is[1] prince, or sovereign (whatever title he may bear); in the latter he is magistrate. Common parlance, which is generally the echo of sound reason, has long drawn this distinction; it is only by the sophisms of theorists that it became confused. The kings of France and England have the name of sovereigns, and are so. The President of America and the Landammann of Switzerland neither receive the title, nor are they sovereigns.

But this "*holding of power over the people*," *this sovereignty of monarchs*, what does it, and what does it not, essentially imply? For it is only by an accurate answer to this question that we can determine what is essentially necessary to the support of the monarchical principle in existing states.

It implies, in the first place, that the prince should possess his dignity independently of the people: in other words, that the crown should be *hereditary* and *inviolable*. Elective kingdoms, where the election is only in favour of the individual, and not of his heirs, are not true monarchies. Whoever is chosen merely as regards his own person, is by the very act of his election subjected to the people, what-

[1] It would appear, however, that we have authority against us on this point in Frederick the Great, who called himself "a Servant of the State, who had his duty to perform like others."—Nevertheless, Frederick was undoubtedly master in his dominion, and it is impossible to be at once master and servant. Had he chosen to follow out this idea, the truth, and the falsehood contained in it, would have been easily shown.

He was no doubt a servant in a moral sense of the word, since, as a man, he was subject to the law of conscience, which obliges alike princes and servants to do their duty; but in a political sense he was not so, as he did not serve the state but rule it. For the rest, Frederick knew very well the distinction between himself as king, and Washington as President.

ever prerogatives may be formally assigned to him.—Whoever is chosen merely as regards his own person, may also be deposed by his electors, however differently it may stand upon paper.

It is otherwise with those who are elected to an hereditary crown.

Such cases may occur by the actual extinction of the reigning house, by abdication, and so forth, where there is no one who has an hereditary claim. There are accidents which no human power or wisdom can prevent, and on the occurrence of which, the best means which present themselves must be adopted, and thus election is often the only, or at least the most reasonable, expedient. But then, if the power bestowed by election be made hereditary, the person who receives it is at once raised above the people or the electors, as the possession of the throne is then no longer a prerogative of the person but of the dynasty. The name of elective monarchies has therefore been very justly restricted to those in which every vacancy of the throne is filled up by election. That such states are the most unhappily constituted, both as regards themselves and the other states with which they unite in forming a political system, the history of all times will show. Fortunately for Europe, elective monarchies have—with the exception of the papal government, the mode of election to which hardly entitles it to the name—entirely disappeared from its system; and with them the danger of those general wars with which the vacancy of the kingly throne of Poland, or the imperial one of Germany, was wont to threaten the continent.

The inviolability of the sovereign, i. e. the principle that he is not in person accountable, and cannot, therefore, be brought to punishment, is implied, as a matter of course, in true monarchies: for who in such monarchies *is able* to call him to account? But if this should be included as an article in any of our new constitutions, it would be either superfluous or absurd; superfluous in a true monarchy—absurd in a fictitious one, where the sovereignty is reserved to the people, for it would be a contradiction to exempt a delegate from being accountable to his superiors. Nor is it any secret that, notwithstanding all written declarations and assurances, there is always in such states a way open for the deposition, imprisonment, and even execution of the prince.

The idea of sovereignty further implies, and that necessarily, *That in all affairs of the state, nothing shall be done either without or contrary to the will of the sovereign.* Where this is not the case, he ceases to be sovereign (supremus).

By this essential condition, which, indeed, results from the nature of the thing, we ascertain the relation in which, under constitutional monarchies, the sovereign must stand towards the people or their representatives; and we are enabled to draw the line of demarcation which must not be passed if the sovereign is to remain such.

Constitutional monarchies are those in which there is a *popular power*, generally called *the Chambers*, which represent the interests of the people in the councils of the prince, without, however, opposing his interests, as it is too customary to imagine they do—the interests of both being the same—viz. the prosperity of the state.

This power not only advises, but joins with the prince in deciding; still, however, it must be in some manner dependent upon him if he is to remain sovereign, and be a prince not in name only but in reality. Upon the relation, then, in which the prince stands to the chambers, the maintenance of the monarchical principle chiefly depends, and we must, therefore, consider what rights ought in this respect to be secured to him.

In speaking of the *Chambers* we here understand that both, or at least one of them, is to consist of deputies chosen by the people. It is doubtless more in favour of the throne that the assembly should consist of *two* chambers, one of which should be composed of members not chosen by the people, but possessing their seats either by right of birth or by appointment of the sovereign; but it cannot be shown that this is generally necessary. Sometimes, indeed, chambers of peers are neither necessary to the throne, nor any support to it; nay, France has lately shown by example that a powerful opposition may be formed in them.

The division into two chambers affords greater security, however, against party decisions, and makes it more difficult for factions to be formed, and their interests preferred to those of the state. It is necessary, however, that the two chambers should not have two interests, and that the mem-

bers of the one should not possess any privileges which are burdensome to the other, for without this, unanimity cannot be expected between them.

The rights of the prince in his relation with the chambers, as far as these proceed from the definition of sovereignty, may be reduced into three classes, viz. Those which have reference to outward form—those which have reference to the subject matter on which his power is to be exerted—and those which regard the share which the prince is to take in the councils of the nation, and the influence which he is to exercise over them.

As regards the *outward forms*, the idea of sovereignty requires that the chambers should be in strict subjection to the prince. These *outward forms* are the barriers which are to protect the crown from the inroads of the chambers. They should be determined by the charter of the constitution, and it should be incumbent on the prince to maintain them in full force.

The chambers are not to assemble without, or in opposition to, the will of the sovereign. They are to be opened by him, to be prorogued, and to be closed by him; and he must at all times possess the right of dissolving the existing chamber, and of calling for a new election of its members. When chambers assemble, prorogue, adjourn, and dissolve of their own authority, the assembly takes place at once *without* the will of the prince, and will very soon be held in *opposition* to it. Again, a chamber which cannot be dissolved by the prince is independent, and superior to him. He has no means of escaping from its tyranny if it should form itself into a faction, and no opportunity of discovering whether it represents the wishes of its constituents, or stands in direct opposition to them. It is only by a new election that this can be certainly determined. It is requisite, therefore, not only for the interests of the prince, but for those of the people also, that he should have the power of dissolving the chamber of representatives.

In regard to the *subjects which are to be discussed by the chambers*, we may remark at once that all the foreign affairs of the state are to be beyond their jurisdiction, and appropriated to the prince. In treating with other states the prince must be considered as the representative of his

own, otherwise they cannot deal with him with any safety; should it be done only "sub spe rati," they will no longer consider him as sovereign, but as the delegate of a superior power. The maintenance of the monarchical principle requires, therefore, according to our views, that not only all treaties of commerce and alliance, but that all declarations of war and conclusions of peace, should be absolutely in the hands of the prince. This, however, does not by any means exclude the chambers from debating upon foreign policy, and from giving their opinion either in praise or blame of the measures which the government may have adopted.

How far such proceedings may be advisable is a question with which we have nothing to do, as it does not bear upon the maintenance of the monarchical principle.

The sphere of the chambers, then, as a body, sharing the power of ultimate decision with the prince, is confined to the *internal affairs of legislation and taxation.* In these there is no third party concerned: but in the dealings between the two the monarchical principle is sustained by the *veto*, which must be allowed unconditionally to the prince. In compliance with the favourite notion of the sovereignty of the people, frequent attempts have of late been made to restrict the *veto*, by determining that the prince may refuse his approval once, or even twice, but that after this the law shall be valid without it.

It is evident that this arrangement is wholly incompatible with the principle of monarchy, and, moreover, absurd in itself. It is incompatible with monarchy, because it assumes that a law may pass without the will of the sovereign. It is absurd, because there can be no reason why the monarchical principle should not rather be done away with at once, than after the lapse of two or three years.

There is no doubt that the use of the *veto* is an evil in each case to which it is applied, because it presumes that there is a difference between the prince and the chambers: but even though it should become, as in England, a mere form, it is yet important that the prince should possess the *right*, since circumstances may render it valuable.

It remains that we should consider the relations in which the prince stands to the chambers with respect to the *influence which he should exercise over them.* The monarch-

ical principle requires that the prince should have the right of introducing measures into the chambers; he is to possess, in technical language, the right of the *initiative*. But the question which arises is, whether this right is to be confined to him alone, whether he is to be the only source of legislation, or whether the members of the chambers are to be allowed a share in it?

Under the stipulation that the prince is to retain the power of approval or rejection, it does not appear necessary that the *initiative* should be wholly reserved to him; while to refuse it to the chambers would entail the contradiction of denying the representatives of the people all opportunity of expressing its wants. This object, however, may be obtained by requiring that the chambers should be obliged to sue the government under certain forms, for permission to introduce a measure, so that the latter only would retain the formal right. And this institution would possess the further advantage of throwing great obstacles in the way, if not of wholly preventing, all dissensions between the prince and the chambers. It is not, however, the object of this inquiry to ascertain what may best suit the peculiar circumstances of different nations.

If the monarchical principle requires that the prince should have the power of introducing measures into the chambers, it follows of course that he must also possess the means of convincing the chambers of the expediency and necessity of his proposals, and of inducing the adoption of them. He must, therefore, possess an influence in the chambers, since motions must be made in favour of these measures, and they must be supported in debate. This cannot be better done than by the ministers who are the natural organ of the prince. The ministers, therefore, must have seats and voices in the chambers, whether as ministers or as elected members does not matter. Nothing is more mistaken than the restriction of the ministers in the chambers, or their exclusion from them, in order, as it is said, to prevent the government influence from becoming too great. It is only from a false belief that the government and the chambers are in natural hostility to each other, that such regulations could proceed: but if the prince and the chambers are to communicate with each other, through whom can

it be better effected than the ministers who originate the proposals, and must, therefore, best understand their intention?

We need hardly mention that the monarchical principle requires that the prince should have the power which every private person has, of choosing his own servants and advisers, and of dismissing them at will. It appears, in fact, almost incredible that this right should ever have been disputed. Chambers which claim the dictation of the servants and counsellors of a prince, not only invade the province of government, but by that act declare their prince for ever incapable, and range themselves in a faction, whose object is to silence every voice but their own.

We have thus, according to our plan, traced out the relations which should exist between princes and their chambers, if the monarchical principle is to be maintained. The further development of them we leave to politicians. But if any one should think that too much is here allowed to the sovereign, I would refer him to Great Britain,[1] as a proof that all these conditions may be fulfilled, and the rights of the prince maintained, without infringing the liberties of the nation.[2] This will be an answer, at least to those who desire a true monarchy and not a republic. In that state a fortunate concurrence of circumstances has for ages been at work in forming the constitution. It is not, therefore, in the situation of the continental states, which have to provide themselves with a constitution for the first time, and the question can-

[1] [How far recent events may have changed the constitution of Great Britain, and made it inconsistent with the conditions prescribed by Professor Heeren, the reader may himself determine. One point appears to be generally admitted, if not so generally lamented, viz. that by the destruction of the government boroughs, the crown must henceforth be limited in its choice of ministers to such men as the constituent bodies of the country may, for the moment, be willing to return to parliament. And yet perfect freedom in this respect is, by Professor Heeren, considered so essential to the idea of monarchy, as scarcely to call for remark. See above. Tr.]

[2] The author trusts that he will not, on this account, be supposed to wish for the introduction of the entire British constitution into the states of the continent. He is well aware of the impossibility of this. And even if it were possible, he is by no means inclined to think it desirable. A diversity and multiplicity of constitutions is the inseparable condition of our political, and with it of our general, improvement. But this should not prevent us from deriving some practical hints from so great and prominent an example; due regard being of course had to the situation in which we are placed. To deny that any thing from thence is applicable here, would be as absurd as to assert that every thing is so.

not be there asked which has been asked here, viz. *From whom is this constitution to come?* The answer to the question itself is simple. From the sovereign power. In monarchies, therefore, from the princes. In republics, from the people or their representatives. The only difficulty which attends it has arisen from an attempt to apply the notions which the writers above-named entertained on the origin of states, to the present time. An application of which they will by no means admit. All those writers suppose a "state of nature," out of which men advanced into civil society; but in none of the countries which desire the establishment of a constitution, does such a state exist. In every one of them there is an existent sovereign: from whom but him ought these new institutions to proceed? It is only by assuming, with Rousseau, that even in monarchies there is a dormant sovereignty of the people, which may upon any occasion be awakened and become active, that this right can be denied.

But although, according to our views, both expediency and justice require that these new institutions should proceed from the existing authority, yet this by no means implies that the prince may not be assisted in planning them by a body of advisers, even though that body should be popularly constituted. This much, however, I believe to be necessary for the maintenance of the monarchical principle, viz. that such a body should have the power of advising, and that only.

Experience of recent date has shown the consequences of greater concessions; the universal acceptance of a constitution by the voice of the people can never be any thing but an empty form, and the regular establishment of it by the states may be easily shown to bring greater dangers than a concession of it by the sovereign.

Were it possible, within the German confederation alone, to come to an agreement on the boundary line which should be drawn, under the new constitutions, between the rights of the prince and of the states, were the points which we have stipulated for above assumed as matters of course, the rest would consist chiefly of local modifications, which could easily be determined by common consent.[1]

[1] [At the congress of Vienna it was provided that representative constitu-

The voice of those who demand constitutional governments is become too loud to be silenced without danger. But at the same time there is no doubt but that expectations are entertained which no change in the forms of the states themselves can satisfy.

Those who have speculated upon the forms of constitutional government, and set up new maxims of their own, ought at the same time to have learnt to estimate those forms at their true value. They should have shown what they admit of being, and of producing. But in rejecting this course, in giving themselves up without reserve to their metaphysical speculations, they have originated and constantly kept up the error, that every thing depends upon these forms; and that from them, and not from the spirit of the government and of the administration, the welfare or ruin of states must proceed. And thus it has become more and more customary to consider the state as a machine; and whilst men speak of *the machine of state*, they have fallen into the dangerous mistake of supposing that this *machine* may, like any other, be taken to pieces and put together again at will.

They forget that not only mechanical but *moral* powers are at work in it! What are state forms themselves beyond any other empty forms? What more are they—if I may be

tions should be adopted by the federate states of Germany. But the article (the 13th of the Act of Confederation) was so vaguely worded as to admit of almost any latitude of meaning; and accordingly different expositions of it were made and supported by different princes; many of which, as may be believed, tended to the continuance of their own authority. See RUSSEL'S *Germany*, i. 106. The list, however, of those states whose rulers have either adopted or had thrust upon them the liberal meaning of the article, is now pretty large, and embraces Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Hanover, Baden, the Grand Duchy of Hesse, Brunswick, Nassau, Mecklenburg, Saxe Weimar, etc. Of these, Saxe Weimar was the first to receive the boon, although from Russel's amusing description its value does not appear to have been very fully appreciated by the people.

All these constitutions, (to quote the words of Heeren himself, in the new edition of his Manual,) "Notwithstanding many modifications, in respect both of the organization and the greater or less publicity of their transactions, have hitherto coincided in the following points: 1st, The monarchical principle has every where been upheld, in the mode of conferring constitutions by the rulers, and by a just determination of their rights in relation to the states. 2ndly, The assembly of the states consists of two chambers. 3rdly, To these is allotted their proper part in the legislation, especially with regard to taxation."

The 13th article, therefore, does not appear to have been wholly inoperative; but it must be remembered that the act which contains it, also contains provisions for the Diet of Frankfort. TR.]

allowed a simile, not perhaps sufficiently exalted, but yet most applicable—than the track in which the chariot wheels are to run? It certainly is not a matter of indifference how this track is formed, for if it be even and easy, the motion will be so also—if it be uneven and rough, the checks will be more frequent, and some improvements will be required. If it be wholly useless, it must be given up; but be it ever so good, are we thereby assured that the chariot will continue in the track? Will the track alone be sufficient to restrain it? This depends rather upon the steeds who draw, and the charioteer who guides.

But to drop all metaphor—no forms will benefit a state, unless the government and people be moral and enlightened. And as to devising any which shall contain the warrant of its own stability, this would be even more absurd than to endeavour the discovery of a perpetuum mobile which should maintain its own impulse for ever.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

OF

THE RISE AND GROWTH

OF THE

CONTINENTAL INTERESTS OF GREAT BRITAIN.

The political system of Europe is greatly and beneficially modified by containing within it an insular state, which by its extent, and the use to which it applies its domestic resources, maintains its rank among the leading powers. However great the resemblance which may exist amongst the cultivated nations of Europe in points of civilization, religion, and language, the insular character of such a state necessarily gives rise to certain peculiarities, which cannot be effaced. The barriers which nature has interposed between it and the rest of the world, almost certainly produce a feeling of independence among its inhabitants, which may

not only be in the highest degree useful to themselves, but may also serve as an example to others; and that in our quarter of the world it has done so, is sufficiently proved by the history of modern Europe. Moreover, the existence of such a power gives greater security to the political system to which it belongs, against the occurrence of a revolution, which would at one blow annihilate the whole: since the situation of such a state will either altogether exempt it, or at least enable it more easily to escape the shock. But the peculiar importance of such a state to the whole system, consists in the necessity which its own maintenance imposes, of becoming a naval power; and thus rendering it impossible that land forces alone should decide the supremacy. In every system of states, the pre-eminence of one over the rest must eventually ensue, (especially when there is a considerable difference of power among the members,) if the preponderance depend upon land forces alone. Even the expedient of the balance of power, however carefully planned, will prove but a weak security against the occurrence of some favourable opportunity by which the state whose resources, or the talent of its leaders, or both, have rendered it the strongest, may be enabled to take that power into its own hands which in the common course of affairs will at some time or other lead to oppression and tyranny, although it may not at first assume so decisive a character. The rise, therefore, of one or more naval powers, by providing that in the political balance no single interest shall have the preponderance, is of itself most beneficial to the whole; and the more so, because from the very nature of such a power it cannot itself become dangerous to the independence of the rest. But to the reflecting observer, the existence of naval powers acquires its chief interest from the consideration that they can only result from an advanced state of civilization. Barbarians, it is true, will fit out ships for piracy; or if they are sufficiently powerful, for the purpose of conveying their armies into foreign countries and subduing them; but a naval power, in the true sense of the word, arises only from a participation in the commerce of the world, and has for its proper object the protection of its shipping and its colonies in distant seas. This presupposes, therefore, that both shipping and colonies are already in existence; and as they cannot exist except under a high

state of civilization, it follows that without such there cannot be a naval power. The history of modern Europe affords an indisputable proof of this; for it demonstrates clearly and decidedly that the advance of political civilization, and the decrease of ambitious dreams and plans of universal monarchy, correspond with the gradual formation of naval powers, and the growth of their influence upon the political balance.

The policy of a naval power as such, must necessarily have some peculiarities; but much more so, when this power occupies, like England, an insular position. We should undoubtedly be taking a very partial view, were we to found upon this peculiarity in its geographical situation a system of politics, the rules of which such a state should be supposed invariably to follow; for as long as it stands in various relations to other states—as long as their fortunes are an object of interest to it, and more especially as long as it is a member of a political system, it will be compelled, according to the variation in these circumstances, to vary its own maxims of policy. But the relations in which an insular state stands to those of the continent, may nevertheless be reduced to certain general classes, which have reference to as many distinct interests; and this arrangement seems here to be the more important, since in an historical development of the British continental interests, each of these classes comes, at certain periods, under consideration.

We may distinguish four distinct interests by which, notwithstanding its geographical separation, an insular state may become politically bound, as it were, to the continent. 1st, The interest of independence and security. 2nd, The interest of trade and commerce. 3rd, The interest of aggrandizement, by conquest on the continent. 4th, The personal and family interest of the rulers.

With regard to the two last of these classes, I have nothing general to say; for they are in themselves sufficiently intelligible; and in the case of England, the former does not exist; while as to the latter, no one doubts that the agreement or disagreement of the family with the national interest, is the only rule by which its value can be determined. But the two first classes require a more minute examination, not only separately, but also in their mutual relation to each other.

It is most ungrounded to suppose that because an insular state is supported by a navy, it is therefore to take no share in the political transactions of other states. It is certainly by its navy rendered more secure, but by no means perfectly so. Even with numerous fleets it is not always possible to cover widely-extended coasts; and when it is besides necessary for such a power to defend many and distant possessions, on the preservation of which its existence, or at least its wealth, depends, the difficulty is greatly increased. It is true, an insular power has not much to fear from the growth of one which is powerful only by land; but on the other hand, the danger is doubly increased when this power is also a naval power, and as such copes with it. In this relation stood France and England to each other. The proximity of their situations, the contiguity of their foreign possessions, the national hatred which for centuries had received constant nourishment, necessarily produced a rivalry such as does not and could not exist elsewhere.

But when such an insular power is at the same time a commercial state, there becomes connected with the political interest a commercial one, which will not permit continental relations to be neglected. This commercial interest can have no other object than keeping open, and as much as possible enlarging, the market for the disposal of its merchandise; and from this necessarily follows a closer alliance with those nations who will encourage or promote such disposal. Prudence forbids indifference to the fortunes of these allies; and thus arises of itself the connexion between political and commercial interests. But notwithstanding the truth of this, it cannot be denied that this connexion has in modern politics been frequently considered as more binding than it really is. It is sufficiently proved by experience, that the progress of commerce depends immediately on the wants of the buyer and the interest of the seller. Political relations may impede or promote, but they can neither create or destroy it. In countries where the means of communication are, as in Europe, so various and so easy, commerce will find a channel even in the hottest wars, and under the severest restrictions. Where demand exists on one side, and the love of gain on the other, they easily overcome or evade the impediments thrown in their way by go-

vernments. The experience of modern times has thrown much light upon the connexion of political and mercantile interests; it has shown, that if they cannot be wholly separated, neither are they so closely related as they were held to be in times when it was thought that the course which commerce should take, might be prescribed by mercantile treaties, or mercantile interdictions.

Independently of these causes, there is yet another ground which renders it impossible for an insular power, which occupies a prominent place in a political system, to be indifferent to the proceedings of other states; a ground which, in the eyes of a practical politician, is certainly far from unimportant—the maintenance of its station and dignity as a member of that system. In a political body like that of modern Europe, where such unwearied activity prevails, where so many energies are constantly at work, any seclusion from the common affairs, even when of no immediate importance to it, would, to a powerful and leading state, be the unavoidable commencement of its decline. In proportion as such a state contracts its sphere, that of its rival must necessarily expand; while the one loses, the other gains; and how desirable soever the maintenance of peace may be, the remark is not without its value, that power increases only through a struggle, and that a long peace purchased by such politics as these, often proves a very dangerous blessing.

The history of Europe has furnished many useful examples in this respect; but none more so than that of the United Netherlands. Its active interference in the politics of Europe cost this state many heavy sacrifices, and even reduced it to the brink of destruction. After the peace of Utrecht, it embraced the opposite principle, and has maintained it as steadily as it has been able. But from that period began its decline, and the internal causes of its fall worked thenceforth with a certainty proportionate to their undisturbed development. An absolute monarchy, which chiefly depends upon the genius of the ruler, is much more calculated to outlast a long period of peace; although even here symptoms of decline are usually visible. But in a state with a republican constitution, whether combined with monarchy or not, other causes step in, which, under such circumstances, must almost necessarily prove detrimental. The times of peace

are here generally the times of factions; which, although they may not directly bring on a civil war, do not the less gnaw at the very heart of the state. An active participation in foreign affairs, on the other hand, is well calculated to avert the internal fermentation; it affords a subject of common interest to all; whereas men's political opinions invariably become divided when they turn only upon their domestic relations.

This, however, will not, it is hoped, be understood as a defence of rash and general interference in foreign politics and wars. Between such thoughtless interference and indolent apathy, there is a medium which is fixed by the interest and the strength of the power concerned; and it is of the observance of this medium that we are now speaking. In order not to exceed it, the statesman must have not only clear and fixed notions respecting the real interests, but also respecting the extent of influence which the state possesses, of which he guides the helm; and the latter of these seems no less difficult to attain to than the former; for the delusions of pride and self-conceit are to the full as dangerous as those of ambition and self-interest.

These considerations may serve as an introduction to the following inquiry, which has for its aim, an historical development of the continental interests of Great Britain, during the last three centuries. The task which I propose to myself, is to give, in chronological arrangement, a review of the links by which the political and mercantile interests of England were bound up with those of the continent; and to examine how they became united, and how loosened. Unconnected and transient relations, such as sometimes arose in the course of great wars, do not come under our consideration; those only which were lasting deserve our attention. The history of the continental interests of Britain can be clearly viewed only, by considering it according to the periods in which it was subject to its principal changes. We must therefore take the following:—1. The period from Henry VII. to Elizabeth. 2. That of Elizabeth. 3. That of the Stewarts, down to William III. 4. That of William III. and Anne. 5. That of the house of Hanover, down to the commencement of the French Revolution. 6. The period from this, down to the restoration of the political system of Europe, which the revolution had destroyed.

FIRST PERIOD.

FROM HENRY VII. TO ELIZABETH, 1484—1558.

Even during the middle ages, England had taken a very active part in the affairs of the continent, by her wars with France, and her endeavours to conquer that kingdom. The marriage of Isabella, daughter of Philip the Handsome, with Edward II.,—a marriage in so many respects unfortunate,—had laid the foundation of these contests, since Edward III., the offspring of this union, grounded his claims to the French throne, in opposition to those of the house of Valois, upon his maternal descent. A series of wars ensued, which for a long time were as fortunate for England, as their consequences in the middle of the 15th century were fatal. The political interest which connected England with the continent, was therefore at this period only one of conquest. In times when the principles by which politics were directed were as yet coarse and unrefined, and when the love of conquest was the sole spring of action, such plans were possible, although even then there were evident indications, that a lasting subjection of France to England was nothing but a dream. Since the year 1450, the English had been excluded from France, but the bare title of king of France was not all which England retained. Political ideas, so deeply rooted as these were, are not easily got rid of; and the result shows, that they were active in England throughout the whole of this period, since every opportunity was eagerly seized, which held out the least chance of carrying them into execution. Brittany was at that time under the rule of its own dukes, in whom, as they were almost constantly embroiled with the kings of France, England found allies within France itself; and had not this position of affairs been altered, by the extinction of the male line (1488) and the subsequent union of the heiress Anna with Charles VIII., the consequences of it would probably have been long felt. Besides, whilst Calais remained in the hands of the English, it was imagined that they possessed as it were the gate of France, by which they might enter as often as they thought fit.

But even in the reign of Henry VII., England obtained by family connexion an interest in the continent. Arthur, son of Henry VII., married Catharine, daughter of Ferdi-

nand the Catholic; and upon his death, while still a youth, she became the wife of his brother, afterwards Henry VIII.

During the reign of Henry VII., these relations could not have any important consequences, because he purposely avoided, as much as possible, all interference in foreign transactions, in order to secure his own throne. Once only he crossed over to Calais with an army, to please Maximilian I., when he was deprived of his betrothed bride, Anna, the heiress of Brittany, by Charles VIII., who thus laid the foundation for this important acquisition; but although the English interest was, by this circumstance, exposed to imminent danger, it was more a financial than a military expedition. For 600,000 crowns Charles VIII. purchased the treaty of Estaples (1492); in a few weeks Henry returned home, and the alliance between England and Brittany was for ever dissolved.

But during the reign of his son and successor, Henry VIII., (1509—1547,) the consequences became, on this account, the more striking. When he ascended the throne, Italy had, by the league of Cambray, become the centre of European politics. England, from her position and other circumstances, could derive no benefit whatever from taking a share in the proceedings in Italy; nay, her neutrality must have given her the advantage over France, while this state was fruitlessly expending its strength in attempts at conquests. But the family connexion with Spain was now employed by his father-in-law, Ferdinand the Catholic, for the purpose of involving Henry in these transactions.

When the league of Cambray fell to pieces, and out of it arose the holy league against France, Ferdinand joined himself to it, in order to find an opportunity of seizing Navarre. He fully estimated the advantages which would probably result to him from the interference of Henry, whom he flattered with the hope of being able to enforce his old claims to Guienne. He obtained his object; Henry VIII. quarrelled with France, and when he had done so, his father-in-law and his other allies forsook him, and after a fruitless invasion of Picardy, he put an end to this war, which had exhausted the crown treasures left him by his father, by a peace (1514) intended to be confirmed by the marriage of his sister to Lewis XII.

An interest so entirely misunderstood as this had been, and only raised by the craftiness of a false friend, could not be otherwise than transient. But the times soon changed; and when Lewis XII. and Ferdinand (1516) left the stage, at nearly the same time, and Francis I. and Charles V. stepped into their places, new relations arose, which became, or at least seemed to become, much more important to the continental interests of Great Britain. The new rivalry between the French and Austrian-Spanish houses, first laid the foundation of the system of a balance of power, and four bloody wars between Charles and Francis were the result.

Under these circumstances, it was very natural that the idea should arise in England, that she was able to turn the scale in these wars. And what can we conceive so well calculated to flatter the vanity of Henry VIII., as to consider himself the umpire of Europe? And indeed he seemed to have many means in his power for accomplishing this object. If he embraced the side of Charles, he could easily injure France, since the possession of Calais made it easy for him to land troops on the French coast; and if he joined the party of Francis, he could, in the same manner, make an incursion into the Flemish possessions of Charles V. We cannot, therefore, be surprised, that he really assumed this character; but he acted it so badly, that it led to no results; and by casting a single glance into history, we shall easily discover why it did not. When the contest between Francis I. and Charles V. first began, in the year 1521, and both monarchs strove for the friendship of Henry, it was for a time uncertain which side he would join, until at length Charles succeeded in winning over Cardinal Wolsey, by promises and flattery. Through him the king was also gained. But still the war in Picardy was only a subordinate transaction, and its results could be of no great importance. The melancholy fate of Francis I. at Pavia (1525) brought Henry to his senses. He now began to fear that his ally might become too strong; he therefore forsook him, and after the peace of Madrid, by which Francis bought his freedom at the expense of conditions which he had no intention of fulfilling, (1527,) he even went so far as to unite himself with his former enemy. But at the commencement of the second war, he voluntarily disabled himself; since he was

induced, by commercial considerations, to concede to the emperor the neutrality of the Netherlands, the only point in which he was capable of doing him any injury. The consequence was, that he gave his ally no assistance, and as his attention was engaged during the war, by religious matters, and the question of his own marriage, he appeared wholly to have forgotten the important part which he was to play, and took no share in the third war between those two monarchs, which was concluded by the ten years' armistice of Nice (1538). But when the fourth broke out, (1541,) he formed a close alliance with Charles, not because he then feared the power of France, but because he wished to gratify his own capricious humours. The compact which he concluded with Charles V., is a striking example of the politics of that time; the conditions show that there was no intention they should be observed, because their observance was impossible. Henry VIII. desired nothing less than the French crown, and, in order to conquer the whole of France, he went to Calais with an insignificant force, while Charles invaded Champagne. But the allies fell out amongst themselves; Charles concluded a separate treaty at Cressy, (1544,) and left his ally to get out of his difficulties as he best could; Henry was content with the promise of an annual payment, which, on the other side, there was no intention of discharging, although Boulogne,[1] which he had taken, was left in his hands as a pledge for eight years.

From all this it is clear, that the pretended maintenance of the balance between the two great powers of the continent, in these times, existed only in name. A monarch, who was ever the slave of his inclination, and the tool of those by whom he was surrounded, was incapable of adhering to a firm line of politics; and this remark applies with equal truth to his minister, Cardinal Wolsey, who was not less guided by his passions than his master. It might have been expected, that the new interest created under Henry VIII. by the Reformation, might have caused a connexion between England and the continent; but the conduct of Henry rendered this impossible, notwithstanding the share which he took in these transactions. As long as he claimed

[1] This, during the reign of his son, was recovered by France, on the payment of a much smaller sum than had been originally stipulated.

the supremacy, and only exchanged the power of the pope in England for his own, without tolerating the Protestant doctrine, the adherents of which he persecuted, there could be no union between him and the Protestant princes of Germany; and the attempts which he made to attain this object were necessarily fruitless.

Under the government of his son and successor, Edward VI., the political connexion with the continent was not in any way strengthened; it was, on the contrary, made apparent, that the ties by which, under Henry VIII., England had been united to the continent, had arisen, not from any national interest, but from the caprices of that king. Although, during this reign, the Reformation was introduced into England, that country was not involved in the great crisis, by which the condition of the Protestants of Germany was determined, although so fair an opportunity of its becoming so was offered by the alliance of Henry II. of France and Maurice, against Charles V. But upon the premature death of Edward, and the succession of his sister Mary, England was brought into a new connexion with the continent, and one which might have had the most fatal consequences, by the union of Mary and Philip II. of Spain (1554). It is true, the parliament took all possible precautions, but had there been any children of the marriage, Philip's unwearied activity might easily have overcome these difficulties. Even as it was, the political relations of England were affected by it. When Philip II., soon after his succession, saw himself compelled (1557) to a war with France, he contrived, by his personal influence with his wife, to make her a party to it. The result was the loss of Calais, the only remains of the old conquests of Britain in continental France.[1] Calais was taken by the French in 1558, and at the time was considered a most serious loss; but in reality it was a gain to England. It was this that chiefly tended to dispel the old visions of conquest in France, which had so often been the occasion of undertakings against that country, although the impracticability of the design might long have been discovered.

From what has been said, it is clear that, although England during this period occasionally interfered in the affairs

[1] The islands of Guernsey and Jersey she still retains.

of the continent, the British continental interests were not as yet become national interests; they existed only in the family connexions of the reigning houses, or in the old claims of the kings of England upon France: that is to say, in an idea which had already outlived its own strength. For her independence, England had then little to fear from either France or Spain, since Italy was the prize for which these powers were contending; and if there had been any apprehension that they might hereafter become dangerous, it would have been most natural to permit them to wear out their strength against each other. It remains therefore only to inquire, how far the interests of England, during this period, may have been involved in those of the continent by its commercial transactions.

As England was then wholly without colonies, which might give her the produce of distant parts of the world to convey to other markets, and as her domestic industry was too confined to produce any considerable means of commerce, it is easy to see that her trading interest at this time could not enter into the most remote comparison with that which arose in the subsequent periods of her history. The great commercial revolution for which the ground was laid by the discovery of America and the East Indies, in the beginning of this period,—the only one which furnishes an epoch in the general history of trade,—was not entirely without its influence upon England; for as early as 1497, John Cabot sailed on a voyage of discovery to North America, and others followed him; but those discoveries, although made with the *consent* were without the *support* of the government; and during this period led to no advantageous results.

But, in the mean time, the wool which England produced, and which was exported partly in a raw and partly in a manufactured state, was of so much importance that it was not entirely without influence upon her continental policy. From the twelfth century, the breeding of sheep (which was afterwards greatly improved by the introduction of the Spanish breed, in the reign of Edward IV.) had been the principal employment of the English farmer; and after continuing to export it raw for a considerable period, cloth manufactures were at length introduced. The nearest mar-

ket, and that to which English wool was first carried, was in the Netherlands, the manufacturers of which depended for their prosperity upon the trade; and hence arose a connexion which existed not merely in the caprice of the sovereign or the minister, but in the real interests of the nation. Even in this period it had some political consequences; for when Henry VIII. declared war against Charles V. in 1527, the discontent of those engaged in this business, compelled the king to make a separate treaty for the neutrality of the Netherlands. The sequel of this inquiry will show, that as the connexion with this country was one of the oldest, so it has always remained one of the firmest links of the British continental interests. Besides the trade with the Netherlands, England found a market for her wool in the north-eastern countries of Europe, in Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, and even in Russia. This trade was for some time carried on only by the vessels belonging to the Hanseatic league; which, as it is well known, had one of its commercial establishments in London. But the English began to try all means in order to bring it into their own hands, and thus differences arose; which, however, ended rather in piracy, and that of the most cruel kind, than in formal wars. If the power of this league, however, had not been already so much on the decline, that Elizabeth was enabled to deprive it of its commercial privileges in England, these circumstances might have had a much greater influence upon the continental politics of this country, than actually was the case.

These are the ties which, under the first four Tudors, connected England with the continent of Europe. They were all of the most delicate and frail nature; and for the most part detrimental to England. But it was reserved for the last monarch of this house to create a firmer and better connexion; and in the history of the continental interests of England, her reign undoubtedly constitutes a distinct and very important period.

SECOND PERIOD.

PERIOD OF ELIZABETH, 1558—1603.

In the whole history of the British continental interests there are, properly speaking, only two periods which form

general epochs—that of Elizabeth, and that of William III. However great may have been the claims advanced by her arrogant father, it was only under Elizabeth that England raised itself to the first rank among nations. During this reign it first learnt its power and the proper sphere of its action; the old visions of continental conquests vanished away; all the family connexions by which England had been united with the continent were dissolved; and in their place arose relations of a very different character, produced by neither private interest nor vain projects of aggrandizement. Elizabeth has the merit of having made her private interest subservient to that of her nation, or at least of having united the two, whilst her predecessors were guided solely by the former; and this, notwithstanding the cunning and deceitfulness sometimes displayed in it, forms the principal feature of her glorious reign.

Her first undertaking was the introduction of Protestantism into England; and this determined not only the internal relations of her kingdom, but became for a long time the true foundation of the foreign interests of Britain.

A change of religion was in itself an affair of the people, and not of the government alone. Elizabeth, in yielding to the wishes of a large majority of the nation, founded a real and universal national interest; but at the same time one which affected the government. And as the Reformation implicated England in the politics of the continent, it is at once evident that this connexion must have been closer than any could have been before. It now for the first time became possible, that a real continental interest should arise, at least if we understand by this one which is not merely the personal interest of the ruler, but also that of the people. Such a connexion was now, by many circumstances, rendered unavoidable.

About the time when the Reformation was introduced into England, the religious interest[1] was also in a great degree a political one. The maintenance of the constitution rested directly on Protestantism; and it could not escape the observation of the queen, that the fall of that religion would have involved her own. She was forced, therefore,

[1] See above, *Political Consequences of the Reformation*, second period; page 289.

to become its defender, but circumstances made it impossible that she should confine herself to playing that part at home. England (for Sweden had not yet taken a decided part) was the first leading power which had declared for the Protestants; and Elizabeth was therefore considered as the general supporter, if not the head, of the party; a character which she could not refuse without endangering her own interests. Then as Spain was at this time governed by Philip II., the most determined of the defenders of the old doctrine, a man too whose pride Elizabeth had wounded by the refusal of his hand, the antipathy which sprung up between these two powers became an almost necessary consequence. But, again, it was this very antipathy which laid the foundation of the greatness of England. The religious interest now involved that of independence and political existence; and England, in entering the lists against the first power of the time, was under the necessity of either raising herself to eminence, or abjectly submitting to be crushed; the choice lay between victory and destruction.

That this relation between England and Spain could last thirty years (1558—1588) without breaking into open war, while at the same time Elizabeth never, during this long period, made a single sacrifice of her real interests, is undoubtedly the most splendid proof of her superior political ability. But in the mean time, other circumstances arose on the continent, which very much strengthened the connexion with England; namely, the war of the Hugonots in France, and the revolution in the Netherlands. And although one of these ties was broken off even during the reign of Elizabeth, the other seemed to be permanently established.

When the disturbances began in the Netherlands, there were three reasons why England should take part with the insurgents. It has been mentioned, that the Flemish provinces were the principal market for the disposal of British produce,[1] and even on this account England could not be in-

[1] Even at the beginning of the troubles in 1564, an attempt to prevent the importation of English cloths, occasioned disputes which were terminated only by a provisional arrangement. See Rapin, in whose work may also be found an account of the trade between England and the Netherlands. Its whole value is put at twelve millions in gold, (quere, what dollar?) of which the exportation of cloth alone from England amounted to five millions. Vol. viii. p. 308. ed. 1729.

different to their fate. This, then, was one reason for interference. The second regarded the religious interests which they had in common. The struggle which was here beginning, was one against religious tyranny; if the Protestant creed was victorious in the Netherlands, its maintenance in Germany and England was also secured; but in both countries this was more than doubtful, if Spain succeeded in stifling it there. The third reason was, that the loss of the Netherlands would be a blow to the Spanish power, which must eventually prove fatal to it, and insure success to England in the rivalry which had now commenced.

For these reasons Elizabeth took a share in the Flemish disturbances; and this share was advantageous not only to her, but to the nation. She did not do more however than give them scanty subsidies, and permit her subjects to serve as volunteers in their army. She wished, as it appears, to avoid, if possible, a war with Spain; and she well knew, that the scanty assistance she gave, was best calculated to develope their powers, and thus to obtain her principal object.

It was only in 1585, that she made a formal treaty with them, by which, in consideration of the money which she had advanced, and the troops which she supplied, three of their ports were pledged to her, and a place in the council of war, then existing, was promised to her ambassador; at the same time, however, she declined the proffered sovereignty over these provinces. These and other well-known circumstances led to a formal quarrel with Spain, and the interests of England and the Netherlands, in respect to this power, became inseparably united. The destruction of the invincible armada (1588) freed England at once from all apprehension of the Spanish power; and now Elizabeth had no longer any wish to put a stop to a war, the circumstances of which were favourable not only to the security, but also to the greatness of her empire.

If we consider the whole conduct of Elizabeth towards the Netherlands, we shall plainly discover what her intentions were. That this infant state, just liberating itself from thraldom, would advance with such gigantic strides towards the greatness which awaited it: that it would not only outstrip Spain, but, by engrossing the commerce of the world, would even surpass England itself, and oblige that state to

strain every nerve, in order to supplant its rival: all this did not occur to her, nor was it probable that it should. She fancied that she was raising up a state, which could exist only under the protection of England, and would therefore never be able to act in opposition to the British influence. She wished to establish her supremacy here, as she had done in Scotland, and would gladly have done in France. This manner of extending her power, was as much studied by Elizabeth as it was by Philip II.; but she knew how to play her game more secretly, and calculated the chances better. It could not be otherwise, however, than that the mutual rivalry between England and Spain, (on which now depended the balance of Europe,) should produce these struggles: the territory which one side gained, was lost by the other; and each therefore was compelled to endeavour, not only to maintain, but also to add to its possessions.

The turn which the affairs of the Netherlands took during this reign, must have tended still more to strengthen the ties between them and England. The Belgic provinces, it is true, were restored during the war to the Spanish dominion, and the Batavian alone maintained their independence; but even while the war was raging, all manufactures and trade had been transferred from the former, which were the constant scene of action, to the latter, which suffered infinitely less; and since in these Protestantism finally triumphed, they became connected with England by religious as well as mercantile interests, and common enmity to Spain remained the watchword of both nations.

The relations in which Elizabeth stood towards France, were much more complicated; and she could hardly herself have been aware, how far they would lead her. The protracted hopes of marriage which she held out to Francis of Alençon, the presumptive heir to the crown, and which, even allowing for the feelings of her sex to the degree which her history requires, it could never have entered into her plans to fulfil, were the veil under which she concealed her true designs. The religious wars, which commenced in 1562, had lasted but a short time, when she began to support the Hugonots by intercession, by money, and by volunteers; and this she continued to do, without openly breaking off her amicable relations with the government.

It would be difficult to find a parallel to the political game which she played here, and which surpassed in subtlety even that carried on by her in the Netherlands. It was impossible to know how these wars might terminate, but here too her rivalry with Spain formed her chief inducement to act as she did. As Philip II. supported the league in order to further his own views, she opposed him by siding with Henry of Navarre; and when this prince came into quiet possession of his throne, she joined him in the war against Spain, which, as concerned France, was terminated by the peace of Vervins (1598). But the pacification of the Hugonots by the edict of Nantes, and the death of Philip, which happened in the same year, were of themselves sufficient to destroy this interest, the very nature of which was but transient.

These were the principal supports on which rested the continental interests of England during this reign; but the great and manifold development of the powers of the nation during the same period, had also an influence upon them which must be the less neglected in proportion to its greater permanency.

It was during the time of Elizabeth that England first learnt for what she was destined, and became acquainted with her proper sphere of action, since it was then that she laid the foundation of her universal commerce and navigation, although it was not till a later period that the structure was brought to perfection. The rivalry with Spain chiefly conduced to this; and as the possessions of that nation extended over the most remote parts of the earth, England was not wanting in the courage requisite to seek and encounter its enemies on the most distant seas. In this manner were the seeds of many branches of British commerce, which attained their perfection long afterwards, sown, since England now sought to appropriate to herself her own carrying trade, which hitherto had been chiefly in the hands of foreigners. While she was seeking a north-eastern passage to India, arose her commerce by way of Archangel with Moscow, and even Persia. Thus originated the share which she took in the Newfoundland fisheries, which afterwards became of such immeasurable importance. Thus, too, the first trial of the African slave trade. It was thus that the

Hanseatic league was deprived of its privileges in England, and British ship-owners got the continental trade into their hands. Thus, too, were made the first, although ineffectual attempts, to colonize North America. Thus was England even then induced to turn her attention to the commerce with India by the way of the Cape of Good Hope; and as early as the end of this reign (1600) the old East India Company was established, although as yet there were no important possessions in those parts. Thus many discoveries were made, and to this it is owing that Drake made his successful voyage round the world.

Most of these new branches of commerce were, it is true, so inconsiderable at that time, that they could not be fairly regarded as possessing direct political influence. Commercial wars, strictly speaking, had not as yet arisen; but the importance of trade in general began to be more sensibly felt. To this it must be added, that with the commerce and the navigation of England, her naval power was also extended. As yet England had not been, in the present sense of the word, a naval power—it was only in the reign of Henry VIII. that a slight foundation was laid for that "*Royal Navy*" in which was to consist the future strength of the country. The rivalry with Spain rendered an increase of naval power necessary, and therefore it was augmented under Elizabeth; but some great trial of strength was wanting to prove its whole importance to England. This was afforded by the invincible armada; and from that time the conviction became deeply rooted that the security and independence of Britain depends upon her wooden walls. From that moment she suddenly became conscious of her power, and the defensive war was changed into an offensive one; from it too we must date the rise of her designs upon the sovereignty of the seas, which, cleared as they now were of the Spanish fleets, seemed only to await a new mistress.

The conclusion at which we arrive therefore is, that, 1. The interest of religion under Elizabeth was also that of independence, and of the connexion between England and the continent; 2. That during her time the foundation was laid for a commercial interest, the whole power of which however was not to be developed till a later period.

THIRD PERIOD.

PERIOD OF THE STUARTS, 1603—1689.

At the time when the Stuarts ascended the throne of England, the religious interest formed, as is evident from the preceding part of this inquiry, the pivot on which turned the whole politics, both foreign and domestic, at once of England and the rest of Europe. On Protestantism Elizabeth had founded her throne and her greatness, and a firmer basis they could not have had; because she thus united her interest with that of the people. Her successor appeared therefore to have his way marked out for him; he thought fit, however, to choose another, and thus prepared the fall of his dynasty.

The house of the Stuarts is probably the only one in history which brought on its fall, not so much by practical as by theoretical principles. These principles were, however, at direct variance with the interests of England generally; and more especially with her continental interests. Since Elizabeth, by the defence of Protestantism, had attained the supremacy of Protestant Europe, it was evident that to maintain it her successor must assume the same character. But James I. was rendered incapable of doing so, by the strange mixture of political and religious sentiments in which he loved to indulge, and which remained the hereditary and deep-rooted sentiments of his family. His theory respecting the high dignity and unlimited power of royalty, determined his religious creed, which was confirmed by the feelings which in his youth had been roused in him by the fate of his mother. He hated the puritans from the bottom of his heart, because he scarce considered them in any light but that of rebels. He professed that he belonged to the episcopal church, because to be king of England it was necessary that he should do so, but his very first speech in parliament declares in such plain words that Catholicism, (excepting the doctrine of the papal supremacy, which was detestable to him from its limiting the regal power,) was the religion of his heart, that it could not but destroy once and for ever the confidence of the nation in their king.[1]

[1] This speech, like the rest of those composed by the king himself, forms a curious document illustrative of English history. It contains the seeds of

An immediate reaction upon the continental policy of England could not but ensue, and even at the commencement of the reign of James I. it showed itself in two ways; in the peace with Spain, and in the transactions between that power and the Netherlands. In 1604 James concluded the war with Spain which Elizabeth had so determinately carried on, by a peace with Philip III.; in which no single advantage was gained for England, and the Netherlands were left to their fate. How far the conditions of that treaty were favourable or unfavourable to England, made but little difference; with this peace expired that rivalry with Spain, which under Elizabeth had been the soul of British politics. On this rivalry was founded the greatness of the nation; through it her naval power had developed itself; and it supported the confidence of the other Protestant states of Europe and the supremacy of England. It is clear also, that the change in these relations produced a corresponding one in the whole course of foreign policy pursued by England, and the firmest, and under existing circumstances the most natural, connexion between her and the continent was broken.

The second occasion, when the change in the political system of England became apparent, was the negotiation which the Netherlands entered into with Spain, respecting the recognition of their independence in the year 1607. This period was of incalculable importance to England, which had so long fought the same battle as themselves. With what activity would not Elizabeth have applied the negotiation to her own advantage, so as to take the whole credit to herself, and to attach the new state to England, by unstrained but yet secure ties! But thoughts like these did not enter a head like that of James I. According to his sentiments, the Netherlands were nothing more than rebels to their sovereign, and thus even in the midst of the negotiation, he acted in so contradictory a manner, that no one knew what his designs were, because he did now know himself. The consequence was, that at length no one noticed him, and Henry IV. obtained the influence which Elizabeth would have secured to herself.

that harvest of misfortunes which the Stuarts afterwards reaped. One might almost say that the evil genius of this family, which drove it blindly from one fault to another, had inspired the king with it.

This apathy and indolence, which James I. concealed under the name of love of peace, would have completely broken up the relations between England and the continent, had they not been renewed by family circumstances. The care of making a suitable marriage for his son, which, according to his notions, could only be with the daughter of a king, carried him into negotiations, which characterize more perhaps than any thing else the perverseness of this eccentric king. A Spanish princess was to be the wife of his son and future successor; a Catholic, therefore, a descendant of that family and of that nation, who, both by religious and political interest, were the hereditary foes of England. Thus James I. was indifferent to risking his own interest, that of his son, and of his country, for the sake of gratifying a caprice, which found a ready support in his prejudices. This is not the place for reviewing this extraordinary negotiation, in which Spain had the advantage during seven years (1617—1624) of leading the weak monarch according to her own views, and which, when at length it failed, was the occasion of a war, by engaging in which the luckless Charles took the first step towards his ruin. But during the progress of these negotiations, the marriage of Elizabeth, only daughter of James I., had created new continental relations, which had a considerable influence. In 1612 she was married to Frederic V., Elector of the Palatinate, who, in 1618, assumed the crown of Bohemia, which, as well as his own family possessions, he lost by the battle of Prague and its results. If James I. had taken an active part in the German war, it would never have been laid to his charge, that he bartered the interest of the empire for that of his daughter. For the first was here concerned as well as the latter; the interest of Protestantism was at stake, and this more especially, because in 1621, the war between Spain and the Netherlands was renewed. But here too James I. played a double part. He did not approve of the undertaking of his son-in-law, because he considered the Bohemians as rebels, and yet he would willingly have seen his daughter a queen. But the close connexion between Spain and Austria made the policy of interference still more questionable; for if he had decided on coming forward, a threat from Spain of breaking off the negotiations for the marriage of his son

would have made him as undecided as ever. Hence the melancholy part which he took in this eventful period. An idle show of assistance was all that his son-in-law received from him.

But if James I. thus betrayed the continental interests of England, this neglect brought its own punishment, and that a severe one. The power which, under his predecessor, had turned the scales in the political balance of Europe, now sank into such insignificance as almost to become the ridicule of Europe. Our inquiry thus far has shown, that the relations between England and the continent were as yet very simple, when compared to those of later times; and yet her history, even under James I., clearly shows that a neglect of her continental interests is with her the signal of decline.

It is true, that the reign of his ill-fated son began with a twofold war, with Spain and with France; but the first arose from the failure of the scheme of marriage, and was founded only on family interests; the other aimed at the defence of the Hugonots in France, who had been disarmed by Richelieu, and therefore the support of religion might be supposed to be involved in it; but the real cause was hatred of that minister; while both were carried on in so weak and spiritless a manner, that they only served to embroil Charles I. with his parliament. Although Charles took some share in the affairs of Germany and of the Palatine family, it was so inconsiderable, that it led to no results; and it was very evident that he was induced to it, not so much by religious or national, as by family interests. The true continental interest of England was left out of sight; and when the storm in his own country began to gather, he had no time to give any attention to foreign affairs, and England remained as it were isolated in the European system, until Cromwell (1649) had possessed himself of the helm of state. The government of that bold usurper is distinguished, not only by a more active interest in the transient affairs of the continent, but also for the lasting consequences which resulted from it. The stormy times of the revolution had roused a power in England hitherto unknown; almost every one who was capable of it had carried arms, and the spirit of faction had created moral energies, which can be brought into action only at such periods. To this must be added the fact, that,

notwithstanding the troubles of the times, the navy had not been neglected either by Charles I. or his father. He had most scrupulously applied the sums granted for its support, and England, as a republic, stood both by land and sea in a more formidable attitude than she had done as a monarchy.

The private interest of the Protector made it, no doubt, requisite that he should take an active part in foreign affairs, as well to afford vent to the excitement at home, as to give splendour to his reign; but, independently of this, a new interest had been springing up, which, in progress of time, rapidly increased, and gradually gained a greater influence upon the relations between England and the great powers of the continent, namely, the colonial interest.

With the East Indies, England had, it is true, for some time carried on a considerable trade, but as yet it had no territorial possessions, and was confined to a few scattered factories. But even these already furnished occasions of quarrel with Holland and Spain, whose jealousy would suffer no strangers to gain a footing there.[1] But, properly speaking, the first colonies of the English were on the coasts of North America, and the West Indies; and they owed their origin chiefly to political and religious interests. Bands of malcontents wandered across the ocean, and sought beyond its waters a freedom or security, which they either did not, or imagined they did not, find at home. Thus arose the numerous settlements in several of what are the United States, and in 1623, and 1624, in Barbadoes, St. Christopher's, and some of the smaller islands, which the Spaniards had not thought it worth their while to occupy.

These foreign possessions always continued in a certain state of dependence on the mother country, although this relation received different modifications. The mother country was therefore under the obligation of defending them, and as this was especially necessary against the continental powers, the colonial interest naturally became a mainspring in the continental politics of England. This state of things was at first caused by the absurd pretensions of the Spaniards, who, as the first discoverers of the new world, claimed the

[1] Particularly in the year 1623, at Amboina, where the Dutch massacred the English colonists in a horrid manner, under pretence that they were engaged in a conspiracy; and also took the small island of Poleroon from England.

exclusive possession of it, and the sole right of trading in its seas. These claims were not relinquished even in time of peace; and although after the treaty of 1604 these settlements obtained a little more peace, and therefore prospered better, the Spaniards exercised occasional acts of violence and cruelty, which sufficiently proved that they had no intention of resigning their claims, and afforded at least one of the grounds which determined Cromwell to chastise them, when he declared war against them in 1655.

The whole system which the Protector adopted in regard to continental politics, is very comprehensive and complicated, and therefore not easy to include in one view.[1] His whole government show how important he considered it; and although we cannot deny that private feelings and objects influenced his measures, still it is clear that his main object was to make it a means of increasing the commercial navigation of England. The consequences of it were, the two foreign wars which he carried on; viz. that with Holland (1652—1654), and that with Spain (1655—1657).

Whatever other circumstances may have had their influence in the former of these, it was in reality a commercial war, and the first in which England had engaged. The relation in which she stood to the West Indian colonies, where the Dutch were in possession of nearly all the commerce of the British islands, and more especially that of Barbadoes, led to the passing of that famous Navigation Act, which not only secured to the mother country the whole trade of the colonies, but also forbade the introduction of European produce in any ships but those of the country from which it came; and thus gave the death-blow to the extensive carrying trade of Holland. This Act was therefore little less than a declaration of war. The relations between the two states, however, had undergone a great change. Holland had all but secured the monopoly of the commerce of the world, and England if she wished to have any share of it, could not avoid entering into a contest such as Cromwell engaged in. The dispute which arose respecting the rights of the flag, unimportant as it may appear, displays in a re-

[1] This is the part of Cromwell's history in which Hume has been the least successful. He omits the mention of all those leading principles of his policy, which the slightest glance at it will display.

markable manner the rivalry of the two nations; but that England, by persisting in the Navigation Act, laid the foundation of her naval power, requires no proof.

The war with Spain, with the assistance of France, exercised a twofold influence upon the interests of Britain. In the first place, the conquest of Jamaica (1655) secured for ever the colonial interest in the West Indies. Until that time England possessed only a few of the smaller Carib islands, and that by sufferance rather than by any power of her own. It was the intention of Cromwell to wrest St. Domingo from the Spaniards, and thus to make England mistress of the West Indies. In this he did not succeed; but the conquest of Jamaica, which, although at that time of no moment, became in a few years a flourishing English colony, compensated for the disappointment; and as the demand for their produce increased, the West Indian colonies gradually became of such importance to England as necessarily to influence, and that in a material degree, her relations with other nations which already had established, or were on the point of establishing, settlements in those islands. A second result of this war was the renewal of the scheme of conquests on the continent. It was the intention of the Protector to gain possession of the sea-port towns, and perhaps of the whole coast of the Spanish Netherlands; and France was obliged to pledge herself beforehand to resign to England the places which it was proposed should be taken, viz. Dunkirk, Mardyk, and Gravelines; and in this manner the two former really came into the possession of the English. But his views were yet more extensive. He wished to gain also the principal ports in the North Sea and the Baltic; and the treaty with Sweden (1657) was intended to prepare the way for this.[1] At this period Charles X., the warlike successor of Christina, was planning the formation of a great Northern monarchy, by the conquest of Poland and Denmark. The Protector promised him support, and expected in return the possession of Bremen, of Elsinore, and Dantzic. But a longer life would have been requisite to carry out

[1] According to Hume, he entered into this alliance with Sweden from mere zeal in the Protestant cause. Nevertheless, according to the seventeenth article of the treaty, he retained the right of disposing of all fortresses taken from the Danes; which surely cannot have been wholly dictated by zeal for the Protestant cause.

these plans than fell to the lot of Cromwell; the possession of Jamaica and the Navigation Act, (Dunkirk being sold to the French in 1662,) remained the only permanent memorials of his protectorate.

However extensive therefore were his views of continental policy, it is clear that but few of them were carried into execution. But when the Stuarts were restored to the throne (1660) the old prejudices of their family came back with them, and under the existing circumstances became still more dangerous to England than they had been in the reigns of James I. and his son. It was at this period that Lewis XIV. raised his power in so sudden and formidable a manner as to disturb the peace and independence of all his neighbours. In order to carry out his plans, the concurrence of England was indispensable; and although at his first attempt England took part in the alliance which brought about, or seemed to bring about, the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, (1668,) it is well known from history that Charles II. and his venal ministers soon became so wound up with the interests of France, that they even took part in the war for the subjection of Flanders to France, although that event was evidently opposed to the interests of Britain. The hope that, with the aid of France, he should be able to overturn the constitution and the established religion, and thus attain unlimited power, was the talisman by which Lewis led this abandoned monarch to embrace his interests,[1] and induced him, as well as his brother and successor, to continue in them. It would be in vain, during the reign of princes who were guided only by their passions and their prejudices, to look for fixed principles of policy; a revolution was necessary to establish these upon a new foundation.

FOURTH PERIOD.

WILLIAM III. AND ANNE (1689—1714).

We now come to the period which is undoubtedly the most important in the history of the modern continental politics of England, namely, the period of William III. The merit of having laid the foundation of those continental interests which have lasted to our time, belongs undoubtedly

[1] The conditions of the secret alliance with France (1670) as quoted by Hume, put this point beyond dispute.

to him. In the time of Elizabeth, as we have shown, it was Protestantism which determined the relations between England and the continent. It is true that this spring of action operated more powerfully, and for a greater length of time, here, than in any other European state; so much so, that it displayed considerable strength even under William III.; but as it began about this time to relax in other states, the same necessarily became the case before long in England; and here as elsewhere it could only be maintained for a short additional period by the local or family circumstances of the reigning house. Some other powerful inducement was therefore requisite, in order that the participation of England in the affairs of the continent should rest upon higher grounds than the personal connexions and inclinations of the monarch. This new spring of action, which has continued down to the latest times the soul of British policy, was the rivalry with France, a principle which was then established for ever. England since that time has scarcely ever entered into any political connexions with the continent which have not either mediately or immediately proceeded from this source. This rivalry has been one of the mainsprings of European politics, and the more partial the view which is often taken of this circumstance, the more necessary it is that we should consider it in its real bearings.

The rivalry of these two great powers was undoubtedly the cause, partly of the origin, partly of the extension and of the prolongation of several of the great wars which have desolated not only Europe, but even the most remote parts of the earth. Considered in this light, we may well excuse the opinion which refers to this rivalry, as to one of their chief causes, the manifold evils which in these times have happened to mankind; but it is undoubtedly a false estimate which would assert that these evils, undeniable as they are, outweigh the advantages which have sprung from the same source. A more extensive view of history in general will lead us to a very different result.

What is the rivalry of nations but the spur, ay, and the most effectual one, to prompt them to the development of their powers? What else therefore than the mainspring by which they are urged to the attainment of that state of civilization for which they are by their capacities and circum-

stances fitted? The progress of whole nations is in this respect the same as that of individuals; nor can it be otherwise, since it is of such that they are composed. As amongst individuals it is emulation which ripens youth into manhood, so it is also amongst nations; and it would probably be in vain to search in history for an example of a nation which became great without the impulse of rivalry. The Greeks would never have been the first nation of their time, had it not been for their victory over the Persians! Never would Rome have been mistress of the world, had it not been for the struggle with Carthage; and Carthage would have been without a Hamilcar and a Hannibal, had she not been the rival of Rome. Nay, even when she was mistress of the world, and seemed to stand without a rival, Rome would scarcely have outlived the first century of our era, had not the contest with the Germanic nations, which finally subdued her, then upheld her in her place. And does not the history of modern Europe present an equal number of examples? Have not Spain, France, and the Netherlands raised themselves since the sixteenth century by their mutual rivalry? Was not the rivalry between the Catholic and Protestant parties the life of the German confederation? Would Peter the Great, would Frederic II., have reached their height of power, if the one had not had Swedes, the other Austrians to engage with? And yet in none of these instances has national rivalry done so much as in the contest between England and France. It was this which drew out the noblest qualities of both nations—it was this which preserved that love of freedom and independence which is founded on patriotism—it was this which kept alive the most lofty feelings of the human race—it was this which not only brought to perfection the civilization of these nations, but also planted the seeds of European refinement in the most distant parts of the globe; and thus what in the eyes of short-sighted mortals was frequently considered the source of misery and calamity, became in the hands of Providence the means of producing and diffusing the perfection of our race.

And thus, by taking this view, we escape that partiality which in any less exalted one is unavoidable. If we place ourselves in the position of either of the two nations, we

shall never be able to form a judgment which will not be accused of partiality by the other; but if we take this higher ground we shall easily escape the reproach. It is not necessary to deny that errors have been committed, or to gloss over past acts of injustice. We grant that from that rivalry have sprung many evils; but in this we only recognise a confirmation of the universal law, that beings so imperfect as we are can never attain to the great and good without alloy, because we require the impulse of our passions before we can put forth the whole of that power with which nature has endowed us.

When William III. was placed on the throne of England, this rivalry was already existing between the nations, although not between the governments; and even the animosity between the nation and the government affords proof of this. The religious influence was still in full force in England, because the nation was convinced of its connexion with liberty and independence. But other causes were added to strengthen this rivalry by the spirit of the government of Lewis. His conquests must have excited the attention of England the more from their being directed against both the Spanish and the United Netherlands. The independence of the latter depended immediately upon the fate of the former, and we know that the connexion between the United Provinces and England was so close, that even the wars of Cromwell and Charles II. had interrupted it only for a time. But France was becoming a more dangerous neighbour to England, as she now took a place among the leading naval powers; and the rivalry was yet more inflamed by the commercial and colonial system created by Colbert. During the reigns of the two last Stuarts the commerce of England had advanced simultaneously with the extension of her colonies;[1] its importance was now fully felt; and a neighbouring nation which in this point sought to equal, if not to excel her, could not be regarded with indifference. But the colonial system of France now received as great, if not a greater extension than that of England; and hence resulted that unfortunate confusion of the colonies of the two nations,[2]

[1] By the peace of Breda, 1667, she obtained the province of New York; and in 1680 William Penn founded his settlement in Pennsylvania.

[2] We may add, of the European colonies generally. If there were any step

in their geographical situations, which has cost so much blood, and will probably cost yet more. In the West and East Indies, and in North America, the French and the English now became neighbours. Their interests therefore crossed each other more and more; they came in contact no longer only in Europe; they found each other in every corner of the world. Even under the Stuarts this rivalry had displayed itself notwithstanding the unanimity of the sovereigns. England in 1668 had joined the triple alliance against France, in opposition to the wishes of Charles II.; and although in the next war (1672) Charles united with Lewis against Holland, after two years the voice of the nation forced him to break the alliance. We find, then, that at the time of the revolution, the foundation had already been laid of a *national rivalry;* it did not therefore owe its origin entirely to the policy of William III.

It does not however admit of a doubt that the personal inclinations, and the position in which this monarch was placed, tended greatly to increase this rivalry, since he made its maintenance a principal maxim of his policy. Even in his youth (1672) he stood opposed, as the champion of the Netherlands, to the great king of France,[1] to whom he bore a personal hatred, which was in turn cherished against him by that monarch; and from that moment he seemed to live for the sole purpose of thwarting Lewis, and became the life and soul of all the alliances which were formed against him. When raised to the throne of England he had to defend it against Lewis, who took his rival under his protection. The war, hastened as it was besides by many other causes, became thus unavoidable, and it wrapped nearly all Europe in flames, (1689—1697,) until at the peace of Ryswick Lewis found it convenient to acknowledge William as king of England.

which would lead, if not to interminable, at least to lasting peace in Europe, it would be the geographical separation of the colonies. This has been in great part although not wholly accomplished, by the last treaty of peace, which we shall consider hereafter; the fortunes of the Spanish colonies will perhaps bring about the rest.

[1] It is well known from the Memoirs of St. Simon, that this personal hatred arose from the refusal of William, when only Prince of Orange, to accept the hand of one of Lewis's natural daughters, which was offered him by her father. We should be careful, however, not to lay too much stress upon such anecdotes, even when true. The result would have been the same had this circumstance never occurred.

There is probably no other example of a rivalry between two civilized nations in which so many causes of jealousy are to be found, as those upon which that between England and France was founded. The interests of independence, of religion, and of commerce, were involved in an extraordinary manner with those of the sovereigns themselves. Is it then to be wondered at, that such a rivalry should become at the same time both violent and lasting? But it is time to follow out the consequences which it had on the subsequent continental interests of Britain; we shall thus trace the formation of many of the threads on which was wrought the whole web of the subsequent politics of Europe.

Alliances on the continent were, under the existing circumstances, absolutely necessary to England. It was a struggle with a power which at sea was about equal to her in strength, but which on land was infinitely superior; and which necessarily remained superior until it was discovered that an addition to the standing army was not at the same time a diminution of national freedom. England therefore dared not enter into a contest with France alone; and when this idea had once gained ground, it continued even in times when its justice might well have been disputed, and thus became the governing principle of the continental policy of Great Britain.

An alliance therefore with that state which as a military power maintained the next rank to France, was an unavoidable consequence; and hence arose the close connexion between England and Austria, a connexion which may be considered as the true foundation of the British continental interests, and which, although for a time dissolved, was soon again renewed, and will probably be from time to time renewed as long as the rivalry between England and France continues to exist. As long as a branch of the house of Hapsburg reigned in Spain, this connexion could not but lead to an alliance with that country, and this the rather as the plans of Lewis were constantly directed against the Spanish Netherlands. But yet more important was the influence of the British policy upon the United Netherlands, now that their hereditary stadtholder was at the same time king of England; and hence arose the great alliance of Vienna, (1689,) in which England for the first time dis-

played in full force her vast influence upon the affairs of the continent. This alliance, and the ensuing war down to the treaty of Ryswick in 1697, gave to the politics of western Europe that character by which they were afterwards peculiarly distinguished. The alliance of the naval powers (England and Holland) with Austria, against that power which had become equally formidable on land and sea, forms the groundwork of the system, and the interests of these states so clearly demands such an alliance, that political sophistry will scarcely be able to prevail against it. All the states of the continent, which had learned by experience that Lewis was desirous of increasing his power at their expense, if not of destroying them entirely, could not but see that this was the most natural means of defence; and it is clear from what we have above said, that the same applied to England.

Under these circumstances it resulted from the geographical situation of these states that the Spanish, afterwards Austrian Netherlands, became the centre of this alliance. They were, in the first place, the chief aim of the policy of France: in the next, they were the connecting link between England and her continental allies. They formed the passage into Germany, the means of junction with the allied armies, and the conductor, so to say, by which the war might be drawn off from the principal countries of the Austrian monarchy; on their independence rested that of the United Provinces as well as of the German empire; and with all these points was connected the balance of political power in Europe. The maintenance of the Belgian provinces was therefore necessarily one of the leading maxims of the continental policy of England—a maxim in the support of which she has repeatedly and wisely exerted her best energies. While England was thus connecting herself on every side with the continent, it could not but follow that several smaller states should be drawn into these arrangements. But those only will require mention which were permanently involved in them, and amongst these the first is Savoy. In 1689 the fatal activity of Louvois first compelled the duke Victor Amadeus II. to take part in those tragic scenes which were now repeatedly acted in Europe; and the situation and condition of his territory, which was at

once the gate and the bulwark of Italy, necessarily, when that country became the scene of action, gave this family a degree of importance which the political talents of its leaders turned with extraordinary dexterity, and still more extraordinary good fortune, to their own advantage. Of the remaining states of Italy, Naples being still a province, none was of sufficient importance to make an alliance with them possible; and with the individual princes of Germany it was not necessary to be at any pains, as the whole body generally followed its chief, and each of the great Austrian wars became a war of the empire.

By means of the war of 1689 therefore the relations in which England stood to the continent were first organized; and in her subsequent policy she merely continued to build on the foundation which was here laid. A proof of this is to be found in the Spanish war of succession, which followed only four years afterwards. By the negotiations which preceded it, England had become deeply involved in continental politics, and even if Lewis XIV. had not forced her to war by recognising the pretender, contrary to the provisions of the treaty of Ryswick, she would scarcely have been able to preserve her neutrality. A contest was pending, upon the result of which, according to the principles of the policy of that time, whether just or not, depended the maintenance of the political balance in Europe.

The connexions of England with the continent continued then during this war the same as during the last, with the exception of the altered circumstances of Spain; although their author did not live to see its commencement.[1] But the unaltered policy of his successor, Anne, notwithstanding the change which took place in the influential persons at court, affords the clearest proof that, in spite of the clamour of parties during the reign of William III., the interests which he had pursued were not merely his own, but those of the nation. The alliance with Austria was the great link on which all the others depended, since not only the republic of the United Netherlands, although it had abolished the dignity of stadtholder, persevered in its previous policy, but the Germanic empire also took an active part in the war, and the duke of Savoy, although at first on the side of

[1] William III. died March 19th, 1702.

France, was soon won over by the allies. But still the war of succession in Spain modified the British continental policy in more than one respect, and at the same time increased its strength and its sphere of action; and it is necessary that these points should be more closely examined.

1st, The old connexions, especially that with Austria, were greatly strengthened. The confederacy found (what alone can render any alliance formidable) chiefs who were capable of holding it together and infusing life and spirit into it. Where can history produce a duumvirate like that of Eugene and Marlborough? And when did any thing but success stamp such an alliance with durability? It is true the alliance fell to pieces towards the end of the war, but still it is an example without parallel that it should have lasted so long; and even that the dissolution was but temporary, and the tie was renewed as soon as circumstances demanded it.

2nd, One lasting consequence of that war was the close connexion with Portugal: while this state trembled, and not without cause, for its independence, when a Bourbon ascended the throne of Spain, and therefore sought to unite itself with the allies, they on the other hand required its assistance in order to play their game with a probability of success, and to drive Philip of Anjou from his throne. This connexion, however, springing as it did from the circumstances of the moment, would have been but transitory, had it not been strengthened by other ties. This was done by means of the commercial treaty of the British minister, Methuen, (1705,) which granted a free entrance into Portugal for British manufactures, especially woollens; and for Portuguese wines into England. It is well known that scarcely any other treaty has been so advantageous to England, owing to the extraordinary wealth which this market had derived at that period from the newly-discovered gold mines of Brazil. Thus by the interweaving of political with commercial interests, arose that connexion between England and Portugal which has not been broken by the most violent storms of revolution.

3rd, In the war of the Spanish succession, England first employed the granting of subsidies. The wealth of England and the financial system founded by the creation of the

national debt, and the means thus afforded of obtaining unlimited credit under William III., must sooner or later have given rise to this, even were it not the character of great commercial nations to carry on their military enterprises, if they should be engaged in such to any extent, more or less with the aid of foreign troops received into their pay. Whether this be done by subsidies or by fairly taking troops into pay, the system remains in its principal features the same, and the consequences must be the same also. The Spanish war, continued as it unnecessarily was by the breaking off of the negotiations in 1709, gave a dangerous example of the facility with which such wars may be protracted if the interest of the party at the helm of state demands it; but experience has also shown that the injury must necessarily recoil upon England itself.

4th, The conditions of the peace of Utrecht necessarily strengthened the continental relations of England, without however, except in the case of Spain, materially altering them. This was occasioned partly by the resignation by Spain of her European provinces, partly by the acquisitions which England made in America. The Spanish Netherlands now became the property of Austria, which thus became the natural ally of England; and when the Italian possessions were given up, partly to Austria, partly to Sardinia, new points of connexion arose between these states and England, who had already by the possession of Gibraltar and Minorca gained a firm footing in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the conditions of the treaty of Assiento with Spain, and the acquisition of Nova Scotia in North America, scattered the seeds of future wars; which however did not spring up until the following period.

From what has preceded, then, we conclude that, when the house of Hanover ascended the British throne, the continental interests of England were, in their leading features, already fixed. The rivalry with France was the foundation on which they were built; and as long as this lasts it will remain essentially the same, whatever temporary changes may take place. The friendly connexion which was formed under George I., seemed for a time to put an end to the rivalry; but it was only the consequence of a family dispute of the Bourbons, and with the dispute itself it ceased; as will appear in the consideration of the next period.

FIFTH PERIOD.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF THE HOUSE OF HANOVER TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1714—1789.

The continental relations of England under the house of Hanover became still closer and more complicated than they had previously been. Our inquiry will therefore lead us more deeply into the general system of Europe, and becomes proportionally more difficult, although at the same time more instructive; nay, perhaps we may add, more meritorious also, since this whole period of British history, however rich in materials, has not as yet found an historian worthy of it. Although therefore what may here be offered can only serve as a brief introduction to such a work, we shall still find it worth while to follow the history of this nation in one of its most important aspects, during this its most prosperous period; and perhaps at the same time to combat some prejudices which have arisen from partial views of the subject.

I believe that I have sufficiently established in the first half of this inquiry, that when George I. ascended (1714) the British throne, the principal ties between England and the continent were already in existence. These however were now strengthened and some new ones added to them. The first and most important of these is generally considered to be the circumstance, that the family which ascended the throne of England was possessed of hereditary dominions on the continent. That it is a totally false opinion which attributes to this the main foundation of the foreign policy of England, is clear from what has preceded; it certainly had its influence, exaggerated as this has been at particular periods by British authors, but an impartial estimate of its extent requires a more minute consideration of the political situation of George I. at his succession, as well in reference to his position at home, as in his relations to the remainder of Europe. The internal position of England must at that period have given rise to closer connexions with the continent, even had not external circumstances led to the same result. Although the house of Hanover was called to the succession by the voice of the nation, it is well known how divided within itself the nation was—how thoroughly the parties of whig and tory became political factions, and what fierce convulsions were the consequence. There was

a pretender, with numerous adherents at home and powerful friends abroad. As long as he found foreign support, or there was even a probability that he would do so, it was necessary to oppose his endeavours; and this opposition brought on a long chain of political connexions with the continent. The existence, and what is more, the lengthened existence of such a pretender, who at least *might* obtain political influence, and at particular periods *did* actually obtain it, was a piece of signal good fortune to England itself as well as to the new government. The continued danger kept the government, as well as the nation, continually on their guard, and became one of the strongest ties between them. However deeply the conviction might be impressed upon the latter that the maintenance of their constitution depended upon the Protestant succession, the great mass of the people were still in need of something to remind them of it; and what could be better calculated to secure this object, than the unceasing claims of a Catholic pretender? And however great may have been the personal qualities, however pure the intentions, and however strong the attachment to the constitution, in the members of the new reigning family, still nothing would serve better than those very claims, to keep it constantly in their minds, that it was through the constitution, and for the constitution, that they were invested with their high dignity. Thus the king and the nation could not but agree in considering the constitution the palladium of their freedom to the latter, and of his throne to the former; thus the conviction naturally grew upon them, that the interests of the king and the nation were inseparably the same; thus in a word the constitution escaped being considered a dead letter, and was impressed upon the hearts of the people and their rulers. But external circumstances were of yet more influence in strengthening the continental policy of England, by which it became deeply involved in the affairs both of eastern and western Europe.

The west of Europe had just emerged from a contest of thirteen years, in which the Spanish monarchy was the stake. This war had been sustained by an alliance, the soul of which was England, and which drooped and ended soon after England retired. The peace, in which she had secured

to herself important advantages, however trifling they may have appeared in the eyes of the whigs, had been her work, and its maintenance was no less her interest. But hardly ever was there a more insecure peace than that of Utrecht; for between the two principal parties—Spain and Austria—there was no stipulation of peace, even though the distance between their dominions and the position of the remainder of Europe had really caused a cessation of hostilities. The loss of her European dependences in Italy and the Netherlands to Austria and Savoy, was not forgotten by Spain, and she was only waiting for an opportunity of seizing them again. The interests therefore of England and Austria coincided in the maintenance of peace; and the connexion between them consequently continued and was strengthened. But the circumstances which then took place in the house of Bourbon, procured for England another ally on the continent, and that in a nation against which all her powers had been but a short time before exerted, namely, France. Since the death of Lewis XIV. (1715) affairs under the regency of the duke of Orleans took a very different turn from what had been expected. Instead of the close connexion between the Bourbons of France and those of Spain which had been looked for, rivalry and strife arose which ultimately led to war. The weak health of the youthful king of France excited the expectation of a speedy vacancy of the throne of France. Who in this case was to be his successor? the regent, or the king of Spain, who had resigned for himself and his descendants all claims upon the French throne? The example of Lewis XIV. however had shown how far such a resignation was binding. But it did not appear probable that the regent would suffer the sceptre to be wrested from him if the attempt was delayed till the death of the young king. It seemed much easier at once to deprive him of the regency; and this idea suggested itself the more readily to the Spanish minister Alberoni, since it agreed with his other plans for recovering the provinces which had been yielded to Austria and Savoy, (especially those in Italy,) and even for overthrowing the whole political system of Europe, by the elevation of the pretender to the throne of England. But the attempt to raise a conspiracy against their regent was betrayed and failed, and the recommencement of hosti-

lities between Spain and France (1719) was the consequence of its discovery.

Under these circumstances it was natural that a connexion should be formed between England and the regent; his interest and that of England were alike involved in the maintenance of the established order of things in Europe, as settled at the peace of Utrecht. He was compelled, in order to provide for his own security, to oppose the plans of Spain. On the other hand, however extraordinary it might seem that England and France should be allied, it is easy to perceive that no material alteration had taken place in the policy of England. Spain, under Alberoni, wished to rule as France had done under Lewis XIV.; England was therefore guided by the same interest in offering a strong opposition to the plans of Spain, as that which had formerly engaged her in war with France. But other causes were added in reference to Spain, founded upon commercial advantages, which induced England to oppose that country, and (for it amounted to the same thing) to make the observance of the conditions of the peace of Utrecht the aim of her policy; and these were the great concessions made by Spain in the treaty of Assiento. By the provisions of this treaty, England obtained the right of furnishing Spanish America with negro slaves for thirty years, and of sending annually a vessel of 500 tons to the great commercial fair of Portobello.[1]

These privileges could not fail, on account of the smuggling to which they gave rise, of securing to England the greater part of the trade of Spanish America; and in proportion to the increase of profit, the British government became more anxious to insure the continuance of them, by maintaining the peace. It would be superfluous to describe the events, which after the year 1714 caused the fall of Alberoni, and upon it the accession of Spain to the quadruple alliance, and thus led to the attainment of this object.

Thus it becomes evident that the participation of England in the affairs of western Europe during the first half of the reign of George I., arose not merely from the personal in-

[1] The fair of Portobello was at that time one of the most important in the world, as at it the European goods required by the South American provinces of Spain were exchanged for the gold and silver of Peru.

terests of the monarch, but also from those of the nation. At that time there were as yet no designs upon the dominion of the sea; the only objects aimed at were the security of the balance of power—the confirmation of the advantages which had been gained by England—and the maintenance of the peace of Europe. The colonies however now began to exert an influence upon continental politics, which must not hereafter remain unnoticed.

But while the British cabinet was thus active in the west, new connexions arose in the east. The great war which had laid waste the northern part of this quarter of the globe for one-and-twenty years (1700—1721) was not without its influence on England. George I. has been represented in almost all the histories of England, as having upon this occasion exchanged the king for the elector; and for the sake of his German territories permitted himself to be mixed up, as king of England, in the strife which took place. We ought therefore to attempt what there is no longer any reason to prevent, viz. an impartial consideration of the question, how far the interests of the English nation required this interference of the king? how far the interests of the nation were the same as those of the electorate? and how far the consequences were advantageous or the reverse to Great Britain?

It has already been shown that England had long been no indifferent spectator of the proceedings of the northern powers. The trade in the Baltic was the cause of this; and after it became considerable, the English could remain as little indifferent upon the subject as the Dutch, with whom they shared it, though at that time very unequally. Besides, the geographical situation of the Baltic, which can only be reached by narrow straits, one only of which, the Sound, is perfectly navigable, made it by no means a matter of indifference in whose possession this passage, and with it the means of entering this sea, should be.

If any single power obtained the dominion, if, as had more than once happened in the times of the Swedish monarchy, any single state arose with such power as either actually to close that entrance, or by the imposition of heavy tolls virtually to effect the same object, that branch of the commerce and navigation of both England and Holland

could not but become in the highest degree precarious. The active interference of England in the affairs of the North commenced therefore during the period of the Swedish dominion, when that state began to menace Denmark; and the maintenance of a certain balance, or at least the preservation of both powers, was the object which this interference had in view. It is true that, besides negotiation, England, owing to her situation, had no means of giving succour except by her fleets; but the position of the two states, which made it necessary that a war between them, if undertaken in earnest, should be carried on by sea as well as land, rendered this kind of assistance very important, and might even do what in naval expeditions very rarely is the case, viz. make it decide the event. The internal disturbances which distracted England towards the close of the thirty years' war, rendered an active intervention in favour of Denmark, then menaced by Sweden, impossible. Denmark however was relieved by the peace of Brömsebroe (1645). It was in Cromwell's time however that attention was first directed to these affairs: nay, as we have previously shown, his designs went even to the acquisition by England of possessions on the shores of the Baltic. When Charles Gustavus of Sweden threatened the total annihilation of Denmark (1657) England strenuously took her part, and procured the peace of Roschild (Feb. 26, 1658); and when that monarch suddenly broke the conditions and besieged Copenhagen, not only did England join the confederacy at the Hague, but English vessels accompanied the Dutch fleet to the Baltic, and by a victory over the Swedish fleet contributed much to the relief of Copenhagen (1659). The trade with the Baltic and the maintenance of the previous tolls at the Sound, are the causes assigned for this interference in the treaty which was then made.[1]

The change which shortly afterwards was effected in England by the restoration of the king, not only did not diminish, but even increased the share which England had taken in these affairs. The trade with the Baltic was considered to be of such importance, that it was regulated by new conditions with Sweden as well as Denmark, and these continue to this day to be the groundwork of the mutual

[1] Vide Schmauss *Einleitung zu der Staatswissenschaft*, vol. ii. p. 129.

commerce of these countries. The treaty with Sweden was concluded by Charles II. (1661) with the regency during the minority of Charles XI., and altered in some particulars in the year 1666; that with Denmark not till the year 1671.[1] In both these treaties it was especially provided what articles should be considered contraband, in order to avoid any interruption to the trade during times of war. But the attention of England was now especially engaged by the constant endeavours of Holland to obtain the whole of the trade; and owing to this, the relations in which the two states stood to each other, usually had their influence upon the North. A clear proof of this is afforded by the negotiations which took place during the war, (1665—1667,) which was ended by the treaty of Breda. Holland then gained over Denmark as well as Sweden, and the entrance into the Baltic was to have been entirely forbidden to England.[2] But the peace of Breda (1667) which soon ensued, and the new and more important occurrences in western Europe, when Lewis XIV. commenced his wars in the Netherlands, altered these political relations and prevented any consequences which the above negotiations might have had.

The ambitious designs of Lewis extended themselves even to the North; and when France succeeded in winning over Sweden, Denmark also followed; but the war did not become a naval one, and had no reference to commerce. It will only be necessary to bear in mind the internal affairs of England under Charles II., James II., and William III., in order to account for the circumstance that her policy was less frequently directed towards the North during these reigns.

But the great northern war, which, after continuing twenty years, entirely changed the relations of northern Europe, could not fail of engaging the attention of England. The proof of this is found in the peace of Travendal, (1700,) which was concluded between Sweden and Denmark through the mediation of England, and guaranteed by her. The war of the Spanish succession, which immediately afterwards set the whole of western Europe in flames, and which England carried on by land with a degree of vigour and good

[1] They are to be found in Schmauss *Corpus Juris Gentium*, vol. ii. pp. 753 and 2328.

[2] Result of the treaty concluded at the Hague between Holland and Denmark, Feb. 11, 1666.—Schmauss, *Staatswissenschaft*, vol. ii. p. 178.

fortune never before witnessed, made it impossible that she could interfere with energy in the affairs of the North. She contented herself with watching the proceedings of the Swedish hero, and was only anxious lest it should enter into his head to become the ally of France, and strike in with the sword in her behalf. But when by the peace of Utrecht (1713) she was released from this contest, it could not but be expected that she should again become active in that quarter.

But it was no easy question for England to determine what side she should put herself on. All the former relations had been changed; Sweden was exhausted, and while Russia was rapidly developing her strength, the balance between Sweden and Denmark was no longer the only thing to be considered. But in what point of view was England to regard this growth of Russia in reference to her own interests? On the one side it could not be a matter of indifference to British policy, that a power should be forming itself in the North, which not only threatened the independence and existence of all the other states, but was even directly bent upon becoming a great naval force, and thus grasping the dominion of the Baltic. On the other hand it required no great foresight to perceive, more or less clearly, the advantages which would result to England from the civilization of Russia. An acquaintance with the arts and the wants of luxury in a state of such immense extent, laid open an inexhaustible market to the manufacturing and trading nations of Europe; and although it could not then be foreseen what a preponderance England would afterwards obtain by the decay of Dutch commerce, it was very clear that she could not be wholly shut out from these advantages. But the measures adopted did not, as it appears, proceed from such general considerations. No care was taken of the future, and temporary relations only were looked to. Single opportunities were seized as they presented themselves, and thus England became involved in the question without having any fixed system to guide herself by. The extension of the northern war into Germany, in which George I. became concerned, as elector of Hanover, gave the first occasion of interference.

Sweden had been deprived by her enemies of almost all

her German possessions, and of these more particularly, the duchies of Bremen and Verden, which she had obtained by the peace of Westphalia, had fallen into the hands of the Danes. Denmark sold these territories to Hanover, in a treaty which was signed June 26th, 1715. As Sweden would not recognise this sale, nay more, as Charles XII. made it no secret that his whole efforts were directed towards regaining as far as possible the supremacy in northern Germany, the implication of Hanover in the northern war would have been a natural consequence, even if it had not been expressly stipulated in the treaty that George I. should declare war against Sweden.[1] This he did in his character of elector of Hanover, and it was only in this character that he carried it on by land; but at the same time a squadron of eight English men of war was sent to the Sound, which joined the Danish fleet.[2] It was not without cause that Charles XII. complained of this last step, which led however to no important results; nor did he, in the bitter hatred which he bore to George I., distinguish between the king and the elector, but sought his revenge by no less formidable means that a revolution in England in favour of the pretender; and this his minister, Baron Gorz, actually planned, but was unable to execute.

In the mean while the great impediments which arose to the commerce of the Baltic during the war, afforded England opportunities for complaint. No power ever carried commercial restrictions against his enemies so far as Charles XII. did in his regulations.[3] It is true he had extraordinary inducements to such a course. It was according to the existing regulations his chief interest by all means to prevent Russia from excelling him as a naval force; and yet it was to this that Peter especially devoted himself; and he was able as early as 1716 to make his appearance in the Baltic with a fleet superior to that of Sweden. The neutral powers, and especially Holland, assisted him in many ways. The great advantage to be gained by it induced them not only to furnish him with all other necessaries which he re-

[1] The state papers are to be found in *Mémoires de Lamberti*, vol. ix. p. 229.

[2] The British admiral put himself in those days under the orders of the Danish commander. Such are the changes which occur!

[3] See his edicts of Feb. 8, and Dec. 19, 1715. LAMBERTI, vol. ix. p. 228.

quired, but even to supply vessels completely equipped, and which could be used as ships of war. On this were founded the severe measures of Charles, which were directed in the first place against the Dutch, but which fell also upon the English, and would almost have annihilated their commerce with the Baltic had they not protected it by armed vessels. The interest of George I. as elector of Hanover, was therefore not the only cause which induced him to adopt measures against Charles, for he had grounds of complaint also in his character of king of England. Nevertheless it is the constant reproach of all English writers, that he did not distinguish between these two interests; but that the wish to preserve the duchies of Bremen and Verden, by which a communication was opened between his new kingdom and his German territories, led him to implicate England in the contests of the northern states.

It would not be difficult, from what has been already said, to find grounds of defence for George I.; but allowing every one to form his own judgment upon this point, there remains another ground which has not been taken by any English historian with whom I am acquainted, and which is the most important of all in the determination of the controversy—I refer to the question whether the interests of England or Hanover were most nearly concerned in the acquisition of Bremen and Verden? And I believe it will not be difficult to prove that the former were chiefly involved in it.

Hanover certainly gained at a sufficiently cheap rate two provinces, one of little importance, the other more so, yet neither remarkably fertile, except in those parts which border on the rivers. But then, the latter of the two commands the entrance into the two principal rivers, and consequently the chief commercial approaches of northern Germany; and thus by its geographical situation becomes of very great importance. By the electorate, a country which has not one sea-port nor any commercial town of moment, which exports comparatively little, and the exports of which, as they are objects which are not generally classed among contraband commodities, there could not easily be found causes to interfere with, little was gained; but this made the advantages to England all the greater. From the time that the

province which commands the mouths of those streams, and with them the two principal sea-ports of Germany, became annexed to the dominions of her king, these roads of commerce were permanently open to England; the communication with Germany no longer depended on political circumstances; she had no longer any cause to fear that her exports would be either excluded from the continent or admitted under the disadvantages of increased duties; and a fair prospect was opened to her of securing the commerce of the whole of northern Germany.

In order to comprehend the truth of this, we must view the case not according to present circumstances, but those of that time. In the state of alienation which then existed between England and Sweden, it was but too certain that Charles would seize the first opportunity of vengeance. Let us suppose he had succeeded in recovering himself,—and this, considering the reconciliation which he was on the point of effecting with Russia, was far from impossible,—and had regained possession of his German territories, would not these rivers, as well as the entrance into the Baltic, have been closed, either immediately or on every future quarrel, and privateers have been fitted out for the purpose of infesting that as well as the northern sea?

But these advantages must have appeared the more important to England at that time, in proportion to the power of the rivals with whom she had to cope. England was then far from having the greatest share in the commerce of Germany, especially upon the Weser and Elbe. The Dutch unquestionably still retained the superiority. In order therefore to be able to compete with them with a hope of equalling or surpassing them, that acquisition was of the greatest importance. It would be easy to point out other advantages, such as the power of sending troops to and from Germany unimpeded, and the like, which were secured to England, the importance of which depended upon political circumstances as they arose.

From all this I think it has been made clear,—and more was not intended,—that those British authors who make the share which George I. took in the affairs of the North an occasion of reproach, embrace a very narrow view of the subject. Still it remains true, that he did not act on fixed

political principles, but that his conduct was the result of circumstances with the changes of which he changed also. Charles XII. fell in the trenches;[1] his minister, his friend and counsellor, was compelled to ascend the scaffold; and with them was destroyed the whole fabric of their policy, at the very time when it was upon the point of completion. It is known that this was founded upon a reconciliation with Russia, the equivalent of which was to be obtained at the expense of other enemies, especially of Denmark. The new party who came into power would not prosecute this plan, because it had been formed by Görz, whom they hated; but if Charles XII. with his iron arm and iron determination was not able to maintain himself alone, what could be expected from the government which succeeded him? Nothing therefore remained upon the rupture with Russia, but to seek assistance from those powers against whom it had been intended to turn their whole forces; and the first of these was England. The treaty formed with George I. as elector of Hanover, in which Sweden for a sum of money yielded up Bremen and Verden, led the way to this; and was shortly succeeded by a treaty of alliance[2] with England, expressly directed against Russia, and in which assistance by land as well as by sea was stipulated for, in order to set bounds to the devastating inroads of the Czar.

If the consequences of their political errors proved so disastrous to the Swedes, the change in the policy of England admitted perhaps of some palliation, on the ground that she wished to repress the fearful aggrandizement of Russia, and to uphold the balance of power in the North.

But if this was her object, she embarked in an undertaking which she could not accomplish, and even at that early period exhibited a proof how little she was able at any time to form a correct estimate of her own power, or to determine the precise sphere of her influence. The only way in which she could injure Russia was by obstructing for a time the navigation of the Baltic. But this was surely not sufficient to retard the growth of its power. And as to maintaining the political balance in the North, it was now,

[1] Dec. 11th, 1718; and as soon after as Feb. 28, 1719, Görz was judicially murdered.

[2] Peace was concluded with Hanover, Nov. 20, 1719; and on Jan. 21, 1720, followed the alliance with England.

generally speaking, too late. Besides, when Russia at the peace of Nystadt had effected the separation of the finest lands on the Baltic from Sweden, viz. Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and a part of Courland, what support, however powerful, could have sustained Sweden in a position to preserve the balance of power against Russia?

By the peace of Nystadt then nothing, it is true, was definitively settled respecting England; it was nevertheless the foundation of her continental policy in the North. As the consequences of this peace developed themselves slowly, but on this account the more surely, in the growing prosperity of Russia; as not only her exports increased in consequence of her possessing the principal port in the Baltic, but from the spread of European luxury, her internal consumption was also augmented, so the conviction that this was by no means a questionable but in the highest degree an advantageous result to England, developed itself more and more in that country; the market for British manufactures becoming thereby so much the more extensive, and the trade to the Baltic daily more important. On the other hand, the augmentation of the British navy caused in turn a proportionate demand abroad for the materials requisite in ship-building, especially timber and hemp, both of which the immense territory of Russia offered in the greatest profusion. In a word, both countries were becoming every day more and more indispensable to each other; not in prosecuting a common war, but in supplying each other's wants; a bond of union far more durable than any treaties of alliance.

Under these relations the British continental policy in the North necessarily assumed more of a passive than an active character. The good understanding between England and Russia was indispensable to both parties; and there was nothing at that time which seemed likely to disturb this amicable connexion. Even when the occasional re-action upon the north of Europe of the political events of the west might have excited such apprehensions, they passed away without any important consequences. This state of things lasted till Russia took a direct and vigorous part, not only in the affairs of the north and east, but also in those of the west and south of Europe. This intervention necessarily gave

birth to some new features in the British continental policy in the North, as will be seen in the sequel of this inquiry.

The happy influence which the formation of the quadruple alliance produced on the west of Europe, had not only implicated England as closely as possible in the political relations to which it gave rise, but one might even say that she became and continued the moving power in them. The attempt to force upon Spain the acceptance of the conditions prescribed by this alliance did not, it is true, after the fall of Alberoni, re-establish any permanent peace, but still it restored tranquillity (Jan. 26, 1720); the points still in dispute were to be decided at a general congress. Under these circumstances it might be expected that England should take a most lively interest in the affairs of the continent; but yet she did not do so to the extent anticipated.

Political activity and negotiation had become a necessary resource to George I. It is possible that he was at first led by the ambition of showing that it was not merely the government of a small but of a large state to which he had succeeded, and that his growing power enabled him to participate in the direction of the common interests of Europe; but once deeply involved in these interests, he could not easily have drawn back without compromising both himself and his kingdom, even though his inclination might have prompted him to do so. But in addition to this, at that very juncture (April, 1721) the reins of government were held, and retained for twenty-one years in succession, by a minister, whose disposition, in this respect, coincided with that of his master, not it is true in evading the war, but in employing every method which negotiations and demonstrations could supply to avoid it. Such a course of policy might have been expected from the long and almost uniformly peaceful administration of Robert Walpole.

The continental relations of England always require to be considered in two points of view: first, as regards their advantageous or pernicious influence on England itself; and, secondly, in relation to the whole system of European policy. In the British cabinet the first question had of course at all times a preponderating weight. We shall therefore contemplate our subject-matter first of all in this aspect; but nothing shall on that account prevent us from surveying

it likewise in the other, and from noting the points of agreement and difference which they respectively present.

It cannot be denied, that if we examine the British policy in the last years of George I., we are unable to trace any fixed plan of proceeding. An insular state which takes an interest in the affairs of continental powers, can only do so by virtue of a federative system established on sound principles of policy, and followed up with firmness. We have seen how the links of this connexion have hitherto been concentrated in England. But at the period of which we are speaking, those links were so wonderfully complicated, that the principles on which they were founded seemed to be forgotten. The connexion with France was renewed, that with Austria dissolved, while the confederacies in the North were determined by the influence of the combinations formed in the West. The ignorance of the real designs of the foreign states, which we so often see occasion to impute to the British cabinet, manifested itself at this time in a remarkable manner. Justice, however, requires us also to observe, that the relations of the continental powers to each other were not the less variable and uncertain, because they were for the most part determined by the excitement of a personal and angry hatred.

To this cause we must ascribe the wavering policy which characterized those times, and which could not possibly continue without exercising some influence upon England. Nevertheless, in all the activity of the British cabinet at that period, we discover one dominant principle, which was in the highest degree beneficial, not only to England, but to Europe at large. This principle was the maintenance of peace. The only question is whether it always adopted the right method to secure this object.

One result of this policy was the congress at Cambray, which began to assemble under the arbitration of England and France, in order to separate again, after long delays and fruitless negotiations, without any decisive issue. Here the old dispute between Austria and Spain should have terminated; the recent feuds also, especially that about the plaything of Charles VI., the Indian company at Ostend, which became the object of a general outcry to the other commercial states, as soon as their highest interests became

affected by it, ought to have been here laid aside; in a word, the whole evil should have been now rooted out.

But history no where affords a more striking instance of the truth, that large conventions are generally fruitless, nay, often in the highest degree prejudicial, unless they are directed by great men, who know how to raise themselves above petty passions, and to view and treat every question, whether great or small, with strict regard to its merits and proportions. The voices of the arbitrators swelled the note of discord which was raised about the most trivial circumstance; the passions were not calmed, but excited from the first; and the congress could scarcely have terminated otherwise than it did, even if other circumstances had not intervened to dissolve it.

It is melancholy to observe how much the politics of almost the whole of Europe were, at that time, determined by the proposed, though ineffectually proposed, marriage of a child; and how little was wanting to renew the flames of a general war. A Spanish princess, then just twelve months old, was fixed upon by the quadruple alliance, for the consort of Lewis XV., and had been sent to Paris, where she was brought up. The Duke of Bourbon, the minister of France, had, however, private grounds for wishing a speedy consummation of the marriage of the young prince, which, owing to the age of the princess, could scarcely have been brought about in less than ten years. He was, therefore, anxious to procure for Lewis a consort of a marriageable age, which he found in the daughter of the ex-king of Poland, Stanislaus Lescinsky; and the Spanish princess was sent back. This event, which could, under no circumstances, be otherwise than mortifying, produced the highest degree of rancour and resentment in the haughty mind of Elizabeth, who felt herself insulted, both as a mother and a queen.[1] Yet, owing to the friendly connexion between France and England, it would have been the height of rashness to hazard

[1] Elizabeth of Parma was, as is well known, the second consort of king Philip V., having become so in 1715, and the legitimate heiress of the Spanish throne. Her first object was to secure the succession, which properly belonged to the sons of the first marriage, to her own children; in consequence of which Spain was precipitated into more than one war. The prospect of seeing her daughter on the French throne was a principal part of her plan, which was now frustrated.

a rupture with France, especially since a reconciliation with Austria had not yet been completely effected by the congress at Cambray. Indeed, it was hardly to be expected, from the state in which men's minds then were, that such a reconciliation should have been accomplished at a congress. The consequence was, that a resolution was speedily formed in Spain, of establishing a direct connexion with Austria.

This attempt was by no means exceptionable in itself; it could hardly fail of success, since a clear understanding had been arrived at long before, during the peace, on some of the main points of difference, namely, the concessions which were mutually demanded, and no collision of interest had occured in other points; but still, neither in the choice of a mediator, nor in the general conduct of the proceeding, was a sufficient degree of caution resorted to. Never, since their difference with Austria was virtually arranged by the treaty of Vienna, on April 30th, 1725, and the treaty of commerce, which immediately followed it, could it have been more essentially necessary by a provident and careful policy to tranquillize the fears which must have arisen among the foreign powers in consequence of this unexpected result. But the business of pacification was committed to the duke of Ripperda, one of the vainest braggarts that ever existed;[1] who, intoxicated by his unexpected good fortune, knew so little how to conduct himself in such a change of circumstances, that he very soon brought about his own ruin. The senseless behaviour of this man, who now considered himself the first statesman in Europe, his arrogance and haughty bearing towards the ambassadors of foreign powers, caused a crisis in the affairs of Spain, the issue of which promised much more of war than peace.

This reconciliation of Spain and Austria roused all the political energies of George I. into activity. Almost the only provision of special interest contained in it was that which it had always been the policy of England to promote, viz. the complete ratification of the peace of Utrecht and a defensive alliance. But the opinion prevailed that it contained much more than it really did. The public mind was anxious for information about secret stipulations, which were

[1] He was in fact a native of Holland, whom Alberoni had brought as a manufacturer to Spain. After his fall he wandered about as an adventurer in Turkey.

said to be especially directed against England, so as not only to secure Gibraltar to Spain[1] and the establishment of his Ostend company to Charles VI., but even to place the pretender on the British throne; for in which of the political negotiations of that period could this bugbear be dispensed with? The sequel showed that it was a mere phantom which caused the alarm; the British cabinet had not informed itself with accuracy as to the true state of things, it gave credit to rumours and hearsays; but the consequences of its conduct were serious in the extreme.

The supposed new offensive alliance was to be met by a counter-alliance, which George I., during his residence in his German territories, concluded with France and Prussia at Herren-haus (Sept. 3rd, 1725). Yes! these political convulsions extended even to the remotest regions of the North. Austria succeeded in attaching to itself Russia, and at first Sweden also. In order to have a counterpoise here likewise, the allies of Herren-haus obtained Denmark; and Sweden, also, was soon induced, by the promise of subsidies, to join their confederation. This was truly an era of confederacies! But far from erecting them on the basis of mutual and well-defined interests, they founded them on relations which could not possibly be durable. England separated itself from Austria, the only continental power in the south of Europe with which it could be connected by any permanent interests. It leagued itself with France and Prussia. The consequences could not be long restrained. Frederic William I. immediately afterwards entered into various negotiations with Austria; from the prospect of private advantage which he saw, or imagined he saw, in the opening of the dukedoms of Berg and Julich, which might soon be expected, with the view of procuring these possessions for himself.

In the event, however, war, on an extensive scale, seemed likely to be the result of this confederation of Herren-haus. England fitted out three fleets, of which one was sent to the West Indies, another to Gibraltar, and the third to the Baltic. The first two were, therefore, directed against Spain, which, on her part, already began to lay siege to Gibraltar; the third was designed for the support of Denmark and

[1] Spain certainly made claims upon Gibraltar, but Charles VI. had only promised his mediation.

Sweden, in the event of any movement on the part of Russia. But these hostile demonstrations produced no very serious consequences, since some good genius still stifled the flame of war just as it seemed on the point of breaking out.

Europe was indebted for this in a great measure to the ministerial change which occurred in France, 1726. Cardinal Fleury became premier when the Duke of Bourbon fell; and introduced into the French ministry dispositions, not less pacific than Walpole had infused into the British. The negotiations which were more particularly directed by papal nuncios, took a favourable turn; and one of the main stumbling-blocks was removed, when Charles VI. consented to suspend for seven years his Ostend commercial company. George I. lived just long enough to know that the preliminaries of peace had been signed at Paris and Vienna, to which Spain also acceded after some difficulty: and in consequence of which, England recalled her fleets, but on condition that Spain should consent to raise the siege of Gibraltar;[1] and by the treaty at Pardo, (a palace near Madrid,) they were presently ratified by both powers.[2] But a few days after the conclusion of those preliminaries, viz. on June 22nd, 1727, George I. died, during a tour in his German territories.

The foregoing examination will, it is hoped, suffice for forming a general opinion of the continental policy of England under George I., and for determining with greater precision the effect which it produced, as well upon the political fabric of Europe in general, as upon England in particular. The interference of England under George I., was manifestly attended with beneficial results to the whole political system of Europe. The preservation of peace was its object, and peace was either maintained or restored. To what protracted and sanguinary wars must the execution of Alberoni's project in all probability have led, if England had not mediated a peace, and maintained it by means of the quadruple alliance, which it was mainly instrumental in constructing! The execution of those projects, inasmuch as they involved the reconquest of lost provinces, would have been as little a subject of congratulation to Europe as it would probably have been to Spain itself; which had so

[1] June 13th, 1727. [2] March 6th, 1728.

repeatedly learned by dear-bought experience the cost of distant provinces. The war in the North had been terminated through the intervention of England; and though it was impossible for England to re-establish a counter-balancing power in this quarter, Sweden was at all events maintained in the rank of independent states, from which, without assistance, it would probably have disappeared.

It must be allowed that England itself did not acquire any new possessions by its continental relations, (though I think it has been clearly proved that the acquisition of Bremen and Verden were important to it,) but it gained advantages of another description which were by no means inconsiderable.

In the first place it secured the succession of the house of Hanover on the British throne. The voice of the nation has proclaimed this too loudly and unanimously as the most important feature of its returning prosperity to require any detailed proof; the only question which can possibly arise, is whether this was a consequence of its continental relations. It may perhaps be objected on the other hand, that the attempts to re-establish the pretender on the throne originated in the interference of England in the affairs of the continent. But as long as the Stuarts had or might have powerful friends abroad, could the new dynasty safely dispense with such aid? The throne of the Hanoverian house was by no means so secure as to supersede the necessity of accepting every available offer of support. But it was more peculiarly the good understanding which existed for so long a period with France, which was of such infinite service to them in this emergency. France was the principal, perhaps the only power which by supporting the pretender could in any material degree endanger the security of the new dynasty. And surely the favourable opportunity which was thus presented to the new family, of negotiating its private interests by means of this connexion without compromising those of the nation at large, was a piece of good fortune not to be neglected. Further than this—By the active share which England took on this occasion she maintained that high consideration in the political system of Europe, which she had acquired during the reign of William and Anne. It does not require much sagacity to perceive of how much influence

the public estimation of a state must be in such a system as that of Europe. The conduct of others is regulated by it, just as we see it among individuals in private life. Even fallen states have often for a considerable time experienced the benefits of its support; as for example, Venice and the Porte; but even a state which is but on the rise cannot afford to be indifferent to it. Even though no positive advantage should be gained by this public estimation, yet the negative effect is invaluable, since no measure of importance is undertaken without the knowledge of such a state, and therefore none can be easily undertaken which is opposed to it and its interests. We cannot adduce a better illustration of this truth than by comparing the republic of the United Netherlands with England, at the period of which we are treating and still propose to treat. The latter state laid it down as a fundamental principle of her policy after the peace of Utrecht, to keep herself as much aloof as possible from all foreign transactions, or only to take part in them when absolutely compelled. She continued to maintain for some time longer her position in public estimation among the states of the first order. By degrees, however, she began to sink lower and lower in the scale, and experience has shown the result to which this eventually led.

Lastly, the continuance of peace was another result to England of her continental policy, and assuredly not the least considerable. It not only secured to her the quiet enjoyment of the advantages derived from her Spanish commerce, but also those arising from intercourse with her colonies in America and the West Indies, which at that very time were becoming prosperous in the extreme, and to which the annually increasing consumption of West Indian produce, particularly of coffee, began to impart a value which no one could have anticipated. Still the times had not then arrived (as they since have) for such an increase in the power of England as to enable her to carry on her trade, even during war, comparatively without molestation.

But though all this may demonstrate the soundness of the British continental policy in *general* during the reign of George I., it will not by any means vindicate every single measure which was resorted to in pursuance of it. It cannot be denied, that, particularly in the last six years of this

monarch's reign, the interference of the British cabinet in the affairs of the continent, assumed the character of over-activity without at the same time maintaining that stability which is the indispensable condition of all durable alliances. It cannot be denied, that precipitate measures were sometimes adopted, particularly those occasioned by the league of Herren-haus, which, without a concurrence of fortunate circumstances, which were beyond the control of England, would in all probability have caused disastrous consequences. To this period we may perhaps ascribe the illusion that she was able by her fleets to accomplish more than the nature of things permits; so likewise the notion of deriving great advantages from the subsidies which she furnished, was then at least entertained, though it had not as yet any serious consequences.

Important changes in the ministry were expected on the death of the king (1727). These anticipations, however, were not realized; Walpole, supported by the credit of Queen Caroline, continued prime minister. It could scarcely have been expected therefore, that the spirit of the British continental policy should be materially altered during the first years of George II.'s reign. But though no immediate changes ensued, the alteration which took place in the political relations of the continent, caused a corresponding alteration in those of England, which ought not to pass unobserved.

When George II. ascended the throne, the amicable relations subsisting between England and France remained in all their force. The character of the two premiers, Fleury and Walpole, were too well suited to each other to admit readily of a change. Both were intent upon the preservation of peace, and their union was still more strongly cemented by the brother of the British minister, Horatio Walpole, in the character of ambassador at Paris. Prussia, the other ally of Herren-haus, had, as we have before remarked, already entered into separate negotiations with Austria; the republic of the United Netherlands stood on a most friendly footing with England and France; accustomed as Europe was to see the republic take part in all her great confederations, it was now taken for granted that no association could be formed without its concurrence; while the

republic itself, intent upon the preservation of peace, thought it could never employ sufficient precaution in pursuit of this object. With regard to the confederate powers, Spain and Austria, negotiations had been opened with the former of them, which though at first they appeared to take an unfavourable turn, owing to the death of the king, were soon restored to their former course, by the continuance in office of the Walpole administration, and were brought to a successful issue by the treaty at Pardo. Since the scheme of the Ostend company had been suspended, it appeared as though friendly relations might be renewed with Austria likewise; but new events intervening, this was prevented, or at least delayed.

The British cabinet at that time evidently set a much higher value upon the friendship of Spain than on that of Austria. The temporary advantages derivable from the secure possession of Gibraltar and Minorca, the profitable trade with Spain itself, and, above all, with its American possessions, guaranteed as it was by existing treaties, seemed to claim a paramount importance. But this friendship could not well be maintained without entering into the interested plans of the queen of Spain for the advancement of her children, and thus hazarding giving offence to Austria. However, the prospect of advantage derivable to England from a separation of the two powers, Austria and Spain, overcame this consideration. By the conditions of the quadruple alliance, Tuscany, with Parma and Placentia, were secured to the queen of Spain for her elder son Don Carlos, as soon as their projected opening should be completed—till which time they were to remain in the occupation of neutral troops. But apprehensive that obstacles might be thrown in her way, she wished to secure the immediate possession of them, and Spanish troops were sent into them as a garrison. England entered into these plans, and although they were an infraction of the quadruple alliance, without consulting or apprizing Austria, joined with France in concluding a treaty with Spain at Seville,[1] in which it was not only permitted to Spain thus to act, but even England rendered itself liable to contribute towards sending Don Carlos into those provinces with 6000 Spanish troops.

[1] Nov. 9, 1729.

The most violent indignation on the part of Austria was the natural result of these proceedings. But, however much incensed Austria may have felt, however loudly she protested that she would not tolerate any foreign troops in this quarter, Walpole nevertheless succeeded in calming her resentment. His plan was to endeavour to steer his way clear between two rocks, and he succeeded. When the more dangerous alternative of the two, viz. a breach with Spain, had been eluded—his next point was to avoid the other. But Walpole knew the talisman by which the opposition of Charles VI. might be charmed away. Whoever recognised his order of succession in favour of his daughter, his Pragmatic Sanction, might always calculate upon gaining him over, and even inducing him to make a sacrifice of his own interest. At this price Walpole, by quietly negotiating with Austria as he had just before done with Spain, obtained the formal abolition of the Ostend company for England, and the promise of the investiture of Tuscany and Parma, with permission to send Spanish troops thither for Spain; and the treaty of Vienna was concluded on the 16th of March, 1731.

In any continental state Walpole would, with such a policy as this, in all probability have failed. England was now in friendship with all the world, without possessing a single true friend in the political sense of the term. The friendship of Spain could not be permanent, since a growing cause of differences lay hid in their commercial relations; the friendship of France was now growing cold in consequence of the treaty of Vienna, which had been concluded without her participation; to counteract which Fleury not only re-established the good understanding with Spain, but likewise showed his skill in strengthening it. The renewed friendship with Austria required under such relations to be severely tried before its sincerity could be depended upon. England had engaged herself in a tissue of treaties, out of which it seemed scarcely possible she should extricate herself. Had she been prepared to fulfil all her engagements, scarcely a war could have arisen in any quarter of Europe in which she would not have been implicated, nay, in which she would not have been obliged to furnish auxiliaries in several quarters at once. But an insular state has certainly

in such cases great advantages over every other. Its position gives it in every case the best chance of keeping clear of the struggle; and how many resources may not be discovered when time is allowed, by which we may extricate ourselves from difficulties, without being directly unfaithful to our engagements! It is a sure rule, that an insular state, in its connexions with continental powers, always stakes less upon the game than is staked by them in their connexions with it. Probably, however, Walpole was not influenced by such considerations as these. He was not a man who built his policy on general grounds, or who looked very far into futurity. His object was the preservation of peace; and he cared not through what obstacles he had to steal his way towards the attainment of this object, provided he was only so fortunate as to avoid each as it occurred.

The truth of these observations is strikingly corroborated by the events which occurred in Europe in the following years. The throne of Poland, which had been vacated by the death of Augustus II.,[1] plunged the greater part of the continent of Europe into a war, in which the occupation of this throne was to the majority of those engaged but the pretext of their interference. Charles VI. was guilty of the folly of taking part with Russia and Prussia, in favour of Augustus III., in order to obtain from Saxony the recognition of his Pragmatic Sanction, and thus armed the Bourbon powers with weapons which they might wield against himself. Attacked by France, Spain, and Savoy, Charles VI. saw himself stripped within the space of a year of all his Italian possessions, while at the same time the banks of the Rhine became the scene of the war in Germany.

After so many previous negotiations and so many connexions contracted in every quarter, who could have expected that England at such a crisis, when her most recent allies were the objects of attack, would have remained neutral. There was no backwardness on the part of Austria in demanding assistance; but as the treaty with this power was only a defensive treaty there was not much difficulty in evading it. England, in connexion with Holland, confined herself therefore to that which touched her most nearly, the

[1] Feb. 1, 1733.

maintenance of the neutrality[1] of the Austrian Netherlands, and generally to making proposals of peace which however were not accepted. The issue is well known. France concluded the preliminaries of the treaty of Vienna with Austria without any interruption from England.[2] It acquired for itself in return for the bare promise of recognising the Pragmatic Sanction, the dukedom of Lorraine; and the queen of Spain was eventually contented to accept the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, in lieu of Parma and Tuscany, for her son Don Carlos, in hope of recovering also at the first opportunity the other Italian territories for her second son.

The course pursued by Walpole during the progress of these events, was perhaps most consistent with the momentary advantages of England, but it was not consistent. The very minister whose whole energies were roused into action the moment that a single twig of the political tree was set in motion, now looked on with indifference while the whole stem was shaken! How could he any longer hope to find a faithful ally—he, who was so deeply interested in such connexions—if he saw his most recent and almost his only ally despoiled of his most valuable territories, without tendering him the least assistance? It might certainly be a matter of indifference to England who continued to sit on the Polish throne, but after all that she had hitherto done, was it possible that the fate of Italy and the aggrandizement of France could be so likewise? We are far from meaning to assert that England ought to have taken up arms in every such emergency. The presumption of being able to decide such points has already cost the world enough! But still I repeat that this conduct in comparison with his former policy was not consistent. History never presumes to determine what would have happened in any given case, but the supposition is at all events not without foundation, that if Austria had been at that time vigorously supported, Europe might have been spared the whole war of succession.

Meanwhile the times were approaching in which all the anxiety of the minister to maintain peace was unavailing, since the nation was unable any longer to endure the blessings of tranquillity. England was plunged into two wars at

[1] By a treaty with France at the Hague, Nov. 24, 1733.
[2] October 3, 1735.

the same time, the Spanish and the Austrian wars of succession, both of which became at last blended into one. But they constituted an epoch in the British continental policy; and it is in this point of view that they must here be considered.

The war which broke out with Spain in the year 1739, can only be regarded as a remote consequence of the continental relations; so far, namely, as the commercial concessions made at the peace of Utrecht, by means of the treaty of Assiento, laid the ground for it. But considered in another point of view, it is nevertheless always of extreme importance, as a phenomenon arising out of the development of the British commercial policy, so far as this had always a considerable influence on her foreign relations. It was the first war which England carried on under the house of Hanover, or indeed it would not be too much to assert that it was the first which she carried on at all, barely for the sake of commerce; and then it must be allowed the voice of the nation imperatively demanded it. And although the treaty of Assiento and some other disputes, as about cutting logwood and others, gave occasion to it, yet the cause, properly speaking, lay more deep. The spread of British power in the West Indies, and the flourishing commerce of her colonial possessions there, could not possibly consist with the claims which Spain still made to the dominion of these seas; and the war was from the very first not merely a war for the protection of the smuggling trade, but for the free navigation of the West Indian seas. The point in dispute could not be, and of course was not, whether England should carry on its smuggling trade with the Spanish colonies, but the question was from the first, whether British ships trading to the West Indies should in the high seas be subjected to Spanish search? The Spaniards had hitherto exercised this right as consequent on their dominion of the sea, and regarded it as the only means of restraining the smuggling trade. The English on the other hand refused to submit to that search. Viewed in this light, the importance of this war with respect to its consequences will not require any further notice.

Meanwhile the exertions of the minister were wholly and sincerely directed to the means of averting the war, if it could only be effected without trenching too closely on the interests of the nation. He accordingly entered into nego-

tiations; and as he well knew that the demand relative to the right of search would never be explicitly and unreservedly given up by Spain, he sought as much as possible to evade it; and eventually succeeded, on Jan. 15, 1739, in bringing about a treaty with Spain, which was signed at Madrid. It contained, however, only a few preliminaries, while the further arrangements respecting the future security of British navigation in the West Indies was referred to commissioners appointed on both sides for the investigation. However much sagacity the minister had shown in these negotiations, his whole project nevertheless now miscarried. The opposite party prevailed, and he saw himself compelled to declare war against Spain. Would it not have been better to have let this be done by another, and to have tendered his resignation at once, rather than to have submitted after a fruitless struggle to be driven from power by his opponents?

The scene of this war was, as might be expected, in the West Indies. It was the first time that a British fleet had sailed to those regions of the world; where only single ships, or at most small squadrons, had formerly been seen. The growing importance of the colonies in connexion with their commercial jealousy, led subsequently to the result that even their colonies became the scene of war between the European powers.

But this war did not long remain the only one. The year 1740, in which Maria Theresa and Frederic II. mounted the throne, constituted an era in the general history of Europe; and likewise in the history of the British continental relations. We have seen the fluctuations which took place in the latter during the last fifteen years; we have seen that, although at certain periods greater stability of purpose might have been expected from the British ministry, yet the main cause lay in the fluctuating politics of the continental powers themselves, and in their mutual relations. But the Austrian war of succession, which broke out at the instigation of France, and had no less considerable an object than the dismemberment of the Austrian monarchy, excited a general interest among the powers which leagued themselves with France for this purpose, viz. Spain, Sardinia, and Bavaria, and though only for a short time and for definite objects, Prussia also. The old enmity which subsisted

between Austria and France, revived therefore in all its vigour; and had the object which the league had in view been attained, France would have reigned without a rival over the whole continent of Europe.

That the dismemberment of the Austrian monarchy would be in two respects detrimental to England, as neither the destiny of the Austrian Netherlands nor the balance of power on the continent could be matters of indifference to her, was generally agreed upon in England. Besides, England had not only guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction in general, but had also entered into peculiar responsibilities for sending twelve thousand auxiliaries against Austria.[1] The honour and interest of England seemed to render it imperative upon her to make a vigorous effort to save Austria. But how this might be effectually done, was another question.

The relations of Austria and the continental relations in general, had been materially changed since the accession of George I. to the British throne by the growing power of Prussia, which even now, in a military point of view, stood in the first rank of powers. England herself had few points of contact with Prussia; but it could not be a matter of indifference to England, that Prussia should join her enemies, and besides, so long as the interest of Hanover was not considered altogether detached from that of England, a point of contact of more than ordinary importance was here presented. The alliance of Herren-haus seems also to have laid the foundation for it. But the desertion of this alliance by Prussia, and still more a personal aversion which subsisted between George II. and Frederic William I. notwithstanding their near relationship, had frustrated these views, and had even neutralized every attempt to re-establish amicable relations; yet the British cabinet did not lose sight of this measure; and even in the very next year after the death of Charles VI. it became the favourite project of Walpole to consummate a grand confederation with Austria, Russia, and Prussia, which should maintain the balance of power against the Bourbon courts. But as this was frustrated and the Austrian war of succession broke out, hopes were nevertheless at first entertained of realizing this idea in part, since a separate treaty between Austria and Prussia was

[1] By the treaty of 1731.

effected, which was to have a defensive alliance for its sequel. But Maria Theresa, who would consent to no sacrifice, rejected this proposal of reconciliation, chiefly influenced by the visionary hopes so absurdly excited in her by the negotiations in London.[1] Considered merely in a political view, Walpole's plan would have been excellent; but ministers too often forget that political plans are morally impracticable, so long as political motives are subject to the influence of the passions. How could it have been possible to effect a solid union between two powers, when the principles on which it was based demanded the compulsory surrender of considerable provinces from the one to the other?

England had therefore no alternative remaining, but either to leave Austria to her fate, or to interpose for her deliverance; and, notwithstanding the unfortunate issue of the Spanish war, she chose the latter, which the voice of the nation loudly demanded. Walpole, however, while he held the reins of government, would not renounce his old policy; he wished to administer succour without involving himself in the war; he furnished subsidies and took German troops into pay.

Both these phenomena, subsidies and mercenary troops, especially characterize the continental policy of England from this period. It is requisite therefore that we should examine them somewhat more minutely with regard to their nature and their effects; and indeed the more attentively we view them, the more unfair and partial will the employment of them often be considered, especially in later times.

The granting of subsidies to foreign states was not, as we have already shown above, p. 396, first introduced by the kings of the house of Hanover, but had prevailed as early as the reign of William III., and more especially in that of Anne, during the war of the Spanish succession. Upon a general view, it appears a consequence of the un-

[1] The most credible and satisfactory explanation which we have received of all the diplomatic relations and negotiations of the British cabinet, at that period, derived entirely from public documents, and supported by them, first appeared in the two works of W. Coxe. "Memoirs of Robert Walpole," 1798, 3 vols., and "Memoirs of Horace Walpole," 4to, 1802. I refer particularly to the last, pp. 211, 224, et seq. What valuable materials of every kind, historical and moral, do these works present to the future historian of Great Britain, under the house of Hanover! They have been the first to render such a history of the whole period of the two Walpoles feasible.

equal distribution of wealth in the countries which formed the complicated political system of Europe; and for that reason necessarily extended itself more and more in proportion as this inequality increased. Since the western countries of this part of the globe, by the advantage of their position, drew to themselves the most extensive commerce, wealth became accumulated in specie, and enabled these countries to furnish the subsidies of which the others stood in need. Not only England, but France and Holland followed this system. But England, by reason of her position and her relations, was manifestly most frequently placed in a condition to adopt it.

The granting of subsidies may prove a great gain, or a great evil, as well to the state which furnishes them as to that which receives them, accordingly as it may be directed by a sound policy, by despicable passions, or by mere political caprice: its effects, if pernicious, may even extend to the whole political system.

Independence and security are more valuable than money, and if both of them can be purchased or maintained for a state itself and its confederates by money, such an expenditure certainly cannot be without advantage. In a system composed of such different elements as the political system of Europe, that nicely-adjusted balance of power which can afford the only security for the perpetuity of the whole, cannot possibly be maintained without reciprocal support. It is clear, however, from the preceding observations, that those states which had been accustomed to receive supplies of money rather than of men, must unavoidably be subsidised as soon as they themselves experience a greater deficiency in money than in men. To rich states, therefore, who spared their own subjects, which they might otherwise have been compelled to sacrifice, the granting of subsidies became under such circumstances an almost necessary condition for the maintenance of this balance. But considered in another point of view, it is unquestionable that such a resource is likely to be scandalously abused, whenever blind passion resorts to it for satiating its animosity, or even that execrable policy is followed which sees its own interest in the protraction of war amongst others, and does not shrink from making considerable sacrifices in order

to compass its object. The maxims which sound policy would dictate in granting subsidies, have never, so far as I am aware, been made the subject of a distinct inquiry. They may, perhaps, be most correctly deduced from the expression itself. Subsidies are succours furnished in money by one state to another, principally for the purpose of defending the interests of that state, which are indirectly identified with its own. This appears to be the main point for consideration, but which immediately becomes changed when the defence of our own interests becomes the direct motive of our actions. It is only in the first case that any reasonable prospect of advantage can be expected; and a detailed history of subsidies would probably lead to the conclusion that great statesmen have pretty closely adhered to that fundamental maxim; and that those who violate it do so to their own cost. In an isolated case it might certainly be sometimes difficult to determine whose interests predominated; whether those of the state that furnished the subsidies, or those of the state that received them. This, however, could never be less doubtful than in the case of the subsidies afforded by England at this period to Austria. Even the enemies of England did not venture to cast any imputation upon her for her conduct.

The taking foreign troops into pay in order to prosecute our own wars, is an expedient closely allied to that of subsidies. This phenomenon, as we learn from history, is an immediate consequence of the nature of great maritime and commercial states; where there is neither a large population, which can be employed in land service without considerable injury to commerce, nor indeed is land service usually considered so honourable as in those which are peculiarly territorial states.[1] But England had besides an especial reason for having recourse to this expedient, which, in her case, could not possibly have been avoided, viz. the objection of the nation to any increase of its standing army, from a fear that it would prove dangerous to its liberties. We need only retrace the parliamentary history of the past century, commencing with the last quarter of it, in order to know how often, whenever an opportunity occurred, this object became the

[1] I have already shown this at large in the instance of an ancient people, the Carthaginians, Historical Researches, African Nations.

bone of contention between the opposition and the ministerial party. Although this distrust was not altogether groundless, yet there can be no question that it was carried too far, and that it might have led to very detrimental consequences. While the other states of Europe continued to augment their standing forces almost every year, even an insular state could not entirely avoid doing so, where it was not merely an active member of the general state system of Europe, but was likewise threatened, and not idly so, with an invasion from without. From such exigencies and obstacles, the system of nations supporting themselves as much as possible by taking foreign troops into pay, naturally had its rise. Even this might have its good and evil consequences, according as it was proceeded in with moderation, or abused and carried to excess. England might by that means spare her men; but on the other hand it might prove a very pernicious expedient, if it weakened the confidence which she ought to repose in her own strength, and damped the military spirit of the nation. The evil appeared to attach for the most part to those nations who furnished troops for money. But in the first place, and this is a very important circumstance, according to the recognised principles of international law in those times, the people who furnished mercenary troops were not on that account regarded as enemies of those against whom these troops were employed; and if we do not take narrow and confined views of the subject, it is not difficult to show how one side of the question alone was considered by those persons whose declamations were solely directed against a market of the human species, where slaves are exposed for sale. God forbid that these expressions should be supposed to recommend the hiring out one's own troops for foreign pay as a universally excellent maxim of policy. But if countries which groan under the burden of a heavy national debt, are not only relieved from it by this expedient, but are restored to a state of public prosperity, and who can be ignorant that such is the case? may it not be truly asserted, that the troops which enter into a foreign service promote the good of their country in a more eminent degree than they could do on the field of battle in any cause of their own. Here too it is the relations under which the circumstance occurred, and the objects which might be, and

indeed were attained thereby, which form the true criterion of approbation or censure. Besides, how often has it happened, indeed almost invariably in continental wars, that the countries which furnish troops for pay, were themselves interested in the war! What an advantage it was in such a case, not only to devolve upon others the expenses of a war, in which they could not have avoided taking a part, but also to contribute towards keeping it at a distance from their own frontiers; for which object scarcely any sacrifice is too great for small and weak states to make.

England had already, before the breaking out of the war, concluded some negotiations with Hesse and Denmark for auxiliary troops. But as an active participation in the continental war was decided upon when Carteret succeeded Walpole in office, and as Denmark also renewed her treaty, a Hanoverian corps of 16,000 men was taken into British pay. How much it contributed to the successful issue of the war, particularly at the battle of Dettingen, is well known. Yet never have the measures of government during the whole period of the house of Hanover excited a more violent opposition than at that time, when the quiet spectator would certainly least have expected it. Never were the old objections more vehemently and unbecomingly re-echoed than at that juncture.

We shall be disappointed if we expect to find in any British historian, so far as I am aware, a dispassionate and impartial examination of this opposition. The positions from which they set out render this impossible. They have the interests of England alone in view, and perhaps not merely is a disregard of them, of which they themselves cannot quote any well-grounded proof, an offence in their eyes, but even the attempt to identify the interests of England and Hanover.

But, naturally asks the impartial inquirer, had your kings then ceased to be electors of Hanover? Is it to be supposed that England had demanded this from them? Had they in that capacity no duties towards their German subjects, for which they were responsible? Did they owe them no protection, as far as negotiation and continental connexions could afford it? It is scarcely credible how far and in what tone such claims have been urged in England. A person must have read the parliamentary speeches of those times,

particularly in the Upper House,[1] in order to form a conception of the furious diatribes, full of ebullitions of the coarsest national pride, and of the grossest insults, against a people which stand connected with them by so many ties. Time itself has given perhaps too complete a refutation to those fictions of projects formed for the extension of the electorate, which, whenever the slightest step was taken, or only presumed to be taken, for the advantage of Hanover, were again revived.

But in order to estimate duly those objections, it is necessary to trace them to their genuine sources. They originated much less in conviction than in party spirit. It was the cry of the opposition which succeeded at that time, after having put down Walpole, in gaining over to itself the great mass of the nation. Where could they more readily find materials for their speeches than here, where they never failed, as soon as they set out on mere selfish principles? It is not the design of this dissertation to give an account of that opposition in detail. Otherwise readers who are not conversant with the history of those times, would behold with amazement the degree of blindness and fatuity to which the rage of faction can lead.

The history of England during the 18th century is as rich as any other, and perhaps richer, in instances of great virtues and great achievements; but there is one aspect in which a man of right feeling cannot contemplate it for the most part without abhorrence. It is not the opposition itself, without which no political liberty can exist; neither is it the ebullition of party spirit, which at certain periods is inseparable from it, with which I find fault. Even that disgust which arises from the reiterated and incessant clamour frequently raised on the most trivial occasions about the impending ruin of the state, which never ensued, may be overcome. But it is that melancholy and so often recurring spectacle, of men, themselves of the highest talents and character, who,

[1] In the years 1742 and 1743, during the ministry of Carteret, the discharge of the Hanoverian corps in the British service is the constant topic of the rival speakers. This corps constituted at that time almost the half of the allied army, and the consequences of their dismissal may easily be calculated. I question whether the whole range of history has produced a similar example of the mastery of passion over sound reason amongst people who called themselves statesmen.

calling their selfishness patriotism, speak in despite of their better conviction; who censure every measure of the minister, because it is his measure; whilst in every instance their object is not to promote the interests of the state, but to force themselves into power. The conduct of the first William Pitt, whom England still regards, with justice, as the first of her statesmen, while he was in opposition against Walpole, a circumstance on which he himself afterwards always looked back with self-reproach, may be mentioned as an example. The true character of the opposition is said to be a continual censure of the minister. But a censure which only finds fault, and is always finding fault, loses its power, and does not attain its object. This perverse spirit of the opposition is mainly instrumental in giving to the government such excessive and increasing power. The opposition had often prevailed in England, and forced the minister from his ground, when the evil was already past; but was seldom or never able to prevent the execution of perverse measures at the right time.

The history of the Austrian war of succession interests us here only on account of the consequences resulting from it to the British continental policy. As soon as the old enmity between France and Austria revived, not only was the ancient connexion between this power and England renewed, but similar connexions were likewise formed on the continent, as in the reign of William and Anne. The king of Sardinia was by the treaty of Worms the ally of England in Italy, on condition of receiving subsidies; the republic of the United Netherlands was likewise drawn into the war, and since the peace of Dresden, in 1745, England herself also entered into a friendly connexion with Frederic II.

The course of the inquiry demands from us something more than a passing notice of the conduct pursued by that great prince in this eventful period. Properly speaking it was he, who in this war constructed a new political system, since the conquest of Silesia laid the foundation of that rivalry which subsisted between Austria and Prussia, and which became, subsequently, for more than ten years, the hinge, as it were, on which the politics of Europe turned. The later history of Frederic may perhaps afford more valuable lessons in the arts of war and of government; but in

politics, provided that his claims to Silesia, which we cannot here undertake to estimate, shall be considered justifiable, this earlier period will be found most replete with instruction. His conduct, if we consider, how in 1740 he at first single-handed took up arms, how he allied himself with France, and yet so early as 1742 concluded a treaty for himself alone; how two years later he again took up arms; again allied himself with France, and yet after only sixteen months again abandoned her; affords a novel, one may say a startling, exhibition. But we must take a complete survey of the order of his external relations at that time, and above all of those with France, whose design of effecting the annihilation of the Austrian monarchy by no means coincided with his own, in order to understand and admire him. The art, till then unknown in Europe, of concluding alliances without committing one's self, of remaining unfettered while apparently bound, of seceding when the proper moment is arrived, can be learnt from him and only from him. Indeed this seems to have become lost to posterity; yet it could scarcely be otherwise; for his whole policy was, in the first place, not a consequence of the superiority of his genius, but of the independence of his character, which certainly could not be transmitted by hereditary succession. Hence that intrepidity of conduct; that freedom which characterized every movement; that straightforwardness, which was not on that account unaccompanied by cunning; in a word, that superiority over his contemporaries, which displayed itself not less in the cabinet than in the field of action. Hence no trace of that base womanish policy which cringes before a more puissant adversary, in order occasionally to defy a weaker, which has no higher object than to thread its path through the relative circumstances of the day, and which would be ready on the morrow to solemnize a thanksgiving, if it has but escaped to-day unscathed by them. The immutable truth, that independence of character is of more value in negotiation than brilliant talents, and rises in importance proportionately to the eminence of the station in which the possessor is placed, no one has more strikingly attested by his own example than Frederic at that period.

He understood precisely the nature of his own wishes, and retired from the theatre of war as soon as (by the treaty

of Dresden, Dec. 25, 1745) his objects were attained. The war was continued three years longer by the other leading powers, with what view it is difficult to say, unless we take into account the passions which were excited by events which occurred in the interval. France had as little reason to flatter herself with the prospect of annihilating the Austrian monarchy, as of snatching away the imperial crown from Francis I. after he had once been elected, and recognised also by Frederic. And however brilliant her victories in the Netherlands were, experience nevertheless showed that she could not calculate upon achieving any permanent conquests here. All parties eventually concurred in a peace,[1] because all were exhausted. What were the results of this to England? It is notorious that England gained no increase of territory by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. But it would be great perverseness to seek materials for blame in this fact. The war was not commenced with a view to conquest, but to support Austria against France. This object was attained; and any peace may well be termed a good peace, by which the object which has induced a person to undertake a war is attained. It is true that this is not the general opinion, which estimates the advantages solely by the conquests achieved. The more rare the virtue of independence is, the more frequently do we experience that schemes of ambitious projects are first excited during wars; and these, by their prolongation, then become the scourge of nations. This war, however, had attached to it other consequences of greater moment to the policy of England.

The first of these was the more intricate complication of the colonial interest with the political relations of Europe. No war which England ever carried on, had so extensively affected the colonies as this. The war with Spain naturally made the West Indies and the American sea the scene of her enterprises; but the East Indies likewise became now for the first time the theatre of action for the British and French. Two of the most extraordinary men, *Labourdonnais* and *Dupleix*, had already prepared the way for acquiring a dominion there, which, if it had depended upon herself alone, would probably have secured to France the possession of India. The jealousy of the British was aroused; hostili-

[1] At Aix-la-Chapelle, April 30, 1748.

ties broke out there likewise; and although the conquests which had been made were resigned on both sides at the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the spark of discord remained nevertheless unextinguished, and in each of the subsequent wars, India, as well as the new world, became the cause as well as the scene of contest.

In close connexion with this, was the superiority of the navy of England, which afterwards became so firmly established. In no previous war had this ever risen to any pre-eminence above that of her enemies; but at the time this war broke out the French navy had been reduced to the lowest state of decay, by the parsimony and supineness of Fleury, and during the war was almost annihilated. This superiority having been once established, gave rise in every new war to similar plans, which ultimately led to that exclusive dominion of the sea, which became an object of envy to other powers, and the source of so many calamities to Europe.

In the next place, the relations of England with the continental states seemed now for a considerable time to be determinately settled. Her newly-revived rivalry with France had given rise to the connexion with Austria; and the duration of the latter seemed likely to be commensurate with the former. The sources of dispute with Spain were not only stopped,[1] but the personally favourable inclination of Ferdinand VI., the successor of Philip V., since 1743, gave England power, if not as an ally, at least as a friend, in Spain. On a similar footing were the relations with Prussia placed. With the republic of the Netherlands, however, they had not merely continued the same, but had become more close. If the reciprocal connexion of both powers was before founded on their rivalry with France, the revolution in the constitution (which took place during this war) gave rise to new ties. It is well known that in the year 1747, on the advance of the French army into the Austrian Netherlands, the hereditary dignity of Stadtholder in the United Provinces was revived in favour of William IV., the son-in-law of George II.; and the powerful influence, or rather the sovereignty, of the house of Orange was again firmly established. After a war which had been carried on and

[1] By the treaty at Buenretiro, October 5, 1750.

terminated in common, the continuance of the existing connexion was in itself quite natural, but that which was now derived from family connexions added a new link. Lastly, this war had besides strengthened the connexion with Russia. Maria Theresa had succeeded in winning over Russia to her side; and Germany was for the first time visited by a Russian army in the year 1748, in consequence of a subsidy treaty which had been concluded with England and Holland. Nevertheless this first interference of Russia in the affairs of Western Europe, was of short duration; the age had not yet arrived when the maintenance of the balance of power was in her hands.

In the years immediately subsequent to the war, especially after definitive arrangements had been entered into with Spain, England was more engrossed with domestic and financial affairs than with the transactions of foreign countries; and by the reduction of the interest of the national debt, to three per cent, Pelham[1] erected a more glorious monument to his ministry than any victories in the field could have raised. Meanwhile, the consequences of the system established by Frederic II., by which the maintenance of the balance in the German empire between Austria and Prussia was regarded as the foundation-stone of the balance of Europe, began also to develope themselves. It might naturally be expected that England would adhere to its ally Austria; and it seemed the more natural as the occupation of East Friesland, which had been evacuated about this time, and the disputes about the Embden East India Company soon after, had produced a great coolness between George II. and Frederic. But the mode of proceeding then adopted by the British cabinet, put arms into the hands of the opposition which they knew how to wield with great dexterity. Maria Theresa had already conceived the wish of preserving the regal diadem of Rome for her son Joseph, who was yet a minor; and England not only supported this scheme, but also dispensed her subsidies with a lavish hand among the electors, in order to accomplish it. With the elector of Bavaria, the Palatinate, Saxony, and Cologne, treaties were either actually concluded

[1] Pelham, and his brother the Duke of Newcastle, next or subordinate to him, stood at the head of the administration when Carteret went out of office, 1744, till the death of Pelham, 1754.

or subsidies promised them, for the purpose of gaining their votes. It is surprising to hear even Pitt himself speak in favour of the treaty with Bavaria,[1] because, as he expresses it, that state would thereby be drawn away from the French interest. Whether England had any reason at all for embroiling herself so deeply in the affairs of Germany is a question which we need not here determine; the principle that it should, certainly prevailed in the British cabinet. But these subsidies, (as Horace Walpole so bitterly complains,[2]) not only failed in their object, for Frederic II. knew how to frustrate all these plans, but kept open the breach with Prussia at a moment when there was the strongest reason for avoiding one. It was a striking instance of the abuse of subsidies.

But that great change which was so extensively preparing at this time in the political relations of the continent, and which soon actually ensued, quickly diverted attention from the election of a king of the Romans to more important objects, nor could it fail to effect a change in the policy of England.

The approximation and close connexion which immediately ensued between France and Austria, was an occurrence which seemed to mock all the calculations of the politician. No step of the French cabinet has been more frequently and severely censured; and if we take into consideration her next object, the making war upon and annihilating Frederic II., none was ever more justly censured. But the German writers and journalists, who have so often repeated these strictures, ought not to forget that they, at least, have had the greatest cause to be thankful for it. Was not indeed that prosperous period of almost thirty years which occurred, even though Frederic II. had come off victorious in the struggle, and which, upon the whole, was the most prosperous and flourishing that Germany had ever en-

[1] Life of William Pitt, i. p. 114.

[2] An admirable exposition of the British continental relations at that period, particularly in respect to these points, will be found in the memoir which Horace Walpole at that time, 1751, caused to be laid before the Cabinet. *Coxe's Memoirs of Horace Walpole*, p. 386, sq. Both before and after the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, he was most zealous in an alliance with Frederic II., but to no purpose. He was certainly right so far, that it was unwise to exasperate him.

joyed, to be attributed to the good understanding between France and Austria?

This connexion between France and Austria, not only robbed England of her first ally, but by reason of the great differences which had already arisen with France herself, respecting the boundaries of Nova Scotia, the forts in the back settlements of the North American colonies, and the possession of the neutral islands in the West Indies, rendered the probability of war a matter of almost absolute certainty; the object of which, as a continental war, would necessarily be the abolition of the newly-established balance in Germany, by the overthrow of Prussia; and the most important theatre of which, now that the Austrian Netherlands could no longer serve as a diversion, must necessarily be Germany. George II. would have to consider this connexion in two points of view, as king of England, and as elector of Hanover. It would naturally be expected then that, under this coincidence of relations, the affairs of his German states would be first arranged; it could only be considered as a fulfilment of his duties as regent, if he first bestowed his attention upon them. But how could the interests of England and Hanover be more identical than at this time? It was the only state that could now afford to England a powerful ally on the continent, Frederic II.; and what would have been her situation after the subjugation of Hanover? This truth, however, though clear as the noonday sun, was far from being generally recognised in England. The old cry about the Hanoverian interest was again set up. Alas! even the man who, as minister, afterwards maintained the position that America must be conquered in Germany, at this time arraigned the connexion which George II. sought to establish on the continent by means of the subsidy treaty.[1]

[1] Pitt, however, did not speak in general terms. He only censured the connexion which George II. at that time sought to establish between Russia and Hesse. But who would not wish himself to read the very words of such a man on such an occasion: "It is impossible," said he, "to defend Hanover by subsidies. An open country cannot be protected against a neighbour who is able to fall upon it with one hundred thousand men, and to send as many more after them. If Hanover, in consequence of her connexion with Great Britain, shall become the object of attack, then is it obligatory upon us when peace is restored to provide her full indemnification for all the losses she has sustained. But the idea of defending Hanover by subsidies is ridiculous and impracticable." Life of W. Pitt, i. p. 136. The exaggeration of the statement is best refuted by the event.

The first thoughts of the king were directed to Russia. In consequence of the subsidies furnished to Russia in the last war, the presence of Russian troops in Germany was no strange spectacle, and a treaty was concluded with Elizabeth to cover the electorate against the invasion of the French.[1] It may well be doubted whether in the relations of Russia, as they soon developed themselves, this object would be attained, since the French-Austrian party prevailed also in Russia. But Frederic II., who understood these relations too well to admit Russian troops into Hanover, and was also too well aware of the consequences which might result from the occupation of that country by a foreign power, would not allow himself to be influenced by distrust or petty feelings of any kind. He engaged himself to protect the neutrality of Hanover; George II. abandoned Russia and united with him,[2] as well as with several of the neighbouring princes of Northern Germany.

The history of the ever memorable war which now broke out belongs not to this place. The glorious days of the Frederics and Ferdinands are past, and the memory of them is all that is left to us. Followed by almost all their heroic comrades, they have long descended to the shades, in order to make room for a later generation, whose history will be more easily learnt, from its containing fewer names worth remembrance.

But to return to England. The administration of this kingdom now devolved upon a man, William Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatham,[3] whom the nation has never ceased to remember, and whom we, if for no other reason, must not omit to notice, as he was the main stay of the continental relations of England.

He had entered parliament as early as 1735, and had taken office, under the Pelham administration, as paymaster of the forces, which he resigned in 1755.[4] He had long been a member of the opposition against Walpole; but his influence was now become so great, that not only could no administration hold together without him, but even the formation of one was intrusted to him, because on no other terms would he himself accept of place. Accordingly a

[1] In the spring of 1755. [2] By the treaty at Whitehall, Jan. 15, 1756.
[3] He was born on 17 Nov. 1708, was made Earl of Chatham 1766, and died May 11, 1778. [4] Nov. 20.

year had not elapsed before he was called upon to form an administration (Oct. 20, 1756) as secretary of state, when the king approved his proposals for filling up the other appointments, which exalted post he retained till Oct. 5, 1761, when he resigned upon finding that his measures were not supported. The five years of his administration was the most brilliant period which Great Britain had yet seen. His panegyrists have not omitted to enumerate the many battles which were won, the ships which were captured, the conquests which were made during his administration;[1] for although he was not the immediate agent in these victories, it was through him that they were achieved. His real merit may be comprised in two lines. *By the greatness of his individual character he called up, as by magic, the spirit of his nation.* He was a man in the fullest sense of the word. Integrity and independence formed the centre of his whole moral system, from which the rays of his genius and of his often admired eloquence emanated no less than from his sound political maxims. In proportion as he relied upon himself, the nation learned to trust to its own strength and energies. Thus England became familiar with, and accustomed to, the most daring enterprises; thus became improved the discipline of the army and navy; and thus, above all, became roused the spirit of the nation: the minister meanwhile preserving its confidence, by showing himself anxious on every occasion to appear as the champion of the rights and power of the people, in the constitutional sense of the word, rather than as one who wished to court the favour of the prince, by taking every opportunity to extend the rights and power of the crown. It was therefore an essential element in the character of Pitt, that he should in his general policy show little inclination towards the system of subsidies and mercenary troops, inasmuch as it might paralyse the self-confidence and independent energy of the nation. But he exhibited also a proof that great minds do not blindly bind themselves to any particular maxims. As soon as he could resort to that system without prejudice to those higher interests, he adopted it; and the prudence with which he exercised it was as great as its consequences were fortunate.

[1] A list of them will be found in the Life of Pitt, vol. i. p. 198.

Never were auxiliaries more judiciously employed than those of the allies at this period. Never were subsidies more judiciously furnished than those which were granted by Pitt to Frederic II. It is a singularly interesting spectacle to see these two great men united together, each trusting in the first place to himself and acting for himself, without on that account overlooking the advantages which might be derived from their connexion with each other.

The British continental policy during the seven years' war, as long as Pitt held the reins of government, may, according to my idea, be regarded as the most perfect model from which the British cabinet could have drawn (at any time) its fundamental maxims in this respect,—I speak not of the choice of allies; this can only in part depend upon the cabinet, as the relations between the powers of the continent are variable,—but of *its whole course and method of proceeding*. It adhered very properly to the true notion of subsidies. It afforded them to those, who under the existing relations were the most natural allies of Great Britain, and with whom it had in general a community of interest; not to every one who asked for them. They were afforded with the view that those who received them might first of all assist themselves; and hence it was expected that advantage would be indirectly derived to England, but not that they should forget themselves and first succour England. More was not promised than was intended to be given, but what was promised was faithfully performed. They made the weak strong, while they placed them on a secure footing, and supported them there by uniting themselves to them. Thus might Pitt and Frederic, both equally independent, each pursue his own course, without, by so doing, destroying the perfect harmony which subsisted between them. Pitt has himself, in one of his later speeches, so clearly defined the principles on which he acted, and the policy which he pursued at this period, that the reader would not willingly forego the satisfaction of seeing it here introduced.[1]

"I have been much abused, my Lords, for supporting a war, which it has been the fashion to call my German war. But I can affirm, with a clear conscience, that that abuse

[1] Life of Pitt, vol. ii. p. 221. The speech was first delivered in the year 1770, in the Upper House.

has been thrown upon me by men, who were either unacquainted with facts, or had an interest in misrepresenting them. I shall speak plainly and frankly to your Lordships upon this, as I do upon every occasion. That I did in Parliament oppose, to the utmost of my power, our engaging in a German war, is most true; and if the same circumstance were to recur, I would act the same part, and oppose it again. But when I was called upon to take a share in the administration, that measure was already decided. Before I was appointed secretary of state, the first treaty with the king of Prussia was signed, and not only ratified by the crown, but approved of and confirmed by a resolution of both Houses of Parliament."

"It was a weight fastened upon my neck. By that treaty, the honour of the crown and the honour of our nation were equally engaged. How I could recede from such an engagement; how I could advise the crown to desert a great prince in the midst of those difficulties, in which a reliance upon the good faith of this country had contributed to involve him, are questions I willingly submit to your Lordships' candour. That wonderful man might, perhaps, have extricated himself from his difficulties without our assistance. He has talents, which, in every thing that touches the human capacity, do honour to the human mind. But how would England have supported that reputation of credit and good faith, by which we have been distinguished in Europe? What other foreign power would have sought our friendship? What other foreign power would have accepted of an alliance with us? But, my Lords, though I wholly condemn our entering into any engagements which tend to involve us in a continental war, I do not admit that alliances with some of the German princes are either detrimental or useless. They may be, my Lords, not only useful, but necessary." Not, as he further observes, to introduce foreign auxiliaries into England, which is strong enough to protect itself, but into Ireland to defend it from invasion.

The connexion with Prussia and her allies was not, however, the only new feature which the seven years' war produced in respect to the British continental relations. One other was this, that the republic of the United Netherlands, notwithstanding its intimate relations with England, had the

option of remaining neutral in this war, which it had not in any preceding one. But the connexion between France and Austria would necessarily affect in some degree the conduct of this republic, and weaken its connexion with England. In the revolutions of the continent it had only one paramount interest, the continuance of the existing condition of the Austrian Netherlands. As long as these provinces continued in the possession of a distant power, they served them as a bulwark with or without fortified places. Under the existing relations these could not become, as formerly, the scene of hostilities; France had by her connexion with Austria discarded all designs upon them; and therefore for the republic this connexion, viewed in this light, must have been a most felicitous occurrence. But the advantageous effects of this neutrality upon its commerce, which even excited the envy of England, are well known. What an era might this have been for the republic, if it had not been long afflicted with disorders which no remedial measures could now counteract!

These changes in her relations with other powers, rendered it unnecessary for England to establish any federal connexions in Italy, such as it had formed with Sardinia during previous wars. It was during the negotiations for peace in 1762, that recourse was first had to this country as mediator, and that not in vain. But England had still remaining another ancient ally who was drawn with her into the vortex and required assistance—Portugal.

It has been already shown, in its proper place, when and how the connexion with this state arose, and became established. Since the treaty of Utrecht it had kept up a highly advantageous connexion, in a commercial point of view, for England, without any important political consequences resulting from it during the long period of peace which Portugal enjoyed. Even the plans of Pombal could not have dissolved or materially affected it. But the closer connexion which through the family compact drew Spain into the war, was also instrumental in involving Portugal in it, and in causing her now to look for assistance to her ancient ally.

The celebrated family compact of the Bourbons appeared in the result to confirm the fears which had been entertained during the war of the Spanish succession, and at the peace

of Utrecht. Although the crowns of France and Spain remained separate, yet the interests of both powers were intimately united. How little, however, hitherto, had the fears, which were cherished on that account, been justified by the event; Spain would have been unavoidably obliged to take part with France in the war, but this had as yet only served to enable England to support herself at the cost of Spain, and to keep her sailors in good humour by the rich prizes which they captured. This last was perhaps the most important advantage which she gained. By privateering and plunder, individuals enriched themselves; but no nation has ever acquired by such means a single permanent advantage.

The effects of the family compact[1] then were even already apparent; England became unavoidably involved in a war with Spain, and since Portugal was now threatened with an attack from the same quarter, not only were British auxiliaries sent to Spain, but also a German commander, Count William of Lippe Bückeburg, one of the heroes of the seven years' war. Although it was not in his power to recast the nation in a new mould, he nevertheless stamped the recollection of himself indelibly upon it. Who is there even now in Portugal who has not heard of the great Count. The country escaped from the war uninjured; and the connexion with England had become strengthened.

But one consequence of the family compact, though accidental, yet much more momentous as regards the continental policy of England, was the secession of Pitt from the ministry. However secret the conclusion of that treaty had been kept in Spain, with the view of gaining time, in order to secure to themselves the treasures from America, Pitt had nevertheless been able to procure intelligence of their proceedings. His anxious wish was, as might have been expected from a man of his character, to anticipate Spain, and immediately to declare war upon her, which he saw to be inevitable. But he was not believed, and was in consequence outvoted. Not accustomed to capitulate when convinced he was right, he turned his back and retired.[2]

His prediction was fulfilled, and England soon saw her-

[1] Signed on Aug. 10, 1761, but still kept secret. The very first two articles of the treaty contained an offensive and defensive alliance, and a reciprocal guarantee for all possessions. [2] October 5, 1761.

self obliged to declare war. But although even now the short war with Spain had been prosecuted with the greatest success, the retirement of Pitt had such an effect on the measures of the British cabinet, that the whole of his system of continental policy, as yet scarcely matured, necessarily fell to the ground. It ceased, however, to take an active part in the continental war, the subsidies to Frederic II. were discontinued, and England concluded a peace for herself without paying that regard to her ally which he might with justice have demanded.

Viewed in the light of a mere temporary advantage, this conduct of the British cabinet may admit of some vindication; but on the principles of a higher policy it cannot possibly be defended. It cannot be denied that the assertion of Pitt, that Frederic II., if left entirely alone, would be able to extricate himself from all embarrassment, was now verified; but if this be granted, would it not have been more consonant to the principles of sound policy, for England to have allowed her connexions with Prussia to continue as long as the intimate relation between Austria and France should exist. Would England have obtained a peace on less favourable terms if she had concluded it in conjunction with Frederic? It was only owing to a fortunate combination of circumstances that no new relations occurred to render his assistance necessary for England. His aversion to this state was afterwards perhaps too deeply rooted to admit of being ever again eradicated.

England, therefore, after the seven years' war stood alone without allies, or at least without powerful ones; and had, after the prostration of that power which opposed and rivalled her, no immediate cause for seeking new connexions. During the profound peace which the west of Europe so long enjoyed, no such exigence arose. The activity of the nation was confined at first to its own domestic affairs; since the well-known disputes with Wilkes brought questions into agitation which seriously affected the rights of the Upper House. The contest with Spain about the Falkland Islands (1770) produced only threats, but no hostilities; the disputes which commenced with the colonies in North America soon engrossed universal attention. The particulars of the dispute as well as the war which ensued is foreign

to the present inquiry, except so far as continental relations are concerned. The effects which it had upon these were manifold. The first was the restoration of the subsidy system. From the moment it was decided to send an army over to America, the need of foreign assistance was sensibly felt. The assertion of Lord Chatham, "that cases may occur in which connexion with German princes could not be dispensed with," is again applicable here. He certainly had not anticipated such a case as the present, and could not have alluded to the contest which broke out with America on the subject of exemption from taxation.[1] Once admitting however (which I am very far from maintaining) that it was politic to attempt the subjugation of America by force, there can be little doubt that mercenary aid was the best resource which could be adopted. The lives of their own men were thereby spared—lives which a state like England could least of all afford to lose.

Further, although this war did not give rise to a continental war in Europe, yet it did to one amongst the European powers, as France took part with America, and Spain, by virtue of the family compact, was also necessarily drawn into it. America was merely a secondary stage for these powers, the war between them was almost entirely a colonial one, for which new materials had been accumulating ever since the treaty of Paris. One of the greatest evils that disturbs the European system is that intermixture of its colonies, naturally occasioned by their geographical position. This was the principal cause of the seven years' war, and, although the peace which put an end to it, and by which France was completely dispossessed of its continental possessions in North America,[2] was in some measure a remedy for this evil, it nevertheless contributed in other respects

[1] The opinions of Chatham respecting America may be gathered from the bill which he proposed to the Upper House, but without success, Feb. 1, 1775, after the disturbances had broken out. It will be found in Life of Pitt, ii. p. 129. The colonies were to remain dependent, but to have the privilege of taxing themselves by their provincial assemblies. The congress at Philadelphia, which had already assembled, was to settle the division of the taxes among the provinces, and to determine the sum which each was to contribute towards the liquidation of the national debt in England. Even Chatham could not rise sufficiently high to take an enlarged view of the immeasurable advantage which would result to England from the complete liberation of America.

[2] After that it ceded Louisiana also to Spain, 1765.

rather to aggravate it. The power of the British and the French was now nearly equally balanced in the West Indies, but in the East from the time England established herself at Bengal, (1763,) the preponderance was clearly in her favour. France nevertheless still retained hopes of being able to restore the balance, as she had found an ally in one of the chiefs of the interior, who, from personal interest, was necessarily hostile to England, and had already discovered the means of setting her at defiance. The East Indies thus became the principal theatre of the war, and in spite of every effort they would have been lost to England, if a better arrangement in the organization of the East India Company, by the concentration of the four presidencies under one governor-general, and the bill of Pitt, had not rendered them politically independent of the government.

The colonial war, moreover, cost England a political friend on the continent, by the republic of the United Netherlands becoming implicated in it. England certainly lost nothing by this war; she conquered St. Eustace, Trinconomale, Negapatuam; the last of which she retained to the peace. But this rupture with the republic was connected with another event, which was necessarily of critical importance to England.

England by this war became involved in a contest with all the maritime powers of Europe, and was singly a match for them all. It was indeed a signal proof of the rapid advance she had made since the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle that she was now mistress of the seas, although as yet she was far from asserting a dominion over them. But when once her energies were directed to this object, circumstances naturally arose out of her attempt, which exposed England to the danger of being involved more extensively with the greatest part of the continent. It was not enough to cripple, or even to destroy the enemies' fleets, unless she effectually prevented them from refitting and building new ones. Their capabilities of doing this however depended, for the most part, on their interference with neutral powers, from which France would be obliged to procure the necessary materials. This was one reason for her oppression of neutrals and the obstructing of their navigation; but these arbitrary proceedings necessarily became extended beyond all bounds as soon

as the annihilation of the enemy's commerce and the endeavour to appropriate it to themselves (two facts inseparable from the sovereignty of the sea) became their avowed object. In wars of earlier times, the commerce of belligerent powers had escaped under the protection of neutral flags, and although the celebrated maxim, *free ship, free cargo*, had always been but doubtfully maintained, the dispute could never become of much practical importance until some one maritime power felt itself sufficiently strong to maintain the contrary. But this unjust oppression, for such the conduct of England was felt to be, was not submitted to without resistance; Catharine II. set on foot the armed neutrality,[1] which the northern powers, and even Portugal, joined; and Holland herself would have acceded to it, if England had not anticipated her doing so by a declaration of war.

The armed neutrality was a phenomenon from which England might have derived important lessons; but she did not. Submission then was absolutely necessary, unless she was willing to incur the danger of being involved in a war with the whole of Europe; this submission, however, was made in silence, unaccompanied by any formal recognition of the principles which had been set up. All, therefore, that remained was an association which could only be of practical utility during the continuance of the war. The indispensable need of a maritime law of nations was more sensibly felt than ever; and Catharine had loudly proclaimed it by that association; but here, as usual, the policy adopted was merely to serve a temporary purpose; and of what use could a maritime law of nations on paper be when the want of it, in time of peace, should cease to be felt, and which, it was obvious, in time of war would be made subservient to the convenience of individual states?

But another effect of this war upon the continental policy of England was her altered relations with the Netherlands. Internal tranquillity was by no means restored in that country by the peace, and England even found an opportunity thereby of maintaining her influence over it.

It is a remarkable circumstance in the history of the continental policy of England, that although she was so deeply involved in the affairs of foreign countries, yet during the

[1] In the year 1781.

whole period of the house of Hanover, (it may be said too even of the Stuarts,) in no one of them was the spirit of party either fostered or excited thereby. What a different spirit had France excited in Sweden, and Russia in Poland! This consequence may indisputably be ascribed to the fact that England required no party aid for the attainment of her object, but merely the support of the administration; and in some measure to the existing relations of that period, which gave little encouragement to party spirit in the countries with which England stood connected. I have no wish, therefore, to pass any encomium on the more exalted morality of the British minister on that ground; but I am prepared to prove that the interference of England in the affairs of foreign powers, was hitherto much less dangerous to their object than the influence of the continental powers upon one another.

The events which occurred in the United Netherlands formed at the time we speak of an exception. As during the last war this state had leagued itself with France, and as that power found an opportunity to do her some essential services during her quarrel with Joseph II., it could not be difficult for the French ministry to maintain for itself a party here; and this party, under the name of the patriotic party, stepped forward as an antagonist of the house of Orange, without knowing, as far as could be discerned, any thing more determinate as to its real object.

The moment at which England might probably have attached to herself the republic, with less galling, but certainly more lasting bonds, as afterwards happened, would have been the moment of the peace. But this moment was neglected! When could generosity towards an old friend, with whom she had only occasionally fallen out, have been more properly evinced than here? Yet so far was she from acting in this spirit, that she forcibly dispossessed Holland of one of her colonies, *Negapatuam*;[1] a colony of no inconsiderable importance; and was only with difficulty prevented from depriving her of another, *Trinconomale*. By this impolitic harshness the republic was driven to conclude a peace through the mediation of France; and it was made abundantly evident that, as colonial aggrandizement became

[1] In the treaty of peace of May 20, 1784.

the point at issue, no compunction would be shown by England in despoiling, even with her own hands, her ancient ally; and that she only waited for an opportunity to extend further her rapacity. Thus, then, she deprived herself for ever of the confidence of a nation with which she had so long been in close and amicable connexion, in a manner which made its renewal impossible;—what was the equivalent?

The ferment at home, however, certainly made it necessary for the Orange party to attach itself to England, since, during the life of Frederic II., it found no other support. But even this support was of little help to it. The British cabinet did not find it advisable to afford any efficient assistance, when the prerogatives of the hereditary stadtholder were one after another infringed and contracted; and it became highly probable that he would have been entirely dispossessed of his dignity, if Prussia had not adopted a change in her policy.

It is well known under what circumstances, and with what result, in the autumn of the year 1787, the commotions in Holland were suppressed by the entrance of a Prussian corps, and the stadtholder reinstated and confirmed in the full exercise of his power.

England, up to the present time, had remained without any considerable ally on the continent. But the change which we have just mentioned gave rise to another alliance, which was not without important consequences to Europe. England and Prussia both united themselves with Holland; they had the same common object in view, that of supporting her newly given or restored constitution, and this common point of contact soon brought on an alliance between these two powers.[1]

The connexion of Prussia with Holland was a consequence of family interest, the further consideration of which would be irrelevant to this inquiry. With regard to England, the affinity with her was not sufficiently close to allow us to attribute to this source the interest which she took in the affairs of this country. Although the reigning houses were connected, the motive by which she was more immediately actuated in the part she took, was the desire of counteracting French influence by the depression of the patriotic party.

[1] By the treaty of the 13th of August, 1788.

But surely the moment at which the peace was concluded would have been more favourable for this purpose than the present. England certainly could not view the fate of the republic with indifference. She necessarily wished to see her independence maintained; but the compulsory re-establishment of a form of government, to which a great, perhaps the greater, part of the nation were vehemently opposed, could not possibly be considered as a firm foundation of her independence. She united herself in this way with the government which she restored, but not with the nation. Experience has shown the dangerous consequences of such policy.

By this triple alliance, however, the connexion of England with Prussia was renewed, though the basis on which it rested was not formed on so extended a community of interest as under Frederic II. The maintenance of the stadtholdership in the Netherlands could not possibly become of sufficient importance to both these powers, to form a permanent bond of union between them. Chatham, with his principles, would never have concluded the alliance which his son concluded; still less would he have approved the consequences which followed it.

These consequences displayed themselves chiefly in the east of Europe. The representation which we have already given has shown the little share England had taken in the events of those parts since the peace of Nystadt. Her commerce was carried on there without molestation; the growing prosperity of Russia had favoured it, without becoming formidable to England. In the mean time the most decisive changes had taken place in these quarters, such as the foundation of the independence of the Crimea,[1] the appearance of Russian fleets in the Mediterranean,[2] and even the first partition of Poland,[3] without any active manifestation of opposition on the part of England. The British cabinet felt itself too little interested in them; it had no political connexion either with Poland or with Turkey, and had no engagements to perform to either; the trade with the Baltic, and that with the Levant, by no means considerable, was not affected; and those countries in general lay beyond the circuit of its political sphere of action. Whether therefore her policy in this respect was exceptionable or not may

[1] In the year 1771. [2] In the year 1770. [3] In the year 1772.

admit of doubt, although an action which set at nought the hitherto recognised law of nations could not be a matter of indifference even to England. Her policy can only be excused on the ground that she connived at what she could not hinder. But after the triple alliance her former maxims of policy were evidently changed, and England sought not only to obtain an influence over the affairs of those countries, but even assumed a tone of dictation. If we may credit French authors,[1] she was actuated by a jealousy of the treaty of commerce, which Russia had concluded with France, 1787, by which France had been greatly favoured; in consequence of this, England herself felt an inclination to do every thing to involve Russia in a war with Turkey, which it is well known broke out 1788. The truth of this unauthenticated assertion may reasonably admit of doubt; but that the British policy here stepped beyond its proper sphere, that England had thought herself able to dictate where dictation was not to be dreamt of—of this the ministry were soon to experience a painful conviction.

The mediation of England at the congress of Reichenbach, 1788, was not without advantage; but when the British cabinet wished likewise to dictate to Catherine II. the conditions of peace with Turkey, she declared that she concluded peaces only for herself; nor was she alarmed at the demonstration made by the equipment of a fleet; she actually concluded the peace at Jassy[2] for herself, and on the terms she wished, and the British cabinet gained no more from its threats than the knowledge that it had threatened to no purpose.

The first object to which the exertions of every cabinet should be directed would seem to be, to comprehend clearly, and to determine precisely, the proper course of action which its position and strength point out to it; and thence to deduce the fundamental maxims of its foreign policy. This assertion will not be supposed to imply that such a theory should be openly paraded, as it were, and be laid down in public declarations; but the fact that every state,

[1] Compare Segur, Histoire de Frédéric Guillaume, vol. ii.

[2] The 29th of December, 1790. The empress retained in it the district on the Neister, instead of the old boundary which England had wished to prescribe.

however powerful, has certain definite limits to which its sphere of action should be confined, is an immutable truth; and he who would deny the conclusions drawn from it, would be guilty of an absurdity. Yet if we look into history, how seldom do we find this truth kept in view! How many unsuccessful plans and undertakings do we discover, which it were easy to see beforehand could not succeed! Indeed it would seem to require nothing more than sound common sense, and a moderate degree of intelligence, to determine the sphere of action to which a nation should confine itself. But still we must not forget to take in account the great influence of the passions upon politics, and, above all, the exaggerated conception, which every minister is prone to form, of the importance of the state at the head of which he is placed, in order to explain the many disastrous errors from which scarcely any state has kept itself wholly exempt. Even England did not exhibit at this period the only example of this kind. Justice, however, assuredly demands of us to remark, that it is much more difficult for a maritime and commercial state to determine the boundaries of its interests and its sphere of action, than it is for a continental one. Not only the direct, but, still more, the indirect points of contact are here so numerous, the calculation of how much damage may be inflicted on other powers by its fleets, is made on no determinate data, and is on that account in the highest degree indeterminate. The indirect damage is greater than the direct; and the state is so much misled by an exalted opinion of its own power, as to think itself still greater, and its own influence more decisive than it really is, and from its nature can be.

We have thus far traced the continental policy of England up to the period at which, by the great revolutions of Europe, not only the triple alliance last concluded was dissevered, but all political relations were at once violently rent asunder, and then forcibly joined together again by new ties, which, after such sanguinary conflicts, could not keep together the contracting parties for any length of time.

How, under such circumstances, could the former relations of England be maintained? It was not, however, merely a change in individual instances which they underwent, but the whole system of her continental policy

assumed a different form. On this account then it is necessary to pause here awhile in order to review some general results, for which the previous investigations will afford materials.

Our statements have shown that England was certainly involved in the affairs of the continent, sometimes more and sometimes less, without ever being entirely disengaged from them. But if we make some allowance for the period of the quadruple alliance under George I., England was very far from having ever been, or having ever claimed to be, the dominant power in the political system of Europe. The internal relations of this system were not in general determined by England, but England rather determined her own conduct by them. This was precisely the reason why the continental policy of England so seldom proceeded on solid principles. How far, however, this should be made a matter of reproach to the British cabinet, requires a close investigation. To settle permanently the reciprocal relations of the continental powers was throughout beyond the capacity of England. It would have been a foolish and vain presumption to attempt it. For this very reason then she could discover no durable and solid basis for her federative system, in respect to the choice of her allies. England was not, like France and Prussia, and other countries, surrounded by weaker states, which she might attach to herself by means of her preponderating influence; she was obliged to seek out allies for herself; and could not even make the ties which bound her to the most powerful of all, to Austria, indissoluble. England, from her position, can only have allies which are separated from her by the sea. If they are among the weaker states, such as Holland, Portugal, and Sardinia, they are from their very nature more likely to be under the influence of their immediate neighbours than hers; if they are among the more powerful, as Austria and Prussia, the connexion will only subsist so long as it afford some point of common interest. England therefore has not the power to construct a federative system as the powers of the continent have.

But though we cannot with justice cast any imputation on England for the change which she made in the choice of her allies, (if she erred in that, she committed political

errors, for which she would have to atone,)—the non-performance of engagements for which she had made herself responsible certainly exposes her to merited censure. In the three great continental wars in which England took part, the Spanish, the Austrian war of succession, and the seven years' war, she concluded every time a peace for herself, or only in connexion with Holland, and deserted her principal confederates. This conduct did not originate in any refined policy, systematically taken up, nor in a dereliction of public faith and confidence; but in the change of political principles, which, according to the general spirit of the British constitution, is almost inseparably connected with a change of ministry. In none of these cases did the minister who begun the war bring it to a close; his successor generally belonged to the opposite party, and therefore brought with him the opposite principles. The influence and power of the premier in England does not trench at all upon the personal character of the regent, as it does in unlimited monarchies; but emanates immediately from the spirit of the constitution, from the relation between the king and his parliament, between whom the minister is the connecting link. Without him therefore nothing of importance can be done. Hence arises what is certainly a most pernicious consequence in respect to foreign powers, that the British government cannot guarantee, with the same assurance as others, the performance of its obligation. The periods of Marlborough and Chatham exhibit a proof of this. But then, again, on the part of continental powers, physical impossibilities may occur, from extreme distress or total subjugation, to prevent the fulfilment of their engagements, a case which can scarcely be supposed to occur with respect to England.

Notwithstanding this one real defect, which attaches to the policy of England, her continental influence seems upon the whole, throughout this period, to have been highly beneficial in a twofold point of view. In the first place, Europe was indebted to it, during a considerable period, for the maintenance of peace. That this was the object of the British policy under George I., and continued to be so, as long as circumstances permitted, under George II., has been already shown. It was therefore any thing but a hostile

influence. In the second place, in the great wars in which England took part, she uniformly supported the weaker against the more powerful. She connected herself with Austria in the early wars, and in the later with Prussia, as these monarchies, one after the other, seemed threatened to be destroyed by confederated Europe. Both might possibly have saved themselves without the co-operation of England; but the merit of England must not, on that account, be depreciated. She materially contributed, perhaps in a greater degree than any other European power, to uphold the political balance of Europe.

SIXTH PERIOD.

PERIOD OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1788—1815.

We have still to consider the last period of the British continental policy, which, though not the most extensive, is unquestionably the most interesting, both as respects England herself, and the continent of Europe. In respect to England herself, because it is distinguished by the most remarkable development of her energies; in respect to the continent, because England became in it the centre and the only unshaken support of the still existing political system of Europe; and because she determined and influenced the politics of other cabinets much more decisively than she had ever done in any former period. Never has the truth of the observation with which we commenced this inquiry, "that it is a highly advantageous circumstance for the maintenance of the liberty and independence of a states-system, that one of its principal members should be an insular state and in possession of a naval force," been more strikingly demonstrated than in this period. If a bridge had been thrown across the Channel how totally different might have been the fate of England and of Europe! We certainly do not entertain the slightest doubt that England, even in this case, would have remained unconquered, or that the invasion of a French army would eventually have ended in its destruction; and simply because the warlike energies of the nation would in that case have been more generally roused and concentrated, and more resolutely displayed. But the destiny of the British state, at least, if not of the British people, is now so entirely identified with the

security of the capital, that the consequences of its capture, or even of its being exposed to any imminent danger of capture, are incalculable; and who will venture to assert, that in such a case its security would have remained unendangered, or that even a conquest, though perhaps only momentary, could have been averted, especially as to this point all the powers of the foe would have been undoubtedly directed.

The relations of England with the continent at the period of which we speak, were determined by a man, who, in the double capacity of first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer, directed the helm of the state as premier, and who enjoyed the full confidence of his sovereign—*William Pitt.*[1] When scarcely arrived at manhood—when only twenty-four years of age—he was raised to this exalted post, and had already held it six years when the French revolution broke out, which soon placed even England in a position that would not allow her to be a mere spectator. At this early period of his life this extraordinary man displayed not only wonderful talents and intelligence, but what was of much greater consequence, a maturity of understanding and judgment which seemed far beyond his years; and these qualifications were combined with an energy of character equally remarkable. Several of his contemporaries, his opponents and rivals, might possess more brilliant talents, but none could vie with him in clearness of intellect, in decision of purpose, and devotion to his country. He was a perfect statesman, in the noblest sense of the word; and what Plutarch says of Pericles, that

[1] William Pitt, the younger son of the Earl of Chatham, was born on the 28th of May, 1759. He was indebted for his early education to his father, and the subsequently appointed bishop of Winchester; and for his further tuition, especially in classical literature, philosophy, and eloquence, to Eton School and Cambridge. He entered the Lower House as early as his 22nd year, on the 23rd of Jan. 1781, as member for Appleby; and delivered his first speech on the 26th of February, on the better regulations of the civil list, by which he immediately excited general attention. He entered the ministry for the first time as early as July, 1782, under the Earl of Shelburne, as chancellor of the exchequer; but upon his retirement from office, March 14, 1783, he also resigned; until, after the dismissal of Lord North and Fox, Dec. 23, 1783, he was placed at the head of the administration, as first lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer, which distinguished post he retained till his voluntary resignation on the 9th of February, 1801; and resumed the second time from the 25th of May, 1804, until his death, 23rd of January, 1806.

he was only to be seen when going to the Senate House or returning from it, may with the strictest justice be applied to him. His policy it will be the object of the following inquiry to set forth. According to our professed design we are certainly principally concerned with his foreign policy; but this nevertheless stands so closely—so almost inseparably connected with his domestic administration, that we must be permitted at least to cast an occasional glance at that. Here, however, alas! we have too much occasion to regret the scantiness of our materials.[1] Of his public parliamentary career our information is sufficiently ample, but for all that relates to the whole internal mechanism of his financial administration, for all that relates to the manner in which Pitt conducted this, and especially for all that relates to the extraordinary simplification of the business of the treasury, his eminent services in which respect have acquired for him such imperishable fame, where can we find any accurate information? The account of his foreign policy, however, must be prefaced by one general observation. His conduct throughout was uniformly in accordance with his own conviction, and this is expressed in every one of his speeches in a manner not to be mistaken. According to this conviction *the summum bonum for England was the maintenance of her constitution.* This is therefore the hinge on which his whole domestic policy during that most eventful period revolves. But, in the maintenance of this constitution, which involved the condition of his whole sphere of action, he had in view merely the means for carrying on his foreign policy; and thus both stand in the closest reciprocal connexion.

When, in the year 1789, the opening of the assembly of the states-general ushered in the revolution, the attention of the minister was more engrossed with domestic than with foreign affairs. The relations of England with the continent

[1] Would it be believed, that in a country so rich in biography, the first of its statesmen has not yet met with a biographer in any degree worthy of him? According to the public organs of intelligence we may expect to have this desideratum supplied by his tutor and friend the aged bishop of Winchester; by which also it is hoped a clearer light will be diffused over the simplicity of his private life. The genuine portrait of this great man, in which the clearness, composure, and energy of this master spirit are so majestically expressed, is rarely to be met with on the continent; whilst most of our readers have perhaps seen it a hundred times in miserable caricatures. Even the collection of the speeches of the Right Hon. William Pitt, in 3 vols. London, 1808, is by no means complete; still it is one of our principal sources for what follows.

were decisively influenced by the affairs of Holland, which, as we have shown above, by the restoration of the stadtholdership, occasioned a close connexion not only with the house of Orange, but also with Prussia, who had effected this object by open force. The interference of England in the affairs of the North, which was a consequence of this, though a fruitless one, and the rupture with Russia which thereupon ensued, have been noticed above. In his domestic administration, after completing the new arrangements for the management of the affairs of the East India Company, in accordance with the bill passed in reference to them, the minister was chiefly occupied with his financial measures for the diminution of the national debt, and for the reduction of the interest of the 4 per cent. annuities to 3 per cent. Convinced that the regular payment of the interest upon the national debt was not sufficient for the maintenance of the national credit, but that it was necessary to think of paying off the principal, he had, three years before, by the institution of a sinking fund, thrown out an anchor which has since given assumed stability to its credit.[1] This great institution could scarcely begin to operate at that time; the contraction of new debts, which a new war rendered inevitable, could not therefore enter into the plan of the minister. The observation of a strict neutrality was consequently the policy adopted by the minister during the first and second so called Constituent and Legislative Assemblies; for however imperfect and exceptionable, in many respects, the first constitution might be, which Lewis XVI. accepted and pledged himself to, the British cabinet, nevertheless, abstained from any interference in the affairs of France. But when, indeed, during the session of the second national assembly, political principles of a totally different character were set forth, the throne subverted, the king with his family cast into prison; when, moreover, the National Convention, which next followed, abolished monarchy and sent the king to the scaffold, the relations of the two nations were disturbed; yet still no war ensued, though considerations arose which rendered other proceedings necessary.

The question now became one of intervention in the domestic affairs of a foreign state: a question which has always

[1] 26th of May, 1786.

had its difficulties, and was perhaps never embarrassed with greater than in the present instance. It was to be decided whether this intervention should be general, or to what extent it might be carried. It was a favourite assertion of the popular leader and popular writer of that time, that no foreign state ought to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state; and even now we hear it asserted, that such an interference is to be regarded as an attack upon its independence and self-existence. That assertion holds good, so long as it is applied to states which, by their geographical position and political relations, stand separated. When revolutions occur in China and North America, it would be preposterous to assert that France or Austria are authorized to interfere.

The case, however, is altogether different where states are intimately related to each other by geographical or political contact, by a common union, a confederacy, or a states-system, as is the case with the states of Europe. Here the domestic concerns of the one are by no means always indifferent to the other; and cases may occur in which interference may be inevitable. If we begin by taking a survey of the constitution of the different states, we shall find that with all their individual varieties, yet in the system, taken as a whole, either the monarchical or the republican principle is predominant. The transition from the one to the other in any of the leading members of the system, must necessarily, by its unavoidable influence upon the whole, excite just apprehensions among the others. Thus an interest is awakened which may certainly still remain unaccompanied by any active intervention. How intense, however, and how lively must this interest be, and how just the apprehension, when the principles promulgated in the other states are diametrically opposed to those which were formerly received, and altogether irreconcilable with them! Does no common interest here find a place? Would not therefore an active interference in such a case become just? Would not negotiations here be allowed? Would not the revolutionary state feel at liberty to reject these, with the contemptuous answer, that it would not allow of any foreign intervention? Then again, what if these principles are not only in their nature opposed to others, but at the same time their propagation

and practical introduction into other states shall be expressly determined upon, and loudly proclaimed? Does not the duty of self-preservation then step in? Will it not then be requisite even to take up arms in self-defence, and to combat those principles?

These cases occurred as soon as the French revolution took its proper direction. This was founded upon the sovereignty of the people; but *the sovereignty of the people stands in direct opposition to the monarchical principle.* Now only one sovereign can exist in a state, not two. Either the people are the sovereign, and then is the state a republic, or the monarch, whatever may be his title. If he ceases to be so, then he sinks directly to the level of a mere magistrate; whether he preserve the title of king or not. "It is," says Pitt, in one of those powerful speeches, from which I shall have frequent occasion to quote, (and what higher authority can be cited than that of such a statesman at the head of the freest of all monarchies?) "It is a gross perversion of the principles of all political society, to suppose that there exists continually, in every government, a sovereignty in abeyance (as it were) on the part of the people, ready to be called forth on every occasion, or rather, on every pretence, when it may suit the purposes of the party or faction who are the advocates of this doctrine, to suppose an occasion for its exertion. It is in those false principles that are contained the seeds of all the misery, desolation, and ruin, which in the present day have spread themselves over so large a portion of the habitable globe. I have said more upon this subject than I should have thought necessary, if I had not felt that this false and dangerous mockery of the sovereignty of the people is in truth one of the chief elements of Jacobinism, one of the favourite impostures to mislead the understanding, and to flatter and inflame the passions of the mass of mankind, who have not the opportunity of examining and exposing it, and that, as such, on every occasion and in every shape in which it appears, it ought to be combated and resisted by every friend to common order, and to the peace and happiness of mankind."[1]

But if this principle were directly opposed to the British constitution, a constitution which is a pre-eminent example

[1] *Speeches*, iii. p. 58, etc.

of a free monarchy, how much more was it incompatible with the constitutions of the principal states of the continent, which are either in the class of absolute monarchies without democratic influence, or at most belong to those in which the higher classes exercise in the state assembly only a certain, and for the most part very limited, share in the legislation. If in the case of the British state a reform in the constitution might possibly have been sufficient, (though even this is scarcely probable,) an entire change in the constitution of those other states must unavoidably have ensued, if the French principle prevailed. How just, therefore, were the apprehensions which every where arose! Who could determine how far a doctrine would spread, which at the same time flattered the people, and was set forth by its originators as that which alone was productive of happiness? But these apprehensions received a new and formidable increase by the decree of the Convention, 19th Nov. 1792, which offered assistance from France to all people, who, for the establishment of liberty, i. e. democracy, should rebel against their constituted authorities. Such a summons to a general insurrection is unparalleled in history, and if any indulged the flattering hope that such a decree would never be executed, it was crushed by the new decree of 17th Dec., which enjoined all the generals of the new republic to establish in those countries into which they should carry their arms, a democracy in place of the pre-existing constitutions.

Thus by this decree was the most sacred prerogative which nations possess, that by virtue of which they form a state, their constitution, threatened with annihilation. In their constitution was at the same time involved their independence, because the new constitution was prescribed to them. Can any thing more be required to justify the ruling authorities, if they refused what was attempted to be forced upon them; if they defended their rights; if they even took up arms in their defence?

The foregoing remarks apply to all governments; we now return to England, to whose policy our researches are confined.

Among the states which formed the first great confederacy against France, England was one of the last, and cannot therefore be regarded as the originator of that confederacy.

As long as Lewis XVI. sat on the throne, all interference in the French affairs was carefully avoided by the British government. The French ambassador, *Chauvelin*, remained as representative of his sovereign in London, and was recognised as such, as was also the British ambassador in Paris. Indeed, even when the unfortunate Lewis was torn from the throne and plunged with his family into prison, the sympathy of England confined itself to the private demands of her ambassador, whether he could contribute any thing to relieve the wants of the unfortunate prince. The public relations were not changed till after the execution of the royal martyr, and then without a war. The British ambassador was recalled, and the recognition of Baron Chauvelin, to whom the Convention had sent credentials, was withheld; he soon afterwards received orders to quit England.

These measures certainly not only expressed a just abhorrence, which the execution of the unfortunate monarch had excited, but they implied likewise a refusal to recognise the newly-constituted republic, and with it the avowal that England would not enter into political relations with it. Although the prospects were in consequence clouded, no hostilities immediately ensued. It is of great importance for the practical purposes of politics, to have a clear understanding, that the provisional breaking off of relations between states does not amount to a declaration of war. Negotiations between two states presuppose in both a regular system of government. How can a government negotiate with a state which itself acknowledges that it is occupied in effecting a revolution, and wishes first to give itself a new constitution, and at the same time a different government.

Other causes, however, soon concurred to render the participation of England in the war unavoidable. Notwithstanding their disavowal of any intention of aggrandizement, the new republic not only assumed the character of a conqueror, but even scoffed at the laws of nations, which had been hitherto recognised, by immediately appropriating to herself the provinces of Avignon and Savoy, which had been taken from the pope and king of Sardinia. But that which more nearly concerned England was *the invasion of the Austrian Netherlands*, which followed in the autumn, 1792. These provinces formed, as we observed above, the bridge

which connected England with the continent, and above all with Austria. The partial suspension of the embargo upon the navigation of the Scheldt, which rested on the faith of treaties, was a new specimen of the republican code of international law. But that which must have most disturbed the tranquillity of England under the circumstances of those times, was the danger with which the Republic menaced the United Netherlands. At the head of this state stood the house of Orange, which had been for five years past reinstated in its privileges; with this house England, in conjunction with Prussia, had concluded the triple alliance, and in the same had guaranteed to it its prerogatives. It was precisely against this very house, that the attacks of France, in her desire to conciliate or maintain the support of the popular party, were directed. Could a war under such circumstances be avoided? Yet the war was not declared by England, but by France. The 1st Feb., 1793, was the day on which a declaration of war was issued at the same time against England and the stadtholder.

"What was," says Pitt, in one of his early speeches, "the state of this country with respect to France, previous to the declaration of war on her part? We then contended, first, that she had broken a treaty with our allies, which we were bound to support: secondly, That she had engaged in schemes of ambition and aggrandizement, inconsistent with the interests of this country and the general security of Europe: thirdly, That she had entertained principles hostile to all governments, and more particularly to our own. In consequence of all these circumstances, you then declared, in addresses to his Majesty, that if proper satisfaction was not obtained, a war must be the consequence. But while this was in agitation, they had themselves declared war, and been guilty of a sudden and unprovoked aggression upon this country."

"Acts of hostility," says the minister, upon a later occasion, "had been openly threatened against our allies; an hostility founded upon the assumption of a right which would at once supersede the whole law of nations: a demand was made by France upon Holland, to open the navigation of the Scheldt, on the ground of a general and national right, in violation of positive treaty; this claim we

discussed, at the time, not so much on account of its immediate importance, (though it was important both in a maritime and commercial view,) as on account of the general principle on which it was founded. On the same arbitrary notion they soon afterwards discovered that sacred law of nature, which made the Rhine and the Alps the legitimate boundaries of France, and assumed the power, which they have affected to exercise through the whole of the revolution, of superseding, by a new code of their own, all the recognised principles of the law of nations. They were actually advancing towards the republic of Holland by rapid strides, after the victory of Jemappe; they had ordered their generals to pursue the Austrian troops into any neutral country; thereby explicitly avowing an intention of invading Holland. They had already shown their moderation and self-denial, by incorporating Belgium with the French republic. These lovers of peace, who set out with a sworn aversion to conquest, and professions of respect for the independence of other nations; who pretend that they departed from this system only in consequence of your aggression, themselves in time of peace, while you were still confessedly neutral, without the pretence or shadow of provocation, wrested Savoy from the king of Sardinia, and had proceeded to incorporate it likewise with France. These were their aggressions at this period; and more than these. They had issued a universal declaration of war against all the thrones of Europe; and they had by their conduct, applied it particularly and specifically to you; they had passed the decree of the 19th February, 1792, proclaiming the promise of French succour to all nations who should manifest a wish to become free: they had by all their language, as well as their example, shown what they understood to be freedom; they had sealed their principles by the deposition of their sovereign; they had applied them to England, by inviting and encouraging the addresses of those seditious and traitorous societies, who, from the beginning, favoured their views, and who, encouraged by your forbearance, were even then publicly avowing French doctrines, and anticipating their success in this country; who were hailing the progress of those proceedings in France, which led to the murder of its king: they were even then looking to the day

when they should behold a National Convention in England, formed upon similar principles."[1]

After this, the frequently contested question, *who was the originator of the war*, requires no further investigation.[2] Even if France had not first declared it, she would notwithstanding have been the aggressor; for this charge attaches to those who desire war without provocation.[3] Thus then England enrolled herself amongst the belligerent powers. It is necessary to cast a glance at her position at that time with regard to the continent.

Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, and some of the German states, and soon after the whole empire, were already, at this period, in a state of war with France. It was easy at the same time to foresee that other states would take up arms, partly in self-defence, partly, as was the case with Spain, from indignation at the execution of the king. But at this critical juncture, the system of standing armies had been carried on by the principal states of the continent to a degree which was no longer consistent with their resources. These scarcely sufficed to keep the great mass of stipendiary forces from mutiny. The extraordinary expenses of the war exceeded the resources of the states, and rendered it impossible to employ the whole force which they had under arms. England, in respect to naval power, might with good reason calculate upon vanquishing and possibly annihilating the fleets of France; and thus pave the way for the conquest of her colonies. But, however alluring these prospects might be, she could not flatter herself with the hope of thus bringing the war to a termination. Those conquests, however well they might have succeeded, could only, as Pitt himself expresses it,[4] have a collateral influence. France at that period, besides having been already by her own fault deprived of her most valuable colony, St. Domingo, did not attach so much importance to the rest, as would have been the case in earlier

[1] Pitt's *Speeches*, iii. p. 97.

[2] A work, expressly on this subject, appeared from the pen of an Englishman, *Herbert Marsh*, upon the causes of the war between England and France. Leipsig, 1796.

[3] Which party, whether the Girondists, as is asserted, or the violent Jacobin party, made the declaration of war, is of no importance in the solution of this question. And can it be supposed that the last were deterred by any other motive than because the time did not seem opportune?

[4] *Speeches*, l. c.

times. The contest must be decided by a land, and not by a naval force, and the formation of a league with the continental powers was the natural consequence. A series of alliances, from Portugal to Russia, followed in the same year, 1793. In order to estimate these, and to form an opinion of the general conduct of Pitt, we must place ourselves in his position. England certainly was in a certain sense the centre of the first league against France; but this league remained to a certain degree ineffectual: it was not in the power of the British minister to direct the energies of the allies at his discretion. It was ineffectual with respect to a leading power, Russia. Although Catharine II., as early as March 25, 1793, surpassed all the others in her eagerness to conclude an alliance with England; although she declared herself in a state of war with France; although her voice predominated above all, she still, in spite of all this, did least of any. Her views were directed to other objects; first, to the renewal of the advantageous commercial treaty with England of the year 1766; secondly, and above all, to the carrying into execution her new and unjust design of a partition of the too unhappy Poland, which was effected in this very summer. Thus the certainty of not having Russia for an antagonist was the only advantage which England derived from this connexion. Among the other continental powers, Austria and Prussia were naturally those with which the first and strongest connexions were formed; after these, came Spain, Sardinia, Portugal, and some smaller states. Most of these states were in the situation which we have already alluded to, their finances were greatly disproportioned to their military force. The natural consequence was that they sought assistance, where alone they could find it, in Great Britain. Thus not only was the subsidy-system of earlier times renewed, but carried to a much greater extent than it had been before. The war was for the most part carried on at the expense of England. During the eight years which elapsed between 1793 and Pitt's retirement from the ministry, loans to the amount of twenty-three millions sterling had been on the average yearly advanced by the minister. The British ministry was certainly, on this account, allowed to exercise a great influence in the conduct of the war; yet never so decisive a one as to have the

direction of it entirely in their own hands. The plan of every campaign had to be jointly concerted; the continental powers moreover had each naturally their several interests to be regarded. A mere minister of state is not capable, as such, of being unconditionally the soul of a large confederacy. It is only when the statesman and general are combined, as in Marlborough and William III., that this can occur. The wish of the minister was to arm, if possible, all Europe against France. But it was not in his power to accomplish this on a systematic plan, much less to give a permanent and systematic direction to the confederacy.

We must bear this in mind while considering the campaigns of 1793 and 1794. The first was successful. In consequence of the battle of Neerwinden, the French armies were compelled to evacuate Belgium. This gave England an opportunity of taking an active part in the war on the continent. An English-Hanoverian army united itself with the Austrian in the Netherlands, and these provinces became again what they had often been before, the bridge between two allied powers. Even the republic of the United Netherlands, now covered by the allied armies, appeared as a participator in the common field of battle. But the posture of affairs underwent a change in the following year. The system of terrorism established in France, which left security only in the armies, drove every one to arms capable of bearing them. Her preponderating power, and the new system of warfare which spared no men, decided the question: in the autumn of 1794, Belgium was again in the hands of the French. More severe reverses were soon to follow. An intense frost covered the rivers, the natural bulwarks of Holland, with a sheet of ice. The defence of the republic was impossible. The house of Orange fled to England; and the *patriot party* in expectation of a golden futurity received their new friends with open arms.[1]

This conquest of the republic had a double effect on the continental policy of England. In the first place it put an end to the direct participation of England in the war on the continent, inasmuch as she had now no field of action on which her armies could enter. Henceforward therefore she was obliged to confine her participation in the continental

[1] In January, 1795.

war to the advice and support which she gave her confederates. A second consequence was the commencement of a dissolution of the league, since one of its members had not only seceded from it, but had even gone over to the enemy. But this first separation was only the precursor of one still greater, to which, in some measure, it contributed. By the summer of 1795, England had lost two of her principal allies, Prussia and Spain.

The secession of Prussia must no doubt be chiefly attributed to financial embarrassments, which the subsidies of England could not relieve, as the main cause lay in the prodigality of its financial administration. But it is no less certain that false political principles had also a material influence upon her. An idea had existed from the early part of the reign of Frederic II., that Prussia and France were natural allies, an idea which France upon every opportunity endeavoured to revive. This idea, however, was manifestly grounded on the earlier relations in which France and Austria at one time, and Prussia and Austria at another, respectively stood towards each other. So long as the rivalry lasted between France and Austria, Prussia was for France the most advantageous ally; and after Prussia, by the conquest of Silesia, had entered the field as the antagonist of Austria, France was certainly so for Prussia. How Frederic II. availed himself of this has been shown above. This connexion rested solely on political relations, which were in their very nature mutable, and which had actually changed, since Austria and Prussia had become friends, and even allies; from the time that Austria had ceased to be annoyed at the loss of Silesia, Prussia could no longer be called the natural friend of France. But it is a phenomenon of frequent occurrence in politics, that political feelings are frequently called into play, even after the circumstances which gave them birth have ceased. Again, by the conquest of Holland, the position of Prussia in respect to the war was geographically changed. Her western provinces, protected by few fortresses, lay open to every assault. But that which operated most powerfully was, the brilliant prospects which France displayed before her, of future aggrandizement, in the shape of indemnifications; as the limited possessions of Prussia on this side the Rhine remained, from the peace of

Basle till the conclusion of the general peace, in the hands of France. Thus England lost one of her principal allies on the continent, though not by any fault of her own; for Pitt still continued to advance subsidies, even when a zealous co-operation in the war could no longer be expected. Prussia now adopted a system of neutrality; to which Hanover and the other provinces of Northern Germany acceded.

In the course of the summer, Spain also withdrew from the league; the peace which she concluded at Basle placing her in the condition of a neutral state. Her participation in the war had been founded less on political than on family motives. The Bourbons who were seated on the Spanish throne, regarded the ignominious fate of their house as an insult offered to themselves. But their animosity had gradually subsided, or they thought they had been sufficiently avenged; greater facilities too were here offered for peace, inasmuch as, at least in Europe, no claim had been made to conquest on either side. The cession of her share of St. Domingo to France was, properly, only the fulfilment of an ancient treaty, in which Spain had engaged to resign this possession in return for another held by France—Louisiana.

Thus was the first great confederacy, or as it was then usually expressed, the first *coalition* against France dissolved. Its dissolution cannot be considered otherwise than calamitous, because the object of the war had not been as yet attained. The articles of the peace of Basle were even concluded with the National Convention, which, in spite of all its protestations, could not be supposed to have renounced its revolutionary principles. Thus, too, was exhibited the first example, that England was by no means capable of holding together the league which she had formed. Still, after all, the league was not altogether broken asunder; Austria, the most powerful ally of England on the continent, still remained, and by her successful operations on the Rhine, reanimated her courage. Besides Austria she had also remaining South Germany, Bavaria and its other states. In Italy she had also remaining Sardinia, which from the fortresses of Piedmont was the key of that country. She had also Naples, valuable for her sea-ports. In the west of Europe, she had still left Portugal, whose political relations were determined by her commercial connexions. So long,

therefore, as the war lasted, it might naturally be expected she would earnestly exert herself to draw more closely together the ties which connected her with the other allies. As early as the 18th Feb. of this year, 1795, a new defensive alliance was concluded with Catharine II., with reciprocal guarantees of possessions held by either party, which, like the first, was unproductive of any material consequences; on the 20th May, a contract with Austria: these two were the foundations of the triple alliance, concluded on the 28th September; the conditions of which have not been made known to the public. A new loan was granted to Austria in the same year.

The renewal of the connexion with Russia happened in the same year in which Catharine consummated her designs against Poland, by a third and final partition. England abstained from any active interference in these proceedings. Pitt, in his negotiations respecting the treaty of Russia with Turkey, had experienced how hazardous it was to interfere with the designs of Catharine. Whether the British cabinet would have manifested this passive spirit in more tranquil times, may admit of doubt; that resistance, under the existing circumstances, would have disturbed the good understanding with her allies, and perhaps, if it had been energetic, would have led to a war with Russia, is as evident, as it is improbable that any resistance could have prevented the dismemberment. Nevertheless, the opposition in parliament did not neglect to avail themselves of this ground for assailing the minister. He answered them briefly in his speech of May 10, 1796, in reply to Mr. Fox.[1] "Are ministers to be blamed," said he, "for not doing what it would be hazardous in them to attempt? and would it not be hazardous to propose a mediation where both parties were not ready to agree? To have erected ourselves into arbiters, could only expose us to difficulties and disputes, if we were determined, as we ought to be, to enforce that mediation on the parties who refused to admit it. And what is the great use which the honourable gentleman seems to be so eager to derive

[1] *Speeches*, vol. ii. p. 169. It is a part of the ordinary tactics of the opposition to embarrass ministers by reproaches for having suffered this or that to happen in Europe. The most recent events of history afford evidence of this. The reproaches would have been without doubt much more violent in the opposite case.

from that peace, if so procured? Is it fit that we should go to war in order to prevent the partition of Poland? In general policy I am ready to confess that this partition is unjust; but it does not go, as is said, to overturn the balance of power in Europe, for which the right honourable gentleman, as it suits his argument, expresses greater or less solicitude; for that country being nearly divided equally between three great powers, it can little contribute to the undue aggrandizement of either."

It was not compatible with the plan of the minister at this time to take up this subject on the different and higher grounds, which easily and spontaneously suggest themselves.

The whole energies of England were thus left to be directed against France, who in this same year obtained a great accession of power by drawing Spain from her neutral position to become her active ally. This she effected by the alliance-compact of August 10, 1796, by which the weaker state completely identified her fortunes with the more powerful, and which necessarily paved the way for its subsequent fate. This connexion became immediately of importance to France, inasmuch as it drew into her interest a naval power whose fleet she might expect in some measure would repair the loss of her own. Experience has shown how vain this hope was. The war with Spain necessarily became a maritime one; and, as formerly happened on the invasion of the United Netherlands, materially contributed to procure for England that sovereign command of the sea, which became afterwards the subject of so many complaints and reproaches. A war with Spain was besides generally very popular in England, and particularly wished for by the British navy, since it promised a rich booty to privateers as well as to ships of the line.

As long therefore as Russia remained inactive, Austria continued to be the principal ally of England, and at the same time the principal foe which France had to encounter on the continent. If Austria were conquered or forced to make peace, the weaker allies must follow of course. The great object of the French government, which had been for a short time in the hands of the Directory,[1] was to accom-

[1] In October, 1795, after the completion of the new constitution and the

plish this object. Three armies were to make an attempt on three different points to force a way into the heart of this monarchy in the summer of 1796, in order, if possible, to dictate peace in the capital itself. One proceeding from the Lower Rhine under General Jourdan, was to penetrate through Franconia; a second under General Moreau, through Swabia and Bavaria; while another under the new general-in-chief, Buonaparte, drove back the Austrian force in Lombardy. The unsuccessful issue of this plan is well known. Austria found in her own imperial house (a discovery of inestimable importance for her cause) the general and hero who held her enemies at bay. Jourdan, defeated at Amberg and Würsburg, hastened back across the Rhine with the relics of his army; Moreau was also obliged to make a retreat. These victories, however, had no effect on Italy. There the commander-in-chief, relying solely upon himself, pursued his own course undisturbed. While those events were taking place in Germany, he completely established the influence of France in Italy; and this country, which had been hitherto only a subordinate seat of the war, was made by him the theatre of its great operations. Here Austria, and with her, England, had a train of allies, among whom Sardinia was in every respect pre-eminent. Her territories are, by their position and their fortresses, the key of Italy. The first object, therefore, of the new generalissimo was to dissever this connexion, and to force Sardinia into a separate treaty. A few weeks sufficed for the execution of this project. By the 17th May, 1796, Victor Amadeus saw himself compelled to sign a peace, by which he not only renounced Savoy and Nice, but even received French garrisons into his principal fortresses. Thus England lost one of her allies, who had formed for the last hundred years an important link in the chain of her continental relations, and Austria a friend who had never been of greater importance to her than at the present crisis. They were now both obliged to depend on their own resources, for no dependence could any longer be placed on the other states of Italy, which were well satisfied if they could obtain by negotiation or purchase an armistice or a peace. Austria might now expect to be

dissolution of the National Convention, the Directory, consisting of five members, was established.

attacked in a new quarter, and to see, in the event of her main fortress, Mantua, falling, the French armies in her southern provinces, that being the only impediment to the advance of the enemy. It was invested in July, and no wonder she strained every nerve to save it. Three armies were raised, vanquished, again raised, and after all to no purpose! Mantua, on the 2nd of Feb. of the ensuing year, opened her gates to the conqueror; the rest of Italy had already obtained peace either by submission or negotiation, and an entrance was opened into Carinthia and Carniola, as well as into the south of the Tyrol; it seemed indeed questionable whether the progress of the warrior, who had penetrated into the heart of the state, could be arrested. Napoleon himself was not insensible to the hazard of his situation; but the new system of politics afforded him a resource, by making an amicable arrangement at the expense of a neutral state. The preliminaries at Leoben on the 18th April, which were afterwards transformed with some important alterations into a definitive treaty on the 17th October, at Campo Formio, restored peace to the continent—the republic of Venice being made the sacrifice.

We shall only consider this peace in relation to England. There was certainly nothing concluded in it which immediately affected this country, but as the English coalition now ceased of itself, the renewal of it was evidently rendered more difficult in future, as Austria, by this peace, in consideration of the indemnification which she obtained, in a large share in the Venetian territory, resigned her portion of the Netherlands in favour of France; the great importance of which, in the mutual relation of both powers, has been clearly demonstrated above. The occupation of the Græco-Venetian islands, which those treaties ceded to France, was another, by no means unimportant, consequence of that peace to England, since they were likely to affect her relations in the Mediterranean and with the Porte.

Thus the great confederation against France was completely dissolved, and at the end of the year 1797, England stood alone, unsupported by any allies on the continent (with the exception perhaps of Portugal[1]) against France and her allies. It now became a great and important ques-

[1] With Portugal also France had concluded a peace on the 20th of August;

tion, *whether she should continue the war or conclude a peace?* The opposition lost no opportunity of inveighing against the ministers on account of the continuance of the war.—"That it was a war without an object. That they combated principles which ought not to be combated with arms. That they were willing to make no peace with the republic of France; that they aimed at the restoration of the monarchy, or even of the ancient régime, which could not be effected. What had been hitherto achieved by the war? France was now much more powerful than before the conflict, and there was no hope of being able to reduce her to her ancient boundaries." Such was the language delivered on every opportunity by Fox, by Sheridan, and other leaders of the opposition.

That the British cabinet was not decidedly indisposed to peace, its proceedings had already evinced. In October, 1795, a new government had been established in France, that of the *Directory*. It must be allowed that nothing could then be done till experience had determined by what spirit this new body was animated—whether the revolutionary principles of the conventional government, which had made way for it, had descended upon it, or whether neighbouring states might now dwell near it in security and peace. But, however this might be, it was still a government, and as such, whatever well-grounded apprehensions might at first be entertained, it was the highest and only recognised authority with which the British ministers could treat. However faint might be their hopes respecting the final result, a door of communication seemed now opened, and they might, at least, ascertain at what price peace could be purchased. England had already made two attempts at negotiation, and she now made a third by sending over Lord Malmsbury as ambassador. His first attempt, made at Paris, (Sept.—Dec. 1796,) failed; what hopes could be entertained from the beginning of the final result, where the parties, instead of proceeding heartily and with good faith, began by insisting upon an *ultimatum?* It was, nevertheless, renewed at Lille, (July—Sept. 1797, during the negotiations for peace between France and Austria,) at first with a better prospect

which, however, after the suspension of negotiations with England, had been again formally retracted on the 26th October.

of success, as a party of the Directory anxiously wished for peace; but this party being overpowered by the majority and forcibly driven from office, it again fell to the ground; and, just as the negotiations with Austria were approaching a pacific termination, the British ambassador received orders to quit France, and England was left alone to struggle with the enemy.

Now again the reiterated attacks of the opposition, the loud demands Why he still continued the war? When he hoped to conclude a peace? again compelled Pitt to explain his views of the subject. He spoke them boldly and distinctly. However desirable the restoration of the monarchy in France might be, (no one at this time ventured even to think of the reinstatement of the Bourbons,) it was not insisted upon as an absolute condition; much less the entire restoration of the ancient form of government. Even with France as a republic peace might possibly be concluded, provided that it could be a secure peace. But since the politics of the Directory clearly showed that it had adopted the revolutionary principles in all their force, Pitt resolutely adhered to his principle: better no peace than an insecure one! "I have never believed," said he,[1] "that we could not treat with France as a republic. Whatever I may, in the abstract, think of the kind of government called a republic, whatever may be its fitness to the nation where it prevails, there may be times when it would not be dangerous to exist in its vicinity. But while the spirit of France remains what at present it is, its government despotic, vindictive, unjust, with a temper untamed, a character unchanged, if its power to do wrong at all remains, there does not exist any security for this country or Europe. In my view of security, every object of ambition and aggrandizement is abandoned. Our simple object is security, just security, with a little mixture of indemnification. These are the legitimate objects of war at all times; and when we have attained that end, we are in a condition to derive from peace its beneficent advantages; but until then, our duty and our interest require that we should persevere unappalled in the struggle to which we were provoked. We shall not be satisfied with a false security. War with all its

[1] Speeches, iii. p. 85.

evils is better than a peace in which there is nothing to be seen but usurpation and injustice, dwelling with savage delight on the humble, prostrate condition of some timid, suppliant people. We are not in arms against the opinions of the closet, nor the speculations of the schools. We are at war with armed opinions; we are at war with those opinions which the sword of audacious, unprincipled, and impious innovation seeks to propagate amidst the ruin of empires, the demolition of the altars of all religion, the destruction of every venerable, and good, and liberal institution, under whatever form of polity they have been raised; and this, in spite of the dissenting reason of men, in contempt of that lawful authority which, in the settled order, superior talents and superior virtues attain, crying out to them not to enter on holy ground, nor to pollute the stream of eternal justice. If it be asked whether I am determined to continue the war till the republic be overthrown? I answer, I do not confine my views to the territorial limits of France; I contemplate the principles, character, and conduct of France; I consider what these are; I see in them the issues of distraction, of infamy, and ruin, to every state in her alliance; and therefore I say, that until the aspect of that mighty mass of iniquity and folly is entirely changed; until the character of the government is totally reversed; until, by the common consent of the general voice of all men, I can with truth tell parliament, France is no longer terrible for her contempt of the rights of every other nation—she no longer avows schemes of universal empire—she has settled into a state whose government can maintain those relations in their integrity, in which alone civilized communities are to find their security, and from which they are to derive their distinction and their glory;—until in the situation of France we have exhibited to us those features of a wise, a just, and a liberal policy, I cannot treat with her."

The Directory itself soon realized the views of the British minister. The scandalous proceedings at the congress of Rastadt; the contumacious bearing of the French ambassadors; the seizure of Ehrenbreitstein in the midst of the peace; above all, the surreptitious attack upon Switzerland, and the treatment she received, afforded stronger evidence than the case required. Meanwhile England stood alone on

the field of battle; the question was, how and where she should be assailed? The earlier attempts on the West Indies and Ireland had failed;—*the Egyptian expedition* followed.

We propose to consider this extraordinary and remarkable enterprise only in one aspect, as to the influence which it had and must have upon the British continental policy. It soon assumed a greater and more comprehensive form than might have been expected from the nature of the expedition.

The object of this enterprise being the colonization of the fertile plains of Egypt, the result which France expected from it was, properly speaking, the acquisition of an important colonial possession, which might not only compensate the loss of the West Indian islands, but by the altered direction which it gave to the whole colonial system, might injure the British colonies in the West Indies; and perhaps even operate upon the relations in the East Indies. How far these projects were feasible or not, may be reserved for a distinct inquiry. It is enough that the apprehensions which they excited took such deep root in England, that the principle was firmly embraced not to lay down the sword until that plan was frustrated,—until Egypt was wrested from the French.

Certainly this war appeared, by the distance of its scene from Europe, to have no connexion with the British continental policy; indeed from its engaging so entirely the attention and energies of Great Britain in a different part of the world, it rather seemed to produce a relaxation in the continental relations. The contrary, however, was the result. The Egyptian expedition became one of the principal means of bringing about the second great confederacy or coalition against France, which was directed by England—and of which it remained the centre in an equal if not in a still higher degree than it had been in that confederacy which had been dissolved.

The expedition to Egypt thus became so pregnant with consequences and so momentous in relation to the British continental policy, that not only were the ancient cords for the most part re-knit together again, but new ones were likewise added. Amongst these must be enumerated as more particularly important, *the connexion with the Porte.* The storm which raged in the west of Europe had not yet reached this state. Its position, its relations, and its often

blissful ignorance, had allowed it to remain neutral. It had been for two centuries and a half the ally of France, without however taking part in her wars. England had had little connexion with it. She had wished perhaps, though in vain, to take an interest in its affairs before the conclusion of the last peace; but in this she was not actuated so much by a tender solicitude for the Porte, as by jealousy on account of the growing power of Russia. But now relations had changed;—Egypt belonged to the Porte; which now also discovered by experience that no public law afforded any protection against the political code of the revolution. Its oldest friend despoiled it, without any provocation, of one of its best provinces; and though this proceeding might be inexplicable to them, they were quite sensible that an insult had been offered them, which a semibarbarous people is of all others usually least disposed to brook. The means for gaining the divan failed; their voice was raised for war; and under these circumstances it could not be difficult for the British cabinet, when war was declared, to find in her an ally. Both expectations proceeded rapidly to their fulfilment. As early as the 12th Sept. the Porte issued a declaration of war against France, and by the 5th of January, 1799, a league was concluded, by which was stipulated mutual assistance, their harbours were closed against the French vessels, and they engaged not to make peace except with mutual consent, and guaranteed to each other their possessions. The alliance of the Porte differed only in one respect from that of the other powers with England. The Porte was the only power which received no subsidies, nor even desired them. This connexion was for England, not only of the highest importance in regard to her immediate object and the present war, but it opened to her a new and dazzling prospect of the fortresses in the Mediterranean and the trade in the Levant, which had been hitherto in the hands of the French and Dutch; but if it once passed into hers, it would not be so easy to wrest it back from her. The sequel has shown how these expectations were realized; it was written in the book of fate that the fruits of the expedition to Egypt, if we except its literary advantages, should not be reaped by France, but by England. The importance of this new continental connexion is sufficiently obvious.

But the expedition to Egypt was of service to the British continental policy in another respect. At the time it was set on foot, the spirit and courage of the continental powers were at a low ebb. The haughty tone assumed by the French plenipotentiaries at Rastadt had dispirited and humiliated, as well as exasperated them. A new war was considered inevitable; but all seemed afraid to strike the first blow. Exactly at this crisis, and in this disposition of affairs, the glorious victory of the Nile was achieved by Nelson.[1] This however did not immediately affect the relations of the continental powers, though it had an indirect influence upon them. This humiliation of the haughty raised the courage of the oppressed; their confidence in England was revived; her exhortations and offers were listened to with more attention, and what perhaps is almost without a parallel in history, the effects of this victory were much greater in a moral than in a military point of view. The relations of France with Austria were already greatly disturbed. A new war was felt at Vienna to be inevitable. That country was only looking about for allies; negotiations with Russia had already been quietly going on during the interval of repose; it could not therefore be difficult for England to find an opening. It was still more easy at Naples, where the personal influence of the ambassador, or rather of his consort, Lady Hamilton, determined the queen, and through her the court, and even excited them to a precipitate rupture, the consequences of which were the occupation of Naples and the flight of the king and the court to Sicily.

But a new connecting link in the chain of British continental policy was formed in Russia. The connexions with Catharine, as well as their inefficacy, have been noticed above. She had retired from the stage,[2] and had made room for her son and successor Paul. This period is not only highly interesting as respects the British continental policy, but to the whole state-system of Europe. With it commences *the active participation of Russia in the affairs of the West*, which Catharine had always studiously avoided. And it might be foreseen that this could not easily be again withdrawn, whatever change might take place in the character and policy of the reigning prince. A power of the

[1] August 1st, 1798. [2] Nov. 16th, 1796.

first order, having once adopted an active participation, cannot easily stand aloof, for any considerable time, even if she wished it, which it is almost absurd to suppose she could do. The Egyptian expedition however had an essential influence in bringing about the co-operation of Russia. The capture of Malta by the French, having wrested this island from its ancient possessors, the knights of the order of St. John, and threatened their order with extermination, imposed on them the necessity of seeking a powerful protector. This they hoped to find in the emperor Paul, whom they chose for their grand master, and thus drew over to their interests one of the most powerful princes of Europe, who, flattered by the compliment, accepted their offer. The personal character of this prince, who always prosecuted his wishes with vehemence, and the desire he now showed to draw into a league the whole of Europe, and who indeed concluded alliances with Austria, England, (who consented to subsidies,) Naples, Portugal, and even with the old hereditary enemy of Russia, the Porte, removed every obstacle.

These were the elements of *the great confederacy* against France. If we measure it solely by the extent and population of the allied states, it was more powerful than the first. But the *neutrality* which *Prussia* maintained, and with her Northern Germany, left a great chasm which could not be filled up. It was not merely the want of the military force of Prussia which caused this chasm to be sensibly felt, but rather the geographical position of this state. The half of France, the whole northern half of it, according to its line of frontier at that time, was covered by this neutrality; and when after the successful progress of the allied armies, an attack upon the southern half was not impossible, it was obvious how difficult this must be rendered if France could concentrate all her forces here for resistance.

England thus again united the links of her continental policy by this second confederacy, as far as circumstances permitted. She concluded an alliance with Austria, Russia, Naples, and with the Porte. Circumstances did not admit of its being extended to Prussia, or to Sardinia; since, immediately on the breaking out of the war with Naples, the Directory availed itself of that crisis for robbing its proper ally, without the least pretext, of all its possessions on the

continent, and for banishing it to Sardinia. England was, it is true, by her subsidies, in a certain sense the centre of this second confederacy; but yet in a less degree than of the first. She was less capable of keeping it together. The Porte received no subsidies. It might be foreseen that its object went no further than the recovery of Egypt. Russia, though she received subsidies, was yet by her position and power virtually independent. But the greatest apprehensions were founded upon the personal character of its sovereign; whose policy was rather influenced by caprice and momentary impressions, than built on any firm principles. But all these things lay beyond the control of the British minister. Whatever expectations he might have formed of this confederacy, he could not conceal from himself the fact that it was but feebly held together. The first result, however, seemed almost to surpass their expectations. They had the good fortune to find great generals; in Southern Germany the Archduke *Charles* was victorious, in Italy the redoubted *Suwarrow*. Still further, in the course of the summer the French armies were driven back across the Rhine and the Alps; Switzerland was left only half occupied by their troops.

But the year was not to end without the sky which had thus brightened up becoming again overcast; and the germs of dissolution already developed themselves in the confederacy. The apprehensions which the capricious policy of the Russian sovereign necessarily excited were too soon to be realized. What it was which disturbed the relations with Austria, whether the disasters in Switzerland, or the occupation of Piedmont, without its being immediately restored to its legitimate king, has not been cleared up; those with England were deranged by the ill-combined and ill-conducted enterprise against the north of Holland;[1] which afforded the strongest proof that without the co-operation of Prussia no effective attack upon France could be made from the north. Paul I. withdrew from the confederacy, and it was not long before there were reasons to apprehend that he would go over to the other side.

The great alteration of affairs in consequence of the overthrow of the Directorial government and the elevation of

[1] Aug. and Sept. 1799.

General Buonaparte, after his return from Egypt, to the post of first consul, or regent of the French state, could not immediately exercise any considerable influence on the continental relations of England. The peace which he offered to England in a letter to the king, altogether at variance with the customary forms of diplomacy, clearly could not be brought about, for this reason, because it was scarcely credible that the proposal made in this manner was seriously meant. The relations of England with Russia were virtually dissolved; those with the Porte had only reference to Egypt; those with Austria and the states of Southern Germany were all, as far as regards the continent of Europe, she could reckon upon. But even these were destined to be torn from her by the campaign of 1800. The battle of Marengo restored the ascendency of France in Italy; the advance of Moreau through Suabia and Bavaria, and last of all his victory at Hohenlinden, opened a passage to the Austrian provinces. Austria saw herself driven to negotiations, which brought on the peace at Luneville, and the breaking off of her connexions with England, which, without this, would have naturally followed, was made a preliminary condition of this treaty.[1]

Thus with the exception of the Porte and Portugal, this second confederacy against France was also dissolved; and England for the second time stood almost alone: unconquered to be sure as formerly, as inaccessible to assault as ever, and with the confident expectation that the liberation of Egypt would sooner or later be effected, of which, indeed, the capture of Malta, compelled by famine to surrender,[2] seemed to afford her a pledge. But the implacable hatred and indefatigable policy of her adversary found means to set new enemies upon her; and to raise a new storm, of which the altered relations with Russia formed the materials. A league of the northern powers against England was now effected.

The notion of the armed neutrality, which Catharine had originated, was not extinct. It was in the nature of things that so long as peace continued, during which there were no enemies, and therefore no neutrals, it should slumber,

[1] England exempted Austria herself from her engagements Dec. 31, 1800; which, according to the last subsidy and alliance-treaty, June 20, 1800, would have continued to the end of February, 1801. [2] Sept. 1801.

because it admitted of no practical application. But it was obvious that it would not be neglected in new wars, in which circumstances should favour a revival of the scheme.

England had certainly given occasion for its restoration: not only were the old subjects of controversy renewed, they were even multiplied and augmented. The meaning of contraband was extended to a degree unheard of before; even corn and provisions were reckoned as such, in the vain hope that France might be reduced to submission by famine. One of the favourite ideas of Pitt was to ruin the commerce, and above all, the maritime commerce, of France, because he fancied he had discovered the means thereby of forcing her to a peace. The allied powers readily concurred in his views; it was a standing article in the leagues which were formed to close their harbours against the French shipping. The only alternative, therefore, that France had left, was to carry on its trade in the ships of neutral nations; but never was England less disposed to tolerate this than at the present time. The pressure, therefore, necessarily fell on those neutrals which had a traffic of their own, in which class only the northern powers of Europe could be reckoned. No sooner was the principle once admitted, that an enemy's goods in neutral ships was fair booty, than the claim to search neutral ships became a direct consequence of this admission; and who could fail to perceive what disputes and altercation such searches must lead to, whether the property of an enemy should be discovered or not.

The assertion, *that the neutrality of the flag protected the cargo*, even though the property of an enemy, cannot be proved from the law of nature, but rests upon conventional principles of international law, founded either on mere custom or positive compact.[1] The idea of neutrality, according to our conception of it, extends only to the notion that every neutral ought to be at liberty to offer for sale, to belligerent parties the products of its own country, (so far as they are not acknowledged to be contraband,) as its own

[1] In order not to interrupt the thread of the inquiry, I have thought it better to investigate the claims of the armed neutrality, considered in this point of view, in an appendix to the present treatise; the more so because, with the majority of readers, the ideas on this subject can hardly be sufficiently accurate.

property; as well again as to fetch, as its own property, the goods which he has bought of these and paid for, but not to offer them for sale to others as the property of the people engaged in the war. As far as practical policy is concerned, it is most important to observe, that the whole question may be of greater or less importance according to the different relations and the position of the belligerent nations; and that it is therefore scarcely to be expected, that the conventional policy on the question should be always consistent and universally agreed upon. Let us consider, for example, the case of a people whose wealth and power chiefly depends upon its maritime commerce, and, above all, upon an active trade with its colonies; can it be supposed for a moment, that its opponent, in case it be powerful enough to hinder it, will quietly suffer that commerce now to be carried on in foreign ships instead of in its own? And, above all, will it quietly suffer this trade not only to be carried on to the extent which was customary in time of peace, but even to a still greater, from the ports of the colonies, which were formerly closed against foreigners, being now thrown open by the colonists for the conveyance of their products; their own ships being excluded from trafficking.[1] Would a naval power at war with Spain, allow foreign ships to convey to her stores from Peru and Mexico, without which perhaps she would be obliged to give up the contest? We are here speaking only of the general principle and the consequences which flow from it; far be it from us to vindicate the abuse to which the rejection of it has led. Far be it from us to justify it, if more than the goods which upon search have been found to belong to the enemy, if perhaps even the ship itself has been confiscated, with all its cargo.

The revival of the project of an armed neutrality was a consequence of the perfect unanimity into which the regent

[1] On the British side, the question is best elucidated by Pitt in his speech on the 2nd Feb. 1801. *Speeches*, iii. p. 220, sq. *First*, on the ground of international law, because the admission of the right of neutral flags in specific treaties is only an exception to a right recognised as a rule. *Secondly*, on the ground of convenience, because the greatness and preponderating weight of England as a naval power, and consequently her greatness generally, rests upon the maintenance of the principle hitherto received; since otherwise her enemies would have uncontrolled supplies of naval stores from the Baltic. *Thirdly*, on the ground of positive compacts which are opposed to it. See below in the Appendix.

of France had succeeded in drawing the then sovereign of the Russian empire. The revival of this measure might seem the more surprising since it was a measure of Catharine II., which Paul I. was otherwise certainly not disposed to revive. It was now followed up with all the impetuosity which marked his character: not only Denmark and Sweden, but Prussia also was obliged to accede to it, or to run the risk of being treated as an enemy. The claims were the same as under Catharine, only in consequence of a remarkable incident, a new one had been annexed. A Danish convoy, accompanied by a frigate,[1] was compelled to undergo a search; whereas according to the maritime laws in force up to that time, the convoy of a man of war furnished security, that the vessels under her protection had no contraband goods on board.

By the institution of this league England was placed in a state of hostility towards this half of Europe. The determination of the question, whether the claims of the armed neutrality are, on a general view, compatible with the law of nations or not, we will leave to theorists; that England, under existing circumstances, could not suffer the commerce of its enemy to be freely carried on under neutral flags, we believe no practical statesman, whose judgment is unbiassed by party prejudice, will deny. Indeed we have no hesitation in asserting that an international maritime law will never be established further than on paper, so long as that principle shall be maintained in its full extent; the present vast importance of maritime commerce to many of the states will not permit more. The just censure to which England was amenable in those times does not lie, in our opinion, in her refusal to recognise that principle, but in the unjust extension which she gave to her claims and to her proceedings respecting prizes. If she had only confined her claims to the seizure of the enemy's goods; if she had exercised strict justice in every thing else, and treated neutrals as neutrals, the whole contest might perhaps have been superseded.

Be that as it may, it was no longer possible for England to avoid the conflict. The measure which Paul I. employed in seizing upon all English ships in his ports, was equivalent to an act of hostility; and in politics as well as

[1] The frigate Freja; she was taken and brought to England.

in private life it is an acknowledged principle, that a state cannot submit to an affront without degrading itself. A British fleet passed through the Sound; the attack upon Copenhagen followed;[1] and perhaps no blood would have been spilt if it had been known on the 2nd April at Copenhagen what had transpired on the 24th of March at Petersburg.

The succession of Alexander to the Russian throne had the happiest effects on the continental relations of England. The northern league dissolved of itself (there had indeed been only a partial acquiescence in its formation) immediately the new emperor offered the hand of friendship to England. It fell to the ground without leaving behind any permanent traces of its existence; nothing was determined respecting the principles of international maritime law; even the claims of England were, to a certain extent, tacitly recognised. She had, though not strictly allies, yet at least friends, in the North. The armed neutrality now survives only in history; it is scarcely possible that it should again exist in Europe; though it may possibly be recalled into being by America.

The British policy was directed to other objects. The time approached when England was to retire from the conflict, which she had now carried on for nine years without intermission. The deliverance of Egypt had removed out of the way a main obstacle, and facilitated the negotiations; preliminaries of peace were signed in the autumn of the same year,[2] and its final ratification at Amiens was only delayed by the determinations respecting Malta to the spring of the following year.[3] Even on this occasion the peace was not concluded by the same minister who had conducted the war. *William Pitt* had previously made way for his successor Addington; though not by compulsion as formerly, but voluntarily. In full possession of power, and of a majority in parliament, he resigned his post, because his opinions on Catholic Emancipation, which was to crown his great and newly achieved work, the union of Ireland and England into one kingdom, did not harmonize with those of his sovereign. And if George III. did not hesitate to accept the resignation of his long-tried counsellor and friend, rather

[1] April 2, 1801. [2] Oct. 1, 1801. [3] March 25, 1802.

than wound his conscience, the minister showed no less tenderness for the dictates of his, by quitting office, when his measures were no longer approved:[1] though poor and in debt, notwithstanding the treasures of the world had passed through his hands, he preferred retiring from the glory of supreme power into private life.[2] The peace of Amiens, however, may in some measure be considered as his peace, inasmuch as it was not concluded without his approbation and advice. His successor was not his opponent, but the friend of his youth; the ex-minister did not take his seat, as was usually the case, on the opposition bench, but on the right-hand side, on which for so long a series of years he had directed and determined the destinies of Great Britain, and not unfrequently of Europe.

By virtue of the peace of Amiens, Great Britain ceded all her conquests in the colonies, together with Malta, to their former possessors, with the exception only of Trinidad and Ceylon, which Spain and the Batavian republic were obliged to cede to her; very dear conquests in return for a debt of 300 millions sterling, which the war had cost![3] But who will take so narrow a view of this peace? We have already on another occasion given our opinion of the criterion by which the value of this peace should be estimated; namely, how far the object for which the war had been commenced and carried on was attained by it. This was not merely the conquest of a few islands; but two objects of a much higher character; the maintenance of the constitution and independence of Great Britain, and the freedom and independence of Europe against the encroachments of France.

[1] That this was the real cause, there is not a shadow of doubt. The very expressions of the great statesman on the subject, with the tenderest forbearance to his sovereign, may be seen in the speech of May 13, 1805. *Speeches*, iii. 420, sq.

[2] Feb. 9, 1801.

[3] That portion of these sums which went abroad consisted partly of loans which England guaranteed—capital as well as interest, and which, until their reimbursement, make up a part of the national debt; partly in subsidies, that is, sums granted by virtue of compact for certain services, which cannot therefore be reclaimed. Only two loans were advanced during the two administrations of Pitt to Austria, in 1795, to the amount of £4,600,000; and in 1797, to the amount of £1,620,000. The loan to Portugal, amounting to £600,000, was first made in 1809. *Hamilton, National Debt*, p. 133. The whole amount of the subsidies and loans, which flowed to the continent on account of the government, is computed at £45,800,000. *Nebenius on Public Credit*, in German, sect. 13, note. I know not from what data; and I question whether the amount of the subsidies admits of being so accurately determined, since it cannot be known in what instalments they were really paid.

The first of these objects was accomplished; but not the other: the predominating power of France was so far from being broken, that it was greater than ever; considered in this point of view, the peace of Amiens can only be considered as a disgraceful one. All that can be alleged in vindication of it will be found in the speech which Pitt delivered after the ratification of the preliminaries;[1] his opinion on this point is the more impartial because, being no longer minister, he is not vindicating his own measures.

His main argument is; "One object we must give up, which is no longer attainable; we are disappointed in our hopes of being able to drive France within her ancient limits; but we have fulfilled our obligations towards our allies; the glory of the English arms has not been tarnished; and Great Britain possesses the means of opposing France if she should further extend her ambitious views. Further: the re-establishment of the French monarchy is equally impossible, but we have survived the violence of the revolutionary fever, we have seen Jacobinism overthrown; and its new government is only a state of transition towards a monarchy."[2]

But, with all that, it is difficult to palliate the impolicy of neglecting to make some definitive arrangements in the treaty respecting the relations of the continent; and of at once stipulating for the evacuation of the Batavian republic by the French. England remained virtually excluded, in a political sense, from the continent; she could no longer interfere in its affairs; she could only look on in silence, while France might lay down regulations at her pleasure, affecting the continent from the Tagus to the Vistula. The moment she attempted to raise her voice, she was met with the contemptuous answer, "The peace of Amiens, and nothing

[1] On Nov. 3, 1801.—*Speeches*, iii. p. 270, sq.

[2] *Speeches*, iii. p. 270, sq. That this, and, if possible, the restoration of the old monarchy, or at least, of the reigning family, had always been the object of his wishes, the minister does not dissemble. It was not without the most painful struggle that he could abandon this hope:

> Me si fata meis paterentur ducere vitam
> Auspiciis, et sponte mea componere curas:
> Urbem Trojanam primum dulcesque meorum
> Reliquias colerem; Priami tecta alta manerent;
> Et recidiva manu posuissem Pergama victis!

he exclaims with Æneas. What would his great spirit have felt if fate had permitted him to look for the space of ten years into the future!

but the peace of Amiens." The question was, whether such a state of things could last?

The question soon became answered; in the short space of a year the war again broke out; it was declared by England. The first consul, occupied with the consolidation of his power, and the re-conquest of St. Domingo, could hardly wish for it at this moment! and although some of his proceedings might with justice be made the subject of complaint, they could hardly be considered sufficient to furnish ground for a new war. We certainly do not mean to deny that a war might also have been wished for by him, while he was preparing the steps on which he mounted to the great object of his ambition—the imperial throne. But, notwithstanding this, it still seems certain that he could not have wished it to break out so soon. It indeed becomes a question, whether, according to the particular plans of the British ministry, the peace was intended to be any thing more than an armistice, which they only wanted for the purpose of collecting new forces; and this question we could scarcely help answering in the affirmative, if another and a much more natural solution did not present itself. It was not till after the peace that the English discovered they had committed an error—an error which they now saw with all its consequences. When the surrender of the conquered colonies as stipulated for was made, only one condition remained unfulfilled, the surrender of the rocky island of Malta. The reasons why the evacuation of this was refused will scarcely be regarded by an impartial posterity as any thing more than so many subterfuges; and the true ground can now only be sought in the awakened consciousness that more had been conceded than ought to have been. This was incontestably a political blunder which we are not disposed to justify; although aware that the renewal of the war was the only possible means of repairing it; the war, however, would nevertheless have been continued if this had never happened.

England commenced this new contest without a single ally on the continent; and the terror of the overwhelming power of France could afford her but little hope of procuring any, unless perhaps the haughty spirit of the French ruler should produce them. The occupation of Hanover, a neutral power, proved the complete nullity of the German

empire, but was also a proof how much the Prussian cabinet of that time could submit to, in admitting without hesitation the army of a conquering power into the heart of its states, in order to maintain its precarious neutrality.

The first great effect of this war on the continent, was the erection of the French imperial throne. The formal restoration of an hereditary monarchy in France, could not, considered in itself, be repugnant to the views of England; but the claims which were involved in this new title, were of such a nature, that they defeated the prospect of peace, and must have inspired England with hopes of soon being able again to find allies on the continent; and who, indeed, could doubt that every exertion would be made to effect this object, when Pitt, for the second time, with the same principles, the same powers of mind, though not of body, was placed at the head of affairs.[1] The war itself bore altogether a peculiar character. Here were two hostile powers determined to wreak on each other all the mischief they could; and yet, one being strong at sea, the other by land, they could scarcely come at each other. In France, the popular mind had been so accustomed, during the preceding war, to the loss of colonies, which had scarcely been restored, that the operations of the English in this respect could hardly move it. No field of battle offered itself on which the British troops could disembark. Great preparations, however, were made for effecting a descent on England. A numerous army was assembled on the opposite coast; a whole fleet of armed and unarmed transports were built to carry it over. But that, without a fleet to keep open the communication with France as well as to cover the passage and landing, an invasion was impracticable, or, if indeed effected, that it would end in the defeat and capture of the invading army, was obvious to every one, as was, consequently, that such a design could never have been seriously planned; still there were not wanting political, and even military writers, who believed it! But on the other side, it was not less certain that the threatening attitude assumed could not last for ever, nor even long; that the interest of the new ruler of France required a new war; and experience has now shown, that the descent upon England was

[1] On 28th May, 1804.

only a mask, under which he might prepare for another object.

Its effect upon England, however, was to drive the whole nation to arms. The military spirit was not only every where aroused, but it breathed a new power; a different kind of enthusiasm was naturally kindled in the breasts of troops who were to fight for their country, their families, and their homes, to that felt by men enlisted for foreign war and conquest.

The labours of Pitt were not in vain. He succeeded in the summer of 1805, in bringing about a third confederacy against France. The transfer of the left bank of the Rhine to that country; the distribution of all the ecclesiastical states, on the German side, among those whom she wished to favour; the powerful movements upon Switzerland, and above all, upon Italy, rendered it no longer problematical, that with this predominating power of France and the use she made of it, an independent European state-system could not possibly exist. To the aid of these sound political considerations, there came about this time an event, no less powerful, which roused the moral indignation of nearly all Europe—the arrest and murder of the Duke d'Enghien. This was not only, as it has generally been admitted, a crime, but unquestionably a great political error, which cannot find an apology in the design of renewing a continental war, as that might have been effected without it.

From this moment the sullen spirit of Prussia began to work, and, much increased by the contumelious dismissal and treatment of her ambassador, communicated itself to the cabinets of Austria, Prussia, and, above all, to Sweden. The more keen the sense of justice that prevailed in the dispositions of those princes, the more deeply must they have felt the wound thus given it; and however undefined the plans of these sovereigns, a party from this time soon became formed, not only of men, but even among women of the first rank, in the courts of Vienna and Berlin, as well as of Petersburg, which preferred a renewal of the war to a dishonourable peace. Thus when Pitt re-entered the ministry he found the national feeling and cabinets of the continent favourable to his designs. How much was done by British ambassadors to win over completely, posterity perhaps

will discover, when their official reports shall at some future time be intrusted to a second Coxe.[1] England thus became, in the fullest sense of the word, the centre of the third confederacy against the domination of France, as Russia, Austria, and Sweden, entered into a treaty of alliance with her, upon conditions of receiving certain subsidies; unfortunately, the wavering policy of Prussia placed the same obstacles in the way as had occurred before. The disastrous issue of the campaign of 1805, which, after the battle of Austerlitz, was followed by the peace of Presburg,[2] rent asunder the alliance with Austria; that with Russia was prolonged in little more than in form; that with Sweden was rather more trouble than profit; and new relations with Prussia soon followed, which led to war, or at least to a warlike attitude.

Pitt was destined to live just long enough to see his hopes and his plans frustrated. Intelligence of all these misfortunes, for which the recent victory at Trafalgar (21st October) could not compensate, reached him while yet on his death-bed.[3] However deeply this may have distressed him, he had still two grounds of consolation left. First—The consciousness that his life had been devoted to a good and just cause; and next to that, the certainty that his principles would survive in the school of statesmen which he himself had formed.[4] But dismal as were the prospects when his eye closed in death, they became still darker soon after his departure; and it became of the greater importance that his principles died not with him.

A most striking proof of this was afforded by the administration which succeeded, and which wished to follow a different line of policy. This was a coalition ministry; that is to say, one formed of men of opposite parties and professing different principles; a ministry which can hardly ever suc-

[1] On the internal relations of the court of Vienna, at that time, and the English ambassador, Lord Paget, some interesting information will be found in the treatise, *Die Franzosen in Wein*, 1805, *in Europëische Annalen*, 1809, st. 6, the authenticity of which, however, we cannot vouch for, as we are unacquainted with the sources from which they are derived.

[2] December 26, 1805.

[3] His death, the 23rd January, 1806, happened on the same day of the month as that on which he had taken his seat in the House of Commons twenty-five years before.

[4] A Portland, Liverpool, Sidmouth, Canning, Perceval, Castlereagh, Vansittart, etc.

ceed for any length of time in England. At its head were placed Lord Grenville, as first lord of the treasury, and Mr. Fox, as secretary of state for foreign affairs.[1] By this arrangement the foreign policy of England was intrusted to one, who, all his life, had been the distinguished antagonist of Pitt. Even since the death of both, public opinion has been divided in England as to which has the higher claim to praise; a question the more difficult to settle, because party spirit almost necessarily exercises an influence over all who seek to answer it. With all his genius, with all his brilliant talents as a speaker, Fox, nevertheless, wanted that calmness of mind which is indispensable to the great man of business in practical life. He saw through the medium of his passions, and spoke under their influence; while the steady coolness of Pitt is displayed no less in the details of business than in his speeches, which, never overcharged, seem only designed to convince. Which of the two took the most correct view of the great objects which, in their time, excited so much interest, is perhaps no longer a matter of doubt. We may admire Fox as a speaker and as an historian; but who will now attempt to rank him beside his great rival as a statesman? Even great good nature in him was dangerous, as it inclined him too much to judge of others by himself.

When Fox was placed at the helm of affairs, the continental relations of England, with the exception of those of the North, were dissolved; in Germany they could not be easily renewed, as the southern states had leagued themselves with France, and the confederation of the Rhine, which was afterwards formed, rendered it altogether impossible. With Spain the war was again renewed; with Prussia the relations were doubtful.[2] They soon, however, became decidedly hostile, as Prussia, in compliance with the dictates of France, took possession of Hanover. Fox rightly judged

[1] In February, 1806.

[2] After the capture of the Spanish galliots, (4th October,) the relations of England and Spain have been so diligently investigated by a celebrated writer, that I deem it only necessary to refer to them:—*Fr. Genz authentische Darstellung der Verhältnisse Zwischen England und Spanien*, 1806. I agree with the author, that England was justified in treating Spain as an enemy at any time, yet not without a previous declaration of war. The more strenuously England contended for the maintenance of international law, the more important it became that she should observe its forms.

that such an insult to his sovereign was not to be tolerated. The declaration of war which ensued, was unanimously approved in parliament, in the address of thanks voted in reply to the king's speech. A terrible blow to Prussian commerce.

Fox was scarcely settled in the ministry, before he showed his desire to negotiate a peace; and accordingly he availed himself of the first opportunity of communicating his sentiments to the enemy. A plan having been formed for the assassination of Napoleon, Fox sent information of it to him, and thus had the opportunity he wished for of entering upon negotiations with that potentate. Their many interruptions and slow progress during the whole summer, only served to evidence the weakness of the declining minister; while, by the overthrow of the German empire, the establishment of the confederation of the Rhine, and the more and more warlike attitudes assumed towards Prussia, Napoleon clearly betrayed his ulterior designs. Fox continued to negotiate, and suffered himself to be put off with one proposal after another, which, from their very absurdity, ought to have convinced the most short-sighted politician that they were only meant to delude. A short time before the breaking out of the war with Prussia, he expired.[1] His administration had merely served as a foil for that of Pitt. The war against Prussia and Russia, which was terminated by the peace of Tilsit, (July, 1807,) only falls within the sphere of this inquiry, from the influence which it had upon the continental relations of England opening negotiations with that potentate. The emperor of France succeeded in drawing Russia over to his side; and had not Gustavus Adolphus, with untimely pertinacity, which soon cost him Finland, and even his throne, adhered to his engagements, every tie by which England was still connected with the continent, would have been snapped asunder; and even this last was soon broken.

Of all the states of the North, Denmark alone—a power both military and naval—had been able to maintain its neutrality; but even this was destroyed by England's demanding the surrender of her fleet, and enforcing this demand by the bombardment of her capital.[2]

[1] On 16th September, 1806.

[2] September 7, 1807.

Whether or not this transaction was a breach of the law of nations, still remains undecided, even among the English themselves. If the British ministry had, as they alleged—and in all probability such must have been the case—positive intelligence, that, by express stipulations in the late treaty, Denmark was to be forced into the war, and that Copenhagen was to become the rendezvous of the naval and military forces of the North, could it be an infraction of the law of nations to anticipate this event, especially as England only required the surrender of the Danish fleet, on condition that it should be restored at the end of the war, and did not proceed to enforce its surrender till this had been refused? The course of events will always bring on cases respecting which nothing has been determined in any code of international law. Those proofs, however, have not been made public; and even if they were, who could blame the Danish government for refusing to comply with such a demand? Who, indeed, could blame that nation for regarding the attack as a violation of the law of nations? Be this, however, as it may, it would have been more noble for England to await the attack on the open sea, the theatre of her glory, especially as there could be no possible doubt as to the issue.

Thus the celebrated *continental system* of Napoleon might be said to be realized against England, who was now shut out from every port of the continent, from Petersburg to Cadiz. An armed neutrality was now no longer the question, for, generally speaking, neutrality was no longer tolerated, but the great commercial war was set on foot against England, which gave rise to a tissue of decrees, every where characterized by passion and hatred. These, in the end, had no other result beyond that of warning politicians, that if they listen to any voice, save that of reason and reflection, they must expect the blow, intended for others, to fall at last, with increased force, upon their own heads. Napoleon's continental system, which was to exclude the English from every port, had eventually the effect of re-opening them all to her.

As in the physical, so in the political world, no unnatural condition can last for ever; and if Napoleon had not hastened the catastrophe by new deeds of violence, it must, in some way or other, however tardily, have come to pass at

last. The designs upon the Spanish peninsula were the first, and those against Russia the second step towards it. In the former, England had, if not an ally, at least a friend, in Portugal. Though it was impossible to save this state, yet here, nevertheless, the British continental policy celebrated its first triumph by its success in persuading the court to emigrate to Brazil,[1] and found a new kingdom on that side the Atlantic. A greater triumph, however, awaited it. The ill-treated Spain was roused by her injuries, and a new kind of league was formed, not with a cabinet, but with a nation,[2] which, notwithstanding the frequent vicissitudes of fortune, could not be dissolved. In Spain, the first abyss opened itself, which swallowed up the stores and the armies of Napoleon; a second still more terrific he himself prepared in Russia. It would be superfluous to recount the history of those great events, which rendered it possible for armies advancing from the Tagus and the Volga to combine and co-operate in the heart of France; which hurled the despot from the tottering but imperial throne, and brought about that which Pitt had expressed as the object of his wishes, though no longer of his hopes—the restoration of the ancient dynasty to the newly-erected regal throne of France. Let us rather be permitted to conclude this treatise with some general observations on the co-operation of England in the re-establishment of the European state-system, and on its present relations with the continent.

After the inquiry which we have instituted, no one will dispute the title of England to the glory of having taken the greatest and most effectual part in the liberation of Europe, and the restoration of an independent state-system to our part of the globe. Her share, however, has often been much exaggerated, particularly by Englishmen. England certainly achieved much; but England did not, and, as repeated experience has shown, could not, achieve it alone. It was utterly impossible for her to do so, without the co-operation of continental allies, such as Spain and Portugal, Germany and Russia.

After the catastrophe in Russia, which took place without the participation of England,—when the oppressed began to burst their bands asunder,—it was perfectly natural

[1] November 30, 1807. [2] January 14, 1809.

that the old allies of England should again rally around her; and history will never forget the almost incredible exertions which she made from the years 1813 to 1815,[1] which plainly prove that she did not think the liberation of Europe could be purchased too dearly.

Even Pitt, had he survived the glorious triumph of his principles, could hardly have done more! Yet, all this could only succeed by a uniting of the various powers; for what could gold, however indispensable, do alone; iron, after all, was to decide the contest.

England certainly prides herself, with justice, on being the only power that never bowed her neck during the whole course of that tempestuous period. But England should not forget that she is mainly indebted for this to her insular position. During that political storm, which periodically, as it were, desolated the countries of the continent, she alone could assure to herself that internal tranquillity, without which those peaceful arts, from which alone she derives resources for her great exertions, could not have been continued with such unexampled vigour and prosperity. Besides this, it was undoubtedly of peculiar advantage to all Europe, not only that the wooden walls of England rendered her impregnable, but that she was precisely the state, above all others, fitted by her constitution to keep alive those political opinions, the decline of which could never have been more injurious and lamentable than at this particular period. By this, too, was prepared the amazing influence which England has had, since the struggle for constitutional governments has become general in Europe. Her example was held forth, not in order that her constitution should be adopted as a general model, (which heaven forfend,) but as one from which proper notions might be formed of liberal institutions of this kind; such were now introduced into France, the Netherlands, and several German states.

England is now ranked as one of the five leading powers who determine the relations of the European state-system. It has connected itself with them without any surrender on its own part; it has therefore reserved to itself the power of

[1] The aggregate of the loans advanced in the three years, amounted to no less than £142,000,000 according to the real, and £222,000,000 according to the nominal value.—*Nebenius* über den credit. Anhang, § 5.

stepping forward as a mediator whenever it may be necessary. A continental policy like the last, founded upon loans and subsidies, can hardly ever occur again, at least to the same extent; but if this, as we think we have shown it to be, was, on the whole, beneficial for Europe, are we not thereby justified in hoping, that she will become still more, in future, the mediating power. Thus, then, we think we may conclude this treatise, without exposing ourselves to the imputation of blind partiality, with a wish for Britain, which is, at the same time, the best we can form for the continent and for our native country.—ESTO PERPETUA!

APPENDIX.

(P. 449.)

An Examination of the Questions respecting the claims of the Armed Neutrality.

THE claims of the armed neutrality embrace four questions, which must be kept quite distinct, if we wish to examine them properly. The first is: Whether free ships make free cargoes? The second is, The determination of what are called contraband or forbidden wares? Thirdly, Whether a convoy is a protection from search? Fourthly, When are ports to be considered in a state of blockade? We shall proceed to examine each separately.

I. *Whether Free Ships make Free Cargoes?*

This celebrated maxim, which may be regarded as the basis of the new maritime code, which the armed neutrality wished to introduce, involves two distinct propositions. First, that neutral ships may carry their own wares, (provided they are not contraband, of which below,) to all ports, whether belonging to neutral or belligerent parties, provided they are not in a state of blockade. By virtue of this principle, therefore, the neutral powers wished to have the free navigation and conveyance of their own products, (with the above restrictions,) not only to the ports of all neutral states, but also to those of France, Spain, Holland, etc. But what was of still greater consequence, they desired also, in the second place, free permission, not only to carry to those countries their own wares, and to bring away what they had purchased there, but also to convey, where and how they pleased, the goods of the belligerent parties; thus, for example, freely and at discretion to take in French wares and French property, without let or hinderance from British ships or privateers; and British wares, without let or hinderance from the enemies of England.

The great practical importance of this question will become apparent at once to all who bestow the slightest reflection upon it. Were it generally recognised by maritime powers, maritime wars would no longer exercise any very considerable influence on the trade and commerce of nations. It is true, a war might, perhaps, hinder the belligerent powers from continuing their trade in native vessels, unless, indeed, sufficiently strong at sea to protect it; but this evil would be easily remedied, as neutral vessels would naturally hasten in sufficient numbers to their ports, in order to transport their merchandise to whatever part of the world it might be destined. Instead, therefore, of a maritime war being, as it is now, extremely prejudicial to neutrals, from the many annoyances it occasions them, it would, in this case, be advantageous to them, as they could not fail to be employed in the transport of merchandise, and consequently to draw a large share of the carrying-trade to themselves.

From this it will readily be perceived why England, in her present position, was so deeply interested in withholding her assent to this principle. England is powerful enough at sea to protect her own commerce, and to carry it on, even in the midst of war, without any considerable

interruption. Her enemies are notoriously too weak to do the same, consequently in war their trade is almost annihilated. Had England, then, recognised this principle, the trade of France, Holland, etc., would have immediately revived, which England, who naturally regards her commerce as the mainspring of her power, is, for that very reason, anxious to repress. Those countries, it is true, would not have been able, had England given way, to carry on their trade in their own bottoms; but they would have carried it on in the ships of neutrals, or under neutral flags.

The extent, as well as the importance of this principle, being then sufficiently obvious, let us now see what may be determined respecting it; whether it is founded on the principles of natural law, upon the tacit agreement of civilized nations, or finally, on express stipulations between the now contending powers.

The law of nature, as applied to war, or pure military law, recognises no further principle than "I injure my enemy wherever I can," and in this is comprised, "I take from him his property wherever I can." The principle of free ship, free cargo, in its full extent, that is, if it means an enemy's goods are to be free in neutral ships, is, therefore, not recognised by pure military law. It would be difficult, therefore, to prove from the law of nature, that if Englishmen and Frenchmen wage war with each other, they are, notwithstanding, obliged to spare each other's property. This does not, however, imply, that if an Englishman finds the goods of an enemy in a neutral ship, he is immediately justified in taking possession of the *ship*, for the mere conveyance of an enemy's wares, obviously involves no act of hostility towards him; but it cannot, with any truth, be asserted, on the principles of natural law, that he is bound to let the property of an enemy escape free.

But why this appeal to the law of nature? It is, happily, now universally understood, that this is no longer admitted as a rule in modern warfare. It is one of the fairest fruits of civilization, that states only war with states, not with private individuals, to which, unhappily, privateering (and that, viewed in the most favourable light, is nothing better than piracy on a limited scale) still forms an exception. It is, therefore, evident, that in determining this question, we must not have recourse to the law of nature, but to conventional law or express compacts.

The next question, therefore, is, whether the principle, "free ship, free cargo," has *ever* been generally observed? this *ever* being limited to what has been introduced among the civilized nations of Europe in the two last centuries. In order to determine this, we need only cast a glance over the history of the wars since the treaty of Westphalia, and we shall find this question answered in the negative thus far: Neutrals have certainly generally laid claim to it, but belligerent powers, *during war*, have never been willing to recognise it.

In the great war which Lewis XIV., in 1688, commenced with almost the whole of western Europe, the right of neutral flags was expressly denied on the side of England, while William III. went so far as at once to forbid all communication with France. It was also in vain that the Dutch, who were the greatest sufferers, made representations to him respecting it. He gave the most suitable answer which could be given to these representations—"Let this be the canon law."

In the eighteenth century, the question respecting the rights of neutral flags was not agitated till after the close of the war of the Spanish

succession. It was first brought forward in the great northern war which still continued. That it did not arise during the Spanish war, was owing to the peculiar situation of the parties; in the west of Europe there were no neutrals, and the eastern powers had enough to do amongst themselves. Another and a stronger reason was, that Holland, during the war, though hostile to France and Spain, still carried on a tolerably extensive trade with these two countries, which England either could not, or would not, hinder. But the trade which the Dutch, as neutrals, carried on in the Baltic, soon brought the matter to a crisis. Charles XII. refused to recognise the right of neutral flags; the Swedish privateers captured indiscriminately all vessels bound to ports of the enemy, so that Holland and England were obliged to send, 1715, a combined fleet to the Baltic for the protection of their commerce.

On the breaking out of the war between Spain and England in 1739, and the war of the Austrian succession in 1740, in which Holland remained neutral as long as she could, the dispute was again revived. The English having captured a great number of Dutch vessels on their way to Spain, the latter complained, and appealed expressly to the commercial treaty of 1674, in which England had recognised the principle of "free ship, free cargo," in respect to them; but nothing of any consequence was settled.

No further progress had been made, when, in 1743, the war between Russia and Sweden broke out. The latter power again refused to concede to the Dutch the right of neutral flags, and the latter were once more compelled to send a fleet to protect their trade in the Baltic.

The seven years' war had scarcely broken out, in 1756, before the Dutch renewed their old complaints against England. Desirous to turn their neutral position to account, and that under the protection of the neutral flag they might be allowed to carry on the trade between France and her colonies, more especially the West Indies, the latter again appealed to the commercial treaty of 1674. But the English, admitting their claims just as little as before, made prizes of their merchantmen whenever they found them bound to an enemy's port, or laden with an enemy's goods.

Thus matters went on till the breaking out of the American war. During its course the complaints about the oppression of neutral shipping became again very loud. An armed neutrality was negotiated in 1780, by Catharine II., the basis of which was the maxim, "*free ship, free cargo.*" England certainly did not formally recognise this principle; but she tacitly submitted to it, as she felt herself obliged to succumb to the circumstances of the time.

This survey, we think, will make it quite clear that this principle was very far from having been ever generally recognised in the course of the war by tacit agreement, though it certainly was, once and again, by separate treaties between individual powers, but concluded, for the most part, in time of peace. *Büsch*, in his Geschichte der Zerrütung des Seehandels, (*History of the Obstructions to Maritime Commerce,*) has taken the trouble to enumerate these singly, and has found thirty-six treaties for, and only fifteen against, this principle. But what remedies did these treaties provide? No sooner did a war break out than the nations who had contracted them felt themselves at liberty to violate their obligations, and made such partial arrangements as suited their own interest. This was done, not only by England, but by most of the other states,

whenever they felt themselves sufficiently strong to do so; and who can say that the like will not happen again.

Let us now address ourselves to the *second* question, which is closely connected with this.

II. *What is Contraband?*

When two states are at war with each other, it is scarcely possible for any obligation to arise out of it affecting a third party in respect to its commerce, so as to preclude it from selling certain articles, even though they should be directly intended for carrying on the war, provided it supplies them fairly to the highest bidder. But supposing the said state should be willing to sell them to one state and refuse them to another, this would expressly indicate a disposition to favour one at the expense of the other; and the state thus acting could no longer be regarded as a neutral power. According to the principles of natural law, therefore, nothing contraband, under the above-stated condition, can exist. This, however, is not the place for investigating this question further; it is, besides, a matter of perfect indifference what opinion may be formed respecting it, as the conventional law of nations has long since decided otherwise respecting it. In this, to wit, an important difference is established between various articles: I. Those directly used in warfare, such as ammunition, arms, and all kinds of ready-made weapons. II. Those which only indirectly serve for that purpose, such as unwrought iron, copper, ship-timber, etc., from which must be distinguished, III. Those which have properly no reference to the war, such as provisions, fine linen, cloths, etc.

All treaties of commerce, without exception, which have been concluded during the last few centuries, between European states, and have contained definitions of what is contraband, agree in this, that the articles, No. I., are interpreted as such. The agreement in this is so general, that the more precise definition of it, or the enumeration of the several articles, has become a standard formulary, which always recurs *totidem verbis,* as may be seen in the various acts of neutrality which have been published. Consequently it is a generally recognised principle of positive European international law, that all articles directly used in warfare, attempted to be conveyed by neutrals to nations engaged in war, immediately become contraband.

But however general the agreement may be, that these articles are interdicted, it is by no means so generally agreed that they are exclusively so. It has more frequently happened, indeed, that the European powers, especially on the breaking out of a war, have interpreted as contraband whatever they thought proper, and have consequently made No. II., and even No. III. so, just as it might happen to suit their convenience. The English, it must be confessed, were not behind-hand in doing this; but then it must not be supposed that they did it alone. Others, as for example, Sweden, have gone as far, or even farther; but, as they had not the same power to enforce their views as the English had, the inconvenience resulting therefrom was not so sensibly felt.

Several circumstances, and particularly the following, have contributed to extend the meaning of the word contraband: First, It is quite natural that a belligerent nation should feel sore in seeing articles conveyed to its enemies, which, though not yet wrought into arms and im-

plements of war, may soon become so, and in all probability are designed for that purpose. Secondly: It is well known, that in the present day, the western maritime powers obtain the greatest part of their ship timbers from the northern and eastern countries of this part of the world. In naval wars, the aim for a long period has been, and never more so than at the present moment, not only to annihilate the enemy's fleets, but to obstruct as much as possible the building of new ones. The ardour with which England has pursued this object is known to every one. For this reason, therefore, ship-timber is one of the articles which England insists upon being included in the list of contraband goods; while, on the other hand, the northern powers are especially interested in having it omitted, as it forms the bulk of their exports. If to this we add (as was the case in the war of the Revolution) the endeavours made to embarrass the enemy by impeding the conveyance of provisions, or generally to weaken him by the complete annihilation of his commerce, without respect to the losses which neutrals may thereby sustain, it will easily be perceived that, eventually, every thing will be reckoned as contraband which is not ballast, and, consequently, that all trade with an enemy's country will be virtually suspended.

Whatever opinions may be formed as to the legality and good policy of this proceeding, the following points we think will now be clear: In the first place, according to the generally recognised international law of Europe, only the immediate necessaries of war can possibly be regarded as contraband; and if, in the second place, other articles should also be interpreted as such, this must be settled, as an exception to the rule, by express treaties between the several nations, unless mere force is to supersede right.

These principles appear to be at present actually recognised by both parties. For not only is the restriction, which the existing special treaties of individual powers exhibit, expressly recognised in the act of neutrality, in the definition of contraband; but, on the other hand, the minister in the debates of the British parliament, appeals also expressly to the existing treaties of commerce with the northern powers.[1] An analysis of these, therefore, can alone afford us a deeper insight into the question.

The treaties of commerce quoted in parliament were that with Sweden of 1661; that with Denmark of 1670; and that with Russia of 1793. The continuance of these was expressly asserted; whether it was recognised on the other side or not, is irrelevant to the question, which entirely turns upon the stipulations which the treaties contained.

In the treaty with Sweden,[2] the following articles are those which require to be noticed:

Art. V. "The ships, goods, and ships' crews of either nation, shall, under no pretence, either publicly or privately, either by general or special command, be laid under arrest, detained, or in any way treated with violence in the ports of either country."

Art. XI. "Although it has been settled between the two powers, that neither shall succour the enemy of the other, this is not to be so understood as that all commerce and traffic with the enemy of a belligerent party shall be interdicted to a neutral ally. It shall only be de-

[1] Vide the speech of Pitt, February 2, 1801, in *Speeches*, iii. p. 229.

[2] It will be found at length in Schmauss, Corpus Juris gentium Academicum, p. 2302, and in the other well-known collections.

cided that no wares which are contraband, and of course no gold, provisions, arms, (here follows the usual form,) shall be conveyed to the enemy of the other ; otherwise, if they should be captured, they are to be considered lawful booty. Neither of the contracting parties is to support the enemy of the other, either by selling or lending him ships ; yet each of the parties shall be at liberty to trade with the enemy of the other, and to convey to him wares of every description, with the exception of those above specified, without molestation, excepting to harbours and places in a state of blockade."

Art. XII. "But in order that an enemy's goods may not be concealed under neutral names, ships, as well as stage waggons, shall be provided with passports and certificates (the formula of which is inserted at length). If in this case the ships of neutral powers shall fall in with the ships of war or privateers of the others, the first shall only be required to produce their papers, without being liable to further search or molestation. Should they not be provided with papers, or if otherwise there should be any urgent cause for suspicion to warrant the searching of the ship, (which is only to be permitted in these cases,) then, if an enemy's goods shall be discovered, these shall be lawful prize, but the rest shall be immediately restored."

If, then, this treaty was recognised as the basis of the maritime law between England and Sweden, by both these powers it will follow :

First. That the principle, "free ship, free cargo," had not, between England and Sweden, the extent which was conceded to it in the armed neutrality. It must be admitted, certainly, that Sweden is allowed to carry on a free trade in neutral property (not contraband) to an enemy's port, which is not blockaded ; yet *not* to convey an enemy's property. Sweden would not dare to convey French or Dutch merchandise under her flag.

Second. The definition of contraband admits this further extension, that besides the direct necessaries of war, money also and provisions are included under it ; but not the indirect necessaries of war ; not the principal products of Sweden, iron, copper, and ship-timber. Sweden would certainly at the present time readily acquiesce in this extension, because she wishes to check the export of specie, and is no longer in possession of the rich corn-lands about the Baltic, which she had in 1661.

Such, then, are the relations between England and Sweden, according to those treaties : now follow those between England and Denmark. They are founded, according to the speech of the minister in parliament, on the treaty of 1670.

In that, the commercial treaty which was concluded between Charles II. and Christian V., the articles X. XI. contain the definition of what was contraband. But we need not go back even to that source, for by a later convention, which was signed on 4th July, 1780, (a few days before Denmark acceded to the first armed neutrality,) an explanation of that article has been given, which here follows :[3]

"But in order to leave no doubt respecting what is understood by contraband, it is agreed that this designation comprises nothing but arms, as cannon, etc. etc., (here follows the usual formula,) as well as timber, pitch, copper in plates, sails, hemp, cordage, and, in a word, every thing which serves for the equipment of a ship ; yet with the exception of unwrought iron and planks. As for the rest, it is expressly

[3] Vide Marten's Recueil, etc. etc., ii. p. 102.

declared, that under the designation of contraband shall not be comprehended any kind of provisions, such as fish, flesh, corn, etc. etc., the conveyance of which to hostile ports, if not under blockade, is always to be allowed."

Now, although Denmark, as early as 9th July, 1780, acceded to the armed neutrality, yet this document was not abolished nor infringed, since in that convention the definition of contraband was expressly referred to the existing treaties between the several powers; so again the acceding to the second armed neutrality did not abolish it, since, notwithstanding the general restriction of contraband to immediate necessaries of war, yet the annexation of this proviso, without infringing the existing compacts between the several powers, leaves it in full force. It is obvious, therefore, that Denmark, by her commercial contracts with England, was, with regard to contraband goods, so far bound more strictly to consider every thing which has reference to the building and equipment of ships as comprised in the definition; but not, on the other hand, provisions and money, which Sweden had recognised as such.

Lastly, as regards Russia, the British minister referred in his speech to the convention of 1793. This convention is the treaty of alliance which Catharine II. at that time concluded with England against France.[4] It contains, Art. XI., the definition: "That not only all kinds of supplies and provisions are to be regarded as contraband, but that they will also, on both sides, generally injure, in every possible way, the French commerce," so that the idea of contraband is certainly here taken in its widest extent.

After this investigation there still remain to be considered the two other points which formed the subject of controversy, viz.:

III. *Are Neutral Ships under Convoy liable to Search or not?*

This question was, as is well known, affirmatively answered on the part of England, and negatively on the part of the other states; and although Denmark promised in the last contest not to allow her ships, for the present, to convoy, she nevertheless refused, in any way, to recognise the principle of search. The whole tone of the proceeding rather showed that the Danish government regarded the assertion of the opposite principle as a main point, on which not only the interests of commerce, but also the honour of her flag, and, indeed, in some degree even the independence of herself as a state, was concerned.

But in order to exhibit this subject in its true light, it is necessary to explain first somewhat more distinctly what the idea of convoy involves in maritime affairs and in maritime law.

A convoy is well known to be a guard of one or more men-of-war, which the state grants to a number of merchant vessels for their protection. It is not, therefore, a private, but a public affair. But the granting of a convoy according to the received maritime law, involves the following:

I. When the state grants it, then only armed ships in the service of the state can be used for that purpose, in which case it is however of no consequence to what class they belong. Therefore, privateers, which perhaps are bought for the purpose, or even other armed vessels, which private persons cause to be fitted out, would have no legitimate claim to

[4] Politisches Journal, 1793.

the privileges of a proper convoy. II. When the neutral state grants a convoy, it immediately gives security that the merchant vessels contain no wares which, according to general maritime law, or specific treaties with particular powers, are contraband. In short, the merchant vessels, before they are taken under convoy, must be previously subjected to a strict examination of their papers, which must be conducted by the commanding officer of the convoy. In Denmark, probably also in Sweden and Russia, the commanding officer himself is even made responsible for it. III. It is not, therefore, every ship which can, at its own discretion, obtain convoy even if its papers are in perfect order. The state does not readily undertake the responsibility for foreign ships. It is more usual for each state to allow only its own ships to convoy. Agreements, however, may easily be entered into, especially where several powers bind themselves to an armed neutrality, which may occasion deviations from the rule.

Hence it will be clearly seen why this disputed point is regarded, especially by neutrals, as a question of honour. The search of a convoy is tantamount to a refusal to accept the given security, and the pledged word of honour of a state, and the denial of a right which has been hitherto conceded to every independent state as such. The correspondence which passed between the Danish government and the British Chargé d'Affaires at Copenhagen, perhaps exhausted every thing which can be said on this subject.

Some readers will perhaps ask whether something has not been determined on this point in the commercial treaties. But in no single known treaty, and not even once in the acts of the armed neutrality of 1780, has there been the slightest mention made of it; doubtless because in the European maritime law which existed before that time, the freedom of a convoy was taken for granted. That is to say, it is obvious that the opposite claim could never be preferred by any European power which is not possessed of a similar decisive preponderance at sea to that which Great Britain has at present.

IV. *When are Harbours to be considered as Blockaded?*

In the earlier treaties nothing was decided on this point, because the answer was self-evident: *when they are really blockaded.* But England gave to the phrase an extension of meaning which few will be prepared to justify, that the bare declaration, 'that a port is blockaded, at once constitutes a blockade.' Indeed this was then extended even to the whole line of coast. In consequence, the Act of Neutrality contains this just definition, Art. III. "That the name of a blockaded port belongs only to that which is blocked up by a number of ships of war lying before it and stationed sufficiently near, that the entrance cannot be hazarded without manifest danger; and that the vessel which steers its course in that direction shall not be regarded as acting in opposition to the convention until it makes the attempt to effect an entrance, either by force or stratagem, after it has been apprized of the condition of the harbour by the commander of the blockading squadron."

JOHN CHILDS AND SON, BUNGAY.

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